FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZRCD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 290
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2245 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZRCD
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentRON WITTON IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FLICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 APRIL 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to raise Grounds 2 and 3 in the Notice of Appeal filed on 27 December 2012 is refused.
2.The appeal is dismissed.
3.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Order 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2245 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 290
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case revolved around whether the Appellant was entitled to introduce new grounds of appeal that had not been previously raised, and whether those grounds had any merit. The Appellant argued that the Federal Magistrate had failed to consider the case rationally and that the Independent Merits Reviewer had not considered claims for complementary protection. The Appellant also sought to tender a new document that was not previously available. The Court needed to determine whether these new grounds and the new document could be considered.
The Court held that the Appellant was not entitled to introduce new grounds of appeal that had not been previously raised. The Court found that the Appellant was bound by the manner in which they had presented their case and that, except in exceptional circumstances, a party is not allowed to raise new arguments after the hearing. The Court also found that the proposed new grounds lacked merit and that allowing them would transform the Court into a de facto court of original jurisdiction. Furthermore, the new document tendered by the Appellant was deemed irrelevant to the issues at hand and was given no weight.
The Court dismissed the appeal, refused leave to raise the new grounds of appeal, and ordered that the Appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the principles of judicial review and the timely and effective disposal of litigation. The Appellant's appeal was thus dismissed, and they were ordered to pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to raise Grounds 2 and 3 in the Notice of Appeal filed on 27 December 2012 is refused.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Order 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first Ground of Appeal, construed as an argument that the Federal Magistrate has committed appellable error, is rejected. A LACK OF RATIONALITY AND A FAILURE TO CONSIDER The second Ground of Appeal seeks to contend that the reasons of the Independent Merits Reviewer were “neither logical nor rational”; the third Ground of Appeal seeks to contend that the Independent Merits Reviewer failed to consider claims “to complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act…”. Neither of these Grounds were relied upon before the Federal Magistrate. Except in “exceptional circumstances”, a party is bound by the manner in which he advances his case for resolution: University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481 at 483. Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ there observed:It is elementary that a party is bound by the conduct of his case. Except in the most exceptional circumstances, it would be contrary to all principle to allow a party, after a case had been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or by inadvertence, he failed to put during the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so.See also: Zheng v Cai [2009] HCA 52 at [16], 239 CLR 446 at 453 per French CJ, Gummow, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. Leave to raise an argument not previously advanced may, however, be granted where it is “expedient in the interests of justice to do so”: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 at [46] per Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ. While it is necessary for there to be some consideration of the merits of the application for leave, it is not necessary to “enter upon a full consideration of the grounds. To do otherwise would make the requirement for leave meaningless”: Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 at [24] per Heerey, Moore and Goldberg JJ. Leave to rely upon either the second or third Ground of Appeal is refused. In refusing leave, it is considered that neither of the two Grounds have any merit. Also of relevance is the desirability of this Court not being transformed into a de facto court of original jurisdiction and the desirability of cases such as the present being resolved in a timely and orderly manner: SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499 at [30] per Lander J. In Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929, 192 ALR 71 at 86 Gyles J observed:[62] In my opinion, it is wrong to analyse the question which arises here as requiring a balancing of prejudice. Departure from the proper role of appeal in the court system is not simply a discretionary procedural decision. Furthermore, in public law matters like this, it can always be said that no actual prejudice apart from costs is suffered by the respondent compared with the prejudice to the appellant. It can easily be overlooked that there is a significant public interest in the timely and effective disposal of litigation. This aspect has particular force in this area of public law, where delays in dealing with applications for protection visas are obviously to be avoided if possible…These observations were endorsed by Lander and Middleton JJ in MZYPO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 1 at [63] to [64]. Their Honours there also observed that if there had been some merit in the proposed new grounds “this would be a case where it would be expedient in the interests of justice to allow the grounds to be put for the first time”: [2013] FCAFC 1 at [66]. But there was no merit. See also: SZMRD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 598.