FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
McDermott v Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2006] FCA 248
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to vary consent orders – O 35 r 7(2)(c), O 35 r 7(4) Federal Court Rules 1979 – whether orders interlocutory
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 530C
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 23Federal Court Rules 1979, O 35 r 7(2), O 35 r 7(2)(c), O 35 r 7(4)
Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (In Liq) v McDermott [2006] FCA 52 referred to
Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 referred to
Lindon v Stanton (Supreme Court of Western Australia (Adams M), 27 November 1992, BC9200887), referred to
Nicholson v Nicholson [1974] 2 NSWLR 59, referred to
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 referred to
SZGAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1785 referred to
Abigroup Limited v Abignano (1992) 39 FCR 74 referred to
Comcare v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60 referred to
Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (No 3) (2001) 106 IR 119 referred to
Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 253 referred to
Dudzinski v Centrelink [2003] FCA 308 referred to
Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543 referred toNeil J Williams, Civil Procedure
ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT, MAXWELL ROGER LATIMER, ANN HARRIETT LANGDON v RICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 073 538 959) AND PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (in his capacity as liquidator)
VID 177 OF 2006
KENNY J
17 MARCH 2006
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 177 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT, MAXWELL ROGER LATIMER, ANN HARRIET LANGDON
APPLICANTSAND:
RICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
(ACN 073 538 959) AND PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (in his capacity as liquidator)
RESPONDENTSJUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 MARCH 2006
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 177 OF 2006
BETWEEN:
ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT, MAXWELL ROGER LATIMER, ANN HARRIET LANGDON
APPLICANTSAND:
RICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
(ACN 073 538 959) AND PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (in his capacity as liquidator)
RESPONDENTS
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
17 MARCH 2006
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicants in this matter, Robert McDermott, Maxwell Latimer and Ann Langdon, were defendants in an earlier proceeding before me. That proceeding began as an ex-parte application, filed by Paul Burness as liquidator of Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (“Richmond Sales”), for a warrant under s 530C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The procedural history of that matter is outlined in reasons for judgment delivered on 8 February 2006: see Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (In Liq)…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 248
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court were whether the orders in question were final and, if so, whether the Court had the power to vary them under the Federal Court Rules 1979 or through its inherent jurisdiction. The applicants relied on various rules, including O 35 r 7(2) and O 35 r 7(4), and cited relevant case law to support their argument. The Court had to determine if the applicants' circumstances warranted the variation of the orders, considering the principle of finality in litigation.
The Court found that the orders in question were final, as they determined the rights of the parties with respect to the liquidator’s application to dispose of the vehicles. The Court held that even if the orders had reserved liberty to apply, they remained final. It also concluded that the Court had no power to vary the orders under O 35 r 7(2), O 35 r 7(4), or through its inherent jurisdiction. The Court further noted that even if the orders were interlocutory, the discretion to vary them should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances, which were not present in this case.
The Court dismissed the application, ruling that the orders were final and could not be varied. It ordered that the applicants pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
The respondents also submitted that the applicants should pay their party and party costs.consideration For the reasons I am about to state I would dismiss this application. First, the relevant orders were final and the Court has no power to vary them under O 35 r 7(2), O 35 r 7(4) or in the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. Secondly, even if the Court had discretion to vary the orders, there is simply no basis for doing so. An order is final if it “it finally determine[s] the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them”: Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 443 per Windeyer J; see also the discussion in SZGAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1785 at [32]-[34] per Lindgren J. There is no question that the orders of 10 October 2005 finally determined the rights of the parties with respect to the liquidator’s application to dispose of the vehicles. Moreover, it is settled law that orders may be final even though the Court reserves liberty to apply: see, e.g., Abigroup Limited v Abignano (1992) 39 FCR 74 at 87-88 per Lockhart, Morling and Gummow JJ; Comcare v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60 at 61-62 per Wilcox J; Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (No 3) (2001) 106 IR 119 at 122-125 per Nicholson J; and Nicholson v Nicholson [1974] 2 NSWLR 59 at 63 per Jenkyn J. These cases reveal that liberty to apply does not render a final order any less final: see further Neil J Williams, Civil Procedure at [I 59.01.20] and the cases cited therein. The orders in paragraphs 2 and 2A of the orders of 10 October 2005 were final orders with respect to the application of 24 March 2004. Thus, the Court has no power to vary these orders pursuant to O 35 r 7(2). Further, the Court has no power under O 35 r 7(4) to make the orders the applicant seeks. As a Full Court said in Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 253 at 264 per Lee, Hill and Cooper JJ, regarding O 35 r 7(4), “[c]ritical to the jurisdiction of the court is first that the application not be one in any way to vary or alter the initial order”. The applicants seek orders to vary the orders in paragraphs 2 and 2A of the 10 October 2006 orders; and O 35 r 7(4) does not give power to do this. In the face of Full Court authority, the earlier decision in Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 is either to be distinguished or is no longer good authority. Furthermore, there is nothing shown to attract the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in this case. Accordingly, the Court has no power to vary the orders and the application must be dismissed. I would reach the same result even if the relevant orders were interlocutory. It is well established that the discretion conferred by O 35 r 7(2) should be used only in exceptional circumstances: Dudzinski v Centrelink [2003] FCA 308 at [11] per Spender J. The principle of finality of litigation requires courts to exercise great caution when considering whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the variation of orders: see Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543 at 549-552 per von Doussa, Moore and Sackville JJ. In this case, the circumstances do not support varying the orders.