Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Westfield Management Limited v. Perpetual Trustee Company Limited & Anor. [2006]  NSWCA 245

FILE NUMBER(S):
40820/05

HEARING DATE(S):               26 June 2006

DECISION DATE:     08/09/2006

PARTIES:
Westfield Management Limited - appellant
Perpetual Trustee Company Limited - 1st respondent
City of Sydney Council - 2nd respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Hodgson JA Tobias JA Basten JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          LEC41349/04

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Talbot ACJ

COUNSEL:
Mr. B.W. Walker SC with Mr. R.G. McHugh for appellant
Mr. N.C. Hutley SC with Mr. S. Flanagan for 1st respondent
Mr. M. Craig QC for 2nd respondent

SOLICITORS:
Minter Ellison, Sydney for appellant
Deacons Lawyers, Sydney for 1st respondent
Maddocks Lawyers, Sydney for 2nd respondent

CATCHWORDS:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
TOWN PLANNING
EASEMENTS - Development Consent - Condition requiring extension of existing easement - Interpretation of condition - Whether condition uncertain - Whether condition unreasonable

LEGISLATION CITED:
Interpretation Act 1987 s.32

DECISION:
1. Appeal allowed, orders below set aside. 2. Perpetual to pay Westfield’s costs of the appeal. 3. No order as to the Council’s costs of the appeal. 4. Declaration that condition 56 is valid and enforceable. 5. Cross-claim dismissed. 6. Matter remitted to the Land & Environment Court for decision as to the costs of the first instance hearing.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40820/05
LEC 41349/04

HODGSON JA
TOBIAS JA
BASTEN JA

Friday 8 September 2006

WESTFIELD MANAGEMENT LIMITED v PERPETUAL TRUSTEE COMPANY PTY LIMITED & ANOR.

Headnote

FACTS

On 24 February 1986, development consent was granted for the Glasshouse site in Sydney. That development consent, as later amended, contained Condition 56, which provided to the effect that a right-of-way currently applicable to the basement service parking levels of the Glasshouse site in favour of the adjoining Skygarden site be extended to the adjoining Imperial Arcade site and the Centrepoint site. Perpetual is the current owner of the Glasshouse site. Westfield is the current owner of the other three sites. All four sites front Pitt Street Mall.

Before the primary judge, Westfield unsuccessfully sought a declaration that Perpetual had failed to comply with Condition 56, whereas Perpetual successfully sought a declaration that Condition 56 was invalid and severable.

Relevantly to this appeal by Westfield, the proceedings raised three issues:

(1)          Whether Condition 56 was void for uncertainty.

(2)          Whether Condition 56 was void for unreasonableness.

(3)          If yes to either of the above, whether Condition 56 was severable.
The primary judge answered Yes to all three questions.

HELD

(1)The primary judge was incorrect to hold that Condition 56 was void for uncertainty. Condition 56 should be construed in light of the objective circumstances, including the Council policy of keeping traffic in Pitt Street Mall to a minimum. Condition 56 obliges Perpetual, without consideration, to take the action required to extend the easement if and when there is appropriate co-operation from the owners of Skygarden, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, and the approach taken…

