TERZI and DENTAL BOARD OF AUSTRALIA - [2024] WASAT 52

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT:   HEALTH PRACTITIONER REGULATION NATIONAL LAW ACT 2010 (WA)
CITATION:   TERZI and DENTAL BOARD OF AUSTRALIA [2024] WASAT 52
MEMBER:   JUDGE F VERNON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT
MR J O'SULLIVAN, SENIOR MEMBER
DR C PEARS, SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER

HEARD:   25 AND 28 MARCH AND 2 APRIL 2024
DELIVERED          :   24 MAY 2024
PUBLISHED           :   18 JUNE 2024
FILE NO/S:   VR 27 of 2024
BETWEEN:   PETER TERZI
Applicant
AND
DENTAL BOARD OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

Catchwords:

Vocational regulation – Immediate action – Proper construction of s 156 of the National Law - Requisite beliefs – Whether immediate action is necessary to protect against a risk to public health or safety – Whether immediate action is otherwise in the public interest – Suspension or imposition of conditions

Legislation:

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2010 (WA), s 6, s 11
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Regulation 2018 (WA), reg 4
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Western Australia), s 31, s 155, s 156(1)(a), s 156(1)(e), s 199(1), s 199(1)(h), s 199(2)(a)(i), s 199(2)
State Administrative Tribunal 2004 (WA), s 27(1), s 27(2), s 29(9)

Result:

The respondent's decision to suspend the applicant is set aside and substituted by conditions

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant	:	M Bennett and M Douglas
Respondent	:	J McKenzie and T De Bes

Solicitors:

Applicant	:	Bennett
Respondent	:	Perth Legal Pty Ltd

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Bernadt v The Medical Board of Australia [2013] WASCA 259
Farshchi v Chinese Medicine Board of Australia [2018] VCAT 1617
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26, 170 CLR 104
Kok v Medical Board of Australia [2020] VCAT 405
Kozanoglu v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2012] VSCA 295
Lee v Medical Board of Western Australia [2022] WASAT 28
Liddell and the Medical Board of Australia [2012] WASAT 120
LS v Mental Health Review Board [2013] WASCA 128
Medical Board of Australia v Adams [2023] WASCA 41
Medical Board of Australia v Sami [2022] VSC 90, 66 VR 513
Oglesby v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2014] QCAT 701
Shah (A Pseudonym) v Medical Board of Australia [2022] SASC 140
Thekkekara and Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2020] WASAT 160
WD v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 614
Webb v Tang [2023] WASCA 119

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

(In this published version of our reasons the names of certain witnesses have been replaced and certain portions have been redacted to preserve the witnesses' anonymity and privacy.)

Introduction

On 8 March 2024 the Dental Board of Australia (Board) decided to take immediate action under s 156 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Western Australia) (National Law) to suspend the registration of Peter Terzi (the practitioner) as a dentist (Decision).
On 11 March 2024 Dr Terzi sought the Tribunal's review of the Decision pursuant to s 199(1) of the National Law.
A hearing was listed for a half day on 25 March 2024 as a matter of urgency. It proceeded over the course of a full day on the basis of documentary evidence, namely the contents of witness statements, affidavits, and other documents. No witnesses gave oral evidence or were cross-examined.
The evidence relied on by the Board fell, roughly, into two categories of alleged misconduct. Broadly summarised, the first category concerned the practitioner's behaviour towards women and the second concerned the practitioner's conduct of his practice.
The practitioner denies the allegations of misconduct made against him.
At the conclusion of the hearing on 25 March 2024 we indicated that, whilst we had not arrived at a decision, we were considering the imposition of conditions on the practitioner's registration. The parties were invited to provide the Tribunal with draft conditions for the Tribunal to consider. The parties did this, with the Board maintaining its position that the necessary immediate action was suspension of the practitioner's registration and the practitioner maintaining his position there was no basis to take immediate action.
The Tribunal received draft conditions and written submissions in relation to those draft conditions on 27 March, heard further oral submissions on 28 March 2024 and received further written submissions on the same day.
On 2 April 2024 the Tribunal decided that the correct and preferable decision was to set aside the Decision and to substitute a decision to take immediate action by imposing conditions on the practitioner's registration in the terms set out in the Schedule to these reasons. On that date the Tribunal undertook to provide reasons for its decision.
We now set out the reasons for that conclusion. In these reasons we deal with the following matters:
(a)the legislative framework including the beliefs we are required to hold before taking immediate action;
(b)the parties' submissions;
(c)a summary of the Decision;
(d)the evidence of the practitioner's behaviour towards women;
(e)our consideration of, and conclusions on, the evidence of the practitioner's behaviour towards women;
(f)our beliefs, in light of the evidence of the practitioner's behaviour towards women, on the issues under s 156(1)(a) of the National Law of whether there is a serious risk to persons posed by the practitioner and whether it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health or safety in light of such risk;
(g)our belief, in light of the evidence of the practitioner's behaviour towards women, on the issues under s 156(1)(e) of the National Law, of whether immediate action is otherwise in the public interest;
(h)our consideration of the evidence concerning the practitioner's conduct of his practice;
(i)our beliefs, in light of the evidence of the practitioner's conduct of his practice, on the issues under s 156(1)(a) of the National Law of whether there is a serious risk to persons posed by the practitioner and whether it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health or safety in light of such risk;
(j)our belief, in light of the evidence of the practitioner's conduct of his practice, on the issue under s 156(1)(e) of the National Law of whether immediate action is otherwise in the public interest; and
(k)our consideration and conclusions on the immediate action required.

