FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZGGG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2006] FMCA 528 |
| MIGRATION – Refugee – invitation to hearing – prescribed periods of notice – procedural fairness under general law – jurisdictional error – delay – unclean hands – acquiescence – refusal to exercise discretion – application dismissed. |
| Migration Act 1958, ss.426A, 425, 425A, 441G, 441A(4), 441C(4), 494C, 441B, 494D, 425A(3), 424A, 422B, 65, 36(2) Migration Regulations 1994, Regulation 4.35D(b) Evidence Act 1995, ss.63, 63(2)(a) |
| Applicant: | SZGGG |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW… |
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- Case
- [2006] FMCA 528
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the MRT's actions constituted a breach of the statutory requirement to notify the applicant's authorised recipient of the hearing date, time, and place. This involved assessing the validity of the addresses provided by the applicant for his authorised recipient and whether the Tribunal had complied with its obligations under Section 425A of the Migration Act. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal's actions amounted to a miscarriage of justice or a denial of procedural fairness.
The court held that the Tribunal had not breached its statutory obligations. It was found that the address provided by the applicant for his authorised recipient was not the most recent one, as evidenced by a facsimile cover sheet submitted on the same day as the application for review. Given the absence of evidence demonstrating that the migration agent did not receive the letter, the court concluded that the Tribunal had acted within its authority. Additionally, the court determined that there was no miscarriage of justice or denial of procedural fairness as the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claims of procedural errors.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal had not acted in breach of the statutory obligations. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs in the amount of $3500.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the fixed amount of $3500.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 425A(1) provides that if an applicant is invited to appear before the Tribunal, that the Tribunal must give the applicant notice of the date, time and place at which the applicant is scheduled to appear. On its face the effect of s.441G(1) may be said to be that where an applicant has provided the name of an authorised recipient (authorised by the applicant to do things on behalf of the applicant, and that includes receiving documents in connection with the review), the Tribunal “must” give the authorised recipient, instead of the applicant, any document that it would otherwise have given to the applicant. In the case before me s.441G was not in effect at the time of the application for review. However, by the time of the Tribunal's letter of invitation this section had become operational, and this meant from the perspective of the applicant’s argument now, that the invitation to the hearing letter must [but see “Makhu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 221 (“Makhu”) below] have been given to the authorised recipient. The applicant argues that by sending the letter to the migration agent’s Mt. Waverley address, and not the South Clayton address as provided in the actual form of the application for review, the Tribunal did not fulfil its statutory obligation to give the applicant’s authorised recipient the letter of invitation to the hearing. The Migration Agent’s Address The respondent's submission, put particularly by Mr. Chami when he appeared before me at the second hearing, was that the applicant did provide an address for his migration agent as being in South Clayton, VIC in his application for review. This application was signed, and dated, on 2 November 2000 (CB 39). However, as Mr. Chami noted, the facsimile transmission cover sheet, with the migration agent’s Mt. Waverley VIC address on it, was completed on 8 November 2000 (CB 35), and therefore could be said to have constituted the more recent address for the migration agent. There is nothing before me to show that the letter of invitation sent to the applicant's migration adviser (Kamlesh Singh) was returned to the Tribunal as undeliverable. However, I note that both the application for review, and the facsimile cover sheet which accompanied it, were submitted on the same day to the Tribunal. In these circumstances, there could be some doubt as to which of the two addresses was the latest, or relevant, address for the migration agent (or indeed whether it could be both). I had some hesitation initially in accepting that the address on the facsimile cover sheet constituted the most recent (as opposed to only one of two most recent) address of the migration agent. However, I am persuaded by the respondent’s submission in this regard on the basis that the applicant has brought forward no evidence now as to which of the two addresses was the more “appropriate” address. It was open to the applicant, for example, to bring evidence from the migration agent Kamlesh Singh, or to explain any difficulty in doing so. Significantly, there is no evidence before me that the agent did not receive the letter which on the evidence before me was sent by registered post to the Mt. Waverley VIC address. On what is before me, it was open to the Tribunal to treat the Mt. Waverly VIC address as the last notified address for the reasons submitted by the respondent.