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Details
Case
[2006] NSWCA 245
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Westfield Management Ltd appealed to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales against a decision of the primary judge concerning the validity and enforceability of a condition imposed on a development consent. The dispute centred on condition 56, which required the owner of the Glasshouse property to extend an existing easement to benefit two other properties, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd, as the owner of the Glasshouse, argued that the condition was unreasonable and void for uncertainty, as it required the consent of third parties and lacked clear mechanisms for implementation, including the determination of consideration and reciprocal rights.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether condition 56 was valid and enforceable, or whether it was void for uncertainty or unreasonableness. Specifically, the court had to determine if the condition, as imposed by the council, was so unreasonable that no planning authority, properly advised, could have imposed it, and if it was sufficiently certain to be capable of compliance. The court also considered whether the subsequent acquisition of all three properties by Westfield rectified the inherent unreasonableness of the condition at the time of its imposition.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge erred in concluding that condition 56 was unreasonable and void. The court reasoned that while the condition presented practical difficulties at the time of its imposition, the subsequent consolidation of ownership of all three properties by Westfield rendered the condition capable of performance. The court held that the primary judge had incorrectly assessed the unreasonableness of the condition by focusing on the circumstances at the time of its imposition, rather than its enforceability in light of the changed circumstances. The court applied the principles of statutory interpretation and the test for unreasonableness in administrative law, finding that the condition was not so uncertain or impractical as to be void.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the primary judge. It declared condition 56 to be valid and enforceable, and dismissed Perpetual's cross-claim. The matter was remitted to the Land and Environment Court for a decision on the costs of the first instance hearing, and Perpetual was ordered to pay Westfield's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed, orders below set aside. 2. Perpetual to pay Westfield's costs of the appeal. 3. No order as to the Council's costs of the appeal. 4. Declaration that condition 56 is valid and enforceable. 5. Cross-claim dismissed. 6. Matter remitted to the Land & Environment Court for decision as to the costs of the first instance hearing.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 20 September 2004, Westfield submitted to Perpetual a transfer granting to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint a right of way “as shown and on the terms contained in DP641047”. Perpetual did not execute that transfer.DECISION OF PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge held that condition 56, if valid, would bind Perpetual because its continuing use of the Glasshouse was a “development” under the Act, and accordingly Perpetual could continue this use only if relevant conditions were complied with: Hillpalm Pty. Limited v. Heaven’s Door Pty. Limited [2004] HCA 59, (2004) 220 CLR 472, 137 LGERA 57, at [49]. The primary judge held that condition 56 was a condition imposed for a planning purpose fairly and reasonably related to the Glasshouse development. However, he continued:66 The omission by the council to consistently provide for a viable and reasonable mechanism for the implementation of its grand scheme reinforces the conclusion that compliance with condition 56 was not feasible. Critical questions remain unanswered even at the present time. These include important matters such as the amount of consideration to be paid for the grant of the further right of way and the undefined “reciprocal rights.” The prospect of the achievement of a consensual outcome is left to speculation. It is not reasonable to require a developer to do that which is impossible without the co-operation of third parties. Particularly where the third parties have no commensurate interest in the subject property. There is a total lack of guidance as to how the object of the condition is to be achieved. There is no discretion vested in the City Solicitor or any other relevant person whereby the developer is able to seek total or partial exemption from compliance. Accordingly there is no opportunity for relaxation of the otherwise strict application of the condition. It is altogether unreasonable, principally as a consequence of its inherent impractability.(sic) 67 The fact that compliance is limited to the provision of documentary evidence does not alleviate the imperative to show that “the right of way…is extended to cover the right of way to the ‘Imperial Arcade’ and the ‘Centrepoint’ site.” Moreover, although the wording of the condition when read literally suggests there is already a right of way to the other two properties that is not the case. 68 The scheme envisages that each of Skygarden and Imperial Arcade would be required to grant rights over their own land. There is the further demand upon the owner of the Glasshouse. Prior to the consolidation of ownership of all of the other properties, compliance with condition 56 was at all relevant times unachievable by unilateral action of the owner of the Glasshouse. 69 The difficulty is amply demonstrated by the rejection of the proposal by AMP and Stockland in 1988. Achievement of compliance with condition 56 presented as an impossibility at the time the building was erected. The owner and builder of the Glasshouse was placed in the position where it was unable to comply with the condition prior to completion of the building. Even so the owner of the Glasshouse wrote to council on 14 August 1990 (see [26]) seeking to resolve the problem by suggesting a compromise. Despite further correspondence over the next six years the apparently intractable problem was not resolved. This lack of resolution further demonstrates the extent of inherent unreasonableness in condition 56. Another weighing factor is the effect on future development of the Glasshouse property refected by the opinion of Raine and Horne (see [23]).70 What was being addressed by the s 102 application in November 1988 was the deletion of condition B(b). The underlying justification for the deletion of condition B(b) was the creation of the right of way in favour of Skygarden by registration of the s 88B instrument in April 1988. The developer was released from the requirement to acquire transferable floor space. The extension of the right of way for the benefit of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint was only incidental to the decision. Reference to the report to council (see [25]) makes it clear the award of the floor space bonus was requested in return for imposition of the right of way in favour of Skygarden and the completion of access arrangements to that site and “progressing, as far as possible,” with extension of access to the other two sites.71 Having regard to the whole of the circumstances applying at the time and the surrounding relevant facts and difficulties of enforcement I determine that the decision of the council to impose condition 56 was so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority, properly advised, could have come to it (Temwood Holdings and Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). I reach that conclusion following a consideration of the prevailing facts at the time when the condition was added. The subsequent quirk of history when Westfield became the common owner of all three properties located immediately to the south of the Glasshouse does not rectify or overcome the fundamental unreasonableness of the condition. The context for the assessment of the degree of unreasonableness is the circumstances when the decision was made. At that time, the condition amounted to a relevant abuse of power. It was so devoid of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have imposed it. 72 The degree of perversity can be readily understood by considering whether condition 56 could ever be enforced. It is not an adequate answer to say, as the applicant does, that the condition is anticipatory or ambulatory. Even if the condition is to be construed on the basis that Westfield now holds title to each of the relevant properties it will not lead to a resolution of outstanding issues such as determination of an appropriate consideration to be paid by Westfield or the nature of the so-called “reciprocal rights.” The condition is plainly unenforceable without the co-operation and consensus of all relevant parties. They must first reach a mutually satisfactory agreement that takes account of individual legal rights as well as their complex commercial interests. The council would be involved as the consent authority in respect of any development required as a consequence of, or preparatory to, the finalisation of the commercial agreement between the landowners, particularly if there is an intensification of the use of the right of way across the Glasshouse site (see the discussion in North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1996) 185 CLR 470 at 476 and 477). On the basis of its total lack of capacity for practical application, condition 56 is so devoid of utility and purpose that it is relevantly unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. Alternatively by the same line of reasoning it is void for uncertainty. 73 The effect of condition 56, if enforceable, would be to require the owner of the Glasshouse to obtain the consent of the owner of Skygarden to the use of its land for the purpose of extending the right of way in favour of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. That, according to the first respondent, would be unlawful because it would require the owner of the Glasshouse to obtain the consent of third parties before it could act on the consent. Mr Rares SC, who appears for Perpetual, relies on the judgment of the High Court in Ligon at p 478-9 to support that proposition. However as I read the High Court decision it does not raise a relevant matter for determination in the present case. The High Court was considering whether the consent of the owner of other land in the locality over which a right of way already existed was required before an application could be made for development consent to a proposed development on the dominant tenement. The situation here is the reverse. The applicant for approval to modification of the Glasshouse development consent was not seeking to use other land. To the contrary the council was seeking to force the applicant to make its land available for use by other landholders. Whether development consent would be required to enable the other landholders to use the Glasshouse right of way is but one of the complicating factors that reinforce the impracticality of enforcing condition 56. 74 Even if I am wrong about the validity of condition 56 nevertheless the Court would not be in a position to make an order that would require the applicant and first respondent to successfully negotiate a settlement of the terms of their legal relationships (see for example Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 600 at 604-5). Assuming against the present fact such a settlement can be reached, there would still be the outstanding matter of a further development consent.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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