SZGGG v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZGGG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2006] FMCA 528
MIGRATION – Refugee – invitation to hearing – prescribed periods of notice – procedural fairness under general law – jurisdictional error – delay – unclean hands – acquiescence – refusal to exercise discretion – application dismissed.
Migration Act 1958, ss.426A, 425, 425A, 441G, 441A(4), 441C(4), 494C, 441B, 494D, 425A(3), 424A, 422B, 65, 36(2)
Migration Regulations 1994, Regulation 4.35D(b)
Evidence Act 1995, ss.63, 63(2)(a)
Abebe v The Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
Bin Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172
Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Tony Longo Pty Ltd (2001) 52 NSWLR 458
Cooper as liquidator of Wanted World Wide (Australia) Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 210 ALR 635
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26
Favelle Mort Ltd v Murray (1975) 133 CLR 580
The King v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Ozone Theatres (Australia) Ltd (1949) 78 CLR 389
Makhu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 221
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Anor; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 [2003] HCA
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Huynh (2004) 211 ALR 126
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZANS [2005] FCAFC 41
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73
Murphy v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 135 FCR 550
NAAT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 196 ALR 376
NADK of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 184
NAST vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208
NAVX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287
Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal & Ors; Ex parte Fowler & Ors (1980) 31 ALR 565
Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Defence); Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491
Re Refugee Review Tribunal & Anor; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
S58 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 283
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24
SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 215
SZDOG v Minister for Immigration [2004] FMCA 972
SZEMB v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 448
VEAN of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 570
VNAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 136 FCR 407
WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630
Applicant: SZGGG
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW…
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Details
Case
[2006] FMCA 528
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZGGG v Minister for Immigration, the applicant, represented in person, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) concerning the applicant's application for a protection visa. The primary contention was that the MRT had failed to provide the applicant's authorised recipient with a letter of invitation to a hearing, in breach of statutory obligations under the Migration Act 1958. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's failure to correctly address the letter to the authorised recipient constituted a denial of procedural fairness and a miscarriage of justice.

The court was tasked with determining whether the MRT's actions constituted a breach of the statutory requirement to notify the applicant's authorised recipient of the hearing date, time, and place. This involved assessing the validity of the addresses provided by the applicant for his authorised recipient and whether the Tribunal had complied with its obligations under Section 425A of the Migration Act. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal's actions amounted to a miscarriage of justice or a denial of procedural fairness.

The court held that the Tribunal had not breached its statutory obligations. It was found that the address provided by the applicant for his authorised recipient was not the most recent one, as evidenced by a facsimile cover sheet submitted on the same day as the application for review. Given the absence of evidence demonstrating that the migration agent did not receive the letter, the court concluded that the Tribunal had acted within its authority. Additionally, the court determined that there was no miscarriage of justice or denial of procedural fairness as the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claims of procedural errors.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal had not acted in breach of the statutory obligations. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the amount of $3500.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application is dismissed.

2.

