Wagners Cement Pty Ltd v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Wagners Cement Pty Ltd & Anor v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd
& Anor [2020] QSC 124
PARTIES:  WAGNERS CEMENT PTY LTD (ACN 126 029 481)
(first plaintiff)
WAGNERS QUEENSLAND PTY LTD (ACN 122 170
745)
(second plaintiff)
v
BORAL RESOURCES (QLD) PTY LIMITED
(ACN 009 671 809)
(first defendant)
BORAL LIMITED (ACN 008 421 761)
(second defendant)
FILE NO/S:  BS 4294 of 2019
DIVISION:  Trial Division
PROCEEDING:  Claim
DELIVERED ON:  19 May 2020
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  6 and 7 February 2020
Further written submissions received on 2, 4 and 6 March
2020
JUDGE:  Bond J
ORDER:  The orders of the Court are:

1. 

The parties are directed to bring in minutes of orders reflecting the Court’s reasons for judgment by 4:00pm on 2 June 2020.

2. 

The proceeding will be listed before Bond J at 9:00am on 4 June 2020 for the making of formal orders reflecting the agreed position or, in default of agreement, for the making of directions as to the means by which any remaining disputes may be resolved.

3. 

The parties will be heard as to the orders which should be made as to costs at the hearing referred to in order 2.

4.

Unless further or other order is made, the Court’s reasons for judgment must not be made public before 4:00pm on 4 June 2020.

CATCHWORDS: 
CONTRACTS  – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL
PRINCIPLES  – CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION  OF CONTRACTS –
INTERPRETATION  OF MISCELLANEOUS
CONTRACTS AND OTHER MATTERS – where a cement

supply agreement contained a contractual price adjustment mechanism triggered by the purchaser serving a notice containing market pricing evidence – where supplier could elect to supply at reduced price or suspend contract – where purchaser served notice containing an offer for supply at some future date – whether notice was a valid pricing notice – whether supplier waived irregularity of notice – whether supplier elected to suspend contract

Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 31
Cherry v Steele-Park (2017) 96 NSWLR 548, not followed
Commonwealth Steel Company Ltd v BHP Billiton Marine and
General Insurance Ltd [2018] NSWCA 242, not followed
Coronar (Australia) Pty Ltd v Lake Vermont Marketing Pty Ltd
[2017] QSC 120, applied
Glencore Grain Ltd v Flacker Shipping Ltd (The Happy Day)
[2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 896, considered
HSH Hotels (Aust) Ltd v State of Queensland [2012] 2 Qd R 252,
cited
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd (2015)
256 CLR 104, applied
Nabalco Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd, unreported, New South
Wales Supreme Court, No 4310 of 1974, 27 August 1975,
distinguished
Summer Hill Business Estate Pty Ltd v Equititrust Ltd [2011]
NSWCA 149, cited
Velvet Glove Holdings Pty Ltd v Mount Isa Mines Ltd [2011] QCA
312, applied
Watson v Scott [2016] 2 Qd R 484, applied
COUNSEL:  J McKenna QC, with D Chesterman, for the plaintiffs
L F Kelly QC, with S Eggins, for the defendants
SOLICITORS:  Norton Rose Fulbright…
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Details
Case
[2020] QSC 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wagners Cement Pty Ltd initiated proceedings against Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd, disputing the validity of a notice given by the Purchaser regarding a pricing notice under the Agreement. The dispute arose from the interpretation of clause 7.2 of the Agreement and the adequacy of the Market Pricing Evidence provided by the Purchaser.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the March Pricing Notice, which included a quote for the supply of cement starting two months after the date of the notice, was a valid and effective notice under clause 7.2. The Supplier argued that the quote did not meet the contractual requirements because it did not express a price applicable at the time of the notice, while the Purchaser contended that the notice was valid and that the interpretation proposed by the Supplier amounted to an unwarranted implication of terms.

The court examined the contractual scheme and determined that the purpose of clause 7.1 and 7.2 was to ensure that the Purchaser had access to current market prices for cement. The court found that the quote provided in the March Pricing Notice did not satisfy the requirement of reflecting the price at the time of the notice, as it related to a future supply date under potentially different market conditions. Consequently, the court held that the notice was not valid under clause 7.2.

The court made an order in favour of the Supplier, finding that the March Pricing Notice was not a valid and effective notice under clause 7.2 of the Agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

The orders of the Court are:

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

By letter of 1 March 2019 the Purchaser wrote to the Supplier stating that the letter and attached Market Pricing Evidence (the March Market Pricing Evidence) constituted a notice pursuant to cl 7.2 of the Agreement (the March Pricing Notice).[12] [12] Confidential exhibit 3 (First affidavit of Cameron David Coleman sworn 17 July 2019), redacted version, at Exhibit CDC-10. No pleaded issue was taken as to the legal efficacy of the notice pursuant to cl 24 or as to when pursuant to that clause the notice was to be taken as having been given. As it purports to have been sent The following observations may be made about the March Market Pricing Evidence: The Supplier contended that the March Pricing Notice was not a valid and effective notice under cl 7.2 of the Agreement because the only “Market Pricing Evidence” provided was a quote of the price for the supply of cement commencing on 1 May 2019, which was two months after the date of the Pricing Notice itself, and there was no other information which suggested that that price was a price which was applicable as at the date of the notice. The Supplier submitted that such a quote did not satisfy the contractual requirements of cll 7.1 and 7.2 because the language of those clauses (particularly their tense) suggested that “Market Pricing Evidence” must express a price related to a current supply of cement, and not price related to a supply of cement in potentially different market conditions two months in the future. The Purchaser argued that this approach to construction should be regarded as tantamount to the implication of terms into the Agreement and there was no warrant for such implication. It then raised a number of arguments aimed at demonstrating that the legal requirements for implication of a term into a contract had not been met. The Purchaser argued that construing cl 7.1 as requiring evidence of the price at which Product “can be purchased” as at the date of the Pricing Notice was itself uncommercial. It submitted that: It is necessary to make some introductory observations about the position of the cl 7 mechanism in the contractual scheme taken as a whole. First, in any particular Agreement Year during the Agreement term, the Purchaser was obliged to take from the Supplier the prevailing Minimum Quantity of Products for that Agreement Year and to pay for those Products at the prevailing List Price. Second, if the Purchaser did not meet its Minimum Quantity obligations with the Supplier, it would be in the position of having to pay for Product which it had not taken. So long as the Purchaser met its obligation to take the Minimum Quantity for the Agreement Year at the prevailing List Price, it was otherwise unconstrained in its right to acquire cement products from any third party supplier in whatever quantities and for whatever price suited its purposes.[15] [15] This proposition was subject to an exception which might have applied during the first and second Agreement Years because cl 12 set out an obligation by which the Purchaser might have been required to meet all of its requirement for Products in those years in certain specified markets. It is unnecessary to consider that requirement further.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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