WABZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WABZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1345

MIGRATION – protection visa – judicial review – privative clause decision – Tribunal wrongly excluded Legal Aid WA solicitor from appearing before it on behalf of applicant – applicant’s case prepared on basis that she would be allowed legal representation at the hearing – solicitor sought to intervene later during hearing and was told (again wrongly) that her status was only that of an observer who could stay and take notes – respondent conceded Tribunal’s legal error in this regard – several weeks after hearing, applicant’s social worker wrote to Tribunal referring to her emotional distress and requesting indication as to when the Tribunal would make its decision – member instructed Tribunal staff to advise social worker that he hoped “to sign a decision” by week-ending 21 September 2001 – staff member of Tribunal advised social worker that date for decision would be about 21 September 2001 – decision made on 24 September 2001, but not notified to applicant until 19 October 2001 – in the meantime rights of review severely curtailed by amending legislation taking effect from 2 October 2001 – whether bad faith established – whether Tribunal’s decision otherwise reviewable.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Migration Act 1957 (Cth), s 474

NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 followed
NAAG of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 713 referred to
SBAU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 1076 referred to
NADR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 293 referred to

WABZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W527 of 2001

CARR J
30 OCTOBER 2002
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W527 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

WABZ
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 OCTOBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W527 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

WABZ
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J

DATE:

30 OCTOBER 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for an order of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, made on 24 September 2001, by which the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the applicant.  The application was filed in this Court on 13 November 2001 and thus falls to be decided under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) as amended by the various pieces of legislation which came into effect on 2 October 2001, including the Migration Legislation (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth). The respondent has filed a notice of…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1345
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of WABZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs concerns an application for review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The applicant, a national of Iran, had applied for a protection visa, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision, leading to the applicant filing an application for review in the Federal Court of Australia. The respondent, the Minister, filed a notice of objection to competency, arguing that the Tribunal's decision was a privative clause decision, which is final and conclusive under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant amended her application to rely on s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), which allows for a limited scope of judicial review.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal was a privative clause decision, thereby exempt from judicial review. If it was, the court would be precluded from reviewing the merits of the Tribunal's decision. Additionally, the court had to determine if the Tribunal's findings were legally sound and supported by evidence. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had erred in concluding that she had not encountered persecution in relation to her employment and social activities in Iran.

The court held that the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal was indeed a privative clause decision, as defined in s 474(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Consequently, the court was precluded from reviewing the merits of the Tribunal's decision. The court also found that the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and adequately supported by evidence. The Tribunal had properly considered the applicant's claims and the evidence provided, and its findings were consistent with the legal standards set out in the Act. The court concluded that the application for review was incompetent and dismissed it.

The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs. This outcome underscores the principle that privative clause decisions are not subject to judicial review, thereby affirming the finality intended by such clauses.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for an order of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, made on 24 September 2001, by which the Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the applicant. The application was filed in this Court on 13 November 2001 and thus falls to be decided under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) as amended by the various pieces of legislation which came into effect on 2 October 2001, including the Migration Legislation (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth). The respondent has filed a notice of objection to competency on the basis that the Tribunal’s decision was a “privative clause decision” as that term is defined in s 474(2) of the Act which, as provided by s 474, is final and conclusive and must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called into question in any Court. The application was originally expressed as being brought under s 476 of the Act, but on the first day of the hearing was amended, by leave, into a form in which reliance upon s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) was expressed. The hearing of the objection to competency and the application itself took place at the same time. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The applicant is a national of Iran who is married with two children. She arrived in Australia, on a visitor visa, on 22 August 1999. On 20 October 1999 the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. On 16 March 2000, a delegate of the respondent refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant and on 27 March 2000 the applicant applied for review of that decision. THE APPLICANT’S CLAIMS AND THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The applicant’s claims were, in summary, as follows:A.At the start of the revolution (in 1979), wages due to her husband were not paid and he wrote a letter of demand. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard labelled the applicant’s husband as “anti-government” and he has since been banned from public sector work. Her husband has successfully worked for a private company for the past ten years. In relation to this claim the Tribunal found as follows:“The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s husband did not receive wages due to him at the start of the revolution some years ago and that he was, at least for a time thereafter, prohibited from working in the public sector. It notes that the applicant’s husband has had steady, remunerative and pleasurable employment in the private sector for a decade. The applicant has also had a lengthy history of remunerative employment. The Tribunal concludes, therefore, that the applicant has not encountered persecution in relation to her employment. To the extent that she has encountered any difficulty indirectly due to problems with her husband’s employment the Tribunal finds the evidence discloses a level of discrimination falling well short of a definition of persecution.” B.In about 1997 her daughter’s 12th birthday party was celebrated at the applicant’s home in mixed gender company. The authorities burst into the family home and confiscated equipment such as tapes and a keyboard. The guests were detained for a short while and she and her husband were detained for a few hours before being granted bail. When they appeared in court they were fined 200,000 tomans which they subsequently paid.

