Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission

[2015] FCAFC 137

Citation: Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 137
Appeal from: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Letten (No 23) [2014] FCA 985
Parties: DAMIAN JOHN TEMPLETON, PHILIP ARTHUR HENNESSY and KPMG AUSTRALIAN PARTNERSHIP v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
File number: VID 587 of 2014
Judges: BESANKO, MIDDLETON AND BEACH JJ
Date of judgment: 18 September 2015
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – unregistered managed investment schemes – entitlement of receivers to remuneration – appointment orders permitting remuneration – fixing of remuneration of receivers – reasonable remuneration and reasonable costs and expenses – approval of remuneration by Registrar – primary judge’s review of decision of Registrar – appeal from that review – evaluative judgment – concept of proportionality – grounds of appeal upheld in part – application for review remitted for rehearing
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 425, 449E, 473, 504, 601EE, 1323
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 35A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 14.21, 14.24
Cases cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Letten [2010] FCA 140
Bank of Nova Scotia v Diemer [2014] ONCA 851
Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
Brook v Reed [2012] 1 WLR 419
Conlan as liquidator of Rowena Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Adams (2008) 65 ACSR 521
Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 124
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Ide v Ide [2004] NSWSC 751
In the matter of AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liquidation) [2014] NSWSC 1004
In the matter of AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liquidation) (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1270
In the matter of On Q Group Ltd (in liquidation) [2014] NSWSC 1428
Mazukov v University of Tasmania [2004] FCAFC 159
Mirror Group Newspapers plc v Maxwell [1998] 1 BCLC 638
Mobilio v Balliotis [1998] 3 VR 833
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513
Onefone Australia Pty Ltd v One.Tel Ltd (2010) 80 ACSR 11
Re Korda; in the matter of Stockford Ltd (2004) 140 FCR 424
Re Roslea Path Ltd (in liquidation) [2013] 1 NZLR 207
Thackray v Gunns Plantations Ltd (2011) 85 ACSR 144
Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd v Conlan (1998) 20 WAR 96
Date of hearing: 6 March 2015
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 88
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr R Strong
Solicitors for the Appellants: King & Wood Mallesons
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P D Crutchfield QC with Dr O Bigos
Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 587 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

DAMIAN JOHN TEMPLETON
First Appellant

PHILIP ARTHUR HENNESSY
Second Appellant

KPMG AUSTRALIAN PARTNERSHIP
Third Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
Respondent

JUDGES:

BESANKO, MIDDLETON AND BEACH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 SEPTEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCAFC 137
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission concerns the entitlement of receivers to remuneration for their work in the winding up of unregistered managed investment schemes. The Court was required to decide whether the primary judge's review of the Registrar's decision to approve the receivers' remuneration was conducted properly. The Court also had to determine whether the primary judge's evaluative judgment in reducing the receivers' remuneration was correct. The appeal to the Court was based on several grounds, including errors in the primary judge's approach to proportionality, the consideration of irrelevant factors, and the failure to give proper weight to certain evidence. The Court found that the appeal should be allowed in part, and the primary judge's orders should be set aside. The application for review was remitted for rehearing before another judge, who was instructed to consider the matter afresh and not be constrained by the primary judge's approach. The Court also ordered that the costs of the appeal and the hearing before the primary judge should be treated as costs and expenses of the winding up of the schemes and be paid out of the funds held by the receivers.

The Court's reasoning was based on the grounds of appeal that were upheld. The Court found that the primary judge's approach to proportionality significantly underpinned the reductions in the receivers' remuneration. However, the Court was unable to say that the reductions would necessarily have been made and justified on other grounds relied upon by the primary judge. The Court also found that the primary judge had considered irrelevant factors and failed to give proper weight to certain evidence. The Court concluded that it was more appropriate for the matter to be reheard by another judge, who could consider the matter afresh and not be constrained by the primary judge's approach. The Court also noted that the costs of the appeal and the hearing before the primary judge should be treated as costs and expenses of the winding up of the schemes and be paid out of the funds held by the receivers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The primary judge’s orders made on 12 September 2014 be set aside.

3. The application for review dated 28 March 2014 be remitted for rehearing before another judge of this Court.

4. The parties’ costs of and incidental to this appeal and of the hearing before the primary judge (including the costs of the independent assisting counsel) be treated as costs and expenses of the winding up of the Schemes and be paid out of the funds on hand held by the first and second appellants.

