Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 1247

Citation: Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 1247
Parties: TIMOTHY VISSCHER AND TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD ACN 079 641 580
File number: NSD 308 of 2007
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 9 November 2012
Catchwords:

SHIPPING AND NAVIGATION – Admiralty – masters and seamen – seaman’s wages – alleged delay in payment of wages on discharge from ship – Navigation Act 1912 (Cth), ss 75(1), 78, 83 – application of provisions to a salaried deck officer remunerated under a certified agreement – relationship between certified agreement and provisions of Pt 2 of the Navigation Act – operation of s 83 of the Navigation Act – whether certified agreement void to the extent of any inconsistency – meaning of “discharge” for purposes of ss 75, 78 – whether seaman discharged at the end of voyages – whether “wages” in ss 75, 78 includes accrued leave – whether delay in payment of wages due to seaman’s act or default, a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages or to any other cause not attributable to the wrongful act or default of the owner or master of the ship

INDUSTRIAL LAW – relationship between certified agreement and provisions of Pt 2 of the Navigation Act – whether employment came to an end by resignation or constructive dismissal – constructive dismissal by demotion – where rescission of promotion repudiation of contract of employment – whether rescission effective – whether employee accepted repudiation

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – implied repeal – whether industrial agreement effected implied repeal of Navigation Act – construction of collective agreement – division and headings

WORDS AND PHRASES – “final settlement” – “wages”

Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 18A
Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(3)(t), 37(1)
Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880 (Imp) s 4(4)
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp) ss 187
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp) ss 134, 135
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) ss 6, 46, 68, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 5(3)(a), 170CD(1B), 170LT, 170LU, 170LX, 170LY, 170LZ, 170M, 170N; Pt VIB
Cases cited:

Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2005) 222 CLR 241
Ansett Australia Limited (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers’ Association [2003] FCAFC 209
Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 80 IR 208
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2011) 190 FCR 364
Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City Council (2001) 53 NSWLR 153
Breslin v Maritime Overseas Corp 622 F Supp 195 (SDNY 1987)
Caine v Palace Steam Shipping Company [1907] 1 KB 670
Collie v Fergusson 281 US 52 (US 1930)
Commissioner of Police New South Wales v Gray (2009) 74 NSWLR 1
Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Limited v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594
Doyle v Sydney Steel Co Ltd (1936) 56…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1247
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this matter, Mr. Visscher brought proceedings against Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd, alleging a delay in the payment of his wages upon his discharge from the ship Broadwater. The dispute was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The central issues that the court had to resolve included the application of the relevant provisions of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) to Mr. Visscher, who was a salaried deck officer under a certified agreement, the interpretation of the term "discharge" in the context of the Navigation Act, and whether the delay in the payment of Mr. Visscher's wages was due to his own act or default, a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages, or any other cause not attributable to the wrongful act or default of the ship owner or master.

The court examined whether the certified agreement voided any inconsistencies with the provisions of the Navigation Act. It found that the certified agreement did not effect an implied repeal of the Navigation Act provisions, nor was it void. The court also considered whether Mr. Visscher was discharged from the Broadwater on 3 March 2004 and whether his employment came to an end on that date. It concluded that Mr. Visscher was indeed discharged on that date and his employment ended then. The court further deliberated on whether Mr. Visscher sailed the second voyage as a casual and if any wages were outstanding from that voyage, finding that no wages were outstanding. Finally, the court assessed whether the delay in the payment of Mr. Visscher's wages was due to his act or default or a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages, concluding that the delay was due to a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages and not due to Mr. Visscher's act or default.

The court dismissed the proceeding and ordered Mr. Visscher to pay Teekay's costs. The court also set a timeline for the filing of submissions in support of, and in reply to, any application to vary the order regarding costs. This decision clarifies the interplay between certified agreements and the Navigation Act and provides guidance on the interpretation of key terms within the legislative framework.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

3. By 30 November 2012, the respondent file submissions, not exceeding five pages, together with any affidavit(s), in support of any application to vary order 2.

