Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd - [2006] NSWCA 245

NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION: Westfield Management Limited v. Perpetual Trustee Company Limited & Anor. [2006] NSWCA 245

FILE NUMBER(S):
40820/05

HEARING DATE(S): 26 June 2006

DECISION DATE: 08/09/2006

PARTIES:
Westfield Management Limited - appellant
Perpetual Trustee Company Limited - 1st respondent
City of Sydney Council - 2nd respondent

JUDGMENT OF: Hodgson JA Tobias JA Basten JA

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Land & Environment Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): LEC41349/04

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Talbot ACJ

COUNSEL:
Mr. B.W. Walker SC with Mr. R.G. McHugh for appellant
Mr. N.C. Hutley SC with Mr. S. Flanagan for 1st respondent
Mr. M. Craig QC for 2nd respondent

SOLICITORS:
Minter Ellison, Sydney for appellant
Deacons Lawyers, Sydney for 1st respondent
Maddocks Lawyers, Sydney for 2nd respondent

CATCHWORDS:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
TOWN PLANNING
EASEMENTS - Development Consent - Condition requiring extension of existing easement - Interpretation of condition - Whether condition uncertain - Whether condition unreasonable

LEGISLATION CITED:
Interpretation Act 1987 s.32

DECISION:
1. Appeal allowed, orders below set aside. 2. Perpetual to pay Westfield’s costs of the appeal. 3. No order as to the Council’s costs of the appeal. 4. Declaration that condition 56 is valid and enforceable. 5. Cross-claim dismissed. 6. Matter remitted to the Land & Environment Court for decision as to the costs of the first instance hearing.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40820/05
LEC 41349/04
HODGSON JA
TOBIAS JA
BASTEN JA
Friday 8 September 2006

WESTFIELD MANAGEMENT LIMITED v PERPETUAL TRUSTEE COMPANY PTY LIMITED & ANOR.

Headnote

FACTS
On 24 February 1986, development consent was granted for the Glasshouse site in Sydney. That development consent, as later amended, contained Condition 56, which provided to the effect that a right-of-way currently applicable to the basement service parking levels of the Glasshouse site in favour of the adjoining Skygarden site be extended to the adjoining Imperial Arcade site and the Centrepoint site. Perpetual is the current owner of the Glasshouse site. Westfield is the current owner of the other three sites. All four sites front Pitt Street Mall.
Before the primary judge, Westfield unsuccessfully sought a declaration that Perpetual had failed to comply with Condition 56, whereas Perpetual successfully sought a declaration that Condition 56 was invalid and severable.
Relevantly to this appeal by Westfield, the proceedings raised three issues:
(1)          Whether Condition 56 was void for uncertainty.
(2)          Whether Condition 56 was void for unreasonableness.
(3)          If yes to either of the above, whether Condition 56 was severable.
The primary judge answered Yes to all three questions.
HELD
(1)The primary judge was incorrect to hold that Condition 56 was void for uncertainty. Condition 56 should be construed in light of the objective circumstances, including the Council policy of keeping traffic in Pitt Street Mall to a minimum. Condition 56 obliges Perpetual, without consideration, to take the action required to extend the easement if and when there is appropriate co-operation from the owners of Skygarden, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, and the approach taken in Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 429, at 436-7, can be applied to determine the terms of the extended easement.
(2)Having regard to the transferable floor space made available to the then owner of Glasshouse in exchange for the imposition of Condition 56, and considering that the additional legal burden was not shown to have a disproportionate effect on the Glasshouse site’s value, Condition 56 is not unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, and the primary judge was incorrect to so hold.
(3)In light of the above, the question of severance does not arise.
(4)Accordingly, Westfield’s appeal is allowed.

**********

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40820/05
LEC 41349/04
HODGSON JA
TOBIAS JA
BASTEN JA
Friday 8 September 2006

WESTFIELD MANAGEMENT LIMITED v PERPETUAL TRUSTEE COMPANY PTY LIMITED & ANOR.

