SZUXM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUXM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2015] FCA 1514

Citation: SZUXM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1514
Appeal from: SZUXM v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2278
Parties: SZUXM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1079 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 25 November 2015
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387
SZNOE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 96
SZUXM v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2278
Date of hearing: 25 November 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Kumar
Solicitor for the Appellant: Success Lawyers and Barristers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1079 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZUXM
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 NOVEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1079 of 2015

BETWEEN:

SZUXM
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

25 NOVEMBER 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal on 16 July 2014 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa:  SZUXM v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2278.

    The appellant’s claims

  2. The appellant, who has been legally represented by the Refugee Advice & Casework Service throughout his dealings with the Department and before the Tribunal made claims for protection on a number of bases.  He is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Sinhalese ethnicity who had been a Buddhist monk in Sri Lanka.  For a time, he had been attached to a significant temple in that country to which prominent people in the government and civil society came to worship and seek spiritual guidance.

  3. Between September 2009 until November 2010 the appellant conducted religious activities as a monk while staying in New Zealand before he returned to Sri Lanka.  The appellant first arrived in Australia on 14 June 2012 as the holder of a tourist visa.

  4. He claimed to fear persecution were he to return to Sri Lanka because he has now disrobed as a monk and no longer adheres to the vow of celibacy.  He claimed that he had formed a relationship with a woman while he…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1514
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZUXM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a former Buddhist monk, sought protection in Australia on the grounds of his religion and membership in a particular social group, specifically disrobed Buddhist monks. The appellant argued that he would face persecution in Sri Lanka due to societal stigma and the consequences of his disrobing, including the perception that he had abandoned his Buddhist faith and his relationship with his partner. The Tribunal had found the appellant's claims to be exaggerated and not credible, concluding that while there was social stigma attached to disrobed monks, the harm did not amount to serious harm as defined by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Tribunal further found that the appellant's individual circumstances did not create a well-founded fear of persecution. The appellant appealed the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the Tribunal had failed to consider his specific circumstances and had constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction.

The central legal issues in this case were whether the Tribunal had correctly identified and assessed the appellant's claims regarding his religion and membership in a particular social group, and whether the Tribunal had made any jurisdictional errors in its decision-making process. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal had properly identified the relevant social group, assessed the credibility of the appellant's claims, and applied the correct legal standards in concluding that the appellant did not face a risk of persecution upon return to Sri Lanka.

In addressing these issues, the court found that the Tribunal had correctly identified the relevant social group of disrobed Buddhist monks and had considered the appellant's membership in that group. The court noted that the Tribunal had referred to the group as disrobed monks and had assessed the credibility of the appellant's claims within the legal framework established by the Full Court of the High Court in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The court concluded that the Tribunal had not made any jurisdictional errors in its decision and had properly assessed the harm suffered by the appellant, finding it did not amount to serious harm. The court further found that the Tribunal's rejection of the appellant's claims was in accordance with the law and did not contain any errors.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

