FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Huynh
[2004] FCAFC 47MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Magistrate – s 501(2) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) - cancellation of BB 155 Resident Return visa – respondent entered Australia on Class 200 Refugees visa – whether Minister obliged to consider respondent’s refugee status – whether evidence established respondent has refugee status in Australia
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501
Migration Amendment Act (No 2) 1992 (No 84 of 1992)
Judiciary Act 1903 s 39B
Migration Regulations 1989 Sch 2, reg 108Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433 referred to
The Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd ed, 1998
Germov & Motta, Refugee Law in AustraliaMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS v CHIA NGHIA HUYNH
W 181 of 2003
SPENDER, BRANSON and STONE JJ
8 MARCH 2004
SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W 181 of 2003
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTED BY DRIVER FM
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPELLANTAND:
CHIA NGHIA HUYNH
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
SPENDER, BRANSON and STONE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
8 MARCH 2004
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The orders of the Federal Magistrate be set aside.
2.The application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for constitutional and injunctive relief from the decision of the appellant be dismissed.
3.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W 181 of 2003
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA CONSTITUTED BY DRIVER FM
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
APPELLANTAND:
CHIA NGHIA HUYNH
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
SPENDER, BRANSON and STONE JJ
DATE:
8 MARCH 2004
PLACE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN PERTH)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of a Federal Magistrate. By orders dated 25 July 2003 the learned magistrate declared invalid a decision of the appellant (“the Minister”) made under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) to cancel the respondent’s visa and granted consequential relief. His Honour held that the Minister’s failure to give consideration to the respondent’s ‘status as a refugee’ invalidated the Minister’s decision.
The question of whether the Minister was obliged, before exercising the power given to him by s 501(2) of the Act, to give consideration to the respondent’s ‘status as a refugee’ was not raised by the application which came before his Honour for determination. The issue was raised by the Federal Magistrate himself who then sought submissions from the parties on the question. His Honour did not in his reasons for judgment give express consideration to the grounds of review contained in the application for review of the decision of the Minister other than to note that the final ground of review, which contended that…
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- Case
- [2004] FCAFC 47
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the Court had to address was whether the Federal Magistrate was correct in finding that the Minister's decision was invalidated by his failure to take into account Huynh's refugee status. This hinged on whether the Minister was required to assess whether Australia owed protection obligations to Huynh under the Refugees Convention, a question that was pivotal to the outcome of the appeal.
In its reasoning, the Court found that the Federal Magistrate erred in his conclusion. The Court highlighted that the issuance of a Class 200 visa, which Huynh had, did not necessarily mean that the applicant was assessed against the Refugee Convention's definition of a refugee. Instead, the criteria for Class 200 visas focused on the applicant being a person subject to persecution and other specified conditions. The Court emphasised that the literal meaning of 'refugee' as someone taking shelter from danger did not align with the Convention's definition. Given the evidence before the Federal Magistrate, the assumption that Huynh had been found to be a refugee under the Convention was not supported. Consequently, the Court set aside the orders of the Federal Magistrate and dismissed the application for constitutional and injunctive relief. The respondent was ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The orders of the Federal Magistrate be set aside.
2. The application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for constitutional and injunctive relief from the decision of the appellant be dismissed.
3. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
His Honour also observed:‘I place no significance on the changes to Australia’s domestic law that have occurred since 1992. It does not matter that Australia’s refugee programme was different then from what it is now. Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol have not changed. … The important question is whether [the respondent] got a visa because he was accepted as a refugee. He did. The Minister had not decided whether [the respondent] has ceased to be a refugee.’CONSIDERATION The approach adopted by the Federal Magistrate to the evidence and other material before him is illustrative of the extent to which the literal meaning of the word ‘refugee’ has been obscured by the attention given to the Refugees Convention in recent years. The literal meaning of ‘refugee’ is simply a person taking shelter from pursuit, danger or trouble - especially in a foreign country (see The Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd ed, 1998). Many individuals who fit within the ordinary meaning of the term ‘refugee’ will fall outside the protection provided by the Refugees Convention. The Refugees Convention, which restricts the protection obligations of signatory states to persons who satisfy the criterion, amongst others, that they have a well‑founded fear of persecution on one or more of the bases identified in Article 1A of the Refugees Convention, reflects the outcome of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries which met in Geneva in July 1951. This Conference was convened to amend and finalise the Convention draft. The outcome of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries has been criticised as having a ‘Eurocentric’ geographic and chronological focus (Germov & Motta, Refugee Law in Australia at p 15). It is now widely accepted that there are categories of refugees within the literal meaning of that term that do not fall within Article 1A of the Refugees Convention. As the above discussion reveals, it does not logically follow from the fact that the respondent once held a Class 200 visa that he is a person to whom Australia owes, or once owed, protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. The criteria specified in respect of Class 200 visas, read together with the provisions of Part 2 Division 1AA of the Act as in force in the period following 30 June 1992, make it clear that applicants for Class 200 visas were not assessed against the definition contained in Article 1A of the Refugees Convention. Additionally, as is mentioned above, certain dependent members of the family unit of a person entitled to a Class 200 visa, whether or not they themselves were subject to any persecution, could receive Class 200 visas. The inference that the respondent became entitled to a Class 200 visa as a dependent member of Ms Huynh’s family unit is, on the material that was before the Federal Magistrate, strong. For the above reasons, the assumption made by the Federal Magistrate and upon which he based his decision, namely that the respondent had been found to be a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, is not supported by the evidence and other material that was before his Honour.