Judgment

HODGSON JA: The appellant (Westfield) owns three adjoining properties in the City of Sydney with frontages to Pitt Street Mall, namely Skygarden, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. All three properties also have frontages to Castlereagh Street, and Centrepoint has a frontage to Market Street. The first respondent (Perpetual) owns Glasshouse, a property adjoining Skygarden and having frontages to Pitt Street Mall and King Street.
On 24 February 1986, the second respondent (the Council) granted development consent for the Glasshouse development. Condition 19 of that consent was as follows:
(19) That provision shall be made to the satisfaction of the City Planner, for the connection of the basement service parking levels with the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint;
…
On 26 April 1988, a right of way through a basement service parking level of Glasshouse in favour of Skygarden was registered at the Office of the Registrar-General.
On 13 December 1988, development consent for the Glasshouse development was modified by deleting one condition and adding condition 56:
(56) That documentary evidence shall be provided, to the satisfaction of the City Solicitor, that the right-of-way currently applicable to the subject property in favour of the adjoining property, is extended to cover the right-of-way to the “Imperial Arcade” site and the “Centrepoint” site, with reciprocal rights where necessary and such rights shall embody a provision ensuring their application in perpetuity, except with the consent of the Council.
In proceedings in the Land & Environment Court commenced in 2004 against Perpetual and the Council, Westfield sought a declaration that Perpetual had breached s.76A(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979 (the Act) in failing to comply with condition 56, and consequential orders. Perpetual put on a cross-claim, seeking declarations to the effect that conditions 19 and 56 were invalid, and that Perpetual was under no obligation to take any steps to give effect to them.
On 7 October 2005, pursuant to reasons given by Talbot ACJ on 16 September 2005, the Land & Environment Court declared that condition 56 of the Glasshouse consent “is invalid and of no force or effect and is severed from the Consent”, and that Perpetual was not liable and was under no obligation enforceable against it to take any steps to give effect to condition 19 of the Consent; and it dismissed Westfield’s application and ordered Westfield to pay Perpetual’s costs of the application and cross-claim.
Westfield appeals from those orders.
CIRCUMSTANCES
Pitt Street, between King Street and Market Street, became a pedestrian mall known as Pitt Street Mall pursuant to a consent granted by the Council in 1983. Consistently with this, and as illustrated by inter alia the letter dated 30 June 1988 (see par.[16] below), it became Council policy to minimise traffic in that area.
As noted above, on 24 February 1986 the Council granted development consent for the Glasshouse development. In addition to condition 19 referred to earlier, it was a condition of this consent that “the floor space of the proposed development shall not exceed 12.3:1”. The plans for the proposed development made provision for access from King Street through a basement service parking level of the building to Skygarden. Condition 19 indicates that this access was to be of a kind and capacity sufficient for provision of access through to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, assuming no extraordinary change in the nature of activity on those sites; and it seems clear that it was so constructed.
By deed dated 14 October 1986, a then owner of Skygarden acquired 3,535 sq.m. of transferable floor space for a price of $837,204.94.
On 26 May 1987, the Council amended the Glasshouse development consent to permit a floor space ratio of 12.5:1, and imposed condition B(b):
(B)(b) That a deed shall be executed between the owners of the subject site and owners of the transferable areas for the transfer of 2601 square metres of bonus floor space to the site to achieve a floor space ratio of 12.5:1 as specified in condition (1) and in the event of that floor space not being purchased floor space ratio shall be reduced to 11.5:1, such deed to be submitted to and approved by the Council prior to the approval of the building application.
On 26 February 1988, there was an agreement between Mastwood Pty. Limited (Mastwood), the then owner of Skygarden, and Jamino Pty. Limited (Jamino), the then owner of Glasshouse, whereby Jamino agreed to grant an easement over a defined space in a parking and access level of Glasshouse for a consideration of $100,000.00, with conditions as to construction of related items and with terms set out in a draft easement. Following this, there was an application in relation to a development consent for the Skygarden property so that access to that development would be obtained through Glasshouse.
On 23 March 1988, Carringbush Pty. Limited (Carringbush) wrote to the Council on behalf of Jamino as follows:
We refer to the above Development Approval, with particular reference to Condition 19 where "Provision shall be made to the satisfaction of the City Planner for the connection of basement service parking levels with the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint".
We confirm that the development as currently being constructed will accommodate connection to the adjoining property, which is also under construction, for the purpose of providing vehicular access and egress to that property via King Street.
We wish to stress that the developers of the land adjacent on the south side of our site, the Merlin Hayson Group, (Mastwood Pty Ltd) were advised by this Company that provision was incorporated in our design for vehicular access from King Street to their site.
The Sydney City Council approved Mastwood's Development Application which provided vehicular access from Castlereagh Street. Subsequent to our advice to Mastwood Pty Ltd that vehicular access was possible over our site (135 King Street) a Right of Carriageway has been created (subject only to registration at the Land Titles Office) allowing vehicular access to the Mastwood land over 135 King Street. This will eliminate vehicle crossing on Castlereagh Street. Mastwood Pty Ltd have submitted an amended Development Application for their Skygarden development showing vehicular access over 135 King Street, Sydney.
The ramifications of this vehicular access/egress ramp are significant to the point that it will eliminate any vehicular access requirements that would have been necessary from Castlereagh Street for this adjoining property. The opportunity is now presented for this vehicular access/egress to be extended to ultimately incorporate Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint.
The provision of "such vehicular access to these properties will materially assist in eliminating possible vehicular ramps in Castlereagh Street between King and Market Streets and ultimately a major reduction in goods service vehicles currently traversing the Pitt Street Mall between Market and King Streets.
As you will appreciate, this facility is of significant benefit to the mid-town hub of the City and, as such, we request that Council consider a bonus provision of 1:1 be applied to this development.
We believe that Bonus element No.7 under the Development Control and Floor Space Ratio Code 1971 could be" applied in order to achieve this bonus, particularly where it is relevant to pedestrian circulation improvements within the Pitt Street Mall and along the Castlereagh Street pavement.
Based on the above situation we now seek the Sydney City Council's favourable consideration to allow Jamino Pty Limited to withdraw the Floor Space Ratio purchased for this development. Details of the purchase were forwarded to Council on 18 June 1987 (copy enclosed).
Should you wish to discuss this matter please contact the writer.
On 26 April 1988, an easement granted by Jamino to Mastwood over an access way through a parking and service level of Glasshouse in favour of Skygarden was registered as DP641047. Its terms were as follows:
1. Terms of Right of Way firstly referred to in abovementioned plan
Full and free right of carriageway for the grantee its successors in title and registered proprietors for the time being of an estate or interest in possession of the land herein indicated as the lots benefited or any part thereof with which the rights shall be capable of enjoyment and every person authorised by it, to go, pass and repass at all times and for all purposes with vehicles to and from the said lots benefited or any such part thereof across the lots burdened and this right of carriageway shall include the right to erect illuminated signage above the site of the right of carriageway by affixing to or suspension from the structure or structures erected upon the lots burdened SUBJECT NEVERTHELESS to the right of the grantor its successors in title and registered proprietors for the time being of an estate or interest in possession of the land herein indicated as the lots burdened the right at all times hereafter or at any time or times to erect renew and maintain a security door across the site of the carriageway at a distance of not more than five metres from the King street alignment shown in the above mentioned plan with all necessary fittings and fixtures but so that the same shall not be so erected operated or maintained as to impede or obstruct free use and enjoyment of the right of carriageway at all times AND PROVIDED HOWEVER that no signage shall be placed or positioned above the site of the right of carriageway at a height of less than 3.6 metres or within 4.5 metres of the King Street alignment shown on the above mentioned plan. The grantor and the grantee covenant and it is a condition of this right of carriageway that:-
(1)The site of the right of carriageway shall be constructed at the cost and expense of the grantor.
(2)The grantor will maintain and keep the site of the right of carriageway in a proper state of repair and condition.
(3)Subject to Clause (4) the cost of routine maintenance and repair to the site of the carriageway shall be borne equally between the grantor and grantee.
(4)The cost of repair of damage caused to the site of the carriageway (including all structures, equipment, fixtures and fittings erected or positioned on or over the boundaries of the carriageway which boundaries are shown in the abovementioned plan) by the grantor or grantee, their respective servants or agents shall be borne by such grantor or grantee PROVIDED HOWEVER that in any other case the cost of repair shall be borne equally between the grantor and grantee.
(5)The illuminated signage shall be erected maintained and illuminated by the grantee.
(6)The cost of providing fire separation doors or such other fire restraint as may be required by the relevant authorities from time to time at that part of the site of the right of carriageway immediately adjoining the lots benefited shall be borne equally between the grantor and grantee.
(7)The grantor and grantee shall at their own cost separately insure and keep insured at all times during the life of the right of carriageway the structure of the carriageway and all associated fixtures and fittings (including but not limited to signage) for loss or damage thereto arising as a direct result of their respective use of the carriageway.
(8)The grantor and grantee shall at their own cost separately effect and maintain at all times during the life of the right of the carriageway public risk insurance covering their respective legal liability to third parties (including the other party) for property damage and bodily injury arising out of their respective use of the carriageway.
(9)The grantee shall indemnify and keep indemnified the grantor against all actions, claims, suits, demands and losses arising from any default act or omission of the grantee its servants or agents in the use of the right of carriageway.
(10)In the event of the redevelopment of the buildings erected upon the lots herein indicated as the lots burdened the grantee shall surrender this right of carriageway PROVIDED HOWEVER that at the time of such surrender the grantor will provide at no cost and expense to the grantee an alternative right of carriageway by the shortest practicable route and on the same terms as hereinbefore contained from the King Street alignment to that part of the site of this carriageway immediately adjoining the lots benefited (sic).
(11)If there is any dispute between the grantor and the grantee arising from any covenant herein contained, such dispute shall be determined by a single Arbitrator appointed under the Commercial Arbitration Act, 1984 and the grantor and the grantee hereby reserve their rights to legal representation thereto.
Name of person empowered to release, vary or modify the terms of the right of way referred to in the abovementioned plan.
Mastwood Pty Limited its successors or assigns.
On 27 May 1988, Carringbush wrote the following letter to the Council:
Following the writer's meeting with you concerning floor space bonus related to the above project and in particular our request for a bonus associated with the Right of Carriageway created over the carpark ramp we now seek confirmation from Council in respect of their considerations in this matter.
As explained at our meeting the revised Development Application submitted by Mastwood Pty Ltd was a result of this Company advising that Company access to the basement of their development was able to be secured over our property. This in turn will allow access to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint basements at some future date thus ensuring all vehicular traffic being removed from Pitt Street Mall.
Previous to all of the above Council had approved the Mastwood development with vehicular access off Castlereagh Street thus eliminating any potential to remove Centrepoint and Imperial Arcade traffic from the Mall and creating additional problems to pedestrians on Castlereagh Street.
In consideration of our efforts we requested an additional Floor Space Bonus for the creation of the Right of Carriageway and now seek an early decision from Council. Please refer to our previous correspondence on this matter.
Your advice in regard to the above would be appreciated at the earliest possible convenience.
The Council replied by letter dated 30 June 1988:
In reply to your letter of 27th May, 1988, regarding the vehicular connection provided over your property from King Street to the adjoining site, the provision of the connection forms an acceptable initial part of a future basement connection to the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint buildings, as required by the condition of consent.
The purpose of the condition is the elimination of the need for vehicular movements, across the footpath generally in the whole block, and in Pitt Street Mall in particular. Thus full compliance requires the submission of a practical proposal, for Council approval, which will achieve the aims, and provide also for allocation of responsibility for supervision, lighting, cleaning, maintenance and like factors of operation.
Whilst the development application condition requires such access provisions, the benefits of full compliance thereto, to the City, are substantial, warranting, in the opinion of Council staff, a recommendation to Council favouring the allocation of bonus for space to the project, within the limits of the maximum floor space ratio already granted.
As discussed, in the event that the historic floor space transferred to this development application is not required, it may, in accordance with Council’s usual procedure, be allocated by you to a future development application consent.

