VDAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VDAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCA 1071


MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – privative clause decision – whether alleged error “jurisdictional”, “structural” or “inviolable”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474

NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 applied
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 distinguished
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] 180 ALR 1 at [39-44] and [82-83] distinguished
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 459 cited

Simsek v Macphee (1982) 148 CLR 636 at 643 followed
Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 58 ALD 91 at [32]-[37], [53], [55] followed

VDAA v THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
V 251 OF 2002

HEEREY J
29 AUGUST 2002
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V251 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

VDAA OF 2002
APPLICANT

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HEEREY J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 AUGUST 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed, including reserved costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V251 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

VDAA OF 2002
APPLICANT

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HEEREY J

DATE:

29 AUGUST 2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant seeks review under s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 2 April 2002 affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

  2. The applicant arrived in Australia on 31 December 2001.  His application for a protection visa was lodged on 9 January 2002 and refused by a delegate of the Minister on 30 January 2002.

  3. It is accepted that this application is governed by the Act as amended in October 2001 and that the decision under review is a privative clause decision and thus subject to s 474(1) of the Act which provides:

    “(1)     A privative clause decision:
               (a)       is final and conclusive; and

    (b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and

    (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.”

    The applicant’s claims

  4. The applicant is a 38 year old male citizen of Nepal.  He claims to be a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of political opinion imputed to him as a supporter or Maoist rebels.  He also claims a fear of persecution by those rebels and inability to obtain State protection.

  5. The applicant…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1071
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of VDAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involves a dispute between the applicant and the Minister regarding the applicant's visa application. The applicant argued that the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the Maoists' presence in Nepal and the effectiveness of state protection, which affected the applicant's eligibility for a protection visa. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal's approach to assessing the applicant's protection needs constituted a jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court needed to decide whether the Tribunal's failure to assess the role and attitude of the police in controlling Maoists in Nepal and the effectiveness of state protection amounted to a jurisdictional error under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court considered whether the Tribunal's assessment of the Maoists' presence and the state's control over various regions, including Kathmandu, constituted a jurisdictional error. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's approach fell into jurisdictional error by identifying a wrong issue or failing to consider relevant material, principles established in Craig v South Australia and applied in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf. However, the court noted that the High Court in NAAV clarified that such errors are no longer available under the amended Migration Act. The court further explored whether the Tribunal's error related to a "jurisdictional factor" or "structural element" that must be satisfied for the Minister's power to operate. The applicant argued that the requirement of satisfaction regarding prescribed criteria, including Australia's obligations under the Refugees Convention, qualified as a structural element. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Minister's satisfaction regarding contravention of the Act was inherently a legal question about the operation of the Act itself, and it was unlikely that Parliament intended for the Minister to have the power to decide this question incorrectly as a matter of law.

The Federal Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's approach did not amount to a jurisdictional error. The court found that the Minister's satisfaction regarding contravention of the Act was a legal question inherently tied to the operation of the Act, and it was unlikely that Parliament intended for the Minister to have the power to decide this question incorrectly as a matter of law. Consequently, the applicant's argument that the Tribunal's assessment constituted a jurisdictional error was rejected. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, including reserved costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed, including reserved costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HEEREY J
The second alleged error was that in finding that the Maoists did not operate throughout Nepal and that the government authorities maintained control of various regions, including Kathmandu, the Tribunal failed to assess the role and attitude of the police in controlling Maoists in Nepal and thus failed to assess whether the applicant enjoyed effective State protection in that country. Conclusion The applicant’s argument is based on the principle enunciated by the High Court in Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179 which was considered to be applicable to the Act in its pre 2001 amendment form by members of the High Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 at [39-44] and [82-83]. Under this principle, an administrative tribunal will fall into jurisdictional error if it indentifies a wrong issue, asks itself the wrong question, ignores relevant material, relies on irrelevant material or, in some circumstances, makes an erroneous finding or reaches a mistaken conclusion. However it is now established by the majority judgments in NAAV that this ground is no longer available where the application for review is governed by the Act as amended: see per von Doussa J at [636]– [639]; Beaumont J (at [277]) agreed with von Doussa J, as did Black CJ (at [30]). There remains the question whether the present application concerns one of the few “jurisdictional factors” which attract the authority and powers of the decision-maker and which must be satisfied as a pre-condition to the operation of s 474: see per von Doussa J at [625]. Black CJ (at [37]) preferred the term “structural element”. Such an element has also been described as an “inviolable limitation or restraint” on power: per von Doussa J at [625]. Counsel for the applicant argued that the requirement of satisfaction as to prescribed criteria (s 65(1)(a)(ii)) and, in the case of a protection visa, the criterion of satisfaction that Australia has protection obligations to the applicant under the Refugees Convention (s 36(2)(a)) answer that description. They are pre-conditions that are “fundamental”, “structural” or “inviolable”. Thus, counsel said, the criterion of s 36(2)(a) and the satisfaction as to this criterion (s 65(1)(a)(ii)) should be equated with the pre-condition of the exercise of the power of visa cancellation on satisfaction that a grant was in contravention of the Act (s 116(1)(f)). The latter provision was an issue in the case of Turcan, one of the five appeals dealt with in NAAV. In relation to Turcan, Black CJ joined the judges otherwise in a minority (Wilcox and French JJ) in forming a majority (Beaumont and von Doussa JJ dissenting) for the upholding of the appeal. Black CJ (at [30]) after holding that s 474(1) provided a “contrary intent” so as to exclude the doctrine in Craig v South Australia said:“For this reason, I take s 474(1) to express the Parliament’s intention that the Minister’s satisfaction is to be taken to exist even if the Minister (or the delegate) has identified a wrong issue, asked a wrong question, ignored relevant material or relied on irrelevant material. But here the question as to ‘contravention of [the] Act or any other law of the Commonwealth’ raised by s 116(1)(f) is so centrally definitional to ‘satisfaction’ that is required by s 128, and is posed so directly as a legal question about the operation of the Act itself, that a line might have been crossed, in that it would seem inherently unlikely that the Parliament intended that the Minister be given a power to decide that question in a way that is wrong as a matter of law. Not only is the ultimate question to which s 116(1)(f) requires an answer posed, in terms, as a question of law, but part of that question relates back to the equally fundamental question of validity of the application for the visa (see s 46).”(emphasis in original)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HEEREY J