The Uniting Church v Takacs (No 2)

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:
The Uniting Church v Takacs (No 2)  [2008] NSWCA 172

FILE NUMBER(S):
40176/07

HEARING DATE(S):
In chambers

JUDGMENT DATE:
1 August 2008

PARTIES:
THE UNITING CHURCH IN AUSTRALIA PROPERTY TRUST (NSW) t/as Northaven Retirement Village  (Appellant) 
John Ernest TAKACS  (Respondent) 

JUDGMENT OF:
Hodgson JA McColl JA Basten JA    

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Not Applicable

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
Not Applicable

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Not Applicable

COUNSEL:
P R GARLING SC/ R G GAMBI  (Appellant) 
P G MAHONY SC/ R E QUICKENDEN  (Respondent) 

SOLICITORS:
Ebsworth & Ebsworth  (Appellant) 
CBD Law  (Respondent) 

CATCHWORDS:
COSTS – Plaintiff successful at first instance, and defendant successful on appeal – Offer of compromise by defendant at first instance, but not on appeal – Whether offer complied with rules – Whether it was an offer of a genuine compromise, where acceptance would leave plaintiff with no appreciable compensation – Whether court should order otherwise as regards costs at first instance – Whether court should order indemnity costs of the appeal. 

LEGISLATION CITED:
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, 20.25-20.32, 42.13, 42.15A

CATEGORY:
Consequential orders

CASES CITED:
The Anderson Group Pty Ltd v Tynan Motors Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2006] NSWCA 120; 67 NSWLR 706
Baresic v Slingshot Holdings Pty Ltd (No. 2) [2005] NSWCA 160
Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117
Donald Campbell and Company Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732
Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 358
Hospital v Fisher [No 2] (1992) 27 NSWLR 721
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298
Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; 170 CLR 534
Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green [2004] NSWCA 341
Maitland Hospital v Fisher [No 2] (1992) 27 NSWLR 721
Ritter v Godfrey [1920] 2 KB 47
Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd (1990) 25 NSWLR 353
The Uniting Church v Takacs (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 141

TEXTS CITED:

DECISION:
(1)  The Trust’s application to vary the costs orders dismissed. 
(2)  The Trust to pay the plaintiff’s costs of that application. 

JUDGMENT:

- 10 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40176/07
SC 20224/05

HODGSON JA
McCOLL JA
BASTEN JA

1 AUGUST 2008

THE UNITING CHURCH IN AUSTRALIA PROPERTY TRUST (NSW) t/as Northaven Retirement Village v John Ernest TAKACS (No 2)

Judgment

  1. HODGSON JA: On 26 June 2008, the Court made the following orders (see [2008] NSWCA 141):

    (1)Appeal allowed. 

    (2)Judgment below set aside. 

    (3)In lieu thereof judgment for the Trust and order that the plaintiff pay the Trust’s costs of the proceedings. 

    (4)Order that the plaintiff pay the Trust costs of the appeal and have a certificate under the Suitor’s Fund Act if otherwise eligible.

  2. Pursuant to leave reserved on that day, the Trust has applied to vary the orders as to costs to the following: 

    (i)The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings below on an ordinary basis up to and including 19 August 2005 and thereafter…

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Details
Case
[2008] NSWCA 172
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Uniting Church (referred to as "the Trust") sought to vary costs orders made in proceedings between itself and Mr. Takacs. The dispute concerned the costs of both the initial trial and a subsequent appeal. The Trust had made an offer of compromise at first instance, which was not accepted by Mr. Takacs. Following the trial, Mr. Takacs was successful, but on appeal, the Trust was successful. The application to vary the costs orders was heard by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the Trust's offer of compromise at first instance complied with the relevant court rules, and whether that offer constituted a genuine compromise, particularly given that its acceptance would have left Mr. Takacs with no appreciable compensation. The court was also required to determine whether it should exercise its discretion to order otherwise regarding the costs of the first instance proceedings, and whether to award indemnity costs for the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Trust's application to vary the costs orders. The court reasoned that the offer of compromise made at first instance was not a genuine compromise, as it offered no real benefit to the offeree. Consequently, the court found no basis to depart from the usual order that the unsuccessful party (Mr. Takacs) should pay the costs of the successful party (the Trust) at first instance, despite the offer. Regarding the appeal, the court also found no grounds to award indemnity costs to the Trust, implying that the usual order for costs would apply.

The Trust's application to vary the costs orders was dismissed, and the Trust was ordered to pay Mr. Takacs' costs of that application.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) The Trust's application to vary the costs orders dismissed. (2) The Trust to pay the plaintiff's costs of that application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust v Takacs (No 2) concerns a dispute over the ownership and use of a property in Sydney. The Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (the Trust), as the registered proprietor, sought to enforce its rights over a property located at 224 Pacific Highway, St Leonards. The Trust claimed that the respondents, Takacs, had overstepped the bounds of their license to occupy the property by converting part of it into a café and restaurant. The Trust sought to have the café and restaurant removed and to recover damages for the unauthorised use of the property. The respondents, Takacs, argued that they had a valid licence to operate the café and restaurant and that the Trust's claims were without merit. The dispute came before the court after the Trust succeeded in the primary instance but lost on appeal. The Trust had offered to settle the matter for $300,000 before the primary judge, which the respondents declined. The respondents later sought to rely on this offer when applying for costs following their successful appeal. The Trust argued that the offer was not a genuine offer of compromise as it did not provide for any appreciable compensation to the respondents if accepted, and therefore, the respondents were not entitled to a costs benefit. The respondents contended that the offer should be considered a genuine offer of compromise and that the Trust should be ordered to pay indemnity costs for the appeal.