On 12 July 1988, the Council granted an amended development consent for the Skygarden development. This consent included condition 33:
(33) That a suitable right of carriageway over the access from King Street through the adjoining building known as premises, No. 135 King Street, shall be created in favour of the owner prior to the commencement of construction of the subject development;
There was no reference in that consent to anything requiring creation of an easement over Skygarden in favour of Imperial Arcade or Centrepoint. However, it appears that the plans for the Skygarden development made physical provision for access from the end of the right of way over Glasshouse to Imperial Arcade.
On 8 August 1988 and 12 August 1998, Carringbush wrote to the owners of Centrepoint and Imperial Arcade respectively, as follows:
Following the establishment of the Pitt Street Mall by the Council of the City of Sydney and after discussion with Council we wish to advise you that the first stage of the carriageway for access to loading vehicles has been agreed for construction which is proposed to alleviate future use of the mall for goods delivery.
A condition of the development consent for the 135 King Street project was the construction of an access corridor to allow goods deliveries to be made via King Street to all properties north of Centrepoint. The location of the right of carriageway created is the car park entry ramp running on the south east access along the eastern boundary of the 135 King Street development. Clearance and width are designed and constructed to accept all goods deliveries to all properties requested by the Council.
The adjoining owner Mastwood Pty Ltd (Haysons/Merlin Group) have now established right of carriage over 135 King Street. The access facility will be available to AMP and the head lessee of the Imperial Arcade when construction of Sky Gardens and 135 King Street projects are completed in the latter half of 1989.
This will obviously be subject to agreement between these two owners regarding security maintenance and other appropriate matters.
The buildings which council desired to see use the carriage way are the following:
All owners are being notified concurrently.
1.135 King Street - Jamino Pty. Ltd.
2.Sky Gardens – Mastwood Pty. Ltd. (Merlin/Hayson Group)
3.Imperial Arcade - AMP Society (Head lessee/StockIand Property Trust)
4.Centrepoint - AMP Society
Should you require further information concerning this carriage way please contact Mr. Peter McDougall of Bardon International Pty Ltd, phone 327 3698 or facsimile 327 7953, in regard to properties pertaining to 135 King Street or the Council of the City of Sydney on any other matters.
The response of the then owner of Imperial Arcade was to the effect that the existence of the carriageway over Glasshouse might be considered beneficial should re-development of Imperial Arcade be contemplated; while the response from the then owner of Centrepoint was to the effect that it had no intention of altering its existing access, and saw no need to enter into further discussions with Carringbush concerning the matter.
On 10 November 1988, Raine & Horne Commercial Pty. Limited (Raine & Horne) provided the following letter to Carringbush:
We refer to your recent instructions for advice on the possible affect on the value of the subject property by the Grant of Right of Carriageway, following completion of the retail/commercial building currently under construction.
The subject property is in the ownership of Jamino Pty. Limited and will be burdened by the Right of Carriageway. The adjoining property to the south, being 162-166 Pitt Street and 77-85 A, Castlereagh Street, Sydney (and known as The Skygarden site), is owned by the Mastwood Pty. Limited and will benefit from the Right of Carriageway.
We are advised that the need to create the Right of Carriageway arose as a condition of Council's consent to develop the subject property. We understand the purpose of the Right of Carriageway is to link the basement areas of the subject property and the Skygarden development, and possibly in time with the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. Vehicular access to these properties would then be restricted to King Street through the subject property, thus removing the need for service vehicles to gain access through the Pitt Street Mall.
We have examined the draft Deed of Agreement for Grant of Right of Carriageway and the instrument setting out the terms of the Right of Carriageway to be created, copies of which are enclosed with this letter. We note that Jamino Pty. Limited has agreed to the grant of the Right of Carriageway in consideration of the payment of $100.000.
Upon completion of the development on the subject property and the creation of the Right of Carriageway, the effect of this encumbrance on title is considered to be:-
i)The subject property will be burdened by the Right of Carriageway which will create a "blot" on title.
ii)The registered proprietor of the subject property will no longer have 100% control over the use and future redevelopment of the property.
iii)The registered proprietor of the subject property will incur on-going costs resulting from the creation of the Right of Carriageway associated with additional security and public liability insurance requirements.
iv)The property will suffer from general inconvenience associated with the increased traffic flow through the subject property.
v)The difficulties and additional costs associated with any future redevelopment of the subject property due to the need to maintain or provide alternative means of access from King Street to the Mastwood property adjoining, and any other properties benefiting from the Right of Carriageway at that time, could be substantial.
In terms of value it is difficult to assess the affect of the Right of Carriageway on the subject property upon completion of the development currently under construction. In any case, how the market perceives the overall affect on value of the Right of Carriageway would be based on subjective assessments by prospective purchasers who have differing investment criteria and requirements.
Nevertheless, the grant of a Right of Carriageway does have a detrimental affect on the value of the subject property, and may well reduce the overall value of the development on completion by up to $3,000,000. In real terms, this equates to a minimal reduction in value of approximately 1% or alternatively, a marginal increase in the yield on the property of 0.05% to 0.06%.
We trust the above information is suitable to your requirements. However, should we be able to assist further in this matter, please do not hesitate to contact the writer.
Meanwhile we attach our memorandum of fees for your attention in due course.
On 11 November 1988, Carringbush wrote as follows to the Council:
Further to Council's request, we have now obtained a letter from Raine & Horne which expresses an opinion related to the value of the subject property and the detrimental effect that the Right of Carriageway, which now exists on the title, has on the value of the property both as the building now exists and any future development of the property. Should the property be redeveloped or amalgamated at some future date, the Right of Carriageway, which is required to remain, will obviously be an impediment unless all the properties which receive or will receive the benefit of the Right of Carriageway are included in an amalgamation.
Please advise the writer should you require any additional information beyond that indicated in the letter from Raine & Horne. Raine & Horne were selected to provide this expression of opinion as they are independent to the project and have had no involvement in the development in the past.
On 13 December 1988, the Council modified the development consent for Glasshouse by deleting condition B(b) and adding condition 56. The report to the Council by its Planning Committee recommending this amendment included the following:
This development is one of four major developments covering the majority of the block bounded by King Street, Castlereagh Street, Market Street and Pit Street (Mall).
This development (“Carringbush”) has frontage to King Street, Pitt Street and Castlereagh Street, which vehicular access from King Street. The next development to the south “Skygardens” has frontage to Castlereagh Street and Pitt Street, with vehicular access now available from King Street through the “Carringbush” development. The next major development is “Imperial Arcade”, an existing structure with vehicular access to Pitt Street Mall. The most southerly development is “Centrepoint” – also with vehicular access to Pitt Street Mall.
With a view to elimination of vehicles from Pitt Street Mall as an available option, the “Carringbush” development was made subject to the following condition:
“That provision shall be made to the satisfaction o the City Planner for the connection of basement service parking levels with the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint”.
The first stage i.e. access to “Skygarden” has been achieved. The applicant has sought approval from “Imperial Arcade” and “Centrepoint”, but has not succeeded.
In return for the imposition of a right-of-way over this site and the completion of access arrangements to the adjoining site, and progressing, as far as possible, extension of access to the other two sites, the applicant seeks the award of floor space bonus. This bonus floor space would not increase the building, but would replace the use of transferable historic floor space, which could be utilised elsewhere.
The report then attached and summarised correspondence between Carringbush and the Council, and continued:
The actions undertaken by the applicant have to date been of benefit to pedestrian amenity, in that one access from Castlereagh Street has been eliminated. The applicant has no power to require other owners to comply. Similarly, the Council has no power, unless such a condition was relevant to a development proposal for each site. The existing vehicular access arrangements are as previously approved by Council. It was not expected that imposition of the condition would enable compliance (for access to all sites) at the present time, but was placed on in order to make such a requirement in the future, if redevelopment took place, an achievable and reasonable condition.
It is considered that this has been done to the extent legally possible at this time. There is no doubt that elimination of vehicular access to Pitt Street Mall would be of great benefit to pedestrians, particularly as most vehicular movement takes place in the vicinity of the video kiosk.
A precedent exists for the awarding of such a bonus. Council, in approving the development of the site on the corner of George and Barrack Streets, allowed a bonus of approximately 1.2 to 1 in return for the landscaping and paving of Barrack Street, between George Street and York Street, if and when Barrack Street could be closed. The bonus was granted on the basis of improvement of pedestrian facilities adjacent to the development site.
Whilst bonus floor space is not available simply for compliance with a condition of consent, in this case a substantial encumbrance has been placed on the title, thus embodying a “penalty” beyond that which would be normally encountered. It is considered therefore that it would be equitable to award some bonus floor space in this case.
The applicant has requested a bonus of 1:1 which is intended to replace the transferable floor space purchased of 2601m². Floor space of 2601m² represents, in precise terms, F.S.R. of 1.05:1. Based on the Council’s current rate of $1,300m², less the purchase price of $200/m² the transferable floor space has a residual value of $2.86 million. This compares reasonably with the estimated loss of value due to the encumbrance of the right-of-way of $3 million.