The legislative framework

As at 2 April 2024 the National Law was given effect in Western Australia by the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2010 (WA) (HPR Act).
The Board is established under s 31 of the National Law and reg 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Regulation 2018 (WA).
The term 'immediate action' is defined to mean the suspension or imposition of a condition on the health practitioner's registration: s 155 of the National Law.
Section 156 of the National Law provides that:
A National Board may take immediate action in relation to a registered health practitioner or student registered in a health profession for which the Board is established if –
(a)The National Board reasonably believes that –
(i)because of the registered health practitioner's conduct, performance or health, the practitioner poses a serious risk to persons; and
(ii)it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health or safety;
or
(b)the National Board reasonably believes that –
(i)the student poses a serious risk to persons because the student –
(I)has been charged with an offence, or has been convicted or found guilty of an offence, that is punishable by 12 months imprisonment or more; or
(II)has, or may have, an impairment; or
(III)has, or may have, contravened a condition of the student's registration or an undertaking given by the student to a National Board; and
(ii)it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health and safety.
or
(c)the registered health practitioner's registration was improperly obtained because the practitioner or someone else gave the National Board information or a document that was false or misleading in a material particular; or
(d)the registered health practitioner's or student's registration has been cancelled or suspended under the law or a jurisdiction, whether in Australia or elsewhere, that is not a participating jurisdiction; or
(e)the National Board reasonably believes the action is otherwise in the public interest.
As the person the subject of the Decision, the practitioner is entitled to appeal to the Tribunal: s 199(1)(h) and s 199(2)(a)(i) of the National Law and s 6 of the HPR Act.
A reference to an appeal in the National Law is a reference to a review of the decision under the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) Pt 3 Div 3: s 11 of the HPR Act.
The review is by way of a hearing 'de novo', that is afresh, with the purpose of producing the correct and preferable decision at the time of the decision upon the review: s 27(1) and s 27(2) of the SAT Act. In doing so the Tribunal has the same jurisdiction, functions and discretions as those of the original decision-maker: Thekkekara and Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2020] WASAT 160 (Thekkekara) at [32(b)].
The 'time of the decision upon the review' is at the time of the Tribunal's decision: LS v Mental Health Review Board [2013] WASCA 128 at [93].
The Tribunal is not confined by the Board's reasons for the Decision and may take into account new or additional material that was not available to the Board at the time of the Decision. However, the Tribunal is not able to deal with a matter that is different in essence from the matter that was before the Board: s 29(9) of the SAT Act, Thekkekara at [32(e)].

Beliefs

Section 156(1) requires the Tribunal to form certain beliefs.
In George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26, 170 CLR 104 at [116], the High Court stated that '[b]elief' is an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition and 'the grounds' which can reasonably induce that inclination of the mind may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.'
In Webb v Tang [2023] WASCA 119 the Court of Appeal considered the phrase 'believes on reasonable grounds' in the context of a teacher's duty to report child sexual abuse under the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA). President Buss and Justice Vaughan said:
[95]The notion that 'belief' involves the formation of a 'positive inclination' in the mind to accept a proposition of fact acknowledges that ordinarily the mind will decide whether to accept a proposition of fact after weighing the probabilities by reference to the available information. The 'belief' of a person is ordinarily a conclusion after the probabilities have been weighed.
[96]A 'belief' is more than a 'suspicion' and is ordinarily less than 'positive knowledge'. The intermediate position of 'belief' in this spectrum between 'suspicion' and 'positive knowledge' recognises that the information available to a person who forms a belief may be from external sources, including hearsay, which the person may be unable independently to verify.
[97]The word 'belief' is of sufficient breadth to describe a state of mind which regards the existence of a proposition of fact as certain and also a state of mind which inclines towards accepting rather than rejecting that the proposition of fact exists, but acknowledges a doubt, a prospect or a chance that the proposition of fact may not exist.

Beliefs under s 156(1)(a)

Of the matters it was said to be necessary to form a belief about, in Bernadt v The Medical Board of Australia [2013] WASCA 259 (Bernadt) McLure P said:
[65]It is necessary to identify with precision what it is that must be the subject of the reasonable belief. There are three components in subpars (i) and (ii) of s 156(1)(a), one factual and two evaluative. They are:
(i)(1) because of (that is, by reason of) the practitioner's conduct, performance or health
(2)the practitioner poses a serious risk to persons; and
(ii)it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health or safety.
[66]The 'reasonable belief' requirement applies, in my view, to the three components including the factual substratum ((i)(1)) on which the evaluative assessments (in (i)(2) and (ii)) are to be made. That being so, the fact or facts directly in issue concerning a practitioner's conduct, performance or heath do not need to be proven on the balance of probabilities: George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990 170 CLR 104. However, there must be proven objective circumstances that justify the belief.
In the same case Newnes JA said at [152] and [153]:
[152]… Whilst the practitioner must be given notice of the proposed immediate action before it is taken and an opportunity to make submissions on it, no provision is made at that stage for the practitioner to be given any real opportunity to test the factual basis of the Board's belief …
[153]It is readily explicable that such a summary process should be available to cater for circumstances where the protection of the public may require the Board to take prompt action on relatively limited information, pending a full hearing of the allegation …
Newnes JA went on to say at [171] that:
… The Tribunal was not required to make findings as to whether in fact the appellant posed a serious risk to persons or whether immediate action was in fact necessary to protect public health. The question was whether the Tribunal held a reasonable belief as to those matter, not whether those matters were the fact.
In Medical Board of Australia v Sami [2022] VSC 90, 66 VR 513 (Sami) Cavanough J held at [23] that s 156(1) of the National Law did not require the relevant board or Tribunal to choose between differing versions of past events for the purpose of deciding whether or not to take 'immediate action'.
That case concerned a medical practitioner who had been charged with sexual assault of a patient he had met at a nightclub. The Board took immediate action to suspend the practitioner. The criminal charges were subsequently withdrawn. However, the Board refused the practitioner's application to revoke the suspension and impose conditions instead. The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) decided to impose no immediate action on the practitioner's application for review of the decision. The VCAT hearing proceeded on the basis of the contents of the police brief for the criminal proceedings, without witnesses being called or cross-examined.
The Board appealed the VCAT's decision and submitted (in broad summary) that s 156(1)(a) imposed an obligation on the Board and the VCAT to form a reasonable belief that past events either did or did not occur before determining whether to impose immediate action at least to the extent that the disputed facts were 'centrally important', 'core' or 'essential'. In that submission the Board relied principally on McLure P's comments in Bernadt referred to at [21] above.
Cavanough J considered Bernadt in detail and said at:
[161]McLure P concluded that 'the fact or facts directly in issue concerning a practitioner's conduct, performance or health do not have to be proven on the balance of probabilities', but that 'there must be proven objective circumstances sufficient to justify the belief'. This is not the same as saying that, by virtue of the provisions of s 156(1)(a), the National Board or the appellate tribunal must always or generally form and express a (reasonable) belief as to where the truth lies on 'centrally important' or 'core' or 'essential' points of fact, regardless of the state of the material, regardless of the way in which the parties themselves have approached the matter and regardless of whether the ultimate decision is to take immediate action or not.
[162]It was said in WD v Medical Board of Australia that 'an immediate action order might be based on material that would not conventionally be considered as strictly evidentiary in nature, for example, complaints and allegations. In my view, McLure P was not saying anything different. In saying that 'there must be proven objective circumstances sufficient to justify the belief', her Honour was, I consider, referring to objective circumstances sufficient to justify the belief actually specified in s 156(1)(a), namely that the practitioner posed a (conduct related, performance related or health related) serious risk to persons and that it is necessary (accordingly) to take immediate action, as distinct from a belief that some 'particular identified conduct' actually occurred in the past. In my view, for the purposes of the immediate action regime (and for the purposes of s 156(1)(a) in particular), a very serious allegation made by a seemingly reliable person may well be capable of supplying 'objective circumstances' sufficient to justify' the statutorily specified belief, even where the decision-maker does not form and express a 'belief' that the allegation is true. The position is even clearer in relation to the opposite case – a decision not to take immediate action (such as the present case).
Cavanough J at [166] referred to Newnes JA's comments in Bernadt and said those comments were 'entirely consistent with the absence of a general requirement on National Boards and appellate tribunals to express a preference as between competing versions of past events.'
Sami was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Medical Board of Australia v Adams [2023] WASCA 41 at [93] (Adams). At the hearing before the Tribunal Dr Adams had conceded that immediate action was appropriate but challenged the decision to suspend him. The Tribunal determined that the protection of the public would be achieved by accepting an undertaking on the terms Dr Adams offered. The Board appealed that decision on the sole ground that the Tribunal had erred in refusing to permit the Board to cross examine Dr Adams.
In determining that the Tribunal had not failed to afford the Board procedural fairness by refusing to permit cross-examination of Dr Adams the Court said at [93]:
First, determining what, if any, immediate action is appropriate does not involve determining what had occurred in relation to the matter notified. Rather the inquiry is directed to the future; the focus is on the nature and extent of the risks to persons and the steps to be taken to address such risks. Ordinarily, it will be sufficient for the Board or Tribunal to know what the allegation is, what material supports it and whether the allegation is denied, without attempting to go into the merits the allegation…Consistently with this, as Newnes JA observed in Bernadt v Medical Board of Australia, pt 7 of the National Law provides a relatively summary process and makes no provision for the practitioner to be given any real opportunity to test the factual basis of the Board's belief.
In Adams the issue of whether there was a basis for immediate action had been conceded and the appeal did not directly concern that question. In addition, the Court did not specifically address what McLure P had said in Bernadt. However, the conclusion that there is no requirement for the Tribunal to form a belief as to whether alleged conduct actually occurred is consistent with decisions of this Tribunal, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) and of the South Australian Supreme Court: see Lee v Medical Board of Western Australia [2022] WASAT 28 (Lee) at [73], Liddell and the Medical Board of Australia [2012] WASAT 120 at [21] and [116], WD v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 614 (WD) at [8.3], and Shah (A Pseudonym) v Medical Board of Australia [2022] SASC 140 (Shah) at [231] to [238].

