FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Celik v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCA 1529
MIGRATION – permanent residence visa – application by one member of family – based on exceptional record of achievement in occupation of wood-fired baking in Turkish restaurant – whether Migration Review Tribunal erred in failing to deal with case of children born after application – whether error in expressing doubt as to an item of evidence without rejecting it – whether finding that there was no evidence to satisfy Tribunal amounted to a finding that there was no evidence at all – whether open to Tribunal to take into account level of salary of primary applicant
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) item 805.212(7)Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Afffairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 (2001) 180 ALR 1 at [82] – considered
NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 at [636] – [639] – followed
VDAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1071 at [20] – referred to
SDAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1022 at [24] – [26] – referred toR v Hickman; Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 615 – referred to
ZEYNAL CELIK, SEVGI CELIK, AHMET CELIK AND MAHMUT CELIK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
V 32 of 2002GRAY J
10 DECEMBER 2002
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 32 of 2002
BETWEEN:
ZEYNAL CELIK
FIRST APPLICANTSEVGI CELIK
SECOND APPLICANTAHMET CELIK
THIRD APPLICANTMAHMUT CELIK
FOURTH APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
GRAY J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 DECEMBER 2002
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 32 of 2002
BETWEEN:
ZEYNAL CELIK
FIRST APPLICANTSEVGI CELIK
SECOND APPLICANTAHMET CELIK
THIRD APPLICANTMAHMUT CELIK
FOURTH APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
GRAY J
DATE:
10 DECEMBER 2002
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The nature of the proceeding
This is an application for relief pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in relation to a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, who is now the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (in both cases, “the Minister”), and is the respondent in this proceeding. The delegate had decided to refuse to grant to the four applicants in this proceeding visas pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Migration Act”).
On 13 January 1999, the first applicant lodged with the Department of Immigration and…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 1529
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case revolved around whether the Tribunal had made jurisdictional errors in its decision-making process, and if such errors were significant enough to warrant the overturning of the Tribunal's decision. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had made errors in its assessment of the family unit's eligibility for the visa, and that these errors should invalidate the decision. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, as the respondent, maintained that the Tribunal's decision was sound and should be upheld.
In its reasoning, the Court held that the applicants had not established that the Tribunal had fallen into error in its decision-making process. The Court noted that the Migration Act had been significantly amended since the High Court's decision in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf, which had previously provided a basis for the applicants' arguments. In particular, the Court found that s 474 of the Migration Act, which contains a privative clause, rendered the Tribunal's decision immune from challenge on the basis of jurisdictional error. The Court also determined that even if there had been errors in the Tribunal's decision-making process, these errors would not have made any difference to the outcome, as the first applicant was the only one who needed to satisfy the primary criteria for the visa.
In light of the Court's findings, the application was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the proceeding. This outcome reflects the Court's view that the applicants had not succeeded in demonstrating that the Tribunal's decision was flawed to the extent that it warranted being overturned.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GRAY J
The written contentions referred to the judgment of the High Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Afffairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 (2001) 180 ALR 1 at [82], where McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ discussed the concept of jurisdictional error and indicated that it could include a decision-maker falling into an error of law which caused it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, whereby the decision-maker’s exercise or purported exercise of power was effected.The effect of s 474 of the Migration Act At the hearing, counsel for the applicants conceded that reliance on Yusuf to demonstrate that the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error of one of the kinds described by McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ would not enable the applicants to succeed on the current state of the law. The Migration Act has been amended significantly since Yusuf. Section 474 now contains a privative clause, to which the decision of the Tribunal is subject, providing that that decision is final and conclusive, must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court and is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. In NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228, the majority of the Full Court of five judges held that s 474 renders a decision to which it applies immune from challenge on the basis of jurisdictional error of the kind described in Yusuf. See von Doussa J at [636] – [639] with whom Black CJ and Beaumont J agreed on that point. See also VDAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1071 at [20] and SDAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1022 at [24] – [26]. Counsel for the applicants was therefore compelled to argue that the suggested errors of the Tribunal in the present case caused its decision to fall outside the three provisos referred to in the judgment of Dixon J in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 615, namely that the decision be a bona fide attempt to exercise the power, that it relate to the subject matter of the legislation and that it be reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the Tribunal.The correctness of the Tribunal’s approach The issue of the Tribunal’s failure to deal with the two youngest children may be dealt with shortly. Even though there may have been error involved (perhaps an unwitting error, because it was not clear that the existence of those children was made known to the Tribunal), such error would not be a ground for setting aside the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal was dealing with a subclass of visa for which only one member of a family unit had to satisfy the primary criteria. In this case, that member was the first applicant. If he failed, no member of the family would be entitled to a visa of that type. The failure of the Tribunal to advert to the existence of the two additional children could not have made any difference to the outcome of the case. It is so unlikely that the primary criteria could have been satisfied by either of those children that this possibility need not be taken into account. In the exercise of its discretion, the Court would not grant a remedy that would require the application to be re-processed on this basis. Recognition of the status of the two youngest children could have made no difference at all to the outcome of the Tribunal’s decision. If there were an error of this kind, it was not an error that vitiated the decision.