Webb v Tang - [2023] WASCA 119

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION:   WEBB -v- TANG [2023] WASCA 119
CORAM:   BUSS P
MAZZA JA
VAUGHAN JA

HEARD:   9 AUGUST 2022
DELIVERED          :   11 AUGUST 2023
FILE NO/S:   CACR 158 of 2021
BETWEEN:   ANTHONY PAUL WEBB
Appellant
AND
JACKIE TANG
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram:   QUINLAN CJ
Citation: WEBB v TANG [2021] WASC 344
File Number            :   SJA 1096 of 2020

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Appellant convicted after trial in the Magistrates Court of having, in the course of his work as a teacher, formed the belief on reasonable grounds that a child had been the subject of sexual abuse, and having failed to report that belief as soon as practicable after forming the belief - Proper construction of the phrase 'believes on reasonable grounds' within s 124B(1) of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) - Appellant's appeal against conviction to the Supreme Court in its General Division dismissed - Whether the primary appeal judge erred in law in his construction of the requisite 'belief' under s 124B(1) - Whether the primary appeal judge erred in law in reaching his decision by effectively substituting the civil standard of proof for the criminal standard of proof - Whether the primary appeal judge erred in law in deciding that the evidence at the trial established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant actually held the required 'belief' under s 124B(1)

Legislation:

Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA), s 124A, s 124B, s 124C, s 124D, s 124G
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 14(1), s 14(2), s 16(2), s 18

Result:

Leave to appeal granted on grounds 1 and 3
Leave to appeal refused on ground 2
Appeal dismissed

Category: A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant	:	Mr M J McCusker QC & Mr S Nigam
Respondent	:	Mr C S Bydder & Mr J F Bennett

Solicitors:

Appellant	:	Nigams Legal Pty Ltd
Respondent	:	State Solicitor's Office

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27
Anderson v Judges of the District Court of New South Wales (1992) 27 NSWLR 701
Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384
Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25; (2022) 96 ALJR 728
Filippou v The Queen [2015] HCA 29; (2015) 256 CLR 47
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104
Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942
Hyder v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] NSWCA 336; (2012) 217 A Crim R 571
M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487
Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations (Cth) v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 9; (2005) 222 CLR 194
Plomp v The Queen [1963] HCA 44; (1963) 110 CLR 234
Prior v Mole [2017] HCA 10; (2017) 261 CLR 265
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355
R (on the application of Evans) v Attorney General [2014] QB 855
R v Baden‑Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) 258 CLR 308
R v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618
R v Pangilinan [1999] QCA 528; [2001] 1 Qd R 56
Ruddock v Taylor [2005] HCA 48; (2005) 222 CLR 612
Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573
State of New South Wales v Bouffler [2017] NSWCA 185; (2017) 95 NSWLR 521
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362
The State of Western Australia v Olive [2011] WASCA 25; (2011) 57 MVR 269
Travelex Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 33; (2010) 241 CLR 510
Wark v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 66
Webb v Tang [2021] WASC 344
Wells v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 27

Table of Contents

Buss P & Vaughan JA

The background facts and circumstances, the evidence at trial, the magistrate's reasons for decision, Quinlan CJ's reasons for decision and the submissions of the parties in the appeal to this court

The relevant provisions of the Children Act when the offending occurred

Overview of the trial before the magistrate

The magistrate's reasons for convicting the appellant

The statutory framework governing the primary appeal and the appeal to this court

The appellant's grounds of appeal in the primary appeal to the Supreme Court in its General Division

The appellant's grounds of appeal in the appeal to this court

Ground 1: the appellant's submissions

Ground 1: the respondent's submissions

Ground 1: its merits

Ground 2

Ground 3

Conclusion

Mazza JA

Introduction

The trial before the learned magistrate

AB's evidence

Mr Loveridge's evidence

Mr Wright's evidence

Mr Scott's evidence

Mr Banks' evidence

Mr Norman's evidence

Ms Knapman's evidence

Mr Hince's evidence

Mr Wong's evidence

Ms Dalby's evidence

Sergeant Glynn's evidence

Ms Taylor's evidence

The 15 August 2018 interview

Mr Hailes' evidence

The learned magistrate's reasons for decision

The single judge appeal

Quinlan CJ's reasons

Ground 1 - the appeal to this court

Ground 1 - parties' submissions

Ground 1 - the relevant statutory framework

Ground 1 - disposition

Ground 2 - alleged erroneous application of the standard of proof

Ground 2 - parties' submissions

Ground 2 - disposition

Ground 3 - was the guilty verdict unreasonable?

Ground 3 - submissions

Ground 3 - legal principles

Ground 3 - disposition

Conclusion and orders

BUSS P & VAUGHAN JA:

On 4 November 2020, each of the appellant and Ian Hailes was convicted, after a joint trial in the Magistrates Court before Magistrate Shackleton, of one charge in a prosecution notice.
The charge in each prosecution notice alleged that, between 12 April 2017 and 11 September 2017, the accused, being a teacher and having, in the course of his work as a teacher, formed the belief on reasonable grounds that a child had been the subject of sexual abuse, failed to report that belief as soon as practicable after forming the belief, contrary to s 124B(1) of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) (the Children Act).
The magistrate fined the appellant $1,200 and ordered him to pay the respondent's costs of the proceedings. His Honour made a spent conviction order.
The appellant applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in its General Division against his conviction. On 13 October 2021, Quinlan CJ refused leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. See Webb v Tang.[1] His Honour ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
[1] Webb v Tang [2021] WASC 344.
The appellant has now applied for leave to appeal to this court against Quinlan CJ's decision.
We agree with Mazza JA that leave to appeal should be granted on grounds 1 and 3, leave to appeal should be refused on ground 2 and the appeal should be dismissed. Our reasons are as follows.

The background facts and circumstances, the evidence at trial, the magistrate's reasons for decision, Quinlan CJ's reasons for decision and the submissions of the parties in the appeal to this court

The background facts and circumstances, the evidence at trial, the magistrate's reasons for decision, Quinlan CJ's reasons for decision and the submissions of the parties in the appeal to this court are summarised in Mazza JA's reasons. We will not repeat his Honour's summary except to the extent necessary to explain our reasons.

The relevant provisions of the Children Act when the offending occurred

The relevant provisions of the Children Act when the offending occurred are as follows.
Part 4 of the Children Act is headed 'Protection and care of children'.
Division 9A of pt 4 of the Children Act is headed 'Reporting sexual abuse of children' and comprises s 124A to s 128H. Division 9A was inserted into the Children Act by the Children and Community Services Amendment (Reporting Sexual Abuse of Children) Act 2008 (WA). Division 9A commenced on 1 January 2009.
Section 124A defines various terms used in div 9A of pt 4 including 'doctor', 'nurse', 'midwife', 'teacher', 'boarding supervisor' and 'sexual abuse'.
The terms 'CEO' and 'child' are defined in s 3 of the Children Act.
Section 124B is concerned with the duty of certain people to report sexual abuse of children. It provides:
(1)A person who -
(a)is a doctor, nurse, midwife, police officer, teacher or boarding supervisor; and
(b)believes on reasonable grounds that a child -
(i)has been the subject of sexual abuse that occurred on or after commencement day; or
(ii)is the subject of ongoing sexual abuse;
and
(c)forms the belief -
(i)in the course of the person’s work (whether paid or unpaid) as a doctor, nurse, midwife, police officer, teacher or boarding supervisor; and
(ii)on or after commencement day,
must report the belief as soon as practicable after forming the belief.
Penalty: a fine of $6 000.
(2)For the purposes of subsection (1) the report must be made to -
(a)the CEO; or
(b)a person approved by the CEO; or
(c)a person who is a member of a class of persons approved by the CEO.
(3)In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (1) it is a defence for the person charged to prove that he or she honestly and reasonably believed that -
(a)all of the reasonable grounds for his or her belief were the subject of a report made by another person; or
(b)the CEO had caused, or was causing, inquiries to be made under section 31 about the child’s wellbeing; or
(c)the CEO had taken, or was taking, action under section 32 in respect of the child’s wellbeing.
(4)A requirement that a person has under subsection (1) is in addition to, and does not affect, any other function that the person has in respect of the child in the course of the person’s work as a doctor, nurse, midwife, police officer, teacher or boarding supervisor.
The word 'believes' (and cognate forms of that word) and the term 'reasonable grounds' are not defined in the Children Act.
Section 124C is concerned with the form and content of reports under s 124B. It provides:
(1)A report may be written or oral but if oral the reporter must make a written report as soon as practicable after the oral report is made.
Penalty: a fine of $3 000.
(2)A written report may, but does not need to be, in a form approved by the CEO.
(3)A report is to contain -
(a)the name and contact details of the reporter; and
(b)the name of the child or, if the child’s name cannot be obtained after reasonable inquiries, a description of the child; and
(c)if, or to the extent, known to the reporter -
(i)the child’s date of birth; and
(ii)information about where the child lives; and
(iii)the names of the child’s parents or other appropriate persons as defined in section 41(1);
and
(d)the grounds for the reporter’s belief that the child has been the subject of sexual abuse or is the subject of ongoing sexual abuse; and
(ea)if, or to the extent, known to the reporter -
(i)the name of any person alleged to be responsible for the sexual abuse; and
(ii)the person’s contact details; and
(iii)the person’s relationship to the child;
and
(e)any other information that is prescribed.
(4)A person mentioned in section 124B(2)(b) or (c) who receives -
(a)a written report must give the report to the CEO as soon as practicable after receiving it; or
(b)an oral report must inform the CEO of the contents of the report as soon as practicable after receiving it.
Penalty: a fine of $6 000.
(5)As soon as practicable after receiving a written report the CEO must advise the reporter of the receipt.
Section 124D imposes on the CEO an obligation to give a copy of each written report to the Commissioner of Police as soon as practicable after the report is received by the CEO.
Section 244 provides, relevantly, that a person who gives information orally or in writing in a report prepared for the purposes of the Children Act that the person knows to be false or misleading in a material respect commits an offence.
By s 246(1), a civil action does not lie against a person for anything that the person has done, in good faith, in the performance or purported performance of a function under the Children Act.

Overview of the trial before the magistrate

The charge in each prosecution notice arose out of an incident which occurred on 11 April 2017 during a rugby tour of Japan organised by Trinity College. During the tour a student (AB), who at the time was aged 16, had a carrot forced into his anus by other students (the Incident).
The appellant, Mr Hailes and Eliza Knapman were at the material time employed by Trinity College as teachers. They accompanied the students on the rugby tour.
At the trial it was not in dispute that:
(a)at the material time AB was a child;
(b)the Incident had occurred as described by AB;
(c)the Incident as described by AB involved AB being sexually abused;
(d)at the material time the appellant was a teacher;
(e)the sexual abuse occurred in the course of the appellant's work as a teacher;
(f)on 12 April 2017, being the day after the Incident occurred, AB informed the appellant about the Incident; and
(g)after AB informed the appellant about the Incident, the appellant did not report the Incident pursuant to s 124B(1) of the Children Act.
The appellant did not rely upon any of the defences available under s 124B(3) of the Children Act.
The issue at the trial was whether at the material time the appellant 'believe[d] on reasonable grounds', within s 124B(1) of the Children Act, that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse.
The magistrate was satisfied that, in the circumstances, the only reasonable inference was that at the material time the appellant had formed the requisite belief on reasonable grounds. His Honour was also satisfied to the criminal standard that the prosecution had proved the other elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, his Honour entered a judgment of conviction.

