MIGRATION – application for protection (class XA) visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge committed jurisdictional error – whether Tribunal erred by failing to consider whether circumstances of appellant’s likely detention upon return to his country of nationality might involve harm “intentionally inflicted”
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category:
Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:
63
Counsel for the Appellant:
The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent:
Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent:
Australian Government Solicitor
ORDERS
NSD 997 of 2016
BETWEEN:
SZVHC
Appellant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BARKER J:
The appellant, a male citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity, appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing his application for judicial review of a decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal affirming the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refusing to grant a protection (class XA) visa.
The appellant arrived in Australia at Christmas Island by boat from Sri Lanka on 17 May 2012 without a visa.
The…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The case of SZVHC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appellant who sought a protection (class XA) visa, which was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. Following this refusal, the appellant sought a merits review of the decision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which affirmed the delegate's decision. The appellant then appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, arguing that the primary judge committed a jurisdictional error and that the AAT erred by not considering whether the circumstances of his likely detention upon return to his country of nationality might involve harm intentionally inflicted. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection cross-appealed the decision.
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge had committed a jurisdictional error in his approach to the question of whether the appellant was a credible witness and whether the AAT had erred in its consideration of whether the appellant’s likely detention upon return to his country of nationality might involve harm intentionally inflicted. The court was required to determine if the appellant’s claims were fabricated and whether the AAT had appropriately considered the potential harm he might face upon return to Sri Lanka.
The court found that the primary judge did not commit a jurisdictional error in his assessment of the appellant's credibility. The judge correctly applied the law and there was no error in his reasoning or findings. The court also held that the AAT did not err in its consideration of the appellant’s potential detention upon return. The AAT had properly evaluated the appellant's claims and the country information, concluding that there was no real chance of serious harm due to the appellant's ethnicity, political activities, or failed asylum status. The AAT’s finding that the appellant was not a credible witness and had fabricated his claims supported the conclusion that he did not face a real chance of significant harm.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appellant's appeal and the Minister's cross-appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. The orders were made under Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
The appellant then sought merits review of the delegate’s decision in the Tribunal.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION On 26 September 2013, the appellant attended a Tribunal hearing that his representative was connected to by telephone link. The hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Tamil and English languages. At the hearing, the Tribunal gave the appellant an opportunity to provide further information in support of his application and to respond to apparent inconsistencies in his claims. On 27 September 2013, in order to comply with s 424A of the Act, the Tribunal sent a letter to the appellant containing information that would, subject to his comment or response, form the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal stated that if it found the appellant had given vague or inconsistent evidence, developed his claims over the course of the application or failed to provide significant claims at an earlier opportunity, this may lead to a finding that he was not a person of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities or their paramilitary groups, and that his claims had been fabricated to enhance his visa application. The appellant responded to the Tribunal’s letter under s 424A by letter dated 11 October 2013. On 21 November 2013, the Tribunal received a further written submission from the appellant containing additional documentation in support of his claims. On 5 December 2013, the Tribunal received a record of a phone interview between the appellant and his representative containing further information about the appellant’s claims. The appellant, together with his representative, then appeared again before the Tribunal on 9 September 2014, which was again conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Tamil and English languages. At the hearing, the Tribunal gave the appellant an opportunity to explain the significance of the documents provided since the first hearing, and respond to any apparent inconsistencies in his claims. The Minister’s written submissions provide what I consider to be an accurate summary of the Tribunal’s lengthy reasons for its decision, as follows: 4.The Tribunal accepted that the appellant was a Tamil who was born in Udappu in North West Sri Lanka. It also accepted that he lived there until April 2012 save for a period of almost 2 years when he moved for work. However, it found that the appellant had otherwise fabricated his claims for protection and was not a credible witness (at AB tab 3 253 [229]).5.The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claims that he had been detained in Udappu and Negombo for 14 days on suspicion of smuggling weapons and that there had been a court process in relation to the charges. The Tribunal found that the appellant gave inconsistent evidence, failed to raise significant claims at the earliest opportunity and developed his claims over time (at AB tab 3 253-254 [231-237]). For example, the appellant did not claim that there were allegations that he was transporting weapons in his interview before the delegate. Nor did he