FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZUXM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 1514
Citation: SZUXM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1514 Appeal from: SZUXM v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2278 Parties: SZUXM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 1079 of 2015 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 25 November 2015 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387
SZNOE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 96
SZUXM v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2278Date of hearing: 25 November 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 41 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Kumar Solicitor for the Appellant: Success Lawyers and Barristers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1079 of 2015
BETWEEN: SZUXM
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 NOVEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1079 of 2015
BETWEEN: SZUXM
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE:
25 NOVEMBER 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal on 16 July 2014 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa: SZUXM v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2278.
The appellant’s claims
The appellant, who has been legally represented by the Refugee Advice & Casework Service throughout his dealings with the Department and before the Tribunal made claims for protection on a number of bases. He is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Sinhalese ethnicity who had been a Buddhist monk in Sri Lanka. For a time, he had been attached to a significant temple in that country to which prominent people in the government and civil society came to worship and seek spiritual guidance.
Between September 2009 until November 2010 the appellant conducted religious activities as a monk while staying in New Zealand before he returned to Sri Lanka. The appellant first arrived in Australia on 14 June 2012 as the holder of a tourist visa.
He claimed to fear persecution were he to return to Sri Lanka because he has now disrobed as a monk and no longer adheres to the vow of celibacy. He claimed that he had formed a relationship with a woman while he…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1514
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal had correctly identified and assessed the appellant's claims regarding his religion and membership in a particular social group, and whether the Tribunal had made any jurisdictional errors in its decision-making process. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal had properly identified the relevant social group, assessed the credibility of the appellant's claims, and applied the correct legal standards in concluding that the appellant did not face a risk of persecution upon return to Sri Lanka.
In addressing these issues, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly identified the relevant social group of disrobed Buddhist monks and had considered the appellant's membership in that group. The court noted that the Tribunal had referred to the group as disrobed monks and had assessed the credibility of the appellant's claims within the legal framework established by the Full Court of the High Court in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The court concluded that the Tribunal had not made any jurisdictional errors in its decision and had properly assessed the harm suffered by the appellant, finding it did not amount to serious harm. The court further found that the Tribunal's rejection of the appellant's claims was in accordance with the law and did not contain any errors.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In support of the second ground, he argued that the stigma attached to his disrobing and the circumstances of his being in a relationship with his partner, both while a monk and thereafter, were live issues that the Tribunal had failed to consider in relation to what would happen to him on his return to Sri Lanka. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction because it did not deal with his claimed risk of harm, having regard to his former prominence and the circumstances of what had happened to him in New Zealand and here in respect of his relationship with his partner.Consideration In my opinion, ground 1 must fail. I can see no error in the trial judge’s rejection of the appellant’s argument which substantively was repeated to me. As appears from my recitation of its findings above, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that there was a social group of disrobed Buddhist monks and that the appellant was a member of that group. The Tribunal repeatedly referred to “disrobed monks” and “disrobed Buddhist monks”. While it is true it did not add the description “particular social group” before those expressions, it had identified, at [33] of its reasons, the claim that the appellant feared persecution as a member of a particular social group as a disrobed Buddhist monk. Importantly, in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387 at 400-401 [36] Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ said that:the determination of whether a group falls within the definition of “particular social group” in Art 1a(2) of the Convention can be summarised as follows. First, the group must be identifiable by a characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group. Secondly, the characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group cannot be the shared fear of persecution. Thirdly, the possession of that characteristic or attribute must distinguish the group from society at large. The Tribunal identified the relevant characteristic of the social group, as the appellant had claimed it to be that its members had been Buddhist monks who had subsequently disrobed. That was common to all members of the group and it distinguished those persons from the society at large. The Tribunal then considered the credibility of the appellant’s claim that that social group faced persecution in Sri Lanka of the nature and kind that he alleged. It concluded that while there was both social stigma and social disgrace suffered by members of the social group of disrobed Buddhist monks, the harm from those consequences was not serious harm for the purposes of s 91R(2) of the Act. The Tribunal then went on to consider the particular circumstances which the appellant said would attach to him, as an individual member of that social group. It rejected his claims that his own circumstances created a well-founded fear that he would face persecution by reason of his membership of the particular social group of disrobed Buddhist monks, coupled with his own individual circumstances, were he to return to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did so conventionally and in accordance with law. I am not able to detect any jurisdictional error in its treatment of the claims that the appellant made on this basis or in the Tribunal’s findings rejecting those claims.