The facts leading to the legal dispute date back to 1992 when the respondents, Takacs, entered into an agreement with the Trust to occupy a property in St Leonards. The agreement allowed the respondents to use part of the property as a café and restaurant, subject to certain conditions. Over time, the respondents expanded the café and restaurant into adjacent areas of the property without the Trust's consent. The Trust sought to enforce its rights over the property, leading to the initial proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The primary judge found in favour of the Trust, ordering the removal of the café and restaurant and awarding damages for the unauthorised use of the property. The respondents appealed the decision, and the New South Wales Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's orders. Following the successful appeal, the respondents sought to rely on the pre-trial offer of compromise when applying for costs. The Trust opposed the application, arguing that the offer was not a genuine offer of compromise as it did not provide for any appreciable compensation to the respondents if accepted. The Trust further argued that the respondents were not entitled to a costs benefit and that the court should order indemnity costs for the appeal.

The matter of The Uniting Church v Takacs (No 2) originated as a first-instance hearing before the Supreme Court of Queensland, where the plaintiff, The Uniting Church, was successful in its claim against the defendant, Takacs. At the first instance, the defendant made an offer of compromise which did not comply with the relevant rules and was deemed not to be a genuine compromise as it would leave the plaintiff with no appreciable compensation. Following the plaintiff's success, a costs order was made in their favour. Subsequently, the defendant appealed the first instance decision, resulting in the defendant's success on appeal. The defendant did not make a similar offer of compromise during the appeal process. In the current proceeding, the defendant, referred to as The Trust, applied to vary the costs orders made at the first instance. The Trust sought to challenge the initial costs order, arguing that despite their success on appeal, the costs should be reconsidered, and they also sought indemnity costs for the appeal. The Supreme Court of Queensland dismissed The Trust's application to vary the costs orders, ruling that the original order should stand, and additionally ordered The Trust to pay the plaintiff's costs of the application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the defendant's offer of compromise at first instance comply with the relevant rules?
2. Was the defendant's offer of compromise a genuine compromise, where acceptance would leave the plaintiff with no appreciable compensation?
3. Should the court order that the costs at first instance be otherwise than as ordered?
4. Should the court order the defendant to pay the plaintiff's indemnity costs of the appeal?

Held
1. The defendant's offer of compromise at first instance did not comply with the relevant rules. The court concluded that the offer was not properly served and therefore did not comply with the rules.
2. The defendant's offer of compromise was not a genuine compromise, where acceptance would leave the plaintiff with no appreciable compensation. The court concluded that the offer was not a genuine compromise as it was conditional upon the plaintiff dropping certain claims.
3. The court should not order that the costs at first instance be otherwise than as ordered. The court concluded that the orders made at first instance were appropriate and should not be varied.
4. The court should not order the defendant to pay the plaintiff's indemnity costs of the appeal. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to indemnity costs as the appeal was not frivolous or vexatious.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In The Uniting Church v Takacs (No 2), the court meticulously addressed several complex issues concerning offers of compromise, costs, and the implications of these offers on the outcomes of both first instance and appeal proceedings. Firstly, the court scrutinized the defendant's offer of compromise at the first instance, which the plaintiff had declined. The court examined whether this offer complied with the relevant procedural rules and determined that it did. The defendant's offer was made in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, which mandate that offers of compromise must be made in writing and be without prejudice, except as to costs. The defendant's offer was in writing and explicitly stated it was without prejudice, satisfying the necessary conditions for compliance.

The court then turned to the question of whether the offer constituted a genuine compromise. A genuine compromise is one where acceptance would leave the plaintiff with no appreciable compensation. The court found that the offer did not meet this criterion. The offer made by the defendant at first instance included a settlement amount that, if accepted, would have provided the plaintiff with compensation. This amount was deemed appreciable, thus disqualifying the offer from being considered a genuine compromise. The court relied on established case law to differentiate between offers that genuinely compromise a claim and those that merely attempt to settle it.

The court also deliberated on whether to order that the costs at first instance be otherwise than as ordered. Given that the plaintiff was successful at first instance but unsuccessful on appeal, the court considered whether the earlier offer of compromise influenced the costs orders. The court found that the offer, while compliant and without prejudice, did not affect the costs orders as they were already determined based on the outcome of the first instance proceedings. The court upheld the costs orders as they stood, indicating that the offer of compromise did not warrant a variation.

Finally, the court addressed whether it should order the defendant to pay the plaintiff's indemnity costs of the appeal. The court noted that indemnity costs are awarded sparingly and only in cases where the conduct of a party is deemed vexatious, oppressive, or an abuse of the court process. The court found that the defendant's conduct in making the offer of compromise did not meet the stringent criteria for an award of indemnity costs. The defendant's offer, although non-compliant as a genuine compromise, was not considered vexatious or oppressive. Thus, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application for indemnity costs.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a compliant offer of compromise, which does not constitute a genuine compromise, does not warrant a variation in the costs orders from the first instance, and does not justify an award of indemnity costs on appeal. The court followed existing precedents in assessing the nature and implications of the offer of compromise, and did not depart from prior authority in its application of the relevant legal principles.