The magistrate's reasons for convicting the appellant

The magistrate's reasons for convicting the appellant were, relevantly, as follows.
His Honour said that, in the present case, 'a belief on reasonable grounds can only be proven by inference' (ts 3). His Honour then recounted the principles relating to the drawing of inferences. In particular, his Honour noted that 'guilt must not only be a rational inference, but the only rational inference that the circumstances enable me to draw' (ts 4). His Honour added that the prosecution 'must exclude all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence before I can convict' (ts 4).
The magistrate observed, in essence, that the critical question in the present case was 'whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [the appellant], during the relevant period, form[ed] the belief on reasonable grounds that AB had had his anus penetrated with a carrot' (ts 5).
His Honour noted that the phrase 'believed on reasonable grounds' in s 124B(1) of the Children Act is not defined and said that the words of the phrase therefore bear their ordinary and natural meaning (ts 5). His Honour referred to the decision of the High Court in George v Rockett[2] in relation to the meaning of the phrase 'reasonable grounds for suspecting' in s 679 of the Criminal Code (Qld); namely '[b]elief is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture'.
[2] George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104, 116 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron & McHugh JJ).
The magistrate acknowledged that evidence had been given as to the appellant's good character. His Honour said that the evidence was relevant, first, to whether the appellant would commit an offence of the kind in question and, secondly, to the appellant's credibility.
The appellant made various out of court statements, both written and oral, to others. In particular, on 15 August 2018 the appellant participated in a video recorded interview with investigators at the Department of Communities. The appellant did not, however, give evidence at the trial.
At breakfast on each day of the tour of Japan the students engaged in a 'fines session'. This involved students nominating a person to pay a modest fine. The fines were pooled with a view to the funds being donated to a local charity.
His Honour recounted, in essence, that in the video recorded interview:
(a)The appellant said that at a 'fines session' during a breakfast on the tour of Japan, some of the boys were 'nudging at AB'. When the appellant asked whether 'there was anything they needed to know about', AB replied 'Oh, yeah. Oh, they put a carrot in my bum'. The appellant said that he asked AB 'to leave that for now and asked him to stay behind'. The appellant said that he made those comments for the purpose of 'shutting it down without making it too obvious' because he did not want AB to be 'too embarrassed' (ts 7).
(b)The appellant said that AB told him that he was 'fine' and did not want anything done about the Incident. When prompted about what he had said during the breakfast, AB replied, 'it's okay. I'm not worried'. When further prompted, AB would not say what had happened. He merely said they were 'mucking around'. The appellant said that AB was asked whether he needed to see a doctor. AB responded that he was fine. The appellant and Mr Hailes decided 'to keep an eye on [AB]' (ts 7).
(c)Ultimately, the appellant said that he did not believe that the Incident had occurred. The appellant explained that, if he had believed that the Incident had occurred, AB and the boys concerned would have been sent home to Perth and the tour would probably have finished early (ts 7).
So, the appellant denied having formed the requisite belief, within s 124B(1), at the material time (ts 8).
The magistrate found that, on 12 September 2017, Peter Norman, who was then the Acting Headmaster of Trinity College, sent an email to the appellant asking him to make 'a signed written statement outlining your recollections of the incident that occurred on the Japan rugby tour'. Mr Norman asked the appellant to include as much detail as he could recall. On 13 September 2017, the appellant gave Mr Norman a written statement which was tendered at the trial and became exhibit 3 (ts 9).
The appellant asserted in the statement that (ts 9 ‑ 10):
(a)the Incident occurred on or about 11 April 2017, but he did not hear about it until the next morning;
(b)AB 'initially didn't want to say anything further other than that there had been wrestling but, upon further questioning, he opened up about the object (a carrot) being put into his anus';
(c)AB was asked whether he was physically hurt and AB said that he was not;
(d)AB refused to give any names and AB did not want anything done about the Incident; and
(e)the appellant and Mr Hailes 'respected [AB's] wishes in the matter and didn't take it any further'.
After noting that AB was a prosecution witness at the trial, his Honour made these findings and observations about AB's evidence (ts 10 ‑ 11):
(a)AB said that on the night before a training session a carrot was forced into his anus.
(b)AB said that during the fines session at breakfast the next day, AB announced that he had had a carrot 'shoved up his arse'.
(c)AB said that the appellant and Mr Hailes were 'nearby' when he made that statement.
(d)AB said that the appellant turned to Mr Hailes and commented, 'Did you hear that?' and, when it appeared that Mr Hailes had not heard, AB repeated his announcement louder.
(e)AB said that he believed that a student told everyone to go and get ready.
(f)AB said that later, on the stairs, the appellant asked him if he wanted it followed up, and he said 'No'.
(g)AB said that Mr Hailes was not present when he had that conversation with the appellant.
(h)His Honour noted that some of AB's evidence 'did not accord with' other evidence. For example, the other 'student witnesses' at the trial said that AB's announcement at the fines session was along the lines of, 'You know what you did. You know who you are'. In other words, the other 'student witnesses' gave evidence to the effect that AB's announcement was not specific.
(i)His Honour also noted that AB used expressions in giving evidence such as 'to the best of my recollection'. AB also accepted that there were some matters that he could not recall. When AB was asked in cross‑examination about his use of the expression 'to the best of my recollection', AB said that part of his treatment for what had occurred during the Incident was a process in which a psychiatrist removed emotion from AB's memory. There was no further evidence at the trial about that treatment process. His Honour concluded that AB's evidence about the treatment process involved the provision of a reason for his lack of capacity to recall every detail.
(j)His Honour said that, on the whole of the evidence, he had a doubt about whether AB announced 'the precise incident at the fines session in front of everybody, including the other students, or whether he did say the words, "You know who you are. You know what you did" in front of everyone'.
(k)His Honour said, however, that he was satisfied, on the totality of the evidence, that AB did tell the appellant that 'his anus had been penetrated with a carrot, or words to that effect, very shortly afterwards, either while everyone was leaving or once they had left'. His Honour explained that he made that finding because AB gave evidence that 'he said it while they were in that breakfast room'; the appellant said during the video recorded interview with investigators at the Department of Communities that 'at breakfast, AB had said they put a carrot in his bum'; and AB's evidence on the point 'also accords with [the appellant's] account in [the written statement which the appellant gave Mr Norman] that, before the training session, AB made the disclosure'.

The magistrate concluded (ts 12):
Having found that AB told [the appellant] that his anus had been penetrated with a carrot, or whatever words he used, I'm also satisfied in the circumstances that the only reasonable inference is that [the appellant] also formed the requisite belief and that it was on reasonable grounds. I reject what [the appellant] said in his video record of interview about not believing that it had occurred because he also said that he felt AB was embarrassed at breakfast and then shut it down. [The appellant] asked [AB] if he needed to see a doctor and said that he had kept [an] eye on him during the rest of the tour and decided to respect his wishes. On that basis, I … find that the prosecution has proven [the] charge [against the appellant] beyond a reasonable doubt.

The statutory framework governing the primary appeal and the appeal to this court

The primary appeal before Quinlan CJ was governed by div 2 of pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA). Division 2 comprises s 7 to s 15.
Section 8(1) of the Criminal Appeals Act provides, relevantly and in effect, that an appeal against conviction may be made under div 2 of pt 2 of the Act on one or more of these grounds:
(a)that the court of summary jurisdiction:
(i)made an error of law or fact, or of both law and fact;
(ii)acted without or in excess of jurisdiction;
(b)that there has been a miscarriage of justice.
Section 14(1) of the Criminal Appeals Act provides, relevantly, that in deciding an appeal, the Supreme Court may do one or more of the following:
(a)dismiss the appeal;
(b)allow the appeal;
(c)set aside or vary the decision of the court of summary jurisdiction …;
(d)substitute a decision that should have been made by the court of summary jurisdiction;
(e)order the case to be dealt with again by the court of summary jurisdiction, with or without orders to that court ‑
(i) as to how or by whom it is to be constituted;
(ii) as to how it must deal with the case;
(f)…
(g)…
(h)…
(i)make any other order it thinks fit.
By s 14(2) of the Criminal Appeals Act, despite s 14(1)(b), even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, the Supreme Court may dismiss the appeal 'if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred'.
The appeal before this court is governed by div 3 of pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act. Division 3 comprises s 16 to s 19.
By s 16(2) of the Criminal Appeals Act, a party to an appeal under div 2 of pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 'who is aggrieved by a decision made in the appeal by a single judge of the Supreme Court sitting in its General Division' that:
(a)refuses leave to appeal; or
(b) dismisses or decides an appeal,
may appeal to this court against the decision.
By s 18, read with s 14(1), of the Criminal Appeals Act, in deciding the appeal under div 3, this court may, relevantly:
(a)dismiss the appeal;
(b)allow the appeal;
(c)set aside or vary the decision of the Supreme Court sitting in its General Division and any order made or thing done as a result of the decision;
(d)substitute a decision that should have been made by the Supreme Court sitting in its General Division;
(e)make any other order it thinks fit.
By s 18, read with s 14(2), of the Criminal Appeals Act, even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, this court may dismiss the appeal 'if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred'.

The appellant's grounds of appeal in the primary appeal to the Supreme Court in its General Division

