FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 1247
Citation: Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 1247 Parties: TIMOTHY VISSCHER AND TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD ACN 079 641 580 File number: NSD 308 of 2007 Judge: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 9 November 2012 Catchwords: SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION – Admiralty – masters and seamen – seaman’s wages – alleged delay in payment of wages on discharge from ship – Navigation Act 1912 (Cth), ss 75(1), 78, 83 – application of provisions to a salaried deck officer remunerated under a certified agreement – relationship between certified agreement and provisions of Pt 2 of the Navigation Act – operation of s 83 of the Navigation Act – whether certified agreement void to the extent of any inconsistency – meaning of “discharge” for purposes of ss 75, 78 – whether seaman discharged at the end of voyages – whether “wages” in ss 75, 78 includes accrued leave – whether delay in payment of wages due to seaman’s act or default, a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages or to any other cause not attributable to the wrongful act or default of the owner or master of the ship
INDUSTRIAL LAW – relationship between certified agreement and provisions of Pt 2 of the Navigation Act – whether employment came to an end by resignation or constructive dismissal – constructive dismissal by demotion – where rescission of promotion repudiation of contract of employment – whether rescission effective – whether employee accepted repudiation
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – implied repeal – whether industrial agreement effected implied repeal of Navigation Act – construction of collective agreement – division and headings
WORDS AND PHRASES – “final settlement” – “wages”
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 18A
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(3)(t), 37(1)
Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880 (Imp) s 4(4)
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp) ss 187
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp) ss 134, 135
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) ss 6, 46, 68, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 5(3)(a), 170CD(1B), 170LT, 170LU, 170LX, 170LY, 170LZ, 170M, 170N; Pt VIBCases cited: Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241
Ansett Australia Limited (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers’ Association [2003] FCAFC 209
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 80 IR 208
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 364
Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153
Breslin v Maritime Overseas Corp 622 F Supp 195 (SDNY 1987)
Caine v Palace Steam Shipping Company [1907] 1 KB 670
Collie v Fergusson 281 US 52 (US 1930)
Commissioner of Police New South Wales v Gray (2009) 74 NSWLR 1
Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Limited v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594
Doyle v Sydney Steel Co Ltd (1936) 56…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 1247
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the certified agreement voided any inconsistencies with the provisions of the Navigation Act. It found that the certified agreement did not effect an implied repeal of the Navigation Act provisions, nor was it void. The court also considered whether Mr. Visscher was discharged from the Broadwater on 3 March 2004 and whether his employment came to an end on that date. It concluded that Mr. Visscher was indeed discharged on that date and his employment ended then. The court further deliberated on whether Mr. Visscher sailed the second voyage as a casual and if any wages were outstanding from that voyage, finding that no wages were outstanding. Finally, the court assessed whether the delay in the payment of Mr. Visscher's wages was due to his act or default or a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages, concluding that the delay was due to a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages and not due to Mr. Visscher's act or default.
The court dismissed the proceeding and ordered Mr. Visscher to pay Teekay's costs. The court also set a timeline for the filing of submissions in support of, and in reply to, any application to vary the order regarding costs. This decision clarifies the interplay between certified agreements and the Navigation Act and provides guidance on the interpretation of key terms within the legislative framework.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
3. By 30 November 2012, the respondent file submissions, not exceeding five pages, together with any affidavit(s), in support of any application to vary order 2.
4. The applicant file any submissions, not exceeding five pages, in reply to those submissions by 16 January 2013.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I am unpersuaded that any change in this position was intended by the WR Act. Indeed, the WR Act points in the opposite direction. Section 170LZ(4) provided that an agreement certified by the AIRC pursuant to s 170LT of the WR Act (as the Certified Agreement was) displaces certain conditions of employment specified in some particular Commonwealth laws to the extent of any inconsistency. But the Navigation Act is not one of those laws. That tells against the likelihood that repeal is implied.The operation of cl 35.1 of the Certified Agreement Clause 35.1 of the Certified Agreement provides that nothing in the Agreement shall be construed as limiting the rights of any officer under the Navigation Act. On its face, that also points to an intention that the Agreement would not remove the rights conferred by ss 75, 76 and 78 of the Act. The clause is entitled “Navigation, Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Acts”. For this reason Teekay argued that the clause does not assist Mr Visscher because it was limited in its operation to matters relating to occupational health and safety. For the following reasons I reject the argument. A certified agreement is to be construed in the same way as an award: Ansett Australia Limited (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers’ Association [2003] FCAFC 209 (“Ansett”); Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 80 IR 208 at 212. Thus, a narrow or pedantic approach is unwarranted, but a court is “not free to give effect to some anteriorly derived notion of what would be fair or just”: Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184 per Madgwick J. As his Honour went on to explain: The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience or injustice may reasonably be strained for. This oft-cited passage was approved in Ansett at [8]. In Short v F W Hercus Pty Limited (1993) 40 FCR 511, where the question was raised as to whether it was legitimate to look at the history of a clause in an award to interpret its meaning, Burchett J said (at 518):The context of an expression may … be much more than the words that are its immediate neighbours. Context may extend to the entire document of which it is a part, or to other documents with which there is an association. Context may also include, in some cases, ideas that gave rise to an expression in a document from which it has been taken. When the expression was transplanted, it may have brought with it some of the soil in which it once grew, retaining a special strength and colour in its new environment. There is no inherent necessity to read it as uprooted and stripped of every trace of its former significance, standing bare in alien ground. True, sometimes it does stand as if alone. But that should not be just assumed, in the case of an expression with a known source, without looking at its creation, understanding its original meaning, and then seeing how it is now used. Very frequently, perhaps most often, the immediate context is the clearest guide, but the court should not deny itself all other guidance in those cases where it can be seen that more is needed. In literature, Milton and Joyce could not be read in ignorance of the source of their language, nor should a legal document, including an award, be so read.