In Shah, Blue J proceeded on the basis that it was necessary for the Tribunal to assess whether there was 'a respectable evidentiary case' against Dr Shah and not that the Tribunal was obliged to form any belief about whether that conduct had, in fact, occurred.
In Oglesby v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2014] QCAT 701 at [20] Horneman-Wren J said:
… In my view, a reasonable belief may be held that a practitioner poses a serious risk to persons if, based upon evidence of past conduct, there is a real possibility that the practitioner will engage in conduct which could be harmful to persons. If the possibility of engaging in the conduct was not so remote as to be fanciful, or the possible harm trivial, then I would not think that a belief could reasonably be held that the practitioner posed a serious risk to persons.
Accordingly, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to reach a concluded belief that the practitioner has actually engaged in particular conduct. Immediate action under s 156(1)(a) will be justified if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is a reasonable evidentiary case that the practitioner has engaged in conduct, and that the Tribunal reasonably believes that:
(a)because of that alleged conduct the practitioner forms a serious risk to persons; and
(b)it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health or safety.
This view is consistent with both parties' written submissions on the law: see in particular paragraph 33 of the Board's submissions dated 21 March 2024 (Board's submissions) and paragraphs 33 and 34 of the practitioner's submissions dated 21 March 2024.
However, in its written and oral submissions on the evidence, the Board appeared to invite us to make findings, or form beliefs, that the practitioner had engaged in particular conduct he denies: for example, see paragraph 176 of the Board's submissions and the transcript of the hearing on 25 March 2024 at ts 43, ts 56, ts 67 and ts 91. To the extent that the Board intended to make that submission, we do not accept it for the reasons set out above.
Any other conclusion would result in this Tribunal inappropriately making findings about the practitioner's disputed conduct, as opposed to whether there is a reasonable evidentiary case in support of the allegations about that conduct, at a stage where the investigation into that conduct is incomplete, the evidence is imperfect and untested and where any findings of fact may prejudice a final disciplinary hearing.

Need to identify serious risk with precision

Whilst an immediate action order may be based on complaints and allegations, the material produced in support of the evidentiary case for immediate action should be 'carefully scrutinised' in order to determine the weight to be attached to it. No weight will be given to a complaint that is trivial or misconceived on its face: WD at [8.7].
In forming the belief that because of a practitioner's conduct the practitioner poses a serious risk to persons, we must identify precisely what serious risk we believe the practitioner poses and to whom he poses that risk. The answers to those questions are essential to the determination of whether immediate action is necessary and what immediate action is required: Shah at [322] and [323].

Immediate action under s 156(1)(e)

The taking of immediate action under s 156(1)(e) is justified only if the Board, and the Tribunal on review, form a reasonable belief that the immediate action is otherwise in the public interest. This may be founded on an allegation that the practitioner has engaged in conduct unrelated to their health practice, which may not found a belief that the practitioner poses a serious risk to person, but where immediate action is warranted in order to maintain public confidence in the health profession: Lee at [28]. The example given in the legislation is if the health practitioner is charged with a serious crime. However, that example does not define the scope of s 156(1)(e).
For the purposes of s 156(1)(e) the public interest includes (but is not limited to):
(a)the maintenance of a regulatory system that responds in a fair and proportionate manner when allegations are made;
(b)members of the health profession, in whom training and expenditure have been made, being able to practice;
(c)'area of need' professionals being able to practice;
(d)proportionality, particularly where a matter is unlikely to finalise quickly; and
(e)ensuring immediate action is only taken where it is necessary to do so.
Lee at [47] and Farshchi v Chinese Medicine Board of Australia [2018] VCAT 1617 at [71] to [75].