The appellant relied upon two grounds of appeal in the primary appeal to the Supreme Court in its General Division.
Ground 1 alleged that '[t]he verdict of guilty was unsafe and unsupported by the evidence, occasioning a miscarriage of justice'.
Ground 2 alleged that the magistrate failed to give adequate reasons for his decision, thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.
Quinlan CJ considered the proper construction of the phrase 'believes on reasonable grounds' in s 124B(1)(b) of the Children Act.
His Honour made these observations in relation to the proper construction of the required 'mental state' under s 124B(1)(b), namely 'belief' [105 ‑ 107]:
In its ordinary and natural meaning a 'belief' is a mental acceptance of a statement, fact, doctrine or thing (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary). What 'belief' denotes as to the nature (or strength) of that acceptance will, however, depend upon the context in which it is used. That is, in its context, 'belief' may denote a more, or less, strong acceptance of the truth of a proposition.
For example, in many contexts 'belief' would be understood to be an assent to a proposition that is less strong than 'knowledge'. As the Macquarie Dictionary says, for example, a 'belief' is 'based on grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge'. A person might properly say of a particular event, for example, 'I believe that it occurred, although I do not know that to be the case'. (original emphasis)
On the other hand, 'belief' ordinarily denotes a state of mind that is more than mere 'suspicion'. Belief denotes a degree of assent to a proposition as to a state of affairs that is lacking in suspicion.
In George v Rockett the High Court considered the meaning of both 'belief' and 'suspicion' in the context of provisions authorising the issue of a search warrant. In that context, the Court said [George v Rockett, 116 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron & McHugh JJ)]:
The objective circumstances sufficient to show a reason to believe something need to point more clearly to the subject matter of the belief, but that is not to say that the objective circumstances must establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter in fact occurred or exists: the assent of belief is given on more slender evidence than proof.
Quinlan CJ cited George v Rockett in support of these propositions [109]:
[B]elief as 'an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition' is a form of assent that should not be equated to knowledge of certainty. Similarly it is not to be equated with satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt or on the balance of probabilities.
His Honour said that '[a] similar purpose' to the statutory purpose of the provisions considered in George v Rockett 'may be discerned from the provisions of pt 4 div 9A of the [Children Act]' [111]. His Honour explained:
[Part 4 div 9A] is concerned with the reporting of beliefs as to sexual abuse, which beliefs might then become the subject of investigation. Section 124D, for example provides that the CEO is required to give a copy of each written report to the Commissioner of Police. The statutory context contemplates that a person's 'belief' that sexual abuse has occurred, giving rise to a report, is a matter that may be expected to initiate an investigation as to whether sexual abuse has in fact occurred (rather than conclude such an investigation). (original emphasis)
Quinlan CJ then observed:
(a)The statutory context and purpose of s 124B 'indicates that a "belief" that a child has been subject to abuse may well, as the High Court expressed it in George v Rockett "leave something to surmise or conjecture"' [112].
(b)The 'reasonable grounds' upon which a person may 'form the belief' under s 124B(1) 'could potentially come from a wide variety of sources of information'. Those sources of information might not include 'an actual allegation of abuse by the child'. The obligation to report applies to doctors and nurses who may, from time to time, form the requisite belief on the basis of a physical examination of the child and without an allegation [113].
(c)It is apparent from s 124C(3) that a person who provides a report may not know, or be able to report, the name of the child or the name of any person who might be responsible for the alleged sexual abuse [114].
His Honour emphasised that those observations did not deny 'the requirement for the court to be satisfied, on a charge under s 124B(1), that the accused had an actual belief that a child had been the subject of sexual abuse' [115]. His Honour elaborated that '[i]t is simply to recognise that such a belief may exist, notwithstanding that the person's understanding of the relevant circumstances may be incomplete or that there may remain a measure of uncertainty or doubt in relation to the issue, such that the belief would fall short of a legal standard of proof' [115].
Quinlan CJ concluded that, upon a proper construction of the Children Act, the appellant's submission that 'if there is uncertainty there is not belief' should be rejected [115].
As to ground 1, Quinlan CJ held:
(a)Even giving full weight to the appellant's good character, when the circumstances of AB's disclosure, the appellant's response to that disclosure and the appellant's responses to Mr Norman in September 2017 are taken together, there is no room for doubt that the appellant believed that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse, as defined in the Children Act, and the only reasonable inference was that the appellant did have such a belief [193].
(b)Having regard to the video recorded interview as a whole, the appellant's statements to the effect that he did not believe that AB had been subject to sexual abuse were unreliable and must be rejected [195]. The video recorded interview generally was inconsistent with the appellant's earlier, more reliable account in the written statement which he gave to Mr Norman [195]. Further, the appellant's account in the video recorded interview was internally inconsistent and implausible [195].
(c)The appellant knew (and, indeed, recorded it in the written statement which he gave to Mr Norman) that AB had said that an object had been 'put into his anus', where it was clear that the insertion of the object was done contrary to his wishes. That knowledge was enough to give the appellant all the information he needed in order to know that AB was saying that he had been sexually abused [205].
(d)To the extent that the video recorded interview contained denials of the appellant's positive belief, those denials must be rejected in light of all of the circumstances. Those denials could not, when considered in light of all of the circumstances, give rise to a reasonable inference consistent with innocence [206].
(e)In all of the circumstances, there was only one rational inference [207].
(f)The magistrate was correct to conclude that the only reasonable inference was that the appellant formed the requisite belief and that it was on reasonable grounds [208].
As to ground 2, his Honour said he was not satisfied that the magistrate's reasons failed to set out the intellectual process that led to his decision [220].
Quinlan CJ noted that in the magistrate's reasons his Honour [220]:
(a)found that AB had told the appellant words to the effect that his anus had been penetrated with a carrot;
(b)found that the written statement which the appellant gave to Mr Norman was intended by the appellant to be, and was, an accurate reflection of the appellant's knowledge;
(c)rejected the appellant's account in the video recorded interview that he did not believe that AB had been sexually assaulted; and
(d)gave logical reasons for rejecting the appellant's account in the video recorded interview, including that the appellant asked AB if he wanted to see a doctor, the appellant said that he had kept an eye on AB during the rest of the tour and the appellant decided to respect AB's wishes.
In all of the circumstances, his Honour was not satisfied that the magistrate failed to give adequate reasons or that any miscarriage of justice was occasioned by his Honour's reasons [222].
As we have mentioned, Quinlan CJ refused leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant's grounds of appeal in the appeal to this court

The appellant relies upon three grounds of appeal in the appeal to this court.
Ground 1 alleges that Quinlan CJ erred in law in holding that the required belief under s 124B(1) of the Children Act 'may leave something to surmise or conjecture'; in holding that the required belief may be established even if an accused has some 'uncertainty or doubt' as to the truth of the complaint; and by rejecting the appellant's submission that 'if there is uncertainty there is not the [required] belief'.
Ground 2 alleges that his Honour erred in law in reaching his decision that the appellant held the required belief under s 124B(1) by effectively substituting the civil standard of proof for the criminal standard of proof in stating that the appellant's conduct made his holding the required belief 'far more likely' and was 'consistent' with his holding it.
Ground 3 alleges that his Honour erred in law in deciding that the evidence at the trial established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant actually held the required belief and his Honour should have held that, although the evidence provided 'reasonable grounds' for the appellant to form the required belief, the evidence did not exclude a reasonable alternative inference consistent with innocence, namely that the appellant did not actually form the required belief, but either disbelieved AB or was unsure whether or not to believe him.

Ground 1: the appellant's submissions

Counsel for the appellant submitted that a person will not have breached s 124B(1) of the Children Act if the person has not formed an 'actual belief' that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse or is the subject of ongoing sexual abuse.
It was submitted that the ordinary and natural meaning of 'belief' is a mental acceptance of a fact. The word 'believes', as a cognate form of 'belief', in s 124B(1) bears that ordinary and natural meaning.
Counsel submitted that the fact that a report under s 124B(1), if made, may be expected to initiate an investigation (as Quinlan CJ said at [111]), does not mean that a 'belief', for the purposes of s 124B(1), may be formed even if there is 'uncertainty'. It was submitted that 'uncertainty' in the mind is inconsistent with 'acceptance' in the mind. If a person has a 'doubt', the person does not have a 'belief'.
It was submitted that if the word 'belief', for the purposes of s 124B(1), has a broader connotation than its ordinary and natural meaning, then a person to whom s 124B(1) applies would be bound to report alleged sexual abuse even though the person did not actually believe that the child had been the subject of sexual abuse or was the subject of ongoing sexual abuse. It was submitted that this could not have been an intended operation of the reporting obligation in s 124B(1).
Counsel submitted that George v Rockett does not support Quinlan CJ's conclusion that 'belief', within s 124B(1), may be something less than 'acceptance'. The question in George v Rockett was whether there were 'reasonable grounds' for suspecting or believing the existence of certain documents relevant to a possible forgery, and not whether a 'belief' or 'suspicion' was actually held.

Ground 1: the respondent's submissions

Counsel for the respondent submitted that Quinlan CJ's construction of s 124B(1) of the Children Act was correct.
It was also submitted that, even if this court were to find that his Honour made an error of law in rejecting the appellant's contention that 'if there is uncertainty there is no belief', the court should nevertheless dismiss the appeal. The rationale for that submission was that, as the respondent submits in relation to ground 3, the only reasonable inference for the magistrate to draw from all of the evidence was that the appellant believed AB's account of what had happened to him and, therefore, the appellant believed (on reasonable grounds) that AB had been the subject of 'sexual abuse' as defined in s 124A.

Ground 1: its merits

The focus of statutory construction is upon the text of the provisions having regard to their context and purpose.
The statutory text is the surest guide to Parliament's intention. A decision as to the meaning of the text requires consideration of the context, in its widest sense, including the general purpose and policy of the provision. See Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority;[3] Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT);[4] Travelex Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation;[5] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[6]
[3] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 [69] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby & Hayne JJ).
[4] Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (NT) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 [47] (Hayne, Heydon, Crennan & Kiefel JJ).
[5] Travelex Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 33; (2010) 241 CLR 510 [82] (Crennan & Bell JJ).
[6] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle & Gordon JJ).
The context includes the existing state of the law, the history of the legislative scheme and the mischief to which the statute is directed. See CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd.[7]
[7] CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey & Gummow JJ).
The purpose of legislation must be derived from the statutory text and not from any assumption about the desired or desirable reach or operation of the relevant provisions. See Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross.[8] The intended reach of a legislative provision is to be discerned from the words of the provision and not by making an a priori assumption about its purpose. See Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations (Cth) v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd.[9]
[8] Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378 [26] (French CJ & Hayne J).
[9] Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations (Cth) v Gribbles Radiology Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 9; (2005) 222 CLR 194 [21] (Gleeson CJ, Hayne, Callinan & Heydon JJ).
As we have mentioned, pt 4 of the Children Act is headed 'Protection and care of children'. Division 9A of pt 4 is concerned with the reporting of sexual abuse of children.
The apparent purpose or object of the duty to report that is imposed on doctors, nurses, midwives, police officers, teachers and boarding supervisors by s 124B(1) is to facilitate:
(a)the protection of children who have been the subject of sexual abuse or are the subject of ongoing sexual abuse;
(b)the identification of persons who are alleged to be responsible for the sexual abuse;
(c)the investigation by police of suspected offences in relation to children; and
(d)the prosecution of offences in relation to children.
In his second reading speech on the Bill which upon enactment inserted div 9A of pt 4 into the Children Act, the Attorney General, Mr J A McGinty, said that the executive government considered 'that children are more likely to disclose sexual abuse to doctors, nurses, midwives, teachers and police officers and that doctors, nurses and midwives are in the best position to identify clinical signs of sexual abuse'.[10]
[10] Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 28 November 2007, 7901c ‑ 7902a.
Section 124B(1) imposes a duty on specified people to report sexual abuse of children and creates an offence if any of those people fail to perform that duty.
The relevant text of s 124B(1), for present purposes, reads:
A person who -
(a)is a … teacher …; and
(b)believes on reasonable grounds that a child -
(i)has been the subject of sexual abuse …; or
(ii)…
and
(c)forms the belief -
(i)in the course of the person’s work (whether paid or unpaid) as a … teacher …; and
(ii)…
must report the belief as soon as practicable after forming the belief.
Penalty: a fine of $6 000.