It would also be necessary to ensure that the right-of-way established over the “Carringbush” site, in favour of the “Skygardens” site is also available to the “Imperial Arcade” site and the “Centrepoint” site, with reciprocal rights in each case, with such rights being not extinguished without Council approval. It is suggested that the City Solicitor be requested to guide and approve the formulation of such documents by the applicant.
As the proposed variations are in the nature of an amendment to the Development Consent, it is necessary to vary the consent under the provisions of Section 102 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act.
RECOMMENDATION
In view of the benefit to pedestrian movement brought about by the amalgamation of vehicular movement in the subject premises and the adjoining premises to the south, and that further extension of the vehicular movement system to properties to the south has been made possible in the future, thus making available an alternative to vehicular movement in Pitt Street Mall, it is recommended that a floor space bonus of 1.05:1 be granted.
The report concluded with the recommendation for deleting condition B(b) and adding condition 56.
On 14 August 1990, solicitors acting for the then owner of Glasshouse wrote to the Council a letter including the following:
Our client has indeed completed an agreement relating to vehicular access in favour of the adjoining “Skygarden” development. However, precisely as Council Officers advised, our client has no powers to compel the owners of the Imperial Arcade and Centre Point to enter into reciprocal arrangements, as these owners currently have no proposals to redevelop their sites. The result is, precisely as Council Officers advised, that the developers are unable to comply with the conditions imposed by Council.
Our client is, however, willing to comply with the spirit and intent of the condition, so far as it is legally within their power so to do. Given that no agreement can be reached relating to the proposed easement in gross with the Imperial Arcade and Centre Point, our client is willing voluntarily to enter into a binding legal agreement with Council, which could be registered against their title, so as to bind successors. It is proposed that such agreement would contain provisions whereby at any subsequent date, Council may require the owner for the time being of 135 King Street to grant easements in gross in favour of the Imperial Arcade, or Centre Point, upon redevelopment of these sites.
The Council referred this proposal to the City Solicitor. A suggested form of agreement was submitted to the City Solicitor by the owner’s solicitors on 8 March 1991. Amendments were suggested by the City Solicitor. The matter remained under review until 8 January 1996, when negotiations appear to have broken down on account of difficulties experienced in obtaining reciprocal agreements with the owners of Centrepoint and Imperial Arcade.
The building of Glasshouse commenced in 1988 and finished in 1990. Skygarden opened in 1991. Perpetual became the owner of Glasshouse in 1998. Westfield acquired Centrepoint in 2002, Skygarden in August 2004, and Imperial Arcade in September 2004.
On 20 September 2004, Westfield submitted to Perpetual a transfer granting to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint a right of way “as shown and on the terms contained in DP641047”. Perpetual did not execute that transfer.
DECISION OF PRIMARY JUDGE
The primary judge held that condition 56, if valid, would bind Perpetual because its continuing use of the Glasshouse was a “development” under the Act, and accordingly Perpetual could continue this use only if relevant conditions were complied with: Hillpalm Pty. Limited v. Heaven’s Door Pty. Limited [2004] HCA 59, (2004) 220 CLR 472, 137 LGERA 57, at [49].
The primary judge held that condition 56 was a condition imposed for a planning purpose fairly and reasonably related to the Glasshouse development. However, he continued:
66           The omission by the council to consistently provide for a viable and reasonable mechanism for the implementation of its grand scheme reinforces the conclusion that compliance with condition 56 was not feasible. Critical questions remain unanswered even at the present time. These include important matters such as the amount of consideration to be paid for the grant of the further right of way and the undefined “reciprocal rights.” The prospect of the achievement of a consensual outcome is left to speculation. It is not reasonable to require a developer to do that which is impossible without the co-operation of third parties. Particularly where the third parties have no commensurate interest in the subject property. There is a total lack of guidance as to how the object of the condition is to be achieved. There is no discretion vested in the City Solicitor or any other relevant person whereby the developer is able to seek total or partial exemption from compliance. Accordingly there is no opportunity for relaxation of the otherwise strict application of the condition. It is altogether unreasonable, principally as a consequence of its inherent impractability.(sic)
67           The fact that compliance is limited to the provision of documentary evidence does not alleviate the imperative to show that “the right of way…is extended to cover the right of way to the ‘Imperial Arcade’ and the ‘Centrepoint’ site.” Moreover, although the wording of the condition when read literally suggests there is already a right of way to the other two properties that is not the case.
68           The scheme envisages that each of Skygarden and Imperial Arcade would be required to grant rights over their own land. There is the further demand upon the owner of the Glasshouse. Prior to the consolidation of ownership of all of the other properties, compliance with condition 56 was at all relevant times unachievable by unilateral action of the owner of the Glasshouse.
69           The difficulty is amply demonstrated by the rejection of the proposal by AMP and Stockland in 1988. Achievement of compliance with condition 56 presented as an impossibility at the time the building was erected. The owner and builder of the Glasshouse was placed in the position where it was unable to comply with the condition prior to completion of the building. Even so the owner of the Glasshouse wrote to council on 14 August 1990 (see [26]) seeking to resolve the problem by suggesting a compromise. Despite further correspondence over the next six years the apparently intractable problem was not resolved. This lack of resolution further demonstrates the extent of inherent unreasonableness in condition 56. Another weighing factor is the effect on future development of the Glasshouse property refected by the opinion of Raine and Horne (see [23]).
70 What was being addressed by the s 102 application in November 1988 was the deletion of condition B(b). The underlying justification for the deletion of condition B(b) was the creation of the right of way in favour of Skygarden by registration of the s 88B instrument in April 1988. The developer was released from the requirement to acquire transferable floor space. The extension of the right of way for the benefit of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint was only incidental to the decision. Reference to the report to council (see [25]) makes it clear the award of the floor space bonus was requested in return for imposition of the right of way in favour of Skygarden and the completion of access arrangements to that site and “progressing, as far as possible,” with extension of access to the other two sites.
71           Having regard to the whole of the circumstances applying at the time and the surrounding relevant facts and difficulties of enforcement I determine that the decision of the council to impose condition 56 was so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority, properly advised, could have come to it (Temwood Holdings and Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). I reach that conclusion following a consideration of the prevailing facts at the time when the condition was added. The subsequent quirk of history when Westfield became the common owner of all three properties located immediately to the south of the Glasshouse does not rectify or overcome the fundamental unreasonableness of the condition. The context for the assessment of the degree of unreasonableness is the circumstances when the decision was made. At that time, the condition amounted to a relevant abuse of power. It was so devoid of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have imposed it.
72           The degree of perversity can be readily understood by considering whether condition 56 could ever be enforced. It is not an adequate answer to say, as the applicant does, that the condition is anticipatory or ambulatory. Even if the condition is to be construed on the basis that Westfield now holds title to each of the relevant properties it will not lead to a resolution of outstanding issues such as determination of an appropriate consideration to be paid by Westfield or the nature of the so-called “reciprocal rights.” The condition is plainly unenforceable without the co-operation and consensus of all relevant parties. They must first reach a mutually satisfactory agreement that takes account of individual legal rights as well as their complex commercial interests. The council would be involved as the consent authority in respect of any development required as a consequence of, or preparatory to, the finalisation of the commercial agreement between the landowners, particularly if there is an intensification of the use of the right of way across the Glasshouse site (see the discussion in North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1996) 185 CLR 470 at 476 and 477). On the basis of its total lack of capacity for practical application, condition 56 is so devoid of utility and purpose that it is relevantly unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. Alternatively by the same line of reasoning it is void for uncertainty.
73           The effect of condition 56, if enforceable, would be to require the owner of the Glasshouse to obtain the consent of the owner of Skygarden to the use of its land for the purpose of extending the right of way in favour of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. That, according to the first respondent, would be unlawful because it would require the owner of the Glasshouse to obtain the consent of third parties before it could act on the consent. Mr Rares SC, who appears for Perpetual, relies on the judgment of the High Court in Ligon at p 478-9 to support that proposition. However as I read the High Court decision it does not raise a relevant matter for determination in the present case. The High Court was considering whether the consent of the owner of other land in the locality over which a right of way already existed was required before an application could be made for development consent to a proposed development on the dominant tenement. The situation here is the reverse. The applicant for approval to modification of the Glasshouse development consent was not seeking to use other land. To the contrary the council was seeking to force the applicant to make its land available for use by other landholders. Whether development consent would be required to enable the other landholders to use the Glasshouse right of way is but one of the complicating factors that reinforce the impracticality of enforcing condition 56.
74           Even if I am wrong about the validity of condition 56 nevertheless the Court would not be in a position to make an order that would require the applicant and first respondent to successfully negotiate a settlement of the terms of their legal relationships (see for example Booker Industries Pty Ltd v Wilson Parking (Qld) Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 600 at 604-5). Assuming against the present fact such a settlement can be reached, there would still be the outstanding matter of a further development consent.

