FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Renet v The Owner – Strata Plan SP22143 [2023] FCA 631
Appeal from: The Owner - Strata Plan SP22143 v Renet [2022] FedCFamC2G 953 File number: ACD 58 of 2022 Judgment of: RAPER J Date of judgment: 15 June 2023 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia dismissing an application for review of a Registrar’s orders – where Registrar made sequestration order against the estate of the appellant – whether “other sufficient cause” for why the sequestration order ought not be made – appeal dismissed Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 43, 52, 52(1), 52(2), 52(2)(b)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 256(1)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 192E
Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) s 85(5)
Cases cited: BVZ21 v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCAFC 122
Emerson v Wreckair Pty Limited (1992) 33 FCR 581
Ex parte Kibble; In re Onslow (1875) LR 10 Ch App 373
Katter v Melhem (No 2) [2014] FCA 1176; 319 ALR 646
Olivieri v Stafford (1989) 24 FCR 413
Petrie v Redmond [1943] St R Qd 71
Ramsay Healthcare Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132
Re Flateau; Ex parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd (1888) 22 QBD 83
Re Riviere; Ex parte Original Mont de Piete Ltd (1919) 20 SR (NSW) 77
Toki v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 164
Totev v Sfar [2008] FCAFC 35; 167 FCR 193
Division: General Division Registry: Australian Capital Territory National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 74 Date of hearing: 2 June 2023 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Renet appeared in person Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr T Nicolaidis of Baker Deane & Nutt ORDERS
ACD 58 of 2022 BETWEEN: MARK RENET
Appellant
AND: THE OWNER - STRATA PLAN SP22143
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RAPER J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 JUNE 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.If a costs application is to be made, within seven (7) days of the date of this judgment, any such application, any evidence in support of that application and written submissions (not exceeding two pages in length) which address the reasons why a costs order should be made, must be filed.
3.Any party opposing the costs application may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this judgment, file any evidence in opposition of that application and written submissions (not exceeding two pages in length) which address the reasons why a costs order should not be made.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RAPER J
On 6 August 2021, a bankruptcy notice was served on the appellant, Mr Mark…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 631
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the submissions made by Mr Renet, which primarily revolved around a dispute regarding the judgment debt and his contention that a settlement agreement precluded the judgment debt. The court found that Mr Renet's claims lacked substance as there was no appeal or application to set aside the judgment debt, and he had been legally represented during the proceedings that led to the judgment. The court also noted that the figures presented by Mr Renet were not reconcilable. In dismissing the appeal, the court held that Mr Renet had not demonstrated any legal, factual, or discretionary error in the primary judge's decision. The court emphasised that the primary judge's evaluation of whether there was "other sufficient cause" was not subject to the correctness standard but rather required demonstration of miscarriage.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. If a costs application is to be made, the parties must file their submissions within the specified timeframes. The court did not make a costs order at this stage but provided a procedural guideline for future costs applications.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. If a costs application is to be made, within seven (7) days of the date of this judgment, any such application, any evidence in support of that application and written submissions (not exceeding two pages in length) which address the reasons why a costs order should be made, must be filed.
3. Any party opposing the costs application may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this judgment, file any evidence in opposition of that application and written submissions (not exceeding two pages in length) which address the reasons why a costs order should not be made.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Strata Plan sought orders dismissing the appeal and requiring Mr Renet to pay its costs on an indemnity basis.Consideration The nature of an appeal of this kind was recently described in a fulsome way by Wheelahan J in Whiteman v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2022] FCA 975 at [61]–[63] as follows: 61 This appeal comes before me as a single judge exercising appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 25(1AA)(a). The appeal is by way of re-hearing, in which the primary judge enjoyed no relevant advantage over this court. However, unlike the review that was before the primary judge, the appeal to this court is not a re-hearing de novo. The court’s powers on appeal are engaged only if, upon this court considering for itself the evidence and other material that was before the primary judge, some legal, factual, or discretionary error is demonstrated in the orders that were made: Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; 203 CLR 172 at [23] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).62 For the purposes of the demonstration of error on appeal, the engagement of s 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act involves two related levels of decision-making. The first is whether the primary judge was satisfied that there was some “other sufficient cause” for which a sequestration order ought not be made. This does not involve the evaluation of facts and circumstances against some legal norm: cf, Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd [2008] HCA 13; 234 CLR 124 at [40] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ); Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 137; 108 ACSR 545 at [23] (Besanko, Middleton and Beach JJ). Rather, it is the type of decision to which Mason and Deane JJ referred in Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 518, which calls for value judgments in respect of which there may be room for reasonable differences of opinion, no particular opinion being uniquely correct. See also, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541 at [43]-[49] (Gageler J). Because the powers on appeal are exercisable only upon the demonstration of error, the primary judge’s evaluation of whether there was “other sufficient cause” for the purposes of s 52(2)(b) must be shown to have been wrong. Error is not shown merely by persuading an appellate court to make a different evaluation, which may be no better than the first: see, Singer v Berghouse [1994] HCA 40; (1994) 181 CLR 201 at 211-212 (Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ), and the approval of the comments of Kirby P in Golosky v Golosky (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 5 October 1993). The second and related level of decision-making is whether upon the judge being satisfied of some “other sufficient cause”, the court should in the exercise of its discretion dismiss the petition: Endresz v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 33; 228 FCR 334 (Endresz) at [34], [37] (Edmonds, Gordon and Beach JJ).63 Therefore, in relation to this appeal from the decision of the primary judge to the extent that it challenges the judge’s rejection of the appellant’s claim that the power under s 52(2)(b) should have been exercised to dismiss the petition, the principles essayed in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 apply, such that it must be demonstrated that the decision miscarried. Within those principles, the correctness standard applies to any challenge on appeal to the legal principles that were applied, or to findings of material fact upon which the evaluation took place, but not to the primary judge’s evaluation, or to the exercise of the statutory discretion. The principles in House v The King also apply to the appellant’s challenge to the primary judge’s discretionary decision to fix the review for hearing. If the court is satisfied that error is established, then in a case such as the present where the primary judge enjoyed no relevant advantage over this court, the court may proceed to make its own findings and evaluative conclusions, and formulate its own reasoning: Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; 331 ALR 550 at [43] (French CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). (Emphasis added.)