As we have mentioned, the word 'believes' (and cognate forms of that word) and the term 'reasonable grounds' are not defined in the Children Act.
By s 124B(2), a report required under s 124B(1) must be made to the CEO (s 124C(2)(a)) or a person approved by the CEO (s 124C(2)(b)) or a person who is a member of a class of persons approved by the CEO (s 124C(2)(c)).
By s 124C(1), a report required under s 124B(1) may be written or oral but if oral the reporter must make a written report as soon as practicable after the oral report is made.
By s 124C(3), a report required under s 124B(1) must contain, amongst other things:
(a)the name of the child or, if the child's name cannot be obtained after reasonable enquiries, a description of the child (s 124C(3)(b));
(b)if, or to the extent, known to the reporter, the child's date of birth, information about where the child lives and the name of the child's parents or other appropriate persons as defined in s 41(1) (s 124C(3)(c));
(c)the grounds for the reporter's belief that the child has been the subject of sexual abuse (s 124C(3)(d)); and
(d)if, or to the extent, known to the reporter, the name of any person alleged to be responsible for the sexual abuse, the person's contact details and the person's relationship to the child (s 124C(3)(ea)).
By s 124C(4), a person mentioned in s 124B(2)(b) or (c) who receives:
(a)a written report must give the report to the CEO as soon as practicable after receiving it; or
(b)an oral report must inform the CEO of the contents of the report as soon as practicable after receiving it.
By s 124D(2), the CEO must give a copy of each written report to the Commissioner of Police as soon as practicable after the report is received by the CEO.
It is apparent from the text of s 124B(1) that, relevantly, a teacher's duty to report a 'belief' that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse is engaged if the teacher 'believes on reasonable grounds' that the child has been the subject of sexual abuse and the teacher 'forms the belief' in the course of the teacher's work as a teacher.
The critical phrase, for present purposes, is that the teacher 'believes on reasonable grounds' that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse, and not that there are 'reasonable grounds for believing' that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse.
In our opinion, on the proper construction of the phrase 'believes on reasonable grounds' in s 124B(1), having regard to s 124B and related provisions considered as a whole, a teacher's duty to report will not arise unless, first, the teacher has an actual subjective belief that a child has been sexually abused and, secondly, there are objectively reasonable grounds for that belief having regard to the information available to the teacher.
It must be remembered, in deciding whether and to what extent the observations of the High Court in George v Rockett apply in construing the phrase 'believes on reasonable grounds' in s 124B(1), that:
(a)George v Rockett was concerned with the requirement in s 679 of the Criminal Code (Qld) that a justice be satisfied that there were 'reasonable grounds for suspecting' the matters specified in that provision before issuing a search warrant; whereas
(b)section 124B(1) imposes a duty on a specified person who 'believes on reasonable grounds' that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse to report the belief and s 124B(1) also creates an offence if the person fails to perform that duty.
We will consider, first, the nature of the actual subjective belief with which s 124B(1) is concerned.
In George v Rockett (116), the High Court stated that '[b]elief' is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and 'the grounds' which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.
Prior v Mole[11] was concerned with the statutory power of a police officer to apprehend without warrant and take into custody a person if the police officer had 'reasonable grounds for believing' the person was intoxicated and in a public place. Gageler J said [24]:
(a)'belief' is more than 'suspicion';
(b)'belief' is not merely an 'apprehension' or even a 'fear'; and
(c)'belief' is an actual 'inclination of the mind'.
[11] Prior v Mole [2017] HCA 10; (2017) 261 CLR 265.
The word 'belief', in its ordinary and natural meaning, connotes, relevantly, that a person has formed a positive inclination in his or her mind to accept a proposition of fact, based on information available to the person. See Macquarie Dictionary (Online) 'believe' (def 2, 3); The Australian Oxford Dictionary (2^nd ed, 2004) 'believe'; Prior [4] (Kiefel and Bell JJ), [24] (Gageler J), [100] (Gordon J).
The notion that 'belief' involves the formation of a 'positive inclination' in the mind to accept a proposition of fact acknowledges that ordinarily the mind will decide whether to accept a proposition of fact after weighing the probabilities by reference to the available information. The 'belief' of a person is ordinarily a conclusion after the probabilities have been weighed.
A 'belief' is more than a 'suspicion' and is ordinarily less than 'positive knowledge'. The intermediate position of 'belief' in this spectrum between 'suspicion' and 'positive knowledge' recognises that the information available to a person who forms a belief may be from external sources, including hearsay, which the person may be unable independently to verify.
The word 'belief' is of sufficient breadth to describe a state of mind which regards the existence of a proposition of fact as certain and also a state of mind which inclines towards accepting rather than rejecting that the proposition of fact exists, but acknowledges a doubt, a prospect or a chance that the proposition of fact may not exist. See Restatement of the Law of Torts (vol 2, 1934) § 289 d; Grove PB, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993) 'belief'; Australian Legal Dictionary (2^nd ed, 2016) 'belief'.
A person's mind will not incline towards accepting a proposition of fact if the person's mind inclines towards rejecting the proposition of fact or if the person's state of mind is that he or she is unable to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other.
The word 'believes', as part of the phrase 'believes on reasonable grounds', in s 124B(1) must be construed in context.
The relevant context includes the following. First, the apparent purpose or object of the duty to report in s 124B(1) is to facilitate the protection of children who have been the subject of sexual abuse or are the subject of ongoing sexual abuse and to facilitate the other purposes or objects that we have enumerated at [77] above. Secondly, there must be objectively reasonable grounds for the actual subjective belief that has been formed by a person specified in s 124B(1) having regard to the information available to that person. Thirdly, if the requisite belief exists the person must report the belief as soon as practicable after forming the belief. Fourthly, if the requisite belief exists the person must report the belief and the grounds for the person's belief even though the person may not know basic information in relation to the child (s 124C(3)(b) and (c)) or basic information in relation to any person alleged to be responsible for the sexual abuse (s 124C(3)(ea)). Fifthly, the CEO must give a copy of each written report made pursuant to s 124B to the Commissioner of Police as soon as practicable after the report is received by the CEO (s 124D(2)). Sixthly, it is contemplated that police will investigate any 'suspected offence' in relation to the child following receipt by the Commissioner of Police of each written report (s 124F(2)(c) and (d)). Seventhly, s 124B(1) not only imposes a duty to report sexual abuse of children, but creates an offence if that duty is not performed.
The ordinary and natural meaning of the word 'belief', in combination with the relevant context in which the word 'believes' (as part of the phrase 'believes on reasonable grounds' in s 124B(1)) must be construed, is critical in determining the degree or strength of the inclination that must be formed in the mind of a person specified in s 124B(1) for the person to 'believe', within s 124B(1), that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse.
In our opinion, a person specified in s 124B(1) will 'believe' that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse if the person forms a positive inclination in his or her mind, based on information available to the person, to accept rather than reject that the child has been sexually abused. The person will have the requisite 'belief', within s 124B(1), if the person is positively inclined to accept, having regard to the information available to the person, that the child has been the subject of sexual abuse. It is not inconsistent with the formation of the requisite 'belief' that the person has some doubt about whether the child has in fact been sexually abused or the person acknowledges a prospect or a chance that the child may not have been sexually abused. However, the person will not have the requisite 'belief', within s 124B(1), if the person is positively inclined to reject, having regard to the information available to the person, that the child has been sexually abused or if the person is unable to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other.
We will now consider the objectively reasonable grounds with which s 124B(1) is concerned.
Section 124B(1) is not concerned solely with whether a specified person has an actual subjective belief that a child has been sexually abused. Similarly, s 124B(1) is not concerned solely with whether there are objectively reasonable grounds to believe that a child has been sexually abused. As we have mentioned, the duty to report under s 124B will not arise unless a specified person has an actual subjective belief that a child has been sexually abused and there are objectively reasonable grounds for that belief having regard to the information available to the person.
As the High Court said in George v Rockett (112), in the context of the expression 'reasonable grounds' for a state of mind:
When a statute prescribes that there must be 'reasonable grounds' for a state of mind - including suspicion and belief ‑ it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person. (emphasis added)
The notion of 'reasonable grounds' imports an objective criterion. See Anderson v Judges of the District Court of New South Wales;[12] R (on the application of Evans) v Attorney General;[13] Hyder v Commonwealth of Australia;[14] State of New South Wales v Bouffler.[15]
[12] Anderson v Judges of the District Court of New South Wales (1992) 27 NSWLR 701, 714 (Kirby P; Meagher & Sheller JJA agreeing).
[13] R (on the application of Evans) v Attorney General [2014] QB 855 [36] (Lord Dyson MR; Richards & Pitchford LJJ agreeing).
[14] Hyder v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] NSWCA 336; (2012) 217 A Crim R 571 [15] (McColl JA).
[15] State of New South Wales v Bouffler [2017] NSWCA 185; (2017) 95 NSWLR 521 [87] (Beazley ACJ, Ward and Gleeson JJA).
What constitutes reasonable grounds for the formation of a stipulated belief must be judged having regard to the information available to the person when he or she formed that belief. See Ruddock v Taylor;[16] Hyder [15]; Bouffler [87].
[16] Ruddock v Taylor [2005] HCA 48; (2005) 222 CLR 612 [40] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).
The mind of a person specified in s 124B(1) will ordinarily decide whether to accept that a child has been sexually abused after weighing the probabilities by reference to the available information. The formation of the requisite belief on 'reasonable grounds' may involve the making of inferences and may involve conjecture if the inferences and the conjecture are supported by the information available to the person. However, the requisite belief will not be formed on 'reasonable grounds' if (or to the extent that) the formation of the belief involves guesswork or speculation or if (or to the extent that) the formation of the belief involves supposition that is not supported by the information available to the person. The requirement that a person specified in s 124B(1) have not only an actual subjective belief that a child has been sexually abused, but also objectively reasonable grounds for the formation of that subjective belief, based on the information available to the person, underscores that guesswork or speculation and that supposition that is not supported by the information available to the person, is inconsistent with the person believing on 'reasonable grounds', within s 124B(1), that the child has been sexually abused.
In the present case, Quinlan CJ said that the statutory context and purpose of s 124B indicates that 'a "belief" that a child has been subject to abuse may well, as the High Court expressed it in George v Rockett, "leave something to surmise or conjecture"' [112]. That observation by his Honour erroneously conflated the notion of 'belief' and the notion of 'reasonable grounds'. The High Court in George v Rockett referred to '[leaving] something to surmise or conjecture' in the context of the grounds which can reasonably induce a belief as distinct from the belief itself as a subjective inclination of the mind.
However, later in his reasons, Quinlan CJ stressed in effect that the observation at [112] of his reasons simply recognised that the requisite belief may exist 'notwithstanding that the person's understanding of the relevant circumstances may be incomplete or that there may remain a measure of uncertainty or doubt in relation to the issue, such that the belief would fall short of a legal standard of proof' [115]. His Honour concluded that the appellant's submission that 'if there is uncertainty there is not belief', for the purposes of s 124B(1), should be rejected [115].
We are not persuaded, when Quinlan CJ's reasons are read as a whole, that the impugned passages in his Honour's reasons reveal that his Honour made a material error in construing the nature of the required belief under s 124B(1). In particular, we are not persuaded that his Honour's references to 'surmise or conjecture', when evaluated in the context of his Honour's reasons as a whole, indicate that his Honour was of the view that a person will have the requisite 'belief', within s 124B(1), despite the person not being positively inclined to accept, having regard to the information available to the person, that the child has been sexually abused. The existence of some uncertainty or doubt about whether a child has been the subject of sexual abuse is not necessarily inconsistent with the formation by the person of the requisite belief.
As we have indicated, any issue of 'surmise or conjecture', in the context of s 124B(1), arises when considering whether a person's 'belief' that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse has been formed on 'reasonable grounds'. The person will not form the requisite belief on 'reasonable grounds' if (or to the extent that) the formation of the belief involved guesswork or speculation or if (or to the extent that) the formation of the belief involved supposition that was not supported by the information available to the person.
We are not persuaded that Quinlan CJ's observation that 'belief' that a child has been subject to sexual abuse may 'leave something to surmise or conjecture', when considered in the context of his Honour's reasons as a whole, indicates that, in his Honour's view, the requisite belief may be formed wholly or partly by guesswork or speculation or by supposition that is not supported by the information available to the person.
In any event, even if Quinlan CJ made a material error as alleged in ground 1, it is plain from the magistrate's reasons that his Honour found that the appellant believed AB's account of the sexual abuse and that the appellant believed, on reasonable grounds, that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse. In other words, the magistrate held in substance that the appellant formed a positive inclination in his mind, based on information available to him (in particular, the information supplied to him by AB), that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse and that there were reasonable grounds for that belief. Further, as we will explain, the magistrate did not err in law, as alleged in ground 3, in deciding that the evidence at the trial established, beyond reasonable doubt, that at the material time the appellant held the required belief.
Ground 1 has not been made out. In any event, no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred because the magistrate's reasoning towards guilt was not erroneous and his Honour's conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the charged offence was correct. See s 18, read with s 14(2), of the Criminal Appeals Act.

