FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tregidga v Pasma Holdings Pty Limited (No 2) [2021] FCA 1439
ORDERS
NSD 1803 of 2017 BETWEEN: ROSS GILL TREGIDGA
First Applicant
CATHERINE MARY JENKINS
Second Applicant
AND: PASMA HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED ACN 093 774 559 TRADING AS PASMA ELECTRICAL
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
REEVES J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 NOVEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs on a party/party basis up to and including 5 April 2020.
2.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis from and including 6 April 2020.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
REEVES J:
On 28 June 2021, I delivered my reasons for judgment in this matter: Tregidga v Pasma…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 1439
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the procedural history and the timing of the offer, which was made approximately two years and four months after the originating application was filed. The offer, amounting to $450,000, was substantial and made on the basis that the applicants had no reasonable prospects of success. The court found that the offer represented a genuine attempt at compromise, despite its timing. The applicants had incurred significant costs in preparation for the trial that was subsequently vacated due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the applicants argued that the offer was made after their costs had already been incurred, the court concluded that the offer was likely to have at least equalled, if not exceeded, the costs incurred by that date. The court further noted that both parties were at fault for not properly pleading the ownership issue and that Pasma was ultimately successful on the primary liability issues.
The court ultimately determined that the applicants' refusal to accept the Calderbank offer was unreasonable, leading to the granting of the application for indemnity costs. The court rejected the applicants' arguments that Pasma had improperly prolonged the trial or that the issue of proportionate liability was improperly raised. The court found that neither party acted egregiously and that Pasma's abandoned plea with respect to vicarious liability had no significant effect on the length of the trial. The court also dismissed the applicants' vague and general contention that Pasma did not vigorously pursue certain matters at the trial.
The final orders of the court mandated that the applicants pay the respondent's costs on a party/party basis up to and including 5 April 2020, and on an indemnity basis from and including 6 April 2020. The entry of these orders was governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs on a party/party basis up to and including 5 April 2020.
2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis from and including 6 April 2020.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As to the factors that may be taken into account in determining whether the non-acceptance of an offer was unreasonable, in Anchorage Capital Partners Pty Limited v ACPA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 112, the Full Court provided the following non-exhaustive list (at [7]):(a)the stage of the proceeding at which the offer was received;(b)the time allowed to the offeree to consider the offer;(c)the extent of the compromise offered;(d)the offeree’s prospects of success, assessed as at the date of the offer;(e)the clarity with which the terms of the offer were expressed; and(f)whether the offer foreshadowed an application for an indemnity costs in the event of the offeree rejecting itObservations relating to these factors were also made in Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd (2011) 16 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-885; [2011] FCAFC 53 at [145]; Barnes v Forty Two International Pty Limited (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 19 at [19]-[20]; The MTGI Trust at [23]; and Verrocchi v Direct Chemist Outlet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 162 at [8].CONSIDERATION With these principles in mind I turn to consider, first, whether Pasma’s offer was a genuine offer. The key question in that assessment is whether the offer “contained a genuine element of compromise”. Answering that question requires a slightly more detailed examination of the procedural history to the proceeding. As is noted above (at [3]), the originating application in this proceeding was filed on 11 October 2017. After some amendments to the pleadings and the parties had conducted an unsuccessful mediation, the proceeding was eventually set down for a four day trial commencing on 30 March 2020. On 17 March 2020, the parties were notified by my chambers that it was necessary to vacate that trial following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. New trial dates were fixed commencing on 27 July 2020, but COVID-related issues caused its adjournment after three days. The trial was ultimately completed on 13 November 2020 after a further four days of hearing. By the date of the offer, it follows that: the proceeding had been on foot for approximately two years and four months; it had been set down for trial once and vacated; and, as at that date, new trial dates remained to be fixed. It follows further that, because the vacation of the original trial occurred shortly before it was due to commence in late March 2020, the parties were likely to have been well advanced in their preparations for that trial and to have incurred a significant amount of costs. Mr Tregidga and Ms Jenkins have complained that the offer was made after those costs had already been incurred. While they have not adduced any evidence of the approximate quantum of those costs, I can infer that they must have been significant. On the other hand, Pasma’s offer of $450,000 was for a quite significant sum. It is likely to have at least equalled, if not exceeded, the trial preparation costs that Mr Tregidga and Ms Jenkins had incurred by that date. It is also important to note that the offer was put on the basis that Mr Tregidga and Ms Jenkins had no reasonable prospects of success in the proceeding. Having regard to all these factors, despite its timing, I consider the offer represented a genuine attempt at compromise of the proceeding.