FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Robert McDermott [2006] FCA 52
CORPORATIONS – application under s 536 to set aside a warrant issued under s 530C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – challenge to the validity of the warrant – need for full trial before validity could be impugned successfully – further inquiry not justified where defendants no longer have a proprietary or pecuniary interest in the outcome and application to set aside delayed for over 20 months after warrant issued – other factors also considered
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 530C, 536
Burns Philp Investments Pty Ltd v Dickens (1993) 11 ACLC 525 referred to
GIS Electrical Pty Ltd v Melsom (2002) 172 FLR 218 referred to
Re Glowbind Pty Ltd (in Liq); Takchi v Parbery (2003) 181 FLR 208 referred toRICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 073 538 959) PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (IN HIS CAPACITY AS LIQUIDATOR) v ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT, ANN LANGDON, MAXWELL ROGER LATIMER, JOHN McDONALD, MICHAEL GUIFFRE, ROBERT NOMINEES PTY LTD and MARY ANN MARTINEK
VID 3276 OF 2003
KENNY J
8 FEBRUARY 2006
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 3276 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
RICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 073 538 959) & PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (IN HIS CAPACITY AS LIQUIDATOR)
APPLICANTSAND:
ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT
FIRST RESPONDENTANN LANGDON
SECOND RESPONDENTMAXWELL ROGER LATIMER
THIRD RESPONDENTJOHN McDONALD
FOURTH RESPONDENTMICHAEL GUIFFRE
FIFTH RESPONDENTROVER NOMINEES PTY LTD
SIXTH RESPONDENTMARY ANN MARTINEK
SEVENTH RESPONDENTJUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 FEBRUARY 2006
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 29 August 2005 be dismissed.
2.The defendants (save for the sixth defendant, Rover Nominees Pty Ltd) and RAM Parts Australia Pty Ltd pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 3276 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
RICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 073 538 959) & PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (IN HIS CAPACITY AS LIQUIDATOR)
APPLICANTSAND:
ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT
FIRST RESPONDENTANN LANGDON
SECOND RESPONDENTMAXWELL ROGER LATIMER
THIRD RESPONDENTJOHN McDONALD
FOURTH RESPONDENTMICHAEL GUIFFRE
FIFTH RESPONDENTROVER NOMINEES PTY LTD
SIXTH RESPONDENTMARY ANN MARTINEK
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
8 FEBRUARY 2006
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an application by the defendants (save for Rover Nominees Pty Ltd) in this matter to set aside a warrant issued by this Court on 4 December 2003. When issued, this application sought other relief, which is no longer pursued. For the reasons that follow, the defendants’ application is dismissed with costs.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts that lead the Court to consider this application are as follows. Paul Burness (“Burness” or “the plaintiff”) was appointed liquidator of Richmond Sales Proprietary Limited (ACN 073 538 959) (“Richmond Sales” or “the Company”) on 19 February…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 52
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the warrant should be declared void ab initio or set aside without a full trial. The Court had to determine whether the warrant should be set aside based on the current evidence or if a trial was necessary to resolve the complex factual disputes between the parties. The Court noted that the defendants had not previously applied to set the warrant aside despite being informed of their right to do so, and that it would be unfair to determine disputed issues of fact without allowing Burness an opportunity to cross-examine the defendants.
The Court concluded that the case was too complex to determine the validity of the warrant without a full trial. The parties presented conflicting factual positions, and the Court could not ascertain who was correct without hearing the evidence. The Court also noted that the defendants had acted on the basis that they were entitled to a trial. Therefore, the application to set aside the warrant was dismissed with costs.
The Court ordered that the application filed on 29 August 2005 be dismissed and that the defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application filed on 29 August 2005 be dismissed.
2.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KENNY J
On 3 February 2006, the plaintiff filed further submissions, addressing, amongst other things, the relevant authorities and the position of RAM Parts in the litigation. CONSIDERATIONThe Validity of the Warrant Having regard to the parties’ submissions and the affidavits that have thus far been filed, it is plain enough that the Court could not determine whether the warrant should be declared void ab initio or otherwise set aside as the defendants desire without trial of the evidence. The case, particularly as alleged by the defendants, is complex. The parties have presented very different factual pictures. For example, the defendants claim that McDermott did not conceal any of the Company’s records. In contrast, Burness claims that McDermott actively concealed records. Moreover, Burness claims to have seized numerous Company documents pursuant to the warrant although the significance of this seizure is denied by the defendants. The parties also dispute whether Richmond Sales ceased to trade on 30 June 2002 and whether the impending move to the Footscray premises was for the purpose of concealing the property of Richmond Sales. Clearly, the Court cannot determine who is correct without full trial. It must be noted that, as things currently stand, only Burness has been subject to cross-examination in relation to the application of 24 March 2004, the hearing of which was adjourned in the circumstances already mentioned. Thus, it would be grossly unfair to determine disputed issues of fact without providing Burness with an opportunity to cross-examine the defendants. Moreover, in their filing of affidavits subsequent to 10 October 2005, the defendants have apparently acted on the basis that, contrary to the plaintiff’s submissions, they are entitled to such a trial. It is fair to say that, had the hearing in this matter continued, the credibility of the defendants, and McDermott and Latimer in particular, would have come under serious challenge. Without delving into all of the intricacies of this case, I provide two examples. In his affidavit filed in this Court on 18 May 2004, Latimer claimed to have purchased Vehicle 1 in 1999 for a very substantial sum of money. He attached a written contract of sale as an exhibit to his affidavit. However, in a letter dated 22 April 2002 which is exhibited to the affidavit of Burness filed 24 March 2004, Latimer informed the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”) that he had no records relating to any vehicles purchased by him after 1 July 1996. One might reasonably anticipate that counsel for Burness would have used this apparent inconsistency to challenge Latimer’s credibility and the authenticity of the written contract of sale. Similarly, the plaintiff might have challenged McDermott’s credibility with a letter he wrote to the State Revenue Office (“SRO”) on 8 April 2003, which is also exhibited to the affidavit of Burness filed 24 March 2004. In that letter, McDermott stated that vehicle RR909 (apparently Vehicle 1) had been registered by Richmond Sales for the purpose of selling it as a licensed motor car trader. However, in this letter, McDermott failed to inform the SRO that Richmond Sales was then in liquidation or that Latimer was the actual owner of the car. The latter fact would be relevant because, according to the plaintiff, a licensed motor car trader is not permitted to sell cars on a consignment basis.