Having found condition 56 was invalid, he went on to hold that it was severable.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
It is convenient to consider the matters raised on the appeal under three headings:
1.            Construction and uncertainty of condition 56.
2.            Wednesbury unreasonableness.
3.            Severance.
CONSTRUCTION AND UNCERTAINTY
Submissions
Mr. Walker SC for Westfield submitted that the primary judge erred in not addressing and reaching a conclusion on the question of construction and on the related question of uncertainty, before addressing the question of reasonableness. However, Mr. Walker submitted that, in addressing the question of construction, the Court can have regard to the requirements for validity.
He referred to s.32 of the Interpretation Act 1987, which is as follows:
32          Instruments to be construed so as not to exceed the powers conferred by the Acts under which they are made
(1)          An instrument shall be construed as operating to the full extent of, but so as not to exceed, the power conferred by the Act under which it is made.
(2)          If any provision of an instrument, or the application of any such provision to any person, subject-matter or circumstance, would, but for this section, be construed as being in excess of the power conferred by the Act under which it is made:
(a)it shall be a valid provision to the extent to which it is not in excess of that power, and
(b)the remainder of the instrument, and the application of the provision to other persons, subject-matters or circumstances, shall not be affected.
(3)          This section applies to an instrument in addition to, and without limiting the effect of, any provision of the instrument or of the Act under which it is made.
He submitted that this applied to planning consents, and that where more than one interpretation was open, the interpretation that ensures validity should be adopted: Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 14; Warehouse Group (Australia) Pty. Limited v. Woolworths Limited [2003] NSWCA 270, 137 LGERA 115 at [19]. He also submitted that the Court should prefer an interpretation that avoids impossibility of performance: Hinton Demolition Pty. Limited v. Lower (No.2) [1971] 1 SASR 512 at 528.
Accordingly, he submitted, in construing condition 56 one can have regard to the requirements for validity of such conditions, which are set out in Western Australia Planning Commission v. Temwood Holdings Pty. Limited [2004] HCA 63, 221 CLR 30, at [57]:
57 The Commission also does not dispute that a condition attached to a consent must reasonably and fairly relate to the development permitted. A condition attached to a grant of planning permission will not be valid therefore unless:
1.The condition is for a planning purpose and not for any ulterior purpose. A planning purpose is one that implements a planning policy whose scope is ascertained by reference to the legislation that confers planning functions on the authority, not by reference to some preconceived general notion of what constitutes planning.
2.The condition reasonably and fairly relates to the development permitted.
3.The condition is not so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed it.
Certainty as such was not a requirement for validity, though uncertainty could be an element of unreasonableness: Cann’s Pty. Limited v. The Commonwealth (1946) 71 CLR 210 at 227-8; Genkem Pty. Limited v. Environment Protection Authority (1994) 35 NSWLR 33 at 42. In any event, he submitted, as part of upholding the effectiveness of instruments, the Court would try to give them practical effect by avoiding uncertainty. Instruments such as consents and conditions of consent are to be construed, not as documents drafted with legal expertise, but to achieve practical results: Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Limited [1963] 1 WLR 929 at 933-4; Driscoll v. J. Scott Pty. Limited (1976) 50 ALJR 528 at 531; Hecar Investments & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Lake Macquarie Municipal Council (1984) 53 LGRA 322 at 323.
In the present case, he submitted, there was no uncertainty in relation to condition 56 if it is regarded as taking effect if and when there is appropriate co-operation from Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint; if it is understood as not requiring consideration; and if the reference to reciprocal rights and duties is understood as referring to the grant of an appropriate easement by Skygarden to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, and by Imperial Arcade to Centrepoint, and as making provision for a principled extension of the terms of the existing easement so as to make them applicable to the extended easement.
Mr. Hutley SC for Perpetual submitted that condition 56 could not be interpreted as requiring the grant of an easement in favour of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint without consideration, because this would be wholly unreasonable, having regard to the resulting costs, burdens and risks that would be imposed on the owner of Glasshouse, and the enormous commercial benefit that would come as a windfall to the owners of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. The only reasonable conclusion was that what was contemplated was a commercial negotiation as to appropriate consideration.
Further, Mr. Hutley submitted, the terms of the existing easement showed that there was much that needed to be the subject of commercial negotiation in relation to matters other than consideration, such as maintenance, insurance and allocation of risk: the future use of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, if there were re-developments of these sites, could not be anticipated, and could result in greatly increased burdens and risks imposed on the owner of Glasshouse. Mr. Hutley submitted that the reference to “reciprocal rights and duties” confirmed that condition 56 could not be considered as requiring any more than future commercial negotiations.
Decision
In my opinion, the question of interpretation should be approached on the principles referred to by Mr. Walker. Just as a contract should be construed, if possible, so that its validity is preserved and uncertainty avoided (see for example Meehan v. Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571 at 589, and Upper Hunter County District Council v. Australian Chilling & Freezing Co. Limited (1968) 118 CLR 429 at 436-7), so also should instruments of this kind. Plainly, the Council intended to achieve something substantive by condition 56, and it should be construed if possible so as to give effect to that intention.
Another principle to be kept in mind in construing the condition is that a development consent is a document in rem, so that communications between the parties do not form part of the matrix relevant to construction: House of Peace Pty. Limited v. Bankstown City Council [2000] NSWCA 44, 48 NSWLR 498 at [23] and [27]. However, the Court can have regard to objective circumstances, including the physical circumstances, the plans accompanying the development application, and matters relating to title. In this case, in my opinion, the Court can have regard to the following, as they were at 13 December 1988:
1.The existence of the Pitt Street Mall as a pedestrian area, and the Council policy of keeping traffic in that area to a minimum.
2.That the consent and plans for the Glasshouse development provided for access through a basement level to Skygarden of a kind and capacity sufficient for provision of access through to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, assuming no extraordinary change in the nature of the activity on those sites.
3.The grant of the easement to Skygarden and the terms of that easement.
4.Consent to plans for Skygarden providing for access through its basement level to Imperial Arcade, albeit without a condition of that consent requiring Skygarden to grant an easement to Imperial Arcade or Centrepoint.
5.The circumstance that the imposition of condition 56 was associated with the deletion of a condition requiring the transfer of transferable floor space to the site.
In my opinion, it is clear that the obligation sought to be imposed by condition 56 to extend the easement could not be fully performed without the co-operation of Skygarden, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. The need for such co-operation is confirmed by the reference to reciprocal rights and duties. Accordingly, if the condition is to be effectual, it must be considered as imposing an obligation that requires action only if and when there is appropriate co-operation from Skygarden, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint (or at least, Skygarden and Imperial Arcade).
Again, the condition could not be effectual if it left the question of consideration entirely at large. One possibility is that what is required is an extension of the easement without consideration to the owner of Glasshouse. The only other possible alternative which could leave the condition as being possibly effectual and enforceable is to interpret it as requiring Glasshouse to negotiate bona fide as to consideration and/or not unreasonably to refuse a proper offer. However, there is no suggestion in the language that supports this alternative. The language makes no mention of consideration, and that suggests it may be reasonable to interpret it as requiring the extension to be given without consideration. In circumstances where the condition must be interpreted without knowledge of underlying commercial dealings between the Council and the developer, I do not think it can be concluded that such a requirement would impose an unreasonable burden on the developer or on later owners of the Glasshouse. The condition may give rise to a windfall to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, but this may be the inevitable consequence of giving effect to the reasonable planning purpose of keeping traffic off the Pitt Street Mall.
In my opinion, the reference to reciprocal rights and duties does at least refer to the need for Skygarden to give an easement to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, and the need for Imperial Arcade to give an easement to Centrepoint, if the easement is to be effectively extended to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. I think it also refers to the question of what the terms of the extended easement are to be. The terms of the existing easement suggest the need for terms in an extended easement relating to such things as the cost of maintenance and repair and insurance, and possibly also as to such things as signage and allocation of risk.