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR J
The applicant is a national of Iran who is married with two children. She arrived in Australia, on a visitor visa, on 22 August 1999. On 20 October 1999 the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. On 16 March 2000, a delegate of the respondent refused to grant a protection visa to the applicant and on 27 March 2000 the applicant applied for review of that decision. THE APPLICANT’S CLAIMS AND THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The applicant’s claims were, in summary, as follows:A.At the start of the revolution (in 1979), wages due to her husband were not paid and he wrote a letter of demand. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard labelled the applicant’s husband as “anti-government” and he has since been banned from public sector work. Her husband has successfully worked for a private company for the past ten years. In relation to this claim the Tribunal found as follows:“The Tribunal accepts that the applicant’s husband did not receive wages due to him at the start of the revolution some years ago and that he was, at least for a time thereafter, prohibited from working in the public sector. It notes that the applicant’s husband has had steady, remunerative and pleasurable employment in the private sector for a decade. The applicant has also had a lengthy history of remunerative employment. The Tribunal concludes, therefore, that the applicant has not encountered persecution in relation to her employment. To the extent that she has encountered any difficulty indirectly due to problems with her husband’s employment the Tribunal finds the evidence discloses a level of discrimination falling well short of a definition of persecution.” B.In about 1997 her daughter’s 12th birthday party was celebrated at the applicant’s home in mixed gender company. The authorities burst into the family home and confiscated equipment such as tapes and a keyboard. The guests were detained for a short while and she and her husband were detained for a few hours before being granted bail. When they appeared in court they were fined 200,000 tomans which they subsequently paid. The Tribunal stated that it accepted that the applicant and others were present at a party some four years previously from which musical equipment was removed, that the party-goers were detained for questioning in relation to matters such as the playing of music and, in the case of the applicant, detained for a few hours before being released on a friend’s undertaking. In relation to a photocopy document submitted by the applicant and described by her as a “summons”, the Tribunal noted that the document was headed “court order” and stated that the applicant was given a “lower penalty” of a fine, with a written undertaking by her and her husband to refrain from holding “such parties in the future”. The Tribunal then said this: “In light of factors such as the rambling wording of the charge and the lack of reference to any criminal code the Tribunal is not satisfied that the court document is genuine. In any event, any charges that were laid more than four years ago were in accordance with laws of general application. In weighing the circumstances of this case the Tribunal finds that any charges against the applicant for partying in 1997 do not disclose a nexus with the Convention or indicate a real chance of persecution of her now or in the foreseeable future for any Convention reason.” C.Shortly after this incident the applicant was apprehended and taken to a local prison where she was eventually told that she was being held for a breach of the Islamic dress code. Even though the accusation was false, she was insulted, detained overnight and taken before a court the day after her arrest. Her husband and a mullah prevailed upon her to sign an undertaking, as demanded by the investigating authorities, that she would not breach the dress code in the future.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CARR J

The court first addressed the objection to competency raised by the respondent. It examined the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and determined that the Tribunal's decision did not fall within the definition of a "privative clause decision" as provided in s 474(2) of the Act. The court held that the application for judicial review was thus competent and could be entertained by the Court. The court applied the legal principles established in previous cases concerning the scope and effect of privative clauses and distinguished the present case from those authorities.

The court then turned to the merits of the application. It considered the applicant's claims and the evidence presented to the Tribunal. In relation to the applicant's claim concerning her husband's employment, the court found that the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant had not encountered persecution was supported by the evidence. The court noted that the husband had successfully worked for a private company for the past ten years, and that the level of discrimination falling short of persecution. The court applied the legal principles governing the definition of persecution and the standard of proof required in refugee cases, and found that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and correct.

In relation to the applicant's claim concerning the party incident, the court found that the Tribunal's conclusion that the charges against the applicant did not disclose a nexus with the Convention was supported by the evidence. The court noted that the charges were in accordance with laws of general application and that there was no indication of a real chance of persecution of the applicant now or in the foreseeable future for any Convention reason. The court applied the legal principles governing the definition of refugee and the standard of proof required in refugee cases, and found that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and correct.

Finally, in relation to the applicant's claim concerning her detention for breach of the Islamic dress code, the court found that the Tribunal's conclusion that the incident did not disclose a nexus with the Convention was supported by the evidence. The court noted that the incident was a one-off event and that there was no indication of a real chance of persecution of the applicant now or in the foreseeable future for any Convention reason. The court applied the legal principles governing the definition of refugee and the standard of proof required in refugee cases, and found that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and correct.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Tribunal's decision affirming the delegate's refusal of a protection visa to the applicant is lawful and correct where the applicant has not established that she has a well-founded fear of persecution if she were to return to Iran. The court followed the legal principles established in previous cases concerning the definition of refugee and the standard of proof required in refugee cases, and applied those principles to the facts of the present case.