5. Save for the costs referred to in paragraph 4, all other costs incurred to date on the application for review be reserved for further determination by the judge undertaking the rehearing of the application for review.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In our opinion and for the reasons that follow, the appeal should be allowed. The orders made by the primary judge should be set aside and the application for review should be referred to another judge for rehearing in accordance with these reasons.BACKGROUND The primary judge set out in her reasons the background to the present issue and it is convenient to refer to that narrative. On 25 February 2010, 4 March 2010 and 30 July 2010, the Schemes were wound up pursuant to s 601EE(1). The Schemes involved 21 unregistered managed investment schemes and 52 associated companies. The Receivers were appointed as joint and several receivers and managers of identified property of the Schemes, and as joint and several receivers and managers of certain property of identified corporate defendants who were parties to the original 2010 proceedings before her Honour (the Appointment Orders). Under each Appointment Order, the Receivers were:… entitled to reasonable remuneration and reasonable costs and expenses properly incurred in the performance of their duties and the exercise of their powers as receivers and managers [of] the Property of [each Scheme], as may be fixed by the Court on the application of the Receivers, such sum to be calculated on the basis of the time reasonably spent by the [receivers and managers], their partners and staff, at the rates specified in Annexure B to [this Order] … [Emphasis added] Annexure B to each Appointment Order stated: On 17 June 2013, the Receivers filed an interlocutory application seeking approval for their remuneration, costs and expenses for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 March 2013 (the Relevant Period). The remuneration claim divided the Receivers’ work into seven categories — Administration and Risk Management, Assets, Creditors, Investigations, Investors / Distribution, Statutory Obligations and Trade On. The total amount claimed was $4,309,813.79 comprised of: On 17 March 2014, Registrar Luxton fixed the Receivers’ remuneration, costs and expenses for the Relevant Period at $3,764,738.39 (excluding GST) purportedly in accordance with each Appointment Order and pursuant to rule 14.24 of the Federal Court Rules. In general terms, the Registrar:(a)applied a 20% reduction to the Receivers’ remuneration for the “Investors / Distribution” category of work;(b)applied a 5% reduction to the Receivers’ remuneration for all work other than that identified in (a), and to the Receivers’ claim for disbursements; and(c)applied a 2.5% reduction to the Receivers’ claim for legal fees (but not for legal disbursements). On 28 March 2014, the Receivers filed an application for review seeking to review the Registrar’s determination. On the application for review, the Receivers sought an order fixing the Receivers’ remuneration, costs and expenses for the Relevant Period at $4,303,813.79. On the application for review before the primary judge, the Receivers’ submissions focused on the three aspects of the Registrar’s decision identified in [11] above, as well as the impact of a voluntary reduction of 10% in the remuneration of the Receivers and the professional costs of their solicitors.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It will be a matter for the judge dealing with the remittal to consider these matters afresh and not constrained by her Honour’s approach.CONCLUSION — SETTING ASIDE OF ORDERS In our view, as we have upheld grounds 1(c) and (d), 3 and 5, it is appropriate to set aside her Honour’s orders. The consequences of our findings are that errors have been made in the evaluative task undertaken by her Honour. Moreover, we are unable to say that such errors had no causative significance to the making of her Honour’s determination. Her Honour’s approach to proportionality significantly underpinned both the 20% reduction and the 5% reduction. True it is that these reductions were also justified on other grounds. But we are unable to say that those reductions as so quantified would necessarily have been made and justified in any event on the other foundations relied upon. In any event, several of the other foundations relied upon to justify the reductions are problematic for other reasons. Moreover, we are not in a position for ourselves to apply a different set of quantitative reductions by in effect backing out the proportionality analysis, as her Honour elucidated it, and then applying the correct proportionality analysis. It is more appropriate for there to be a rehearing of the matter. Accordingly, we will set aside her Honour’s orders and remit the hearing of the application for review to another judge to be considered afresh on all issues, but subject to our reasons. On the question of costs, her Honour’s order against KPMG will be set aside. We consider that the costs of all parties to the present appeal and the hearing before her Honour should be treated as costs and expenses of the winding up of the Schemes and be paid out of the funds on hand held by the Receivers.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established