After the hearing on 25 November 2013, the Service wrote to the Tribunal and stated that the two Convention grounds on which the appellant had relied before the delegate were based on, first, his religion because of the imputed consequences due to his sur place act of disrobing and the societal perception in Sri Lanka that he had, thus, relinquished his Buddhist faith and, secondly, his membership of a particular social group of disrobed Buddhist monks. The submission went on to note that, as was evident at the hearing, the appellant’s claims had “evolved considerably in detail and sophistication since his first assessment by the Department”. The submission then identified additional claims that need not be considered for the purposes of these reasons.The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal specifically identified in [33] of its reasons that the appellant had claimed to fear returning to Sri Lanka on the basis of his religion and “membership of a particular social group as a disrobed Buddhist monk”. The Tribunal did not find credible much of what the appellant said in relation to his relevant claimed fears. It did accept that he had been a Buddhist monk for about 14 or 15 years and was prominent in that role, having appeared on radio and television and, for five years until 2009, been involved with the prominent temple to which I have referred. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant had lived and worked at the temple during that five-year period, meeting many prominent politicians and monks. In that role, he had travelled to and lived in New Zealand from 2009 to 2010 and then returned to Sri Lanka where he stayed until 2012 when he came here. The Tribunal found that between 2010 and 2012, the appellant lived in another monastery that cared for feeble and sick monks. It found that once the appellant had come to Australia he decided no longer to be a Buddhist monk and had disrobed. However, it found that he continued to be a practising Buddhist, and that he had done so genuinely and not for the purpose of strengthening his claim for refugee status within the meaning of s 91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which the Tribunal found did not apply to his circumstances. It also found that the appellant’s mother was ill and he wished to provide an income for her. Nonetheless, the Tribunal next went on to find that the appellant had fabricated evidence about new claims that he had made to enhance his claim for protection following its rejection by the delegate. The Tribunal gave extensive reasons for these adverse credibility findings, concluding at [45] that it did not find the appellant to be “a credible, truthful and reliable witness”. The Tribunal found that the appellant had exaggerated both his profile as a Buddhist monk at the prominent temple and, generally, the significance of his role in Sri Lanka. The Tribunal concluded that it did not accept as true that the appellant’s partner’s parents had made any threats to harm him or cause him to be harmed on return to Sri Lanka, or at all, and it did not accept that he would face difficulty because he had been in a relationship with his partner while still a Buddhist monk in New Zealand. The Tribunal’s reasons explained how it had explored this issue with the appellant, including the fact that he had not originally raised, in his pre-hearing statutory declaration, the threats that he alleged the parents had made to have him harmed or killed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In support of the second ground, he argued that the stigma attached to his disrobing and the circumstances of his being in a relationship with his partner, both while a monk and thereafter, were live issues that the Tribunal had failed to consider in relation to what would happen to him on his return to Sri Lanka. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction because it did not deal with his claimed risk of harm, having regard to his former prominence and the circumstances of what had happened to him in New Zealand and here in respect of his relationship with his partner.Consideration In my opinion, ground 1 must fail. I can see no error in the trial judge’s rejection of the appellant’s argument which substantively was repeated to me. As appears from my recitation of its findings above, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that there was a social group of disrobed Buddhist monks and that the appellant was a member of that group. The Tribunal repeatedly referred to “disrobed monks” and “disrobed Buddhist monks”. While it is true it did not add the description “particular social group” before those expressions, it had identified, at [33] of its reasons, the claim that the appellant feared persecution as a member of a particular social group as a disrobed Buddhist monk. Importantly, in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387 at 400-401 [36] Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ said that:the determination of whether a group falls within the definition of “particular social group” in Art 1a(2) of the Convention can be summarised as follows. First, the group must be identifiable by a characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group. Secondly, the characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group cannot be the shared fear of persecution. Thirdly, the possession of that characteristic or attribute must distinguish the group from society at large. The Tribunal identified the relevant characteristic of the social group, as the appellant had claimed it to be that its members had been Buddhist monks who had subsequently disrobed. That was common to all members of the group and it distinguished those persons from the society at large. The Tribunal then considered the credibility of the appellant’s claim that that social group faced persecution in Sri Lanka of the nature and kind that he alleged. It concluded that while there was both social stigma and social disgrace suffered by members of the social group of disrobed Buddhist monks, the harm from those consequences was not serious harm for the purposes of s 91R(2) of the Act. The Tribunal then went on to consider the particular circumstances which the appellant said would attach to him, as an individual member of that social group. It rejected his claims that his own circumstances created a well-founded fear that he would face persecution by reason of his membership of the particular social group of disrobed Buddhist monks, coupled with his own individual circumstances, were he to return to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did so conventionally and in accordance with law. I am not able to detect any jurisdictional error in its treatment of the claims that the appellant made on this basis or in the Tribunal’s findings rejecting those claims.