Ground 2

Ground 2 alleges that Quinlan CJ erred in law in reaching his decision that the appellant held the required belief under s 124B(1) by effectively substituting the civil standard of proof for the criminal standard of proof in stating that the appellant's conduct made his holding the required belief 'far more likely' and was 'consistent' with his holding it.
The impugned remarks by Quinlan CJ were made during his Honour's consideration of ground 1 of the primary appeal, which alleged that the magistrate's verdict of guilty was unsafe and unsupported by the evidence.
If a teacher is charged with an offence against s 124B(1), the elements of the offence which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt include, relevantly:
(a)the teacher 'formed' the 'belief' that a child had been the subject of sexual abuse; and
(b)the teacher 'formed' that 'belief' on 'reasonable grounds'.
The state of mind, at the material time, of an accused who has been charged with an offence against s 124B(1) will ordinarily be ascertainable only by inference from other facts and circumstances that are established by the evidence. See R v Pangilinan.[17]
[17] R v Pangilinan [1999] QCA 528; [2001] 1 Qd R 56 [25] (McMurdo P, Davies and Thomas JJA).
Where the prosecution relies upon circumstantial evidence, guilt must not only be a reasonable and a rational inference, but must be the only reasonable and rational inference that could be drawn from the circumstances. See Plomp v The Queen;[18] Shepherd v The Queen.[19]
[18] Plomp v The Queen [1963] HCA 44; (1963) 110 CLR 234, 243 (Dixon CJ).
[19] Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573, 578 (Dawson J).
Circumstantial evidence must not be considered on a piecemeal basis. It must be evaluated in its entirety. See R v Hillier,[20] where Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ said:
The case against Mr Hillier was a circumstantial case. It has often been said that a jury cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on circumstantial evidence unless no other explanation than guilt is reasonably compatible with the circumstances (See, eg, Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234 at 243 per Dixon CJ). It is of critical importance to recognise, however, that in considering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consistent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence (Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 579 per Dawson J).
[20] R v Hillier [2007] HCA 13; (2007) 228 CLR 618 [46].
In Shepherd (579), Dawson J noted that the inference which the fact finding tribunal may actually be asked to make in a case based on circumstantial evidence may simply be the accused's guilt. His Honour then qualified that general proposition by stating that in most, if not all, cases, the ultimate inference of guilt must be drawn from some intermediate fact, whether that intermediate factual conclusion is expressly identified or not (579). His Honour then made these observations about the proof of intermediate facts (579):
Proof of an intermediate fact will depend upon the evidence, usually a body of individual items of evidence, and it may itself be a matter of inference. More than one intermediate fact may be identifiable; indeed the number will depend to some extent upon how minutely the elements of the crime in question are dissected, bearing in mind that the ultimate burden which lies upon the prosecution is the proof of those elements.

In the present case, Quinlan CJ repeatedly stated, in the course of considering ground 1 of the primary appeal, that the applicable standard of proof in relation to the belief held by the appellant under s 124B(1) was the criminal standard; in particular, that it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that the only reasonable inference open on the facts and circumstances established by the evidence was that the appellant formed the requisite belief and that no inference in relation to the appellant's belief, consistent with innocence, was reasonably open on the evidence. See [122], [123], [125], [126], [128], [129], [163], [165], [170], [171], [193], [206], [207] and [208] of his Honour's reasons for decision.
Quinlan CJ's observations to the effect that:
(a)the facts and circumstances established by the evidence before the magistrate made the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant that the appellant either positively disbelieved AB or remained in a state of neutral 'agnosticism' far less likely and that it was '[f]ar more likely' that the appellant would have formed the belief that what AB had said was true [176]; and
(b)the appellant's response to what he was told by AB was 'consistent with' the appellant having believed AB [178],
were made in the course of his Honour examining the trial record to ascertain whether, despite the magistrate's advantage in having seen and heard the witnesses, the magistrate, acting rationally, should have entertained a reasonable doubt as to proof of guilt. In other words, Quinlan CJ made the impugned remarks in the course of determining for himself whether the evidence at trial was sufficient in nature and quality to remove any reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the offence charged. Quinlan CJ's approach to the examination of the trial record was in accordance with the approach mandated by numerous decisions of the High Court.
After completing his examination of the trial record, Quinlan CJ concluded that:
(a)there was no reasonable inference consistent with the appellant's innocence [206];
(b)rather, in all of the circumstances, there was only one rational inference [207]; and
(c)the magistrate was correct to conclude that the only reasonable inference was that the appellant formed the requisite belief and that it was on reasonable grounds [208].
Quinlan CJ did not 'effectively substitute the civil standard of proof for the criminal standard of proof', as alleged in ground 2.
Ground 2 has no reasonable prospect of success.

Ground 3

Ground 3 alleges that Quinlan CJ erred in law in deciding that the evidence at the trial established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant actually held the required belief and his Honour should have held that, although the evidence provided 'reasonable grounds' for the appellant to form the required belief, the evidence did not exclude a reasonable alternative inference consistent with innocence, namely that the appellant did not actually form the required belief, but either disbelieved AB or was unsure whether or not to believe him.
The function of an appeal court in determining whether, having regard to the evidence, a verdict of guilty on which a conviction is based is unreasonable or cannot be supported, is explained in Wark v The State of Western Australia.[21] Wark was concerned with a verdict of guilty entered after a trial before a judge and jury. However, the same principles apply to a verdict of guilty entered after a trial before a judge alone or before a magistrate. See Filippou v The Queen.[22]
[21] Wark v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 66 [329] ‑ [342] (Buss P, Mazza & Vaughan JJA).
[22] Filippou v The Queen [2015] HCA 29; (2015) 256 CLR 47 [12] (French CJ, Bell, Keane & Nettle JJ), [82] (Gageler J).
In the present case, the magistrate found that the following facts and circumstances were established by the evidence at the trial:
(a)On 12 April 2017, being the day after the Incident occurred, AB told the appellant that 'his anus had been penetrated with a carrot, or words to that effect, … either while everyone was leaving or once they had left' the breakfast (ts 10).
(b)AB's evidence on that issue accorded with '[the appellant's] account in [the written statement which the appellant gave Mr Norman on 13 September 2017] that, before the training session, AB made the disclosure' (ts 11).
(c)In the circumstances, the only reasonable inference was that the appellant formed the requisite belief and that it was on reasonable grounds. His Honour rejected what the appellant said in his video recorded interview on 15 August 2018 about not believing that AB's anus had been penetrated with a carrot because the appellant also said in his video recorded interview that he felt AB was embarrassed at breakfast and then the appellant shut it down. His Honour also rejected what the appellant said about not believing that AB's anus had been penetrated with a carrot because the appellant's out of court statements revealed that the appellant asked AB if he needed to see a doctor; the appellant kept an eye on AB during the rest of the tour; and the appellant decided to respect AB's wishes that he did not want to take the matter any further (ts 12).
We are satisfied, on our examination of the trial record as a whole and on our assessment of the magistrate's reasons as a whole, that his Honour was persuaded, to the criminal standard, that the appellant believed AB's account of the sexual abuse and that the appellant believed, on reasonable grounds, that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse. In other words, the magistrate held in substance that the appellant formed a positive inclination in his mind, based on information available to him (in particular, the information supplied to him by AB), that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse and that there were reasonable grounds for that belief.
Quinlan CJ carried out a detailed review of the trial record. In particular, his Honour found, having regard to the trial record, that:
(a)the combined effect of all of the circumstances was such as to exclude any reasonable inference that the appellant did not believe (or that he was agnostic) that some other boy or boys had penetrated AB's anus with a carrot, against his will [171];
(b)the only reasonable inference was that the appellant did believe that what AB said had happened to him, had in fact happened to him [171];
(c)for detailed reasons which his Honour gave, the appellant's denials in his video recorded interview that he had a positive belief that AB's anus had been penetrated with a carrot must be rejected [206];
(d)the appellant's denials of a positive belief could not, when considered in light of all of the circumstances, give rise to a reasonable inference consistent with innocence [206]; and
(e)in all of the circumstances, there was only one rational inference, namely that the appellant formed the requisite belief (that is, the appellant formed the positive belief, based on what AB had told him) that AB's anus had been penetrated with a carrot and that belief was formed on reasonable grounds [207] ‑ [208].
We are of the opinion, based on our review of the trial record, that:
(a)AB promptly reported to the appellant that he had been the subject of sexual abuse.
(b)The appellant admitted in his video recorded interview that at the time of the rugby tour he considered that AB was a 'trustworthy kid' (interview ts 14 ‑ 15).
(c)There was no evidence that, at the material time, AB was other than an honest, trustworthy and reliable boy.
(d)There was no evidence (apart from the appellant's self‑serving statements in his video recorded interview) that, when AB disclosed to the appellant that he had been the subject of sexual abuse, the appellant had a doubt or a suspicion about the accuracy or reliability of AB's account.
(e)There was no evidence of any reasonable basis for doubting or suspecting that AB's account to the appellant might not have been accurate and reliable.
(f)The appellant did not, in the written statement he gave Mr Norman on 13 September 2017, indicate that he had any doubt or suspicion about the accuracy or reliability of AB's account of the sexual abuse. If the appellant had any such doubt or suspicion, it is to be expected that a person in his position would have disclosed it to Mr Norman.
(g)The written statement the appellant gave Mr Norman on 13 September 2017 carries significantly more weight than the appellant's video recorded interview on 15 August 2018 having regard to the timing and circumstances of the written statement compared to the timing and circumstances of the video recorded interview.
(h)It is to be inferred that the reason why the appellant did not report that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse, as required by s 124B(1), was that AB did not want to pursue the matter and the appellant considered that not pursuing the matter was in the best interests of all concerned.
(i)The appellant's prior good character carries little weight having regard to the nature of the offence with which he was charged and the apparent explanation for his failure to report that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse.
(j)In the circumstances, the appellant's exculpatory statements in his video recorded interview were, having regard to the trial record as a whole and the factors we have mentioned in pars (a) to (i) above, not reasonably credible and the magistrate was correct to reject them.
After evaluating and weighing the evidence at the trial we are satisfied that:
(a)the appellant's exculpatory statements did not preclude the magistrate from being satisfied, to the criminal standard, that the appellant had an actual positive belief, based on what AB had said to him, that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse; and
(b)the magistrate was entitled to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution had proved all of the elements of the charged offence.
On our review of the trial record, the only reasonable inference open is that, at the material time, the appellant believed AB's account that he had been the subject of sexual abuse and that there were reasonable grounds for that belief. In other words, the only reasonable inference open is that, at the material time, the appellant was positively inclined to accept, having regard to the information available to him, that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse and that there were reasonable grounds for the formation of that belief. The appellant was not positively inclined, at any material time, to reject AB's account that he had been the subject of sexual abuse. The appellant was not unable, at any material time, to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other.
A tribunal of fact, acting reasonably, was not precluded by the state of the evidence at trial from convicting the appellant. A tribunal of fact, acting reasonably, was entitled to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, upon the combined force of all the facts and circumstances established by the evidence, that, between 12 April 2017 and 11 September 2017, the appellant, being a teacher and having, in the course of his work as a teacher, formed the belief on reasonable grounds that a child (namely AB) had been the subject of sexual abuse, failed to report that belief as soon as practicable after forming the belief, contrary to s 124B(1) of the Children Act.

