Townsville Pharmacy No 4 Pty Ltd v Quattro Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 38 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Townsville Pharmacy No 4 Pty Ltd v V Quattro Pty Ltd [2023] QSC 105

PARTIES:

TOWNSVILLE PHARMACY NO 4 PTY LTD

ACN 611 267 246

(applicant)

v

V QUATTRO PTY LTD ACN 116 556 837
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

100/23

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

17 May 2023

DELIVERED AT:

Cairns

HEARING DATE:

24 March 2023

JUDGE:

Henry J

ORDER:

1.   It is declared that on 12 September 2022, the applicant validly exercised an option to purchase the business of “Alice Pharmacy Warehouse Smithfield”, conducted at shop 140 Smithfield Shopping Centre, Smithfield in the State of Queensland in accordance with the Call Option Agreement, described as made on 27 November 2020, between the applicant and the respondent, by serving a notice made in writing in the manner required by the Call Option Agreement.

2.   The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACT – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS – INTERPRETATION OF MISCELLANEOUS CONTRACTS AND OTHER MATTERS – where respondent company granted the applicant company an option to purchase its business – where consideration for the agreement was the payment of $10 within two business days of the agreement – where the $10 was not paid in time but was paid by the time of exercise of the option – whether payment within time was a condition precedent to the existence of an enforceable contract as a condition of a unilateral or “if” contract – whether time for payment was of the essence – whether the applicant validly exercised the option to purchase the business

Barba v Gas & Fuel Corporation (Vict) (1976) 136 CLR 120

Dacco Pty Ltd v Crows Nest Fund Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 1550

Gilbert J McCaul (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pitt Club Ltd [1957] 59 SR (NSW) 122

Hare v Nicoll [1966] 2 QB 130

Himbleton Pty Ltd v Kumagi (NSW) Pty Ltd (1991) 29 NSWLR 44

Lydia Court Pty Ltd v Panousis (1973) 2 BPR 9178

Stillwell & Co Pty Ltd v Budget Rent-A-Car [1990] VR 589

United Scientific v Burnley Council [1978] AC 904

United Dominions Trust (Commercial) Ltd v Eagle Aircraft Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 74

COUNSEL:

S Kelly for the applicant
M Jonsson KC for the respondent

SOLICITORS: Devenish Law for the applicant
WGC Lawyers for the respondent
  1. The respondent company, V Quattro, granted the applicant company, Townsville Pharmacy, an option to purchase its business.  The consideration identified in the agreement for doing so was the payment of $10 within two business days of the agreement. 

  2. The $10 was not paid within that time.  It was not paid until about 21 months later, when Townsville Pharmacy exercised the option.  V Quattro returned the payment, asserting the purported exercise of the option was ineffective because of the failure to pay the $10 within the time required. 

  3. Townsville Pharmacy now seeks a declaration that its exercise of the option to purchase the business was…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Townsville Pharmacy No 4 Pty Ltd v Quattro Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] QSC 105
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Townsville Pharmacy No 4 Pty Ltd v Quattro Pty Ltd, the dispute arose from an agreement whereby Quattro Pty Ltd granted Townsville Pharmacy No 4 Pty Ltd an option to purchase its business. The consideration for this agreement was the payment of $10 within two business days. However, the payment was not made within the stipulated time but was paid when the option was exercised. The central issue before the court was whether the payment of the $10 within the specified time was a condition precedent to the existence of an enforceable contract and whether the timing of the payment was of the essence.

The court examined the contractual language and concluded that the payment of the $10 within two business days was not a condition precedent to the formation of the contract. The court observed that the agreement did not specify that the grantor's agreement to be bound was contingent upon the receipt of the premium within the stipulated time. The court found that the agreement's operative text, including clauses 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, did not impose a requirement for the payment to occur within the time stipulated in clause 3.2. Furthermore, the absence of conditions or statements in clause 3.2 that the payment occurring within the stipulated time was an event the agreement was conditional on, contrasted with the conditions in other clauses, supported the interpretation that the existence of the contractual element of consideration was essential, rather than the prompt payment of the consideration.

The court ruled that the payment of the premium within two business days was not a condition precedent to the existence of an enforceable contract and that the timing of the payment was not of the essence. Consequently, the court declared that Townsville Pharmacy No 4 Pty Ltd had validly exercised the option to purchase the business. The court also ordered that Quattro Pty Ltd pay the costs of the application.

The final orders of the court were that Townsville Pharmacy No 4 Pty Ltd validly exercised the option to purchase the business on 12 September 2022, and that Quattro Pty Ltd pay the applicant's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. It is declared that on 12 September 2022, the applicant validly exercised an option to purchase the business of “Alice Pharmacy Warehouse Smithfield”, conducted at shop 140 Smithfield Shopping Centre, Smithfield in the State of Queensland in accordance with the Call Option Agreement, described as made on 27 November 2020, between the applicant and the respondent, by serving a notice made in writing in the manner required by the Call Option Agreement.