Generally

The same set of facts may warrant action under both s 156(1)(a) and s 156(1)(e): Lee at [31].
The impact of a particular course of immediate action may be relevant in determining what form of immediate action is necessary or warranted, given the need for immediate action that is proportionate, having regard to the reason for taking the action: Lee at [70]. As was said in Kozanoglu v Pharmacy Board of Australia [2012] VSCA 295 at [126], while the safety of the public must necessarily be the prime concern, it should be secured with as little damage to the practitioner as is consistent with its maintenance.
In relation to the immediate action necessary to protect public safety:
(a)the Tribunal must consider whether the imposition of conditions, rather than suspension, would adequately protect public safety; Shah [347]
(b)the assessment of risk can only be undertaken after the Tribunal has identified conditions that might be imposed; Shah [347] and
(c)the Tribunal must take into account the likely deterrent effect of the practitioner's knowledge of the likely consequences of failing to comply with such conditions; Shah [268].
In Shah, when considering the necessary immediate action to protect the public interest where that interest was identified to be the public perception of the risk of the practitioner sexually harassing female staff members or patients if permitted to practice, Blue J said at [384]:
The public would take into account conditions imposed to mitigate the risk of sexual harassment. It would take into account that the sexual assault charges had been withdrawn by the Police. It would take into account that Dr Shah denied the conduct. It would take into account that the Board was only investigating the conduct and, when the Tribunal delivered its statement of reasons, had been investigating that conduct for more than 15 months without having instituted a substantive disciplinary proceeding. The public would take into account the public interests referred to above in Dr Shah being permitted to practice.

Board's Submissions

The Board submitted, uncontroversially, that the issues to be determined were:
(a)whether the practitioner poses a serious risk to persons;
(b)whether it is necessary to take immediate action against the practitioner to protect public health or safety;
(c)whether it is otherwise in the public interest to take immediate action against the practitioner; and
(d)what form of immediate action is required to protect the public (if any).
For the purposes of determining that there was a need for immediate action under s 156(1)(a), in summary, the Board invited us to find on the evidence that there were serious risks:
(a)of physical, emotional or psychological harm arising from boundary violations including that the practitioner may enter into relationships with patients and treat people with whom he has close personal relationships;
(b)of physical, emotional or psychological harm to colleagues and employees arising from:
(i)an unsafe working environment or workplace;
(ii)the possibility that the practitioner may develop an intimate relationship with colleagues or employees and act in a physically or psychologically abusive manner towards them, including while at work; and
(iii)the possibility that the practitioner will act in a sexually inappropriate way towards them; and
(c)of harm to patients arising from:
(i)an unsafe working environment creating an inherent risk to the proper treatment of patients;
(ii)poor, inappropriate or unprofessional communication;
(iii)inadequate informed consent practices;
(iv)allowing or directing employees to act outside their scope of practice;
(v)poor or dishonest billing practices; and
(i)inadequate record keeping practices;
all of which may undermine the ongoing care of patients and their understanding of the treatment provided.
The Board also submitted that there was a risk that the practitioner would act in a sexually inappropriate manner towards patients. The Board said it accepted that this risk was not as high as the risk to colleagues and employees, but said the risk was 'not fanciful'.
The Board submitted that the practitioner's alleged history of domestic violence, controlling behaviour and sexually inappropriate behaviour was capable of giving rise to a reasonable belief that immediate action was necessary in the public interest under s 156(1)(e). This was on the basis that the allegations, if substantiated, reflected on the practitioner's fitness to hold registration and that it was necessary to take immediate action to address the question of public confidence in the provision of services by health professionals.
The Board submitted that the practitioner's history of violence (both domestic and generally) and sexually inappropriate behaviour would, if proven, demonstrate the practitioner was not a fit and proper person to hold registration.
The Board submitted, in effect, that if immediate action in the form of suspension is not imposed there is a serious risk of the loss of public confidence in the provision of dental services and the standards of the dental profession.
Counsel for the Board conceded that the transgression of boundaries by treating a romantic partner or colleague as a patient was not a reason to take immediate action: see ts 41 to 42.

Practitioner's submissions

The practitioner submitted that the immediate action taken by the Board should be revoked because it is not possible to form a reasonable belief that because of the practitioner's conduct:
(a)he poses a serious risk to persons and therefore it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health or safety; or
(b)taking immediate action is otherwise in the public interest.
The practitioner submitted that the material does not justify a reasonable belief that the practitioner poses a serious risk to persons in circumstances where:
(a)when properly scrutinised, the material submitted by the Board should be afforded reduced weight, or no weight, in some cases;
(b)the practitioner strenuously denies most of the allegations raised against him; and
(c)the most serious matter raised against the practitioner, namely two assault charges, resulted in acquittals.
The practitioner submitted that the material does not justify a reasonable belief that it is necessary to take immediate action because:
(a)many of the allegations concern events that occurred many years ago;
(b)the Board took no immediate action for 11 months after it was notified of allegations of domestic violence against the practitioner; and
(c)the bulk of the allegations concern matters alleged to have occurred in the practitioner's personal life, not impacting on the quality of health services offered by him at his dental practice.
The practitioner submitted (in the alternative) that any risk to persons would be sufficiently ameliorated by appropriate undertakings or conditions and suspension was not necessary. In addition, it was submitted, the suspension was likely to be of long duration, given the length of time it may take to commence and finalise disciplinary action against the practitioner, would ruin the practitioner's business and deny people living in the area of his practice access to health services as well as impacting on his livelihood and that of his employees.

The Decision

As we understand the Board's submission, the Decision was made by the Board's Immediate Action Committee, with delegated authority from the Board. There is no dispute that this was a decision of the Board.
The letter from Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Authority (AHPRA) notifying the practitioner of the Decision says, in brief summary, that:
(a)the Board had formed a belief that the practitioner posed a serious risk to persons in light of the nature and extent of the allegations, involving multiple women, including junior colleagues, over a prolonged period in particular:
(i)the allegation of sexual misconduct towards an underage employee;
(ii)a history of serious allegations of domestic violence by the practitioner in relation to a number of different partners;
(iii)that two of the practitioner's previous partners who alleged domestic violence by him, as well as the underage employee, were the practitioner's employees.
(b)there was a serious risk of financial, physical, emotional and or psychological harm should the practitioner engage in unwanted sexual behaviour towards other colleagues or employees.
(c)colleagues had a right to feel safe in and outside the workplace without being 'violated' by their peers. Such behaviour can place the public at risk because the potential for deterioration in professional relationships may detrimentally impact the culture of a workplace and compromise the provision of safe and effective dental care to clients.
(d)The Board also believed that it was otherwise in the public interest to take immediate action because, whilst the allegations were untested, the alleged conduct demonstrated:
(i)a failure to observe appropriate boundaries in interactions with persons in accordance with legal, professional and ethical boundaries;
(ii)a failure to act in accordance with legal, professional and ethical standards; and
(iii)a lack of honesty, integrity, ethics or compassion for persons;
(e)the alleged conduct reflected on the practitioner's suitability to hold registration as a dentist as, if proved, it is inconsistent with the qualities and obligations required of a dentist;
(f)notwithstanding the absence of criminal charges, public knowledge of the alleged conduct would likely adversely impact public opinion and/or diminish public confidence in the dental profession including eroding the intrinsic trust that the public had in practitioners to provide care and treatment to patients;
(g)the perception of the failure of the Board to act would erode public confidence in the standards to which the dental profession is held and the protective function of the Board and/or regulator; and
(h)the Board considered that suspension is the appropriate form of immediate action necessary to mitigate the identified serious risk and risk to the public interest.