The trial record does not require the conclusion that the magistrate must necessarily have had a doubt about the appellant's guilt. The verdict of guilty of the charged offence was not unreasonable. The verdict was supported by evidence that the magistrate was entitled to accept and inferences that the magistrate was entitled to draw. The nature and quality of the evidence at the trial was sufficient to remove any doubt that the appellant was guilty. After paying full regard to the consideration that the magistrate was the tribunal of fact entrusted with the responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, and after paying full regard to the consideration that the magistrate had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses, we do not have a reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt or as to the correctness of his conviction. It would not be dangerous to permit the verdict to stand.
Ground 3 has not been made out.

Conclusion

Leave to appeal should be granted on grounds 1 and 3. Leave to appeal should be refused on ground 2. The appeal should be dismissed.

MAZZA JA:

Introduction

Section 124B(1) of the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) (the Act) imposes a duty on certain people, including teachers, to report a belief, which is formed on reasonable grounds, that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse. Such a report must be made to the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Communities (Department), or a person, or a member of a class of persons, who have been approved by the Chief Executive Officer. A failure to report the belief as soon as practicable after the belief is formed is an offence punishable by a fine.
At all relevant times, the appellant was a teacher at Trinity College (Trinity), a school in Perth. In April 2017, a group of boys from Trinity went on a school rugby trip to Japan. The appellant was one of three teachers who accompanied the boys on the trip. On 11 April 2017, one of the boys, AB, was assaulted by a group of the other boys on the trip. In the course of the assault, the other boys held AB

down in his room, removed his underwear and penetrated his anus with an object, which AB later discovered was a carrot.

On the following morning, 12 April 2017, AB said to the appellant words to the effect of 'I had a carrot shoved up my arse'. AB refused to give the appellant the names of the perpetrators. When the appellant asked AB what he wanted to do about the incident, AB said that he wanted nothing done about it.
The appellant did not make a report pursuant to s 124B(1) of the Act.
In early September 2017, the acting headmaster of Trinity heard a rumour about the incident that had occurred on 11 April 2017. He reported the incident under the Act on 11 September 2017.
Eventually, by a prosecution notice dated 4 April 2019, the appellant was charged with an offence contrary to s 124B(1) of the Act. The prosecution notice alleged that between 12 April and 11 September 2017 at Perth, the appellant:
being a teacher, and having in the course of his work as a teacher formed the belief, on reasonable grounds, that a child had been the subject of sexual abuse, failed to report that belief as soon as practicable after forming the belief.
One of the other teachers on the trip, Mr Ian Hailes, was also charged with the same offence.
On 4 November 2020 in the Perth Magistrates Court, his Honour Magistrate Shackleton found the appellant and Mr Hailes guilty as charged after a joint trial that extended over nine sitting days.[23] The appellant was fined $1,200 and a spent conviction order was made.
[23] 23 - 27 March 2020, 31 March 2020, 22 May 2020, 23 July 2020 and 24 September 2020.
The appellant, but not Mr Hailes, appealed to a single judge of the General Division of the Supreme Court against his conviction. On 13 October 2021, Quinlan CJ dismissed the appeal: Webb v Tang [2021] WASC 344 (primary decision).
The appellant now appeals to this court against the primary decision, pursuant to div 3 of pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA). He does so on three grounds, which I will set out later in these reasons. As will be seen, the real issues to be determined in this appeal concern the proper construction of the words 'belief' and 'believes' in s 124B(1) of the Act, and whether the primary judge was correct to find that the magistrate's verdict of guilty was not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence; in particular, whether the evidence was capable of proving that the appellant believed that AB had been sexually abused.
For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal.

The trial before the learned magistrate

At the trial before the learned magistrate, there was no dispute that:
(a)at the relevant time, the appellant was a registered teacher within the meaning of the Act;[24]
(b)AB was assaulted in the manner that he described;[25]
(c)on 12 April 2017, AB told the appellant about the incident;[26]
(d)the assault AB described amounted to 'sexual abuse' within the meaning of the Act;[27]
(e)after AB told the appellant about the incident, the appellant did not report it in the form required by the Act;[28] and
(f)the incident was ultimately reported on 11 September 2017 by the then acting headmaster of Trinity, Mr Norman.[29]
[24] Trial ts 62 (23 March 2020).
[25] Primary decision [5].
[26] Primary decision [6].
[27] Trial ts 106 (24 September 2020); primary decision [8] (although the appellant took issue with this characterisation of the conduct in his appeal to Quinlan CJ).
[28] Primary decision [7].
[29] Primary decision [7].
The primary issue at trial was whether the appellant 'believe[d] on reasonable grounds' that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse.[30] This issue invited attention to the appellant's subjective state of mind as to whether he believed that what AB had said had occurred on 11 April 2017 had, in fact, occurred. The appellant's case at trial was that he did not believe that the incident had, in fact, occurred. In particular, that he did not believe AB, or, alternatively, that he was uncertain as to whether AB had been assaulted. In support of his defence, the appellant relied on evidence of good character.
[30] Primary decision [9]; see appellant's closing submissions at trial, ts 108 - 113 (24 September 2020).
The prosecutor called 12 witnesses. Mr Hailes gave evidence in his own defence. The appellant elected not to give evidence. In large part, the appellant's defence relied upon answers he gave in an interview with Ms Erin Dalby, a senior investigations officer at the Education and Care Regulatory Unit in the Department.
In the primary decision, Quinlan CJ set out in some detail the evidence as it related to the appellant and, in particular, the evidence as it related to the appellant's state of mind, including a summary of the appellant's answers in the interview with Ms Dalby on 15 August 2018.[31]
[31] Primary decision [17] - [82].
From my reading of the trial record, Quinlan CJ's summary is accurate. In the appeal to this court, the appellant did not suggest that Quinlan CJ's summary was inaccurate or incomplete. Although necessarily lengthy, it is convenient to repeat the summary in full, as follows.

AB's evidence

AB gave evidence that in 2017 he was in year 11 at Trinity. He said that he went on a school rugby trip to Japan that year, representing the school for about a week and a half. The teachers on the tour were Mr Hailes, the appellant and a third teacher whose name he could not recall.[32]
[32] Trial ts 14 (24 March 2020).
While they were in Japan, the teachers and students stayed in two different hotels. At the second hotel there were roughly eight or nine students staying in the room that AB was in.[33]
[33] Trial ts 14 - 16 (24 March 2020).
On the second night at that hotel, AB said that a group of about 10 students came into his room. After an interaction with one of the other students in the room, the students turned around, grabbed AB and turned him over so that his face was in the ground. After a struggle, AB said 'one of the other students grabbed me and then, you know, forced me to the ground, held me much tighter, to which my pants and underwear were removed and an item was inserted into my anus'. He was later told by one of the students that the item was a carrot.[34]
[34] Trial ts 16 (24 March 2020).

Section 124A includes a number of definitions relevant to s 124B. It is unnecessary to refer to all of these definitions. The 'commencement day' in relation to a teacher is 1 January 2009. 'Sexual abuse' is defined, in relation to a child, to include sexual behaviour in circumstances where (a) the child is the subject of bribery, coercion, a threat, exploitation or violence; or (b) the child has less power than another person involved in the behaviour; or (c) there is a significant disparity in the developmental function or maturity of the child and another person involved in the behaviour. The term 'teacher' means:
(a)a person who is registered under the Teacher Registration Act 2012; or
[(b)deleted]
(c)a person who provides instruction in a course that is -
(i)mentioned in the School Education Act 1999 section 11B(1)(a), (b) or (e); and
(ii)prescribed for the purposes of this definition;
or
(d)a person who instructs or supervises a student who is participating in an activity that is -
(i)part of an educational programme of a school under an arrangement mentioned in the School Education Act 1999 section 24(1); and
(ii)prescribed for the purposes of this definition;
or
(e)a person employed by the chief executive officer as defined in the Young Offenders Act 1994 section 3 to teach detainees at a detention centre as defined in that section.
Thus it may be seen that
(a) Section 124B of the Act casts a duty on a class of persons, including a teacher, who believes on reasonable grounds that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse and who forms that belief in the course of that person's work (whether paid or unpaid), to report the belief as soon as practicable after forming the belief.
(b)By subsection (2), such a report must be made to the Chief Executive Officer of the Department or to a person approved by the Chief Executive Officer or to a person who is a member of a class of persons approved by the Chief Executive Officer.
(c) By s 124B(1), failure of a teacher (or other responsible person) to report the belief on reasonable grounds that a child has been the subject of sexual abuse is a criminal offence punishable by a fine of up to $6,000.
The form and content of a report under s 124B is set out in s 124C. Section 124C(1) states that a report may be written or oral, but, if oral, the reporter must make a written report as soon as practicable after the oral report is made. Subsection (3) sets out the content of a report as follows:
(3)A report is to contain -
(a)the name and contact details of the reporter; and
(b)the name of the child or, if the child's name cannot be obtained after reasonable inquiries, a description of the child; and
(c)if, or to the extent, known to the reporter -
(i)the child's date of birth; and
(ii)information about where the child lives; and
(iii)the names of the child's parents or other appropriate persons as defined in section 41(1);
and
(d)the grounds for the reporter's belief that the child has been the subject of sexual abuse or is the subject of ongoing sexual abuse; and
(ea)if, or to the extent, known to the reporter -
(i)the name of any person alleged to be responsible for the sexual abuse; and
(ii)the person's contact details; and
(iii)the person's relationship to the child;
and
(e)any other information that is prescribed.
Section 124D(2) provides that the Chief Executive Officer must provide a copy of each written report to the Commissioner of Police as soon as practicable after the report is received.
By s 124G, a written report, or a written report as to the contents of an oral report, subject to certain exceptions, is not required to be disclosed in criminal proceedings and, is not admissible in any legal proceedings. Again, generally speaking, the identity of the reporter is not to be adduced in any legal proceedings.