Having regard to the above considerations, and the principles of construction I have referred to, in my opinion condition 56 should be interpreted as imposing an obligation on the owner of Glasshouse to take the action required, if and when there is appropriate co-operation from the owners of Skygarden, Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint; to do so without further consideration; with one aspect of the necessary co-operation being the making of appropriate provision for access across Skygarden to Imperial Arcade and across Imperial Arcade to Centrepoint. As regards the terms of the extended easement, in my opinion this raises questions of the kind referred to in Upper Hunter. In my opinion there are alternative reasonable ways of extending the terms of the existing easement to the extended easement. The existence of reasonable alternatives does not mean that there is invalidating uncertainty: the Court can resolve which of these alternatives is the correct one.
Mr. Hutley did contend that the possibility of greatly altered use of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint shows that there is no reasonable way of working out the terms of an extended easement except by commercial negotiations undertaken at the relevant time. There is some force in this submission, but the force is limited because of the principle of easement law that an easement will not authorise use that is excessive by reason of greatly altered use of the dominant tenement as compared with its use at the time of grant (or agreement for grant in a case where what is sought is in effect enforcement of such an agreement): see Gallagher v. Rainbow (1994) 179 CLR 624 at 640-42.
That case also provides an illustration of approaches that may be taken when circumstances give rise to questions as to how costs relating to the maintenance and repair of a right of way are to be apportioned, when owners of additional lots come to be entitled to use it.
In that case, as set out in the headnote, the owners of four lots on a plan of subdivision gained access to a public street via a private roadway formed from strips of land belonging to each of the four lots. Reciprocal easements over each portion of the roadway were given and taken by the owners of the lots. The right of way was expressed to be for the benefit of the dominant tenement “or any part thereof”. The term “grantee” included transferees and assigns as well as the occupier or occupiers for the time being of the dominant tenement. The owners of two of the four lots subsequently subdivided each of these lots into three lots. It was held by a majority of the High Court that the benefit of the easements attached to the dominant tenements in their subdivided form, so that each owner of any of the six new lots had the benefit of the easement.
Gaudron and McHugh JJ dissented in this case, on the basis that the owners of the four original lots constituting the dominant tenement each covenanted as grantee with each other as grantor that maintenance and repair costs should be borne equally between them; and the minority judges considered that this covenant could not work according to its terms if the right of way was construed as enuring for the benefit of each of the subdivided lots. The majority held that the contribution from each of the original lots remained the same, and that it was not necessary to determine how questions of contribution as between owners of the newly subdivided lots should be worked out.
The view of the minority in Gallagher v. Rainbow was based not on uncertainty as such but on an inference as to the intention manifested by the grant of the easement: Gaudron and McHugh JJ concluded that the considerations they relied on meant that the intention manifested by the grant was that the benefit of the easement should not enure to owners of subdivided lots. If the only question had been, given that the easement was to enure for the benefit of subdivided lots, how the costs were to be apportioned, in my opinion the considerations relied on by the minority would not have precluded application of the Upper Hunter approach. In the present case, there is no question that the Council’s intention was that the easement be extended, so that there is no reason not to apply the Upper Hunter approach.
Applying the Upper Hunter approach, in my opinion what condition 56 contemplates is that where cls.3 and 4 of the existing easement (set out in par.[14] above) provide for equal division of costs between one grantor and one grantee, such costs should be divided four ways between the grantor and three grantees. In my opinion, no change would be required to cls.1, 2, 5 and 6. As regards cls.7 to 11, what would be required would be a similar obligation on each grantee.
What was offered by the transfer submitted by Westfield either did not, or at least did not clearly, have this effect; so in my opinion, Perpetual is not yet in breach of condition 56.
UNREASONABLENESS
Submissions
Mr. Walker submitted that invalidating unreasonableness would not be made out unless the Council’s decision to include condition 56 was “so plainly incorrect as to satisfy the stringent requirements of the Wednesbury unreasonableness test”: Woolworths Limited v. Pallas Newco Pty. Limited [2004] NSWCA 422, 61 NSWLR 707, 136 LGERA 288 at [91]. That test was not satisfied.
It was clear, he submitted, that the Council had a plan to get traffic off Pitt Street Mall, a plan that could not be achieved at one stroke, and that required the co-operation of future owners in the case of future developments of Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint. The absence of an appropriate condition in the Skygarden approval, requiring Skygarden to grant an easement over its property, neither negatived the existence of this plan, nor the reasonableness of other measures to put it into effect.
Mr. Hutley did not contend that requirement (1) of the three requirements stated by McHugh J in Temwood was not satisfied; or that the condition did not relate to the development. However, he contended that the condition did not relate to the development in a reasonable and fair way, and that it was otherwise unreasonable. He made submissions similar to those made in relation to uncertainty, concerning the unreasonableness of the condition unless it left it open to the owner of Glasshouse to engage in commercial negotiations concerning the extension of the easement; but at this stage of the enquiry, that matter may be considered having regard to the actual dealing and communications between the developer and the Council. Mr. Hutley also submitted that the correspondence and the Planning Committee Report showed that the developer had done everything required of it to obtain the removal of condition B(b), and what the Council did was unreasonably to add this extra burden.
Decision
I do not read the Planning Committee Report as suggested by Mr. Hutley. In my opinion, this report recognises that the developer had made physical provision for access that could be extended to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint, and had done what it could in relation to making legal provision; and expressed the view that, provided the developer remained obliged to perfect this legal provision, it should have the benefit of removal of condition B(b). In my opinion, that this was the thrust of the report is shown by the recommendations, which were given effect to by the Council resolution.
In my view, having regard to the value of the transferable floor space which was thereby made available to the developer for use elsewhere, and the fact that the additional legal burden thereby imposed was not shown to have a disproportionate effect on the value of the property, a case of Wednesbury unreasonableness is not made out. The Raine & Horne letter suggested that the existence of the easement reduced the value of the property by up to $3,000,000.00. However, this letter did not indicate to what extent the value of the property would be affected by an extension of the easement to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint; and indeed it did not make it clear whether or not the prospect of such an extension was taken into account in the assessment that was made.
SEVERANCE
Having regard to my decision on the other issues, the question of severance does not arise. However, my view would be that, if condition 56 was invalid, it would be severable. The physical provision for future access across Glasshouse to Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint is there; and the Council has the means by imposition of conditions of approval on future developments of Imperial Arcade and/or Centrepoint, and by resumption (as a last resort if necessary), to put its policy into effect, even if condition 56 is ineffectual.
CONCLUSION
For those reasons, in my opinion condition 56 is valid, effectual and enforceable. No breach has yet arisen, because the request made by Westfield did not offer, or at least did not offer with sufficient clarity, appropriate terms as to maintenance of the right of way and insurance.
As I understand it, this decision on Westfield’s appeal from Land & Environment Court proceedings 41349 of 2004 makes it necessary for there to now be a determination of the application brought by Perpetual (Land & Environment Court proceedings 10114 of 2005) against the deemed refusal of its application under s.96 of the EPA Act to modify development consent No. 44/85/0257. That application was not heard by the Court below and it will now need to be heard. The primary judge also did not resolve the issues raised by Westfield’s application (Land & Environment Court proceedings 40227 of 2005) seeking a declaration that the Council cannot be satisfied that the development to which the consent to development application No. 44/85/0257 relates, if modified, will be substantially the same development for which development consent was originally granted by the Council, as modified. It may be that some of the costs of the first instance hearing in this matter will be relevant to those applications. There is also a question as to the costs of this matter below, in circumstances where breach of condition 56 was alleged and, on the view I have taken, not proved. In my view, the costs at first instance should be left in the discretion of the judge who deals with these applications.

