McDermott v Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (in liq)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McDermott v Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2006] FCA 248

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to vary consent orders – O 35 r 7(2)(c), O 35 r 7(4) Federal Court Rules 1979 – whether orders interlocutory

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 530C
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 23

Federal Court Rules 1979, O 35 r 7(2), O 35 r 7(2)(c), O 35 r 7(4)

Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (In Liq) v McDermott [2006] FCA 52 referred to
Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 referred to
Lindon v Stanton (Supreme Court of Western Australia (Adams M), 27 November 1992, BC9200887), referred to
Nicholson v Nicholson [1974] 2 NSWLR 59, referred to
Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 referred to
SZGAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1785 referred to
Abigroup Limited v Abignano (1992) 39 FCR 74 referred to
Comcare v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60 referred to
Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (No 3) (2001) 106 IR 119 referred to
Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 253 referred to
Dudzinski v Centrelink [2003] FCA 308 referred to
Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543 referred to

Neil J Williams, Civil Procedure

ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT, MAXWELL ROGER LATIMER, ANN HARRIETT LANGDON v RICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)  (ACN 073 538 959) AND PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (in his capacity as liquidator)

VID 177 OF 2006

KENNY J
17 MARCH 2006
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 177 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT, MAXWELL ROGER LATIMER, ANN HARRIET LANGDON
APPLICANTS

AND:

RICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
(ACN 073 538 959) AND PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (in his capacity as liquidator)
RESPONDENTS

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 177 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

ROBERT ARTHUR McDERMOTT, MAXWELL ROGER LATIMER, ANN HARRIET LANGDON
APPLICANTS

AND:

RICHMOND SALES PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
(ACN 073 538 959) AND PAUL ANDREW BURNESS (in his capacity as liquidator)
RESPONDENTS

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

17 MARCH 2006

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicants in this matter, Robert McDermott, Maxwell Latimer and Ann Langdon, were defendants in an earlier proceeding before me. That proceeding began as an ex-parte application, filed by Paul Burness as liquidator of Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (“Richmond Sales”), for a warrant under s 530C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The procedural history of that matter is outlined in reasons for judgment delivered on 8 February 2006: see Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (In Liq)…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 248
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants in the case of McDermott v Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (in liq) sought to have the Court vary certain orders made on 10 October 2005, specifically extending the time for the payment of $33,000. The case involves a dispute over the finality of certain court orders and the subsequent application for their variation. The applicants argued that the orders were interlocutory and that the Court had the power to vary them under various rules and inherent jurisdiction. The respondents, Richmond Sales Pty Ltd (in liq), contended that the orders were final and could not be varied.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the orders in question were final and, if so, whether the Court had the power to vary them under the Federal Court Rules 1979 or through its inherent jurisdiction. The applicants relied on various rules, including O 35 r 7(2) and O 35 r 7(4), and cited relevant case law to support their argument. The Court had to determine if the applicants' circumstances warranted the variation of the orders, considering the principle of finality in litigation.

The Court found that the orders in question were final, as they determined the rights of the parties with respect to the liquidator’s application to dispose of the vehicles. The Court held that even if the orders had reserved liberty to apply, they remained final. It also concluded that the Court had no power to vary the orders under O 35 r 7(2), O 35 r 7(4), or through its inherent jurisdiction. The Court further noted that even if the orders were interlocutory, the discretion to vary them should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances, which were not present in this case.