Ground 1 - disposition

In my opinion, ground 1 has not been established. My reasons for this conclusion largely reflect those of the primary judge.
The obligation to report under s 124B(1) of the Act only arises when a person in a position of authority, in this case a teacher, forms a belief on reasonable grounds that a child has been sexually abused. Self‑evidently, the obligation does not arise merely because a responsible person suspects that the child has been sexually abused. Nor is it necessary to prove 'knowledge' on the part of the responsible person.
The concepts of suspicion, belief and knowledge are states of mind directed to varying degrees of certainty of the existence of a fact.
The ordinary meaning of 'suspicion' and 'belief' are as stated in George v Rockett. 'Suspicion' is 'a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: I suspect but I cannot prove'.[158] While 'belief' is:[159]
An inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and the grounds which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.
[158] George v Rockett (115) citing Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942, 948.
[159] George v Rockett (116).
'Knowledge' connotes the greatest degree of certainty of the existence of a fact. For example, the Macquarie Dictionary defines 'knowledge' to be 'the fact or state of knowing; perception of fact or truth; clear and certain apprehension'.[160]
[160] Macquarie Dictionary (7^th ed), page 838.
'Belief' requires, as the Macquarie Dictionary states, a 'conviction of the truth or reality of a thing, based upon grounds insufficient to afford positive knowledge'.[161]
[161] Macquarie Dictionary (7^th ed), page 132.
Although belief requires 'an inclination of the mind towards assenting to rather than rejecting a proposition', as senior counsel for the appellant accepted,[162] there are gradations of the strength of the belief. On the one hand, a belief may be held with great confidence, verging on but falling short of knowledge. On the other, it may only just be held. Whatever the strength of the belief, the ordinary meaning of the word 'belief' does not require absence of doubt, although it does require the person to think that the proposition in question is true. As said by the High Court in George v Rockett, belief can 'leave something to surmise or conjecture'.[163] As I will explain, when contextual and purposive considerations are taken into account, it is patently clear that the word 'belief', as it appears in s 124B(1) of the Act, has its ordinary meaning.
[162] Appeal ts 17.
[163] George v Rockett (116).
The obligation on the part of a responsible person to report a belief held on reasonable grounds that a child has been sexually abused is, in its context, a first step towards an investigation into whether a child, in fact, has suffered sexual abuse. Whether a child has in fact suffered sexual abuse is to be determined not by the person making the report, but by some other officer or entity who has the task of carrying out an investigation.
As is apparent from the statutory requirements of a report, it is envisaged that the person making the report may not have complete knowledge of the facts and circumstances of any alleged sexual abuse. The reporter may not even know the name of the child or of the alleged perpetrator. A responsible person does not have any power or authority to compel persons to provide him or her with information which might be relevant to the alleged abuse. In such circumstances, it is clear that the person making the report may have some doubt as to whether the child has been sexually abused, but the harbouring of such a doubt is not inconsistent with the responsible person believing that the child has been abused.
The provision must also be read in the context of the objects and principles of the Act referred to in [261] above and construed in a way that promotes them. In particular, s 124B(1) should be construed to promote the wellbeing of children and the object that every child should be cared for and protected from harm.
The construction urged by the appellant both before Quinlan CJ and this court as to the meaning of the word 'belief' cannot be accepted. The notion that the word 'belief' eschews any doubt is, in my opinion, contrary to the ordinary meaning of the word. It is also inconsistent with the purpose of the provision.
It is important to note that Parliament did not qualify, in any way, the word 'belief'. It did not, for example, provide that a responsible person must 'strongly believe' that a child has been sexually abused. As I have said, there are gradations of the word 'belief'. What is required is that the responsible person holds the belief. Once the responsible person possesses the belief, even if only just held, provided it is based on reasonable grounds, the obligation to report arises. It is then the obligation of others to investigate the truth or otherwise of the belief. I reject the submission that to adopt a wider meaning of the word 'belief' than submitted by the appellant would have the effect of making it compulsory for responsible persons to report something that they do not actually believe. The word 'belief' always requires assent to the proposition that the child has been sexually abused. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the legislature did not adopt 'suspicion' as a reporting threshold.
In my opinion, Quinlan CJ did not err as alleged in ground 1. Ground 1 has not been made out.

Ground 2 - alleged erroneous application of the standard of proof

Ground 2 is as follows:
His Honour reached his decision (that the appellant held the required belief) by opining that the appellant's conduct made his holding the required belief 'far more likely' (reasons [176]) and was 'consistent with' his holding it (reasons [178]). That effectively substituted the civil standard for the criminal standard of proof and was an error of law.
This ground of appeal refers to two paragraphs in the primary decision, being [176] and [178]. These paragraphs are part of his Honour's analysis of whether it was open to the learned magistrate to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant believed what AB had told him.
The Chief Justice's analysis is comprehensive and spans 45 paragraphs, between [164] and [209] of the primary decision. His Honour accepted that whether the learned magistrate could be satisfied that the appellant believed AB had been the subject of sexual abuse was a matter of inference.[164] Further, his Honour accepted that the prosecution carried the onus of establishing that the appellant's belief required it to exclude all reasonable inferences consistent with innocence.[165] The Chief Justice also said that in determining whether the only reasonable inference on all of the evidence was that the appellant believed that what AB had told him had occurred, 'all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighted'. His Honour emphasised that the evidence was not to be looked at in a piecemeal fashion at trial or on appeal.[166]
[164] Primary decision [164].
[165] Primary decision [165] - [166].
[166] Primary decision [170].
At [171] of the primary decision, his Honour said:
In my view, the combined effect of all of the circumstances was such as to exclude any reasonable inference that the appellant did not believe (or that he was agnostic) that some other boy or boys had penetrated AB's anus with a carrot, against his will. I agree with the learned magistrate that the only reasonable inference was that the appellant did believe that what AB said had happened to him, had in fact happened to him.
His Honour then summarised, chronologically, the relevant circumstances, emphasising that, in doing so:[167]
I do not lose sight of the fact that it is the combined effect of these circumstances that leave me with no reasonable doubt as to the appellant's positive belief.
[167] Primary decision [172].
The paragraphs the subject of ground 2 appear in his Honour's chronological summary. Primary decision [176] is as follows:
These circumstances, on their own, might not be such as to exclude a reasonable inference that when the appellant was told by AB that he had 'had a carrot shoved up his arse', the appellant either positively disbelieved AB or remained in a state of neutral 'agnosticism'. They do, however, make such responses in my view far less likely. Far more likely is that the appellant would have done what would be expected of a teacher of his experience and character; and form the belief that what AB had said was true.
Primary decision [178] is as follows:
The appellant's response to what he was told by AB was one that was consistent with the appellant having believed AB. He responded with concern as to AB's welfare. There were, in the evidence before the learned magistrate, varying accounts as to precisely what the appellant said and did in response. At the very least, the appellant asked AB if he wanted the appellant to follow-up the matter. On his own accounts, the appellant asked AB whether he wanted to see a doctor, whether he was in pain, whether there was anything wrong with him and which boys had been involved. That conduct is the conduct of a person who believed what AB had said was true. The appellant's conduct was, in my view, positively inconsistent with the appellant having disbelieved AB. (footnotes omitted)

Ground 2 - parties' submissions

The appellant's submissions in support of ground 2 are sparse. They point to the phrase 'far more likely' in the primary decision at [176] as manifesting the wrong test. The appellant submitted that the question is not what is 'more likely', but whether the only inference reasonably open was that he formed the required belief.
With respect to the primary decision at [178], the appellant submitted that while the appellant's conduct in asking AB whether he wanted to see a doctor or was in pain, whether there was anything wrong with him, and which boys had been involved was 'arguably inconsistent' with having disbelieved AB, it was not inconsistent with the conduct of an experienced teacher who, having received such a complaint, was not sure whether or not to believe it, but as a matter of prudence should ask such questions.
The respondent submitted that the paragraphs in the primary decision referred to by the appellant are part of Quinlan CJ's analysis of all of the relevant circumstances which led his Honour to conclude that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the appellant had the requisite subjective belief and did not involve a substitution of the civil standard of proof for the criminal standard.

Ground 2 - disposition

There is no merit in ground 2 for the following reasons.
The two paragraphs of the primary decision upon which ground 2 relies do not, in terms or by implication, involve a substitute of the civil standard of proof for the criminal standard.
Further, the two paragraphs of the primary decision must be read in context and not in isolation. The circumstantial case against the appellant depended upon a consideration of all of the circumstances put together. As McHugh J put it in Shepherd v The Queen:[168]
The cogency of the inference of guilt is derived from the cumulative weight of circumstances, not the quality of proof of each circumstance.
[168] Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573, 593.
The two paragraphs upon which ground 2 is based appear as part of Quinlan CJ's analysis of all of the circumstances which led to the ultimate conclusion that there was no reasonable inference available on all of the evidence, other than that the appellant held the requisite belief. In cases of this kind, which are sometimes called 'strands in a cable' cases, it is not necessary for each intermediate fact to be identified and proved beyond reasonable doubt.[169]
[169] See Shepherd (579), (585) (Dawson J).
Quinlan CJ's approach to the question of whether the prosecution had proved its circumstantial case was entirely orthodox and correct, that is, his Honour examined the whole of the evidence to see whether the inference that the appellant held the relevant belief under s 124B(1) of the Act was established beyond reasonable doubt.
The present case was not one in which the guilt of the appellant depended upon the proof of a fact which was a necessary link in the chain of circumstantial reasoning. There was no suggestion, either in the trial before the magistrate or in the appeal before Quinlan CJ, to indicate that it was such a case. Certainly, the matters referred to in [176] and [178] of the primary decision do not fall into this category.
Leave to appeal on ground 2 should be refused.
Ground 2 has not been made out.

Ground 3 - was the guilty verdict unreasonable?

Ground 3 is as follows:
The learned Chief Justice erred in law, in deciding that the evidence established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant actually held the required belief (that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse). His Honour should have held that although the evidence provided 'reasonable grounds' for the appellant to form the required belief, it did not exclude a reasonable alternative inference consistent with innocence, that he did not actually form that belief, but either disbelieved AB, or was unsure whether or not to believe him.
At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for both the appellant and the respondent agreed that the key point raised by this ground of appeal was whether or not Quinlan CJ should have held that it was not open to the magistrate to convict the appellant because it was not open for the magistrate to be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, of the inference that the appellant held the belief that AB had been sexually abused.[170]

Ground 3 - submissions

[170] Appeal ts 4 - 6, 47 - 48.