mention the payment of bail money or further court proceedings at any time before his first submission to the Tribunal (at AB tab 3 254 [234] and [236]).6.The Tribunal also found that the appellant gave ‘vague and inconsistent’ evidence in relation to his and his father’s claimed political activities. For example, the appellant did not claim he was involved in politics at his entry interview. Whilst he initially claimed that his father had shifted political parties, he later claimed his father had always supported the opposition party. It was not until the second hearing that the appellant claimed that his father was ‘the trusted lieutenant and number two to the ... chairman ‘of the opposition (at AB tab 3 254 [240]).7.The Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s explanations that the inconsistencies were minor, the result of miscommunications and that he had trouble remembering (at AB tab 3 255 [242-244]).8.The Tribunal also rejected the appellant’s claim that he was subject to a reporting condition after the court case in 2003 that an arrest warrant was issued for his arrest in February 2011 and that CID officers had come to his house at that time. Again, the Tribunal found the appellant had given inconsistent evidence and had failed to provide significant claims at the earliest opportunity.9.The Tribunal found it implausible that the appellant would have been able to remain in the same house without the CID finding him if they were interested in him. It also relied on country sources which indicated that people wanted by the authorities were frequently arrested and kidnapped. Nor did it find it plausible that the appellant would have forgotten about these ‘significant’ claims (at AB tab 3 256 257 [246-252]).10.The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim that he was beaten by the army in 2009 while driving a truck because he did not refer to this incident in his application or written submissions lodged with the delegate or the Tribunal. It did not accept the appellant’s explanation that he was unsure how to present his claims (at AB tab 3 257-258 [253-254]). The Tribunal found that the documents provided by the appellant after the first hearing were fabricated. It found that the documents were inconsistent with the appellant’s evidence and that he tailored his evidence when the Tribunal put his concerns to him (at AB tab 3 258 [254]).11.The Tribunal also drew adverse inferences from the appellant stating in his biodata interview that he was seeking protection because of ‘financial difficulties ‘. It rejected that this was because he was stressed, confused or was threatened by the captain on his boat to Australia (at AB tab 3 258 [255-256]).12.The Tribunal noted that the appellant and his family had no actual involvement with the LTTE (at AB tab 3 259 [259]). Nor did it accept, relying upon country information, that he would be imputed with an anti-government political opinion because he was Tamil or because he was a fisherman from Udappu. In any event, it noted that the appellant claimed to have only worked as a fisherman for a brief time in 2000 after leaving school. Given that, the Tribunal also rejected the appellant’s claims that he was targeted or discriminated against because he was a fisherman (at AB tab 3 259 [260-261]). It also noted that the appellant’s family are living in Udappu and have not been harassed (at AB tab 3 260 [262]).13.The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claims that he found out a couple of days before the second Tribunal hearing that his friend had been abducted and killed. It found his evidence was ‘vague and evasive’ and considered it to be another example of the appellant developing his claims over time (at AB tab 3 260 [263]).14.Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the appellant will be suspected of having links with the LTTE or being anti-government if he returns to Sri Lanka (at AB tab 3 259 [258] and 260 [264]).15.The Tribunal relied upon country information and found that the appellant did not face a real chance of serious harm because of his ethnicity. It noted that prior to the end of the war in May 2009, Tamils (particularly in the north and east of the country) faced persecution. However, it found that in 2014 the security situation had stabilised and the country information indicated Tamils were not targeted because of their race (at AB tab 3 260-261 [266-267]).16.The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had been threatened on the boat to Australia because the appellant did not advance that claim in his application, during the delegate’s interview or in submissions made after the delegate’s interview (at AB tab 3 261-262 [268-270]). The Tribunal also considered the country information and found that as the appellant would not be regarded as having a link to the LTTE, he was not at risk of harm as a result of being a failed asylum seeker: AB262 at [271] [273].17.The Tribunal accepted that the appellant departed Sri Lanka illegally (at AB tab 3 263 [274)). It also accepted that, based on county information, the appellant would be interviewed at the airport upon return and a criminal background check would be run. However, it was satisfied that the appellant did not have an adverse profile and was also satisfied that the procedures were standardised for all persons who left the country regardless of ethnicity (at AB tab 3 263 [275]). The Tribunal accepted that the appellant may be arrested and imprisoned for a few days and fined for his illegal departure. However, it was satisfied that the laws in relation to illegal departure were laws of general application and therefore did not amount to persecution (at AB tab 3 264 [277-278]). Accordingly, it found that the appellant did not face a real chance of serious harm as a failed asylum seeker (at AB tab 3 264 [279]).18.The Tribunal relied upon its earlier findings that the appellant had fabricated all of his claims (at AB tab 3 265-266 [283],[286] and [287]). It also found that while the appellant may be remanded in prison for a few days, the country information indicated that he would be subject to a fine and not a custodial sentence. It noted the lack of country information about returnees being exposed to significant harm and found being in ‘overcrowded, dark, unclean and cramped conditions’ for a few days would not amount to significant harm (at AB tab 3 265-266 [284]). In the circumstances the Tribunal was not satisfied the appellant was owed complementary protection obligations.19.Accordingly the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.