Evidence of the practitioner's behaviour towards women

In relation to the allegations concerning the practitioner's behaviour towards women, the Board relies on evidence of the practitioner's behaviour towards 6 women Ms A, Ms B, Ms C, Ms D, Ms E and Ms F.
In relation to the allegations against Ms A, Ms B, Ms C and Ms F the Board relied on:
(a)the contents of a notice of proposed immediate action to the practitioner dated 27 February 2024 by which the Board notified the practitioner that it was considering taking immediate action against the practitioner (Notification);
(b)the practitioner's solicitor's written submissions dated 4 March 2024 in response to the Notification;
(c)a summary of verbal submissions before the Immediate Action Committee on 8 March 2024; and
(d)the practitioner's 'practitioner information' held by AHPRA as at 8 March 2024.
In relation to Ms A the evidence before us is as follows:
(a)a notification summary (00497645) dated 19 April 2022;
(b)Ms A's statement to AHPRA dated 31 May 2023;
(c)Ms A's statement to [redacted] police dated [redacted];
(d)Ms A's statement to [redacted] police dated [redacted];
(e)Ms A's affidavit [redacted] sworn [redacted];
(f)an intervention order dated [redacted], made in the Magistrates' Court [redacted], binding the practitioner and protecting Ms A, and noted to have been made with the practitioner's consent;
(g)the first page of intervention order made by the Magistrates' Court [redacted], dated [redacted], noting Ms A as the applicant and the practitioner as the respondent;
(h)a number of emails between the practitioner and Ms A dated [redacted];
(i)an email from a lawyer to Ms A forwarding a letter from the practitioner to Ms A sent to the lawyer on [redacted];
(j)medical records of radiology to Ms A's left wrist, thumb and hand from [redacted]; and
(k)medical notes of Ms A's attendance at SCGH on [redacted].
In relation to Ms B, the evidence before us is as follows:
(a)a notification summary (00497985) dated 22 April 2022 in relation to Ms B;
(b)a notice completed by the practitioner dated [redacted], notifying the Board that he had been charged with an offence punishable by 12 months' imprisonment or more;
(c)Ms B's statement to AHPRA dated 3 November 2023;
(d)seven statements made by Ms B to police on [redacted];
(e)a prosecution notice dated [redacted] charging the practitioner with aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm to Ms B on [redacted];
(f)an interim family violence restraining order made on [redacted] binding Ms B and protecting the practitioner.
(g)an interim family violence restraining order made on [redacted] binding the practitioner and protecting Ms B;
(h)a withdrawal of complaint signed by Ms B dated [redacted];
(i)a police incident report dated [redacted];
(j)a prosecution notice dated [redacted] charging the practitioner with aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm to Ms B on [redacted];
(k)a prosecution notice dated [redacted] charging the practitioner with failing to comply with a protective bail undertaking on [redacted];
(l)a statement of another witness, Ms LS, to police dated [redacted];
(m)transcripts of proceedings in the [redacted] Magistrates' Court dated [redacted];
(n)a letter from the practitioner's solicitors to the Board dated [redacted] advising that the practitioner had been charged with two counts of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm on [redacted] respectively and that judgments of acquittal on both counts were entered on [redacted];
(o)text communications between Ms A and Ms B on [redacted];
(p)copy communications between Ms B and the practitioner between [redacted] provided by the practitioner's solicitors to the Board on 4 March 2024;
(q)dental records for Ms B's tooth 22 on [redacted];
(r)an annotated calendar for [redacted]; and
(s)five short video recordings.
In relation to Ms C the evidence before us is as follows:
(a)a notification summary (00498039) dated 24 April 2022;
(b)Ms C's statement to AHPRA dated 22 March 2023;
(c)an interim family violence restraining order made [redacted] binding the practitioner and protecting Ms C;
(d)a conduct order agreement made [redacted] binding the practitioner and protecting Ms C; and
(e)a statement of Ms C's Medibank benefits dated [redacted].
In relation to Ms F the evidence before us is as follows:
(a)a notification summary (00547996) dated 18 December 2023;
(b)a police incident report dated [redacted];
(c)Ms F's statement to police dated [redacted]; and
(d)a document entitled '[redacted] Detectives Crime File Write‑Off' dated [redacted] (Detectives' Note).

In relation to Ms D the Board relied on a police incident report dated [redacted] concerning an alleged assault by the practitioner on Ms D. The Board also relied on what was said about Ms D by a police prosecution the Magistrates Court on [redacted].
In relation to Ms E the Board relied on an interim family violence restraining order made [redacted] binding the practitioner and protecting Ms E. The Board also relied on what was said by a police prosecutor in the Magistrates Court on [redacted].
In addition, the Board produced:
(a)a police incident report dated [redacted] concerning an incident between the practitioner and Mr DP, [redacted];
(b)a copy of a statement to AHPRA dated [redacted] of another woman the practitioner was in a relationship with, Ms LP; and
(c)an anonymous letter of complaint dated 30 October 2019.
The respondent relied, in particular, on two affidavits sworn by the practitioner on 11 March 2024 and 19 March 2024 and an affidavit of a solicitor in the employ of his legal representatives sworn 12 March 2024.

Consideration of the evidence of the practitioner's behaviour towards women

As is apparent from the summary above, the bulk of the evidence concerns the allegations of the practitioner's conduct towards Ms A, Ms B, Ms C and Ms F.
As has already been noted, the practitioner denies the allegations of misconduct against him, including the allegations in relation to these four women. He has made some admissions, including in relation to the alleged incident concerning Ms F, which are referred to below.
Our consideration of the evidence is set out below. Our view of the material is necessarily preliminary, given the urgent nature of the hearing and the fact that no witnesses were subjected to cross examination. Our comments are not to be considered binding on the Tribunal that is ultimately constituted to determine disciplinary action brought against the practitioner, when that occurs.