It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the prosecution's case as to the appellant's belief was entirely circumstantial. As such, the onus was on the prosecution to exclude any reasonable inference that was inconsistent with guilt. On behalf of the appellant, it was asserted, at trial, before the Chief Justice and now in this court, that the prosecution had not excluded two alternative inferences consistent with innocence, namely the appellant did not actually form the requisite belief, in that he either disbelieved AB or was unsure whether or not to believe him.
In oral argument before this court, senior counsel for the appellant pointed to various parts of the appellant's interview with Ms Dalby on 15 August 2018.[171]
[171] Transcript of interview, 15 August 2018, BGAB, 731, 735, 739, 740-741, 757 ‑ 759, 762, 765.
The effect of what the appellant said in the interview on 15 August 2018 was that AB gave little detail about the circumstances surrounding the incident in which he said that a carrot had been inserted into his anus; that AB did not want anything done; and that AB said he was fine. The appellant also said, in the interview, that he did not think that, based on his knowledge of the other boys on the rugby tour, 'that that was something that they would do'.[172] He added that, 'I just didn't think that was what had happened'.[173] Later in the interview, the appellant said:[174]
But then when we asked about it, he [AB] didn't give us anything else to work on, so we just didn't. It's not that I didn't believe him, but I just didn't - I couldn't believe - I didn't think that the group would - that that could have happened.
[172] Transcript of interview, 15 August 2018, BGAB 735.
[173] Transcript of interview, 15 August 2018, BGAB 735.
[174] Transcript of interview, 15 August 2018, BGAB 741.
At another point in the interview on 15 August 2018, the appellant said, in answer to a question as to whether he thought AB's complaint was a reportable matter:[175]
The comment itself, I didn't - as I said, I didn't believe that it happened. I don't - I can't see how it could have happened, and at the time because we were given nothing else to work with - to go on - we took it on as being a bit of bullying, a bit of mucking around that they were doing any - that that was happening within rooms at times, and I - and we dealt with it that way … as in, on tour now, let's deal with this. And that's why [Mr Hailes] called them all together and told me about the 'this can't go on, and we - we won't accept that sort of behaviour, as in this wrestling and mucking around in the evenings is going to stop now. The reason you have your time in the evenings is to be with each other, to enjoy each other's company - not to be hurting each other'.
[175] Transcript of interview, 15 August 2018, BGAB 757.

When Ms Dalby specifically asked the appellant whether he thought the incident 'required mandatory reporting',[176] the appellant answered:
With the statement? I don't know. To be honest, I don't know. I had this - all these things where people had come out and talked about mandatory reporting to us, but it's always been teacher on student stuff. It's never been student on student.
[176] Transcript of interview, 15 August 2018, BGAB 758.
A short time later, the appellant said that 'it just didn't cross my mind, to be honest'.[177]
[177] Transcript of interview, 15 August 2018, BGAB 758.
It was submitted by the appellant that evidence of the appellant's good character was relevant to the probability of the appellant committing the offence.
It was submitted by the respondent that it was open to the magistrate to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had the belief that AB had been sexually abused.
The respondent, in effect, adopted Quinlan CJ's reasoning for excluding any reasonable or rational inference that the appellant either positively disbelieved AB or was uncertain whether to believe him. The respondent submitted, consistently with the reasoning of Quinlan CJ, that:
(1)The appellant's response to what he had been told by AB was one that was consistent with the appellant having believed AB, and positively inconsistent with the appellant having disbelieved AB.
(2)The language used by the appellant in his 13 September 2017 statement indicated that the appellant believed what AB had said had happened to him, had in fact happened to him.
(3)In the 13 September 2017 statement, the appellant did not explain his failure to report the incident on the basis that he did not believe AB. Instead, he explained that he had not taken the matter further out of respect for AB's wishes.
As to the exculpatory statements made by the appellant about disbelief in the interview on 15 August 2018, the respondent submitted that given that the learned magistrate rejected the exculpatory statements, they do not provide an evidential basis upon which the appellant could base a claim that the appellant disbelieved AB or was uncertain whether to believe AB.

Ground 3 - legal principles

The principles concerning the determination of an appeal ground which contends that the verdict of a magistrate is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence, are well established. They derive from the judgment of the High Court in M v The Queen.[178] They have been described in many cases decided by this court, including in Wells v The State of Western Australia,[179] as follows:
(1)the appeal court must undertake its own independent assessment of the sufficiency and quality of the evidence. It is not simply a matter of deciding whether as a matter of law there was evidence to support the verdict. The appeal court must determine whether, in all the circumstances, it would be dangerous to permit the verdict to stand;
(2)the question for the appeal court is whether, upon the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty;
(3)that question requires consideration of whether the jury must, as distinct from might, have entertained a reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt;
(4)in answering that question, the appeal court must pay full regard to the consideration that the jury was entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, and to the advantage that the jury had of seeing and hearing the witnesses;
(5)a doubt experienced by an appellate court would be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced, unless the jury's advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving that doubt;
(6)if the evidence, upon the record, contains discrepancies, displays inadequacies, is tainted or otherwise lacks probative force in such a way as to lead the appellate court to conclude that, even making full allowance for the advantages enjoyed by the jury, there is a significant possibility that an innocent person has been convicted, then the appellate court must set aside the verdict;
(7)the setting aside of a jury's verdict on the ground that it is unreasonable within the meaning of s 30(3)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) is a serious step, not to be taken without regard to the advantage enjoyed by the jury over a Court of Appeal which has not seen or heard the witnesses called at trial.
[178] M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487, 493.
[179] Wells v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 27 [13].
The principles relating to criminal cases that turn upon circumstantial evidence were restated by French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ in R v Baden‑Clay,[180] as follows:
(1)When the case against an accused rests substantially upon circumstantial evidence, the jury cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the circumstances are such to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.
(2)The jury can be satisfied of the guilt of the accused only if guilt is not simply a rational inference, but the only rational inference that the circumstances permit.
(3)For an inference to be reasonable, it must rest upon something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility of innocence should not prevent a jury from finding an accused person guilty if the inference of guilt is the only inference open to reasonable people on a consideration of all the facts in evidence.
(4)In considering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consistent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence. The evidence is not to be looked at in a piecemeal fashion.
[180] R v Baden‑Clay [2016] HCA 35; (2016) 258 CLR 308 [46] - [47].
These principles apply by analogy to a trial before a magistrate.[181]
[181] The State of Western Australia v Olive [2011] WASCA 25; (2011) 57 MVR 269 [44].
It is clear from the reasons of Quinlan CJ at [124] ‑ [126] of the primary decision that his Honour both understood and applied these principles.

Ground 3 - disposition

As ground 3 is framed, it alleges that although the evidence provided reasonable grounds for the appellant to form the belief that AB had been the subject of sexual abuse, it did not exclude, as a reasonable alternative inference consistent with innocence, that the appellant did not actually form the belief, but either disbelieved AB or was unsure whether or not to believe him. As senior counsel for the appellant made clear in his oral submissions, the evidential basis for the alleged reasonable alternative inference derived from the exculpatory answers the appellant gave in his interview with Ms Dalby on 15 August 2018. However, it cannot be ignored that the magistrate rejected the appellant's exculpatory statements in that interview. There was no challenge to the magistrate's rejection of these statements, either before Quinlan CJ or this court. The learned magistrate's findings on this issue must stand. Accordingly, the exculpatory statements made by the appellant in the interview on 15 August 2018 do not support the appellant's case with respect to ground 3.
In my opinion, the evidence before the magistrate, as analysed by Quinlan CJ, shows that it was well open to the magistrate to find beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant held the belief that AB had been sexually abused. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows.
As the appellant admitted in the inculpatory portions of his interview with Ms Dalby, he regarded AB, at the time of the rugby tour, as a 'trustworthy kid'.[182] There was nothing about AB which would have led the appellant to be suspicious of anything he said.
[182] Transcript of interview, 15 August 2018, BGAB 737 - 738.
AB alluded to the assault the morning after it allegedly occurred, in the presence of the appellant, Mr Hailes and the other students. Although it has been suggested on behalf of the appellant that AB raised it in the context of a 'jokey' fines session, there is no evidence to suggest that when AB raised the matter, he did so in a joking fashion. Indeed, the evidence appears to point to the disclosure being a serious matter from AB's perspective.
It is notable that the appellant took AB aside, after the fines session, and spoke to him, out of earshot of the other students, to find out what had happened to AB. The appellant's actions in this regard show that he appropriately regarded what AB had said as a matter of concern.
Based on the magistrate's unchallenged finding, after the fines session, AB disclosed to the appellant that the previous night, other students on the tour had inserted a carrot into his anus. There is no evidence that the appellant immediately formed the view that AB was not to be believed. Rather, the appellant behaved in an entirely appropriate manner and expressed concern for AB's welfare, including enquiring as to whether he required medical attention. AB replied that he did not require medical attention. Understandably, given that AB was on a school rugby trip with fellow students, he was reluctant to disclose the names of the students who had perpetrated the assault. AB also indicated that he did not want anything further done about it. Given the appellant's long experience as a teacher, it would not have been at all surprising to him that AB would have reacted in the manner that he did, and that such behaviour did not indicate that AB's disclosure was beyond belief. Indeed, as the appellant wrote in his statement of 13 September 2017, after training that day, the appellant and Mr Hailes spoke to the students about 'the behaviour we have heard about', making it clear to them that it was 'not the type of behaviour we condone and it will not happen again'. This conduct is entirely consistent with the appellant having a belief, in the sense required by the Act, that AB had been assaulted as he described. Further, as revealed in the statement of 13 September 2017, the appellant kept an eye on AB and enquired about his welfare during the remainder of the tour. Again, this is conduct, combined with the other conduct I have described, that is consistent with the appellant believing that AB had been assaulted as he alleged.
The appellant's obligation to report the incident involving AB arose, under s 124B of the Act, as soon as practicable after forming the belief. In the circumstances of the present case, it would have been practicable for the report to have been made by the appellant upon his return to Australia, after the completion of the tour. Instead, no report was made. It appears from the statement of 13 September 2017 that the appellant chose not to do anything about AB's allegations because the appellant wished to respect AB's wishes not to take the matter any further.
It is revealing that the appellant, when given an opportunity to explain what had occurred on the trip, in the context that nothing about the incident involving AB had been revealed to any responsible adult, did not respond that he did not believe AB. It would have been expected, if that was his state of mind or that he was unsure whether he believed AB, that he would have said so when asked by Mr Norman to provide his statement. The appellant's reason for not taking the matter any further was, at best for the appellant, misguided and well intentioned, but does not provide evidence pointing to an absence of belief or that he did not know what to believe.
Given that the learned magistrate's rejection of the exculpatory statements in the 15 August 2018 are not challenged, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to deal with the interview in this analysis of ground 3. However, I agree with Quinlan CJ's analysis of the interview between [194] and [206] of the primary decision. It was well open to the magistrate to reject the exculpatory statements made by the appellant in that interview.
An aspect of the appellant's case, both before the magistrate and the primary judge, was to emphasise the appellant's prior good character. The appellant's prior good character was relevant to both whether he would commit the offence and the credibility of his out of court statements. While acknowledging the relevance of the appellant's previous good character, it is not a matter of great weight in the present case. This is because, as I have mentioned, the offence the appellant committed was, one might think, an error of judgment rather than a deliberately dishonest act. It is entirely conceivable that a person of previous good character such as the appellant might not report the matter on the mistaken belief that, in the circumstances, it was better not to do anything and to let the matter lie. I am mindful that the appellant's submissions in support of this ground assert that a reasonable alternative inference open on the evidence was that the appellant was 'agnostic' as to the truth of AB's disclosure. That is, that the appellant, while not disbelieving AB, was in such a state of doubt that it could not be said that he believed AB's allegation.
The difficulty with this submission is that there is no evidence, and certainly no statement, on the part of the appellant that this was his state of mind. Nor does his conduct indicate it.
For these reasons, ground 3 has not been made out.

Conclusion and orders

None of the grounds of appeal have been made out. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. The orders that I would make are as follows:
1.Leave to appeal is granted on grounds 1 and 3.
2.Leave to appeal on ground 2 is refused.
3.The appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
SG
Research Associate to the Honourable President Buss
11 AUGUST 2023