The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the fixed amount of $3500.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the first hearing Ms. Burnett for the respondent also raised unwarrantable delay on the part of the applicant in bringing these proceedings, as an independent basis in the exercise of the Court’s discretion for dismissing the application. In relation to both this issue, and the issue of the alleged failure on the part of the Tribunal to “correctly” address the letter sent to the applicant’s migration agent, I gave the parties an additional opportunity to file and serve further submissions, and any relevant evidence, in support of these issues. I was not satisfied that the material put before me at that time had adequately presented and considered all relevant matters. This was confirmed given the material subsequently filed, particularly as annexed to the affidavits of Ms. Burnett of 5 and 10 October 2005. I also indicated, at that time, an opportunity for a further hearing if required. The Second Court Hearing, Admissibility of Evidence At the conclusion of the period for further submissions and evidence it became apparent that a further hearing date would be needed. That was set down for 14 November 2005 (“the second hearing”). At this hearing Mr. Chami appeared for the respondents and the applicant appeared in person, again with the assistance of his “friend” (Ms. Frugtniet). Including submissions filed after that second hearing I have before me:For the applicant:1)The application for review and affidavit, affirmed by the applicant on 5 May 2005 and filed 6 May 2005.2)Submissions, filed 25 May 2005.3)The amended application, filed 22 August 2005.4)An affidavit, affirmed by the applicant on 27 September 2005, and supporting submissions, filed 27 September 2005.5)An affidavit, affirmed by the applicant on 4 October 2005, and supporting submissions, filed 5 October 2005.6)A further affidavit, affirmed by the applicant on 10 October 2005, and supporting submissions, filed 10 October 2005.7)Supplementary submissions, filed 14 November 2005.8)Further written submissions filed 28 November 2005.9)Further written submissions filed 15 December 2005. In regard to the admissibility of the evidence contained in the affidavits listed above:1)The applicant (with the assistance of his “friend”) indicated at the second hearing before me that he only intended to proceed and rely on his affidavits of 4 and 10 October 2005. 2)In relation to the affidavit of 4 October 2005 Mr. Chami objected to paragraphs 13 to 17 inclusive on the basis of relevance. These paragraphs relate to the obtaining of documents to “support the merits of my application for a protection visa” and a submission that the matter be remitted to the Tribunal. I upheld Mr. Chami’s objection on that basis. 3)In relation to the affidavit of 10 October 2005 Mr. Chami objected to the totality of the affidavit, but in particular paragraphs 5 to 10 on the basis of hearsay and relevance again. I upheld his objection in relation to these paragraphs. I note that this evidence did not come within the exception for hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, contained in s.63 of the Evidence Act 1995 (“the Evidence Act”). Mr. Chami for the respondent indicated that he did not object to the tendering into evidence of the annexure to that affidavit. The applicant indicated that in any event, in his view, that was the critical part of the affidavit, a submission with which I agreed. The annexure is a copy of a “Return to Sender” postal advice which, subsequently it was agreed by the parties, related to the Tribunal’s invitation to hearing letter sent to the applicant’s residential address.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 425A(1) provides that if an applicant is invited to appear before the Tribunal, that the Tribunal must give the applicant notice of the date, time and place at which the applicant is scheduled to appear. On its face the effect of s.441G(1) may be said to be that where an applicant has provided the name of an authorised recipient (authorised by the applicant to do things on behalf of the applicant, and that includes receiving documents in connection with the review), the Tribunal “must” give the authorised recipient, instead of the applicant, any document that it would otherwise have given to the applicant. In the case before me s.441G was not in effect at the time of the application for review. However, by the time of the Tribunal's letter of invitation this section had become operational, and this meant from the perspective of the applicant’s argument now, that the invitation to the hearing letter must [but see “Makhu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 221 (“Makhu”) below] have been given to the authorised recipient. The applicant argues that by sending the letter to the migration agent’s Mt. Waverley address, and not the South Clayton address as provided in the actual form of the application for review, the Tribunal did not fulfil its statutory obligation to give the applicant’s authorised recipient the letter of invitation to the hearing. The Migration Agent’s Address The respondent's submission, put particularly by Mr. Chami when he appeared before me at the second hearing, was that the applicant did provide an address for his migration agent as being in South Clayton, VIC in his application for review. This application was signed, and dated, on 2 November 2000 (CB 39). However, as Mr. Chami noted, the facsimile transmission cover sheet, with the migration agent’s Mt. Waverley VIC address on it, was completed on 8 November 2000 (CB 35), and therefore could be said to have constituted the more recent address for the migration agent. There is nothing before me to show that the letter of invitation sent to the applicant's migration adviser (Kamlesh Singh) was returned to the Tribunal as undeliverable. However, I note that both the application for review, and the facsimile cover sheet which accompanied it, were submitted on the same day to the Tribunal. In these circumstances, there could be some doubt as to which of the two addresses was the latest, or relevant, address for the migration agent (or indeed whether it could be both). I had some hesitation initially in accepting that the address on the facsimile cover sheet constituted the most recent (as opposed to only one of two most recent) address of the migration agent. However, I am persuaded by the respondent’s submission in this regard on the basis that the applicant has brought forward no evidence now as to which of the two addresses was the more “appropriate” address. It was open to the applicant, for example, to bring evidence from the migration agent Kamlesh Singh, or to explain any difficulty in doing so. Significantly, there is no evidence before me that the agent did not receive the letter which on the evidence before me was sent by registered post to the Mt. Waverley VIC address. On what is before me, it was open to the Tribunal to treat the Mt. Waverly VIC address as the last notified address for the reasons submitted by the respondent.