Ms F

The allegations concerning the practitioner's conduct towards Ms F on [redacted] are the most recent and arguably the most serious. The nature of those allegations differ from the allegations of his conduct towards Ms A, Ms B and Ms C. It is the receipt, on 18 December 2023, from an anonymous notifier of the allegations in relation to the incident involving Ms F (alleged to have occurred on [redacted]) that precipitated the decision to take immediate action.
There is no dispute that as at [redacted] Ms F was the practitioner's employee and [redacted].
The practitioner has admitted that he took Ms F to a work function where Ms F drank a quantity of alcohol, [redacted].
The practitioner does not dispute Ms F's evidence that after the work function they went to other venues at which Ms F drank alcohol nor that he was aware that she was drinking, although he denies that he purchased Ms F any alcohol that evening.
Again, on the practitioner's own admission, he took Ms F to his home late that evening. He accepts that it was his suggestion the employee come to his home, with the stated object to watch a program on TV.
Ms F alleged to police, in effect, that the practitioner indecently assaulted her when they were alone together at his house. In brief summary, Ms F alleged in her statement to police made on [redacted] that the practitioner massaged her neck and shoulders with her consent and then, without consent, exposed her breasts by unzipping her top, touched and kissed her breasts, and rubbed her vagina over her clothing in a manner that hurt her.
The practitioner denies the conduct alleged by Ms F at [78] occurred.
The practitioner has not been charged with indecent assault or any other offence in relation to Ms F. The evidence is that the police considered there were no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the practitioner because of concerns that it would not be possible to prove the lack of consent, which is an element of the offence of indecent assault, and whether the practitioner may have had a reasonable belief that the contact was consensual. It is to be noted that the standard of proof in a criminal prosecution, of beyond reasonable doubt, is higher than the standard to be met in any disciplinary proceedings.
In any disciplinary proceeding, the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, that is the honesty and reliability of their evidence, will be a matter for the Tribunal as constituted at that time, after hearing the witnesses' evidence including evidence given under cross-examination. However, in assessing a witness' evidence the Tribunal will be entitled, at that time, to consider any inconsistencies between the witness' evidence and what they have said on some other occasion including whether any inconsistency is significant and the explanation for the inconsistency. An inconsistency might consist of describing an event differently, adding something to the evidence that was not said previously, or leaving something out.
There would appear to be some inconsistencies in relation to Ms F's evidence about what occurred which may have the potential to undermine the credibility of her evidence at any final disciplinary hearing.
Although Ms F attended the police station the following day, on [redacted], when she told the police something of the allegations, Ms F did not give a statement until [redacted]. The police report of Ms F's complaint on [redacted] does not refer to a number of significant details that were subsequently contained in her statement on [redacted]. In particular, the police report refers only to the practitioner giving Ms F a massage with her consent. The report indicates that Ms F said that during the course of that massage she was slipping into and out of consciousness, or falling asleep, and that she later noticed her top was unzipped and her vagina hurt. She makes no reference to the specific allegations referred to at [78] above.
In her statement, Ms F said that she did not tell the police all that had happened because she was embarrassed.
In addition, as is noted in the Detectives' Note, the allegation that Ms F did not tell the practitioner to stop because she was 'really drunk and dozing in and out' might be considered to be inconsistent with her 'full recollections and details' of the events in her statement, and to text messages said to have been sent at the time to friends in which she denied being drunk (which are not in evidence but are referred to in the police documents). It was also noted that Ms F told her friends, who collected her from the house, that nothing had happened.
The practitioner alleges that Ms F's friends attempted to extort money from him as a result of this incident and that they took Ms F to the police station after the practitioner refused the extortion attempt. Whilst the practitioner does not say that Ms F was present at the time, she may be subject to cross examination about any involvement she had in the alleged extortion.
However, by taking her to his home the practitioner arguably put himself, and Ms F, into a position where some improper sexual contact could potentially occur at a time when his young employee was, as he ought to have been aware, under the influence of the alcohol she had been drinking.
Ms F has not provided the Board with a statement. However, Counsel for the Board advised us that her instructions were that Ms F was willing to give evidence: ts 71.

Ms A, Ms B and Ms C

The allegations of the practitioner's conduct towards Ms A, Ms B and Ms C have similarities. If accepted, the evidence of each might be considered to provide support as to the occurrence of the events alleged by the others.
In each case the conduct is alleged to have occurred in the context of an ongoing intimate relationship with the practitioner.
In summary, it is alleged that the practitioner:
(a)psychologically abused Ms A and engaged in personal and financially controlling behaviour towards her on a regular basis between [redacted];
(b)was physically violent towards Ms A on a regular basis during the same period;
(c)psychologically abused Ms B and engaged in personal and financially controlling behaviour towards her on a regular basis between [redacted], while they were in a relationship;
(d)was physically violent towards Ms B on a regular basis during the same period including that on two occasions he assaulted Ms B occasioning bodily harm to her, and on one occasion assaulted her at the practitioner's dental surgery;
(e)psychologically abused Ms C and engaged in personal and financially controlling behaviour towards her on a regular basis between [redacted], while they were in a relationship.
(f)committed an act of physical violence in close proximity to Ms C, but not directed to Ms C, on one occasion.