4. The applicant file any submissions, not exceeding five pages, in reply to those submissions by 16 January 2013.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before considering these questions, however, it is necessary to refer to the facts and the legislative framework against which they are to be resolved. The facts Many of the facts are uncontentious. Unless otherwise indicated, the following account records facts and conversations the substance of which are either not in dispute or are the subject of agreement. Teekay is a shipping company. At the relevant time it operated a fleet of ships used mainly for transporting oil for oil companies, refiners and traders. Mr Visscher started working for Teekay 4 March 2000. He was taken on as a casual but was later offered permanent employment as Third Mate (also known as Third Officer). The offer was confirmed in writing on 26 March 2001 (“the letter of offer”) and Mr Visscher accepted it on 30 March 2001. The letter of offer set out the terms and conditions of Mr Visscher’s employment. It stipulated that salaries were to be paid monthly by electronic transfer and any accrued entitlements were to be paid when he left the company. The letter of offer also incorporated the terms and conditions of employment contained in an enterprise agreement called the Teekay Australia/AMOU (Deck Officers) Agreement 1998 (the predecessor of the Certified Agreement) and the Maritime Industry Seagoing Award (MISA) 1998 as varied, in accordance with the WR Act. Mr Visscher very quickly impressed his employer. Within a day or so of the offer, he was invited by Teekay’s Marine Operations Manager, Capt Mark Board, to join the Samar Spirit as Chief Officer (also known as First Mate), a position of prestige and responsibility, second only in status to the ship’s master. Mr Visscher accepted the offer and joined the Samar Spirit as Chief Officer on 6 April 2001. When he arrived home from his tour of duty on 7 September 2001, he opened a letter from the company offering him a permanent promotion to Chief Officer with effect from 4 August 2001. He said he was elated to read it and accepted the offer the same day. His joy, however, was short-lived. Around 6 September 2001 the Australian Maritime Office Union (“AMOU”) had notified Teekay that it intended to take strike action over promotions Teekay had made during the bargaining period for the new enterprise agreement. Mr Visscher’s promotion was one of these. As a result, on 7 September 2001, Teekay notified the AIRC of the existence of an industrial dispute and sought its assistance to resolve the dispute by conciliation. Then, on 11 September 2001, the Commissioner who dealt with the dispute (Commissioner Raffaelli) recommended that all recent promotions be rescinded. 15On 20 September 2001 Teekay informed Mr Visscher in writing that it had decided to comply with Commissioner Raffaelli’s recommendation and it would therefore rescind his promotion. From that time Mr Visscher continued to work as a Chief Officer, though he was formally regraded as a Third Mate. Despite the regrading he continued to be paid at the same rate as a Chief Officer. From July 2003 at the latest, it came to him, however, in two components – as a base grade salary and a higher duties allowance. Teekay asserts that it paid him this way from 20 September 2001, but only one pay slip from October 2001 (which, to the contrary, showed that Mr Visscher was paid one amount as ordinary salary at the applicable rate for a Grade 1 Chief Officer) and pay slips from July 2003 onwards (which supported Teekay’s assertion) were in evidence. Neither party offered any explanation for the missing pay slips and neither made anything of the matter.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It follows that if I am wrong in the view I have taken about the question of reasonable dispute, Mr Visscher would be entitled to be paid wages at double rates from 3 March 2004 until 4 June 2004 (93 days). Based on a doubled rate of $578.11 per day, that figure is $53,764.23. Conclusion In summary, I would answer the questions arising in the proceeding in this way:(1)The relevant provisions of the Navigation Act applied to Mr Visscher as a salaried officer. The 2001 Certified Agreement did not effect an implied repeal of those provisions, nor was it void. (2)Mr Visscher was discharged from the Broadwater on 3 March 2004 and his employment came to an end on that date. After he rejoined the ship on 8 April 2004, he sailed until 26 May 2004 when he took leave. He was not then permanently discharged from the ship and his employment did not come to an end until 1 June 2004.(3)Mr Visscher did not sail the second voyage as a casual and no wages are outstanding from that voyage.(4)The payment made on 4 June 2004 was a payment of wages for the purposes of ss 75 and 78 of the Navigation Act. (5)The delay in payment was not due to Mr Visscher’s act or default but it was due to a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages and so no penalty is payable under s 78.(6)If, to the contrary, the obligation under s 78 is enlivened, Mr Visscher would be entitled to be paid $53,764.23. The proceeding must therefore be dismissed. Mr Visscher should pay Teekay’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I am unpersuaded that any change in this position was intended by the WR Act. Indeed, the WR Act points in the opposite direction. Section 170LZ(4) provided that an agreement certified by the AIRC pursuant to s 170LT of the WR Act (as the Certified Agreement was) displaces certain conditions of employment specified in some particular Commonwealth laws to the extent of any inconsistency. But the Navigation Act is not one of those laws. That tells against the likelihood that repeal is implied.The operation of cl 35.1 of the Certified Agreement Clause 35.1 of the Certified Agreement provides that nothing in the Agreement shall be construed as limiting the rights of any officer under the Navigation Act. On its face, that also points to an intention that the Agreement would not remove the rights conferred by ss 75, 76 and 78 of the Act. The clause is entitled “Navigation, Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Acts”. For this reason Teekay argued that the clause does not assist Mr Visscher because it was limited in its operation to matters relating to occupational health and safety. For the following reasons I reject the argument. A certified agreement is to be construed in the same way as an award: Ansett Australia Limited (subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) v Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers’ Association [2003] FCAFC 209 (“Ansett”); Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd (1998) 80 IR 208 at 212. Thus, a narrow or pedantic approach is unwarranted, but a court is “not free to give effect to some anteriorly derived notion of what would be fair or just”: Kucks v CSR Limited (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184 per Madgwick J. As his Honour went on to explain: The search is for the meaning intended by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such framer(s) were likely of a practical bent of mind: they may well have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely to have been understood in the context of the relevant industry and industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon. Thus, for example, it is justifiable to read the award to give effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context, despite mere inconsistencies or infelicities of expression which might tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience or injustice may reasonably be strained for. This oft-cited passage was approved in Ansett at [8]. In Short v F W Hercus Pty Limited (1993) 40 FCR 511, where the question was raised as to whether it was legitimate to look at the history of a clause in an award to interpret its meaning, Burchett J said (at 518):The context of an expression may … be much more than the words that are its immediate neighbours. Context may extend to the entire document of which it is a part, or to other documents with which there is an association. Context may also include, in some cases, ideas that gave rise to an expression in a document from which it has been taken. When the expression was transplanted, it may have brought with it some of the soil in which it once grew, retaining a special strength and colour in its new environment. There is no inherent necessity to read it as uprooted and stripped of every trace of its former significance, standing bare in alien ground. True, sometimes it does stand as if alone. But that should not be just assumed, in the case of an expression with a known source, without looking at its creation, understanding its original meaning, and then seeing how it is now used. Very frequently, perhaps most often, the immediate context is the clearest guide, but the court should not deny itself all other guidance in those cases where it can be seen that more is needed. In literature, Milton and Joyce could not be read in ignorance of the source of their language, nor should a legal document, including an award, be so read.