For those reasons, in my opinion the following orders should be made:
1.Appeal allowed, orders below set aside.
2.Perpetual to pay Westfield’s costs of the appeal.
3.No order as to the Council’s costs of the appeal.
4.Declaration that condition 56 is valid and enforceable.
5.Cross-claim dismissed.
6.Matter remitted to the Land & Environment Court for decision as to the costs of the first instance hearing.
TOBIAS JA: In this matter I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgments of Hodgson JA and Basten JA. I agree with the orders proposed by Hodgson JA for the reasons given by him and for the additional reasons articulated by Basten JA. However, like Basten JA, I find it unnecessary to express a view on the question of severance.
As Basten JA points out in [75] of his judgment, the central issue in the appeal was the validity of condition 56. It was common ground, and acknowledged by the primary judge, that the condition would not be valid unless it met the three-fold test articulated by McHugh J in Temwood Holdings which Hodgson JA has set out in [35] above.
The primary judge found that the first and second of those facts were satisfied in that condition 56 was imposed for a planning purpose and reasonably and fairly related to the Glasshouse development. Its planning purpose was the ultimate deletion of vehicular traffic movements from the Pitt Street Mall. I accept that, as Basten JA observes in [85] of his judgment, such a planning purpose would only be legitimate if it derives from the statutory source of the power being exercised. In my opinion, the powers vested in the Council by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 were more than adequate to encompass not only the provision of the Pitt Street Mall as a pedestrian thoroughfare, but also the adoption of controls to remove from it all vehicular traffic.
Condition 56 also met the second requirement insofar as it related to the Glasshouse development which was in a critical location on King Street to provide vehicular access to the properties to its south as far as Market Street. I would further endorse the finding of the primary judge that is recorded in [87] of Basten JA’s judgment as a further basis upon which the second test referred to by McHugh J in Temwood Holdings was satisfied.
The validity of condition 56 foundered before the primary judge upon the third test referred to in Temwood Holdings. His Honour’s conclusion (at [71]) was that it was devoid of plausible justification such that no reasonable council could have imposed it. Although his Honour coupled that find with the further finding that the condition amounted to a relevant abuse of power, I do not understand him to be backtracking, as it were, upon his earlier finding that the condition fairly and reasonably related to the Glasshouse development. Rather, as [66]–[74] of his judgment illustrated, his Honour dissected the condition in a manner which emphasised his perception of its negative and uncertain qualities which led him to the conclusion that, in all the circumstances, no reasonable council, properly advised, could have it imposed it.
However, as Hodgson and Basten JJA make clear, it is difficult if not impossible to characterise the imposition of the condition as manifestly unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense unless one has first construed it to determine precisely the obligation or burden it in fact imposes upon the owner from time to time of the Glasshouse development. Like Basten JA, I agree with the construction of the condition adopted by Hodgson JA.
Properly construed, the condition does not impose any obligation upon the owner of the Glasshouse development unless and until there is agreement between at least the owners of Skygarden and Imperial Arcade (and, preferably Centrepoint), to accept an extension of the easement the terms of which are recorded in [14] of the judgment of Hodgson JA. It would also be necessary for Skygarden to grant an easement over its property in favour of Imperial Arcade and/or Centrepoint. Until both these events occur, condition 56 would not operate to impose any obligation upon the owner of Glasshouse to agree to the extension of the easement to benefit the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint sites.
The point is well made by Hodgson JA in [45] of his judgment with which I respectfully agree. There is no doubt that condition 56 is only to operate upon the basis of the existing easement in favour of Skygarden being extended to the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint properties with appropriate amendments to give effect to the equal division of costs in the terms referred to by Hodgson JA in [51] of his judgment.
Perpetual would only become obligated to grant an extension of the easement, and to comply with the condition, when an appropriate instrument complying with the requirements to which I have referred, has been tendered to it for execution. But the fact that that obligation does not presently exist and has not existed since the condition was imposed, does not render the condition uncertain in its operation to the extent that that factor might otherwise be relevant to a determination of whether the condition is Wednesbury unreasonable.
It must always be remembered that the test for Wednesbury unreasonableness is stringent: Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 181 at 188 [27] per Mason P. To qualify, the imposition of condition 56 by the Council must have been “so devoid of plausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken that course”. In Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association Inc v Minister for Natural Resources (2005) 138 LGERA 11 at 41 [129] Spigelman CJ, with whom Beazley JA and myself agreed, considered that the most appropriate formulation was whether the decision
“is illogical, irrational or lacking a basis in findings or inferences of fact supported on logical grounds,”
Once condition 56 is construed in the manner to which I have referred, it must follow that the condition is not unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense as I have described it. When regard is had to the history of the matter, the correspondence to and from the Council and the contents of the Planning Committee’s report pursuant to which the imposition of condition 56 was recommended, it becomes apparent that its imposition was the quid pro quo for the removal of condition B(b). This resulted in the then developer of Glasshouse being granted bonus floor space without having to surrender the transferable floor space which it had acquired pursuant to condition B(b) and which it could now retain and make available for use elsewhere.
In these circumstances, given the true nature and extent of the obligation imposed by condition 56 upon the owner of Glasshouse from time to time, no basis exists for declaring the condition invalid as being illogical, irrational or lacking a basis in findings or inferences of fact.
For the foregoing reasons, which generally reflect those of Hodgson JA and Basten JA, I agree with the orders proposed.
BASTEN JA: The central issue in this appeal was the validity of condition 56 in a development consent granted by the City of Sydney Council for the construction of a building known as “The Glasshouse” at 131-139 King Street, Sydney. The condition is set out by Hodgson JA at [4] above.
With one qualification, I agree with the orders proposed by Hodgson JA, for the reasons given by him and for the additional reasons set out below. The qualification is that, because the question of severance does not arise (the condition in question not being invalid) I would express no views about it. The relevant principles were but lightly touched on in submissions. The condition in question, being condition 56, was in effect imposed in exchange for a favourable variation of the floor space ratio. The practical consequences of any finding of invalidity are so fraught with difficulty that they should not be addressed unless and until necessary: cf Lloyd v Robinson (1962) 107 CLR 142 at 152.
In the judgment of the Land and Environment Court in this matter, Westfield Management Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd [2005] NSWLEC 510 at [5], the primary judge stated:
“The fundamental issue in each case is the proper construction of conditions 19 and 56 of the modified consent … .”
That was undoubtedly true: nevertheless, no clear conclusion was reached in the judgment regarding the construction, particularly of condition 56, before considering the validity of the conditions.
Perpetual, which was the respondent and cross-claimant in the Land and Environment Court, filed pleadings which alleged, in part, the invalidity of condition 56, but did not particularise any basis of such invalidity. Nevertheless the points of defence and the cross-claim, somewhat tendentiously, asserted that the condition was “meaningless” and “inherently uncertain”. The primary judge was thus provided with little assistance in the pleadings in determining the basis upon which invalidity was asserted: see also [2005] NSWLEC 510 at [30]. Nevertheless, after dealing with other matters not of present consequence, at [59] his Honour considered whether the condition was imposed “for a legitimate planning purpose” and whether it was reasonably related “to the subject matters of the development consent to which” it was attached. His Honour then set out the “test” adopted by McHugh J in Western Australian Planning Commission v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd (2004) 221 CLR 30 at [57], set out at [35] above. He sought to apply that test. However, as noted below, care must be taken not to treat a succinct statement of principles as a formulaic test.
The first requirement set out in the passage in Temwood Holdings is that the condition be imposed for a “planning purpose” and not for any “ulterior purpose”. It is then said, as a second requirement, that the condition “reasonably and fairly relates to the development permitted”. This may form part of the language of ulterior purpose, because, at [56], McHugh J had stated the requirement that a condition be “reasonably capable of being regarded as related to a legitimate planning purpose”. In paragraph [58] his Honour returned to the concept of invalidity because of an “ulterior purpose”.
In addition, a third requirement was postulated, namely that imposition of the condition not reveal manifest unreasonableness. Such a requirement is usually treated as involving different considerations from those identified in the purpose requirement. Unreasonableness (of a sufficiently serious degree) is usually tested by looking at the effect of the condition on the proponent of the development, rather than by reference to the purpose sought to be pursued by the consent authority.
Further, as noted by Heydon J at [181], the phrase “improper purpose” can have a range of meanings. The range of meanings was helpfully explained by Aickin J in The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170 at 232-233, in a passage which bears repeating. The ‘first question’, which his Honour was addressing, was whether “the reasons, motives or purposes for which the Crown or its representative exercises a statutory power are examinable by a court”. His Honour continued:
“The terminology used in relation to the first of those questions is unfortunately neither uniform nor precise and it is sometimes impossible to be certain of the meaning intended to be conveyed by such expressions as, for example, good faith and bad faith. There are three distinct bases upon which an exercise of administrative power or authority and delegated legislative power or authority may be attacked; they are first the existence of a corrupt purpose, second the existence of an improper purpose and third ultra vires in the narrow sense of the act done being beyond the power of the body concerned, irrespective of the motive or intention of the person or body exercising the power. It is true that in one sense the term ultra vires is capable of embracing all three conceptions. It is however generally unhelpful, if not misleading, to use the term in that wide sense … . I use the adjective ‘corrupt’ to mean an act done for personal gain, including a gain for the person doing the act or his family or friends. Where some act is authorized to be done for a purpose, the doing of that act ‘falsely avowing a legitimate purpose to cover the actual pursuit of an object outside the scope of the power’ is better classified as ‘improper’ rather than ‘corrupt’ in the absence of an endeavour to obtain personal gain, though the ultimate result of invalidity would follow on either view.
I use the term ‘improper purpose’ to mean one for which the relevant power or authority was not conferred. It makes no difference whether or not that purpose was known to, or believed or suspected to be necessary by, the person exercising the power. Generally speaking executive or administrative powers are conferred for a purpose ascertainable, with greater or lesser difficulty, from the terms of the instrument conferring the power. In the case of legislative powers it is not always possible to discern a purpose, as distinct from subject matter or content. A belief that the act done is being done for an authorized purpose will be irrelevant if the purpose for which the power is in fact exercised is not such a purpose, whether the belief is as to a matter of fact or law.
Delegated legislative power may be conferred in respect of a subject matter rather than a purpose, though the two ideas overlap, as some cases concerning municipal by-laws demonstrate. However for present purposes there is no distinction between legislative and administrative acts; each may be attacked in the courts.”
In seeking to apply the requirements stated in Temwood Holdings, the primary judge noted the evidence given by the town planning consultant for Westfield, at [60]:
“He describes the planning principle behind the provision of access to the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint through the existing right of way across the Glasshouse as one to provide the opportunity for goods and service vehicles to be removed from Pitt Street Mall. He says it is a matter of significant planning importance and an appropriate planning objective which will improve the pedestrian movement within the Pitt Street Mall.”
At [62] his Honour identified the opinions of the experts as “based on notions of general planning policy”. He stated:
“Consequently there is nothing that meets the first specification laid down by McHugh J in Temwood, namely that there is a planning purpose implementing a planning policy whose scope is ascertained by reference to the EPA Act.”
Whether this conclusion was determinative or not is unclear: however it would be a mistaken approach to identify the source of the policy by reference to such evidence. Whether the “planning purpose” implements a policy that is within the lawful limits of the authority conferred on a council, depends upon a legal analysis of the statutory source of authority, and not on evidence.
Further, the statement of principle contained in the first requirement noted by McHugh J in Temwood Holdings should not be taken out of context. It reflects a passage in the judgement of Walsh J in Allen Commercial Constructions Pty Ltd v The Council of the Municipality of North Sydney (1970) 123 CLR 490 at 499-500, which his Honour had set out in the preceding paragraph in Temwood Holdings. The point sought to be made was that the scope of a legitimate planning policy, and hence a lawful purpose of the consent authority, must be derived from the statutory source of the power being exercised. Preconceived general notions of what constitutes planning will only give rise to extraneous purposes, to the extent that they fall outside the scope of the statute. Once the focus is on the second category of “improper purpose”, identified by Aickin J, the exercise of statutory construction is analogous to that required in relation to relevant and irrelevant considerations: the inquiry is directed to the boundaries of lawful authority imposed on the repository of the power. As explained by Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40:
“In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard … .”
That is not to say that the exercise will in each case be the same: purposes are likely to be more readily identified than the range of relevant and irrelevant considerations. Many considerations may fall within the category of those permitted, rather than those which are mandatory or proscribed, whereas a purpose is more likely to be identifiable with a degree of certainty. Nevertheless, as the differences of opinion reflected in Temwood Holdings demonstrate, identifying the nature and scope of a purpose may itself involve matters of evaluative judgment. The approach will also depend upon the circumstances of the case. Thus, where the power is one of resumption of private land, for identified purposes, it is likely to be construed strictly in accordance with its terms: see Thompson v Randwick Corporation (1950) 81 CLR 87 at 106-107.
In any event, and somewhat inconsistently with the remarks set out at [83] above, at [64], his Honour concluded:
“One of the stated objects of the EPA Act is and was at all relevant dates the protection, provision and co-ordination of the orderly and economic use and development of land. … If it is accepted that a system that allowed the transfer of floor space and provided for the award of a floor space bonus in certain circumstances is properly a matter of council policy, then condition 56 is to be regarded as a condition imposed for a planning purpose that fairly and reasonably related to the Glasshouse development.”
That would appear to be an express finding, in the terms adopted by McHugh J in Temwood Holdings, that condition 56 is valid, if the premise concerning transfer of floor space were accepted. His Honour did not reject the premise and must be taken to have accepted it. It was not suggested in this Court that the premise was rejected, or that it should now be rejected.
At [65] his Honour turned his attention to condition 19, and suggested that it was at least arguable that there had been practical compliance with condition 19. That suggestion was not revisited in terms until the conclusion at [80] where his Honour held that “condition 19 has effectively been complied with” and that “no further steps are required by [Perpetual] to comply with condition 19”.
Despite the apparent conclusion at [64] that condition 56 was valid, his Honour stated at [66] (set out at [29] above) that the conduct of the Council “reinforces the conclusion that compliance with condition 56 was not feasible”. His Honour further stated that it was “not reasonable” to require the developer “to do that which is impossible without the co-operation of third parties”. The language at [68], [69] and [72] is to similar effect. However, the conclusions stated in such terms invite attention to the proper construction of the condition and the precise obligation imposed on the developer. It will be necessary to return to that matter shortly.
The conclusion that the condition was not feasible was given legal clothes of varying colours. At [71] it was characterised as involving manifest unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense, a characterisation also said to constitute a “relevant abuse of power” and, at [72] as rendering the condition “void for uncertainty”.