The Court dismissed the application, ruling that the orders were final and could not be varied. It ordered that the applicants pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 23 February 2006, the applicants filed this application, under s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), seeking that paragraphs 2 and 2A of the orders of 10 October 2005 be varied. The applicants ask the Court to extend the time for payment of the sum of $33,000.evidence and submissions The applicants relied on affidavits sworn by their solicitor Walter Edwards on 22 February 2006 and 15 March 2006. Edwards attached correspondence between the parties as exhibits to his first affidavit. Mr Edwards deposed that it was “contemplated by the parties (and by the Defendants [sic] solicitors in particular) that the application to set aside the Warrant would be determined by 31 January 2006 (being the date for payment of the settlement funds upon the Liquidators [sic] proceedings).” Edwards further deposed that, on 31 January 2006, he sent a fax to Burness’s solicitors stating that $33,000 had been paid into a trust account to enable the payment of the settlement amount. On 1 February 2006, Edwards sent another fax stating that the funds would be held in the trust account until the determination of the application to set aside the warrant. Amongst other things, this facsimile stated: “With regard to the payment of the $33,000 we advise that on counsel’s advice, we will be holding those funds in our trust account, pending the decision of her Honour Justice Kenny … we believe that your client is likely to owe our clients substantial costs which will exceed the amount already being held by us.” In response, Burness’s solicitors stated that, pursuant to the Court’s orders of 10 October 2006, the relevant vehicles were now the property of Richmond Sales. Edwards then wrote to Burness’s solicitors seeking an undertaking that the vehicles would not be sold until judgment was handed down on the application to set aside the warrant. Burness’s solicitors replied that, for practical reasons, the vehicles could not be sold within that time-frame. Edwards stated that, on 8 February 2006, after judgment was delivered on the application to set aside the warrant, he caused a trust account cheque for $33,000 to be delivered to Burness’s solicitors. Burness’s solicitor, Chris Charles, returned the cheque by mail with a cover letter stating that he had no instructions to accept the funds. In his second affidavit, Edwards deposed that:“Pursuant to the Court Orders made by consent on 10 October 2005 the Liquidator failed to deliver Vehicle 2316 to the person that I nominated (as specified in clause 1 of the Orders) until some two weeks after the making of the order.On 31 January 2006 I informed McDermott’s Workshop of my trust account details as he had indicated to me that he was providing by direct transfer of funds the amount of $33,000.00 being the sum required to payout the Liquidator pursuant to clause 2 of the 10 October 2005 orders. …Funds were shown as having been ‘cleared’ into my trust account on 1 February 2006.I informed the Applicants that I had received the funds into my trust account on 1 February 2006, however, the Applicants indicated to me that the funds were in fact deposited into my trust account on 31 January 2006.”Counsel for the applicants submitted that the Court has the power to vary the order under O 35 r 7(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 1979 which allows the Court to “vary or set aside a judgment or order after the order has been entered where . . . the order is interlocutory.” The applicants argued that the consent orders were interlocutory because they included an order reserving liberty to apply. Counsel for the applicants also relied on O 35 r 7(4) (and, in this connection, Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310) and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J (dissent)

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The respondents also submitted that the applicants should pay their party and party costs.consideration For the reasons I am about to state I would dismiss this application. First, the relevant orders were final and the Court has no power to vary them under O 35 r 7(2), O 35 r 7(4) or in the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. Secondly, even if the Court had discretion to vary the orders, there is simply no basis for doing so. An order is final if it “it finally determine[s] the rights of the parties in a principal cause pending between them”: Hall v Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423 at 443 per Windeyer J; see also the discussion in SZGAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1785 at [32]-[34] per Lindgren J. There is no question that the orders of 10 October 2005 finally determined the rights of the parties with respect to the liquidator’s application to dispose of the vehicles. Moreover, it is settled law that orders may be final even though the Court reserves liberty to apply: see, e.g., Abigroup Limited v Abignano (1992) 39 FCR 74 at 87-88 per Lockhart, Morling and Gummow JJ; Comcare v Grimes (1994) 50 FCR 60 at 61-62 per Wilcox J; Maritime Union of Australia v Geraldton Port Authority (No 3) (2001) 106 IR 119 at 122-125 per Nicholson J; and Nicholson v Nicholson [1974] 2 NSWLR 59 at 63 per Jenkyn J. These cases reveal that liberty to apply does not render a final order any less final: see further Neil J Williams, Civil Procedure at [I 59.01.20] and the cases cited therein. The orders in paragraphs 2 and 2A of the orders of 10 October 2005 were final orders with respect to the application of 24 March 2004. Thus, the Court has no power to vary these orders pursuant to O 35 r 7(2). Further, the Court has no power under O 35 r 7(4) to make the orders the applicant seeks. As a Full Court said in Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 117 ALR 253 at 264 per Lee, Hill and Cooper JJ, regarding O 35 r 7(4), “[c]ritical to the jurisdiction of the court is first that the application not be one in any way to vary or alter the initial order”. The applicants seek orders to vary the orders in paragraphs 2 and 2A of the 10 October 2006 orders; and O 35 r 7(4) does not give power to do this. In the face of Full Court authority, the earlier decision in Westsub Discounts Pty Ltd v Idaps Australia Ltd (No 2) (1990) 94 ALR 310 is either to be distinguished or is no longer good authority. Furthermore, there is nothing shown to attract the inherent jurisdiction of the Court in this case. Accordingly, the Court has no power to vary the orders and the application must be dismissed. I would reach the same result even if the relevant orders were interlocutory. It is well established that the discretion conferred by O 35 r 7(2) should be used only in exceptional circumstances: Dudzinski v Centrelink [2003] FCA 308 at [11] per Spender J. The principle of finality of litigation requires courts to exercise great caution when considering whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the variation of orders: see