Ms A

There is no dispute that Ms A was the practitioner's partner from when he was 16, in 2005, to when he was 27 in 2016. [redacted].
In her statements made to police in [redacted] and to the Board in 2023, Ms A alleges ongoing psychological abuse and personal and financially controlling behaviour by the practitioner. She also alleges that the practitioner was physically violent throughout the relationship. Ms A details a number of specific instances and makes general allegations of ongoing abuse of a similar kind, including the practitioner pushing or dragging her, throwing objects at her, punching her and strangling her.
The most serious specific allegation is of an assault in [redacted] in which it is alleged that, [redacted], the practitioner pushed Ms A against a metal barrier causing pain to her back and later the same night punched her repeatedly, kicked her, strangled her and told her he wanted to kill her. Ms A alleges that after this assault she suffered bruising and ongoing pain with breathing and thought she may have broken a rib. However, she alleges the practitioner refused to let her see a doctor.
Ms A also refers to nine other alleged specific assaults in [redacted]. As described, these are all less serious than the assault referred to at [94] above. Collectively they are largely allegations of the practitioner punching Ms A to various parts of her body, dragging her including by the hair, pushing her and spitting on her. Only one injury is alleged, [redacted], from a punch which hit her hand.
The last specific allegation of assault was on [redacted] where the practitioner pushed Ms A to the ground and punched her to the face but hit her hand which she put up to defend herself, spat in her face three times and punched her to the face again which she blocked with her hand. He also took her mobile phone. Ms A reported that assault to the police on that day.
Ms A also alleges occasions where the practitioner threatened to harm her either expressly or by implication. Ms A alleges that the practitioner had said he wanted to kill her, including on one occasion when he threatened to push her out of a car.
As has been said the practitioner denies Ms A's allegations. He alleges that Ms A suffered mental health issues [redacted] which may have affected her memory.
Ms A did not report her allegations of abuse until the [redacted]. That delay in complaint may serve to undermine her credibility at any final disciplinary hearing, even accepting such delay is common in cases of alleged domestic abuse.
There are also some apparent inconsistencies in the various statements given by Ms A to [redacted] police, [redacted] and AHPRA. The description of the alleged assault on [redacted] differs in the two statements. Whilst Ms A refers to ongoing abuse from the start of the relationship, in an affidavit [redacted] she says that the earliest sign of issues [redacted] were on [redacted]. In a police statement on [redacted] where the last incident was reported, A did not report ongoing abuse, although she described the relationship as controlling and toxic and said that 'If I don't listen or do what he says, he will be verbally, emotionally and sometimes physically aggressive towards me'.
Again, these matters may serve to undermine the credibility of Ms A's evidence at a final disciplinary hearing.
However, there is also evidence that might be construed as constituting an implied admission by the practitioner to having been physically violent towards Ms A. In an email sent to the practitioner on [redacted] Ms A makes reference to physical abuse by him. In an email apparently in response on the same day, the practitioner makes a general admission of wrongdoing and does not expressly deny the specific allegations. However, whether the Tribunal (at any disciplinary hearing) does consider this constitutes an admission will depend in part on the context of all the exchanges between them at that time.
None of the allegations concern the practitioner's professional conduct. It is not alleged that Ms A was ever his employee or that any assault occurred at his dental practice.
The practitioner never been charged with any offence in relation to his conduct towards Ms A.
The Board had Ms A's latest statement by 23 May 2023, 9 months before the notice of proposed immediate action. There is no evidence that there was any consideration by the Board whether Ms A's allegations warranted immediate action prior to the Board being notified of the allegations concerning Ms F.

Ms B

There is no apparent dispute that:
(a)Ms B was in a relationship with the practitioner from between about [redacted];
(b)during that period the practitioner was charged with two counts of assaulting Ms B occasioning bodily harm. The assaults were alleged to have occurred on [redacted];
(c)in relation to the alleged assault on [redacted], the police alleged that the practitioner threw his phone at the wall to the left of Ms B, causing a crack, that he denigrated Ms B before grabbing her, pushing her against a wall and punching her mouth with a clenched fist, before walking away. The bodily harm alleged was an injury to Ms B's tooth;
(d)in relation to the alleged assault on [redacted] the police alleged that during the course of a verbal argument the practitioner forcibly grabbed Ms B on her forearms, pushed her head onto the bed and struck her on the side of the head. The bodily harm alleged was bruising to Ms B's forearms;
(e)the practitioner pleaded not guilty to each charge;
(f)on [redacted] the prosecution sought leave to discontinue the charges on the basis that, although Ms B said she did not resile from her statement against the practitioner, she had said she did not wish to give evidence because she wanted to reconcile with the practitioner. Leave to discontinue was refused and subsequently, on the same day, the prosecution presented no evidence in relation to each charge. As a result, the practitioner was acquitted of both charges.
Ms B's evidence is to the effect that during their relationship the practitioner was physically violent towards her as well as psychologically abusive and personally and financially controlling.
When Ms B attended police on [redacted], she only reported the alleged assault on [redacted], although she mentioned experiencing assaults in the previous three months in a text to Ms A on [redacted].
In her statement to police of [redacted], Ms B raised for the first time eight alleged assaults in addition to the alleged assault on [redacted]. She alleged that five had occurred before her statement on [redacted], including one on [redacted]. She alleged that there had been 2 incidents after [redacted].
In summary, Ms B alleged that on three separate occasions the practitioner had grabbed her by the throat for 5 to 10 seconds, and that he had punched her on one occasion, stomped on her foot on one occasion and pushed her on three occasions, one of which resulted in bruising to her arms. Other than this bruising and pain Ms B does not allege any injury.
Ms B also alleges an incident occurred at the practitioner's dental practice on [redacted] when she was working, where the practitioner put the handle of a bell into her mouth and moved it around aggressively for 10 seconds, hurting her lip and teeth.
No charges were ever laid in relation to these other alleged assaults.
In her 3 November 2023 statement to AHPRA, B raised for the first time a further three allegations that the practitioner had punched her in [redacted] causing bruising on her arms on one occasion.
There are apparent inconsistencies in the various statements given by Ms B, in the failure to refer to assaults she later alleged had occurred, which may affect the Tribunal's assessment of the credibility of her evidence at a disciplinary hearing.
In addition, the following may affect the assessment of Ms B's credibility:
(a)her refusal to give evidence at the hearing of the criminal charges;
(b)evidence produced by the practitioner that Ms B continued to pursue a relationship with him, in [redacted], after their relationship ended, and that he rejected these advances. Ms B does not refer to any attempt to reunite with the practitioner in the statement she provided to AHPRA dated 3 November 2023;
(c)evidence produced by the practitioner that Ms B has sought to defame him to his patients and has been stalking him; and
(d)some inconsistencies in the description of the assaults in the various statements.
As has already been said, the Tribunal at any final disciplinary hearing would be required to determine for itself whether it considered there were any inconsistencies, to assess how significant it considered any inconsistency to be, and to take into account any explanation for any inconsistencies. For example, it may be accepted that it is not uncommon for a person to reconcile with a partner who has assaulted them, or that such a person may not speak of all the allegations of assault when they first go to police. However, on the face of it, the matters referred to have the potential to undermine the Tribunal's assessment of the credibility of Ms B's evidence at any disciplinary hearing.
On the other hand, there is some independent evidence that may be said to support the occurrence of the second of the two alleged assaults that were the subject of the charges, although not that it caused any injury. A former friend of the practitioner, Ms LS, provided a statement to police on [redacted] concerning a conversation with the practitioner that might be considered to amount to an implied admission that he had hit Ms B on [redacted]. Ms LS has not provided a statement to AHPRA.
There is also evidence in the form of five very short video recordings which are said to have been taken by Ms B without the practitioner's knowledge.
The practitioner submitted that we should not give any weight to these consistent with the policy of the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) at s 5, s 6 and s 9. The practitioner also submitted that the provenance and authenticity for the recordings is not clear, they lack context, and it was not admitted that the people speaking were the practitioner and Ms B.
The Board relied in particular on one video which was said to provide some corroboration of the allegation of assault against Ms B on [redacted], where her tooth is alleged to have been injured. The Board's counsel said that the Board had obtained the videos from the police but that the police had not informed the Board from whom they had obtained the videos.
In our view, the contents of the videos are somewhat equivocal. The high point appears to be a clip said to have been taken on [redacted]. However, it is not clear to us on viewing that clip what is happening or what the context is. Two people are heard arguing, and there is, perhaps, some kind of scuffle. There is no footage of the assault described by Ms B. Otherwise, the videos appear to provide some limited support for Ms B's allegations that the practitioner was verbally abusive towards her, assuming the practitioner is the person being recorded. On balance we consider that these add little to Ms B's evidence.