It is true that the various grounds of judicial review can overlap and that, in particular circumstances, a head of invalidity can be characterised in more than one way. However, there are curious features about the characterisation adopted in this case. For example, if the condition were manifestly unreasonable, one might have expected the developer to object to it at or soon after it was imposed, which was in December 1988. Of course, the developer may have assumed a different construction of the obligation, a matter which takes one back to the construction exercise not adequately undertaken in the Court below.
Secondly, it is unclear in what sense the imposition of the condition was an “abuse of process”, given the specific finding that it was imposed for a legitimate purpose, noted at [87] above. Thirdly, to describe the condition as void for uncertainty not only invites attention to its proper construction but also to the range of factors which may be encompassed by such a complaint: see, eg, Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd ed, 2004) at pp 331-334. In particular, it would require consideration of the lack of any general requirement of “certainty” as a condition of validity, as explained by Dixon J in King Gee Clothing Co Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 184 at 194-196.
One is inexorably drawn, therefore, to the proper construction of the condition. In substance, Perpetual said three elements were critical, although each contained specific points, as noted at [38] and [39] above. The first was that the condition could not be understood as imposing a requirement on the developer that he or she provide rights of way in favour of the owners of the Imperial Arcade and Centrepoint sites, in circumstances where each of those owners would require a right of way over the Skygarden site and, in relation to Centrepoint, over the Imperial Arcade site as well. Westfield’s response to this contention was to confess and avoid. An obligation limited in those terms was sufficient for its purposes because it owned each of the affected properties other than the ultimate subservient tenement, namely The Glasshouse, which was owned by Perpetual.
The second argument put forward by Perpetual was that the condition had to be capable of compliance by the owner of The Glasshouse at the time of the development. Whether this was put in terms of statutory power, certainty or reasonableness, or indeed on some other basis, was not entirely clear. Construing the obligation as Hodgson JA does at [42] it imposes a continuing obligation subject to a condition precedent, namely the voluntary co-operation of the owners of the various buildings.
The second construction point presented by Perpetual seems to have been integrally related to the third, was that the owner of The Glasshouse must always be permitted to negotiate appropriate commercial terms on which to extend the easement over its premises in favour of additional dominant tenements. I agree with Hodgson JA that it should be inferred that the obligation of the owner of The Glasshouse was to take the steps required, when the occasion arose, without requiring consideration from the beneficiaries of the easements over its land: see [43] and [45] above.
In substance, the arguments presented by Perpetual, and addressed by Hodgson JA at [42] and [51] demonstrate variations to the condition which might have been thought desirable, in the interests of The Glasshouse developers, when the condition was imposed, but which do not demonstrate manifest unreasonableness of a kind which would render the condition invalid.
Accordingly, Westfield is entitled to orders in the form proposed by Hodgson JA.

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LAST UPDATED: 08/09/2006