Tey v City of Gosnells

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   TEY -v- CITY OF GOSNELLS [2010] WASC 96

CORAM:   EM HEENAN J

HEARD:   12 MARCH 2010

DELIVERED          :   12 MARCH 2010

PUBLISHED           :  7 MAY 2010

FILE NO/S:   SJA 1101 of 2009

BETWEEN:   KOK YONG TEY

Appellant

AND

CITY OF GOSNELLS
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MAGISTRATE L H JONES

File No  :AR 6390 of 2009

Catchwords:

Criminal Law ­ Application for leave to appeal and appeal ­ Practice and procedure ­ Request for particulars ­ Opportunity to be heard - Denial of procedural fairness ­ Prosecution for contravention of s 33(1) of the Bush Fires Act 1954 (WA)

Legislation:

Bush Fires Act 1954 (WA), s 33(1)
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 9
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 55, s 60, s 61
Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), s 8, s 30
Suitors' Fund Act 1964 (WA), s 10

Result:

Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
The charge be remitted for trial before a different Magistrate on a date to be fixed by the Magistrates Court
The respondent have liberty to apply in writing for a certificate under s 10 of the Suitors' Fund Act 1964 (WA)

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     Mr D P Gillett

Solicitors:

Appellant:     In person

Respondent:     McLeods

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond ('Bond Media case') [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488

Re Colina; Ex parte Torney [1999] HCA 57; (1999) 200 CLR 386

Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342

SAAP v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294

Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473

Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288

  1. EM HEENAN J: On 13 August 2009 Mrs Kok Yong Tey (Mrs Tey) was convicted in the Magistrates Court at Armadale of the charge that she had failed to comply with a notice given under s 33(1) of the Bush Fires Act 1954 (WA) (Bush Fires Act). The particulars of the charge were that on 10 December 2008 she failed to comply with a notice requiring action to plough or clear fire breaks to prevent the outbreaks or spread of bush fires at vacant land at Tarradee Circuit, Thornlie. The conviction was entered by the learned Magistrate pursuant to s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (Criminal Procedure Act) because of the absence of the appellant.

  2. However, Mrs Tey had appeared in the Magistrates Court before his Honour L H Jones on that day and it is the circumstances which led to her leaving the court following which the conviction was imposed in her absence which have resulted in…

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Details
Case
[2010] WASC 96
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Tey v City of Gosnells involved the appellant, Tey, who was prosecuted for a contravention of section 33(1) of the Bush Fires Act 1954 (WA). Tey was charged with a breach of the act by allegedly failing to comply with a direction from the City of Gosnells. The dispute centred on whether Tey was afforded procedural fairness during the prosecution process. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The legal issues in the case revolved around the requirements of procedural fairness and whether the appellant was given a fair opportunity to respond to the allegations against them. The court had to determine if the denial of a request for particulars and the subsequent refusal to hear Tey's application for leave to appeal constituted a breach of procedural fairness. The court also needed to consider whether the City of Gosnells' decision to prosecute was rational and reasonable, and if there was any bias or preconception that affected the decision-making process.

The court held that the denial of procedural fairness in this case was a significant error that vitiated the decision to prosecute. The court found that the City of Gosnells failed to provide Tey with an opportunity to be heard, which is a fundamental aspect of procedural fairness. The court also found that the decision to prosecute was not supported by probative material, and that there was an absence of proportionality in the decision-making process. As a result, the court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction against Tey.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was allowed, the conviction was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrates Court for further consideration. The court emphasised the importance of procedural fairness in criminal prosecutions and the need for decision-makers to act rationally, reasonably, and without bias.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There are, of course, a vast number of authorities dealing with the content of the requirements of procedural fairness and many of these relate to statutory or administrative tribunals and often the content of procedural requirements are rendered applicable by specific statutes. One example in the latter class is SAAP v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 dealing with the requirements of fairness to be observed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. Another case dealing with the requirements of fairness relating to a statutory tribunal is Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond ('Bond Media case') [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321. This is not surprising because the rules of procedural fairness applicable in civil or criminal courts are well‑established, and consequently there is less scope for suggesting that any one or other rule need not apply in civil or criminal cases. Nevertheless, in the Bond Media case Deane J had occasion to refer to the requirements of the rules of procedural fairness generally and in the common law context. At (366 ‑ 367), his Honour said:As has been often said, the precise content of the obligation of a statutory tribunal to act judicially or to observe the requirements of natural justice or procedural fairness may vary according to the statutory framework of the particular proceedings and the circumstances of the individual case: 'the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth' (per Tucker LJ, Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All ER 109 at 118). That being so, the content of the obligation is not susceptible of precise definition otherwise than in the particular circumstances of a given case. The most that one can do is identify its ordinary incidents. Obviously enough, those incidents include the absence of the actuality or the appearance of disqualifying bias and the according of an appropriate opportunity of being heard. In the following paragraph, I identify what I see as the other more important incidents of the obligation. In so doing, I have treated what are sometimes referred to as 'Wednesbury principles' (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229 ‑ 233 as encompassed by the obligation to act judicially in cases where that obligation exists (but cf, for a contrary approach, Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 410 ‑ 411, 414 ‑ 415).If a statutory tribunal is required to act judicially, it must act rationally and reasonably. Of its nature, a duty to act judicially (or in accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness or natural justice) excludes the right to decide arbitrarily, irrationally or unreasonably. It requires that regard be paid to material considerations and that immaterial or irrelevant considerations be ignored. It excludes the right to act on preconceived prejudice or suspicion. Arguably, it requires a minimum degree of 'proportionality' (cf the CCSU Case (supra at p 410)). When the process of decision-making need not be and is not disclosed, there will be a discernible breach of such a duty if a decision of fact is unsupported by probative material. When the process of decision‑making is disclosed, there will be a discernible breach of the duty if findings of fact upon which a decision is based are unsupported by probative material and if inferences of fact upon which such a decision is based cannot reasonably be drawn from such findings of fact. Breach of a duty to act judicially constitutes an error of law which will vitiate the decision.