(k)'employment' means an employee's work for the Practitioner or the Practice or any External Practice, whether for payment or not;
(l)'personal contact' means any contact or communication whether orally or in writing, in person, by telephone, text message, messaging service, email, social media application or any other means that does not relate to the employee's employment or the Practice or any External Practice; and
(m)'Statement' means the statement at Annexure A of these conditions.

3.The Practitioner must not practise otherwise than in accordance with the conditions set out in paragraphs 5 to 12.
4.All costs associated with compliance with these conditions are at the Practitioner's own expense.

Interaction with employees and patients
5.Within 7 days of the imposition of these conditions the Practitioner must:
(a)provide a copy of the Statement to all current employees of the Practitioner and the Practice;
(b)arrange for each such employee to sign a copy of the Statement; and
(c)provide to AHPRA the signed copies of the Statement referred to in condition 5(b) and a list of the names of all employees of the Practitioner and the Practice, their dates of birth and contact details.

6.Within one month of the imposition of these conditions the Practitioner must:
(a)provide a copy of the Statement to the principals and all current employees of any External Practice;
(b)arrange for each such principal and employee to sign a copy of the Statement; and
(c)provide to AHPRA the signed copies of the Statement referred to in condition 6(b) and a complete list of the names of the principals and employees of any External Practice, their dates of birth and contact details.

7.Following the imposition of these conditions the Practitioner must:
(a)provide a copy of the Statement to any proposed employee of the Practitioner or the Practice at the same time as the proposed employee is offered employment;
(b)within 7 days of the proposed employee being engaged as an employee (if that occurs):
(i)arrange for the employee to sign a copy of the Statement; and
(ii)provide to AHPRA the signed copy of the Statement referred to in condition 7(b)(i) and the name of the employee, their date of birth and contact details;

(c)within 7 days of becoming aware of the engagement of any new employee by any External Practice;
(i)arrange for the employee to sign a copy of the Statement; and
(ii)provide to AHPRA the signed copy of the Statement referred to in condition 7(c)(i) and the name of the employee, their date of birth and contact details.

8.Following the imposition of these conditions the Practitioner:
(a)must not employ, or allow the Practice to employ, any female employee who is under the age of 18 years;
(b)must not have any personal contact with any female employee outside the workplace; and
(c)must not engage in any personal or private activities or engagements with any patient of the Practitioner, the Practice or any External Practice otherwise than in accordance with the Code of Conduct.

Supervision
9.The Practitioner must engage Dr David Hallett (registration number DEN0001580124) and Dr Kang Kim (registration number DEN0001580744) as supervisors and mentors (individually a Supervisor and, collectively, Supervisors) (or any such other person approved by the Board in the event that either person is unwilling or unable to continue as a Supervisor) of his professional conduct and practise for a period of six months.
10.The Practitioner must:
(a)provide a copy of the Statement to the Supervisors;
(b)ensure that the Supervisors review, and if considered by either of them appropriate, audit the Practitioner's billing practises (including billing to patients, Medicare and private entities), working conditions of the Practitioner's workplace and adherence by the Practitioner to these conditions;
(c)ensure that a Supervisor meets the Practitioner in the workplace or via video link at least once per fortnight, and at any other time the Supervisor or Supervisors consider appropriate without notice to the Practitioner;
(d)ensure that the Supervisors monitor the Practitioner's compliance with the Dental Board's continuous professional development (CPD) program;
(e)attend any CPD course or training nominated by a Supervisor including as to note-taking or billing practices;
(f)ensure that the Supervisors provide a report to a nominated officer of AHPRA of the Practitioner's compliance with these conditions every two months for a total of six months, with the first such report being provided on 28 May 2024; and
(g)provide the Supervisors with access to the Practice, the workplace, and all patient and business records of the Practice to enable the Supervisors to perform their functions under paragraphs 10(b), (c), (d) and (f).

11.Within one month of these conditions being imposed the Practitioner must:
(a)complete the Board's self-reflective tool entitled 'Good Record Keeping' dated September 2020;
(b)discuss his responses to the self-reflective tool with the Supervisors or one of them.

12.Within 12 months of these conditions being imposed the Practitioner must:
(a)obtain a registered psychologist evaluation;
(b)see a registered psychologist each month for a period of six months;
(c)provide AHPRA with the identity of the psychologist he attends pursuant to condition 12(b) and authorisation to contact that psychologist for the sole purpose of AHPRA confirming his attendance at those consultations.

13.There be liberty to apply.

ANNEXURE A
As you may be aware, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency and Dental Board of Australia have been investigating me in relation to allegations of domestic violence and an allegation of sexual misconduct towards a former female employee.
I deny these allegations. However, while the investigation is ongoing, I am required to inform you of these matters and advise you that I am subject to the following conditions of my practice:
(a)I must not employ or allow the Practice to employ, any female employee who is under the age of 18 years; and
(b)I must not have any personal contact with any female employee outside the workplace (whether orally or in writing, in person, by telephone, text message, messaging service, email, social media application or any other means that does not relate to the employee's employment or the Practice).

Please let me know if you have any questions in relation to this.
If at any time you have questions about your safety in the workplace, please contact Dr David Hallett 0427514616.
I ………………………………………………(name) confirm that I have received this statement.
………………………………………………..
Signature of Employee

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
GH
Associate
10 JUNE 2024