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The modest amount of consideration here certainly does not suggest the timing of its payment would have been of determinative importance. To the contrary, it is improbable that having gone to the obvious trouble of creating their contract the parties intended it would within two days be rendered unenforceable if a mere $10 had not yet been paid. Conclusion In conclusion, recital C does not say that the grantor’s agreement to be bound is only operative if the premium is received within the time stipulated in the agreement. At best for V Quattro, recital C is ambiguous as to whether it means that. It may simply mean that the grantor’s agreement to be bound derives from the fact there is to be consideration, in the form of the provision of the premium to the grantor, not from when the benefit of the consideration is to be received. However, the operative text of the agreement clearly confirms the latter meaning. That is apparent from a powerful accumulation of features, namely:(a)cl 3.1 does not say payment of the premium in consideration of which it makes the grant of the option must first occur for an enforceable contract to come into existence or for the grant to become operative;(b)cl 3.2 contemplates payment of the premium occurring after the date on which cl 3.1 of the agreement makes the grant;(c)cl 3.3, the clause actually stipulating the mandatory requirements for the exercise of the option, did not include a requirement that the premium was paid in the time stipulated by cl 3.2;(d)cl 3.2 was not accompanied by a condition like in cl 3.3, stating “the call option will expire worthless” if the payment of the premium does not occur in the time stipulated;(e)cl 3.2 was not accompanied by a statement that the payment occurring in the time stipulated was an event which “this agreement is subject to or conditional on”, which, in telling contrast, was a condition to cl 2.1’s imposition of the event of a far more significant contractual commitment upon the grantee than merely paying $10;(f)that $10 is so obviously a nominal amount of itself supports the interpretation that it was the existence of the contractual element of consideration within the agreement – giving it the business certainty of a contract – rather than the consideration’s quantum or its prompt payment, which was essential. Those features demonstrate both that the payment of the premium within two business days was not a condition precedent to the coming into existence of an enforceable contract and that the time stipulated for its payment was not of the essence. Orders It follows the declaration sought should be made. There is no apparent reason in a case of this kind why costs ought not follow the event and I will order accordingly. My orders are:1. It is declared that on 12 September 2022, the applicant validly exercised an option to purchase the business of “Alice Pharmacy Warehouse Smithfield”, conducted at shop 140 Smithfield Shopping Centre, Smithfield in the State of Queensland in accordance with the Call Option Agreement, described as made on 27 November 2020, between the applicant and the respondent, by serving a notice made in writing in the manner required by the Call Option Agreement. 2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The call option agreement referred to V Quattro as the grantor and Townsville Pharmacy as the grantee. Its recitals state:“A. The Grantor is the owner of the Business.B. The Grantor has agreed to grant to the Grantee an option to purchase the Business (the ‘Call option’).C. In consideration of receiving the Premium the Grantor agrees to be bound by the terms of this Agreement.” (emphasis added)The “premium” referred to in recital C is defined in cl 1 as meaning the sum of $10. V Quattro relies on recital C in support of its argument that the actual making of the payment of the premium was a condition precedent to the formation of the contract. Before testing that it is timely to note the trite foundational principle that consideration is an element of an enforceable contract. That might explain why, in their desire for the business certainty of a contract, parties to an agreement to grant an option sometimes require the payment of only nominal amounts of money as consideration for granting the option. However, while consideration is undoubtedly an essential element of an enforceable contract it is not the law that the agreed benefit underlying the consideration must first be received for an enforceable contract to commence. To the contrary, it would be common that it is received much later, during the ensuing operation of many contracts. V Quattro emphasises its agreement “to be bound” in recital C literally occurs in consideration of “receiving” the premium. The supposed temporal implication is there is no binding agreement to grant the option until V Quattro receives the premium. However, recital C says V Quattro’s agreement to be bound is given “in consideration of” receiving the premium. It says nothing as to when the payment of consideration is to be received relative to the point in time when the agreement becomes binding. That does not mean V Quattro’s urged interpretation of recital C, that the agreement does not become binding on V Quattro until it receives the premium, is not open. Considering the words of recital C in isolation, it is open. But so is another interpretation, namely recital C merely identifies that V Quattro’s agreement to be bound is a result of consideration being an element of the agreement. In other words, the agreement to be bound derives from the fact there is consideration, via the agreed premium of $10, not from when the benefit of that consideration will be received. In short, recital C is ambiguous on the temporal point that is at the very foundation of V Quattro’s argument. While recitals can assist in the interpretation of the operative instrument, their power to do so is confined to instruments in which ambiguity arises. The basic rules governing the relationship between recitals and the operative parts of an instrument were stated by Lord Esher in Ex parte Dawes; re Moon:[8]“If the recitals are clear and the operative part is ambiguous, the recitals govern the construction. If the recitals are ambiguous, and the operative part is clear, the operative part must prevail. If both the recitals and the operative part are clear, but they are inconsistent with each other, the operative part is to be preferred”.[8](1886) 17 QBD 275 at p 286. Also see Onesteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Bluescope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2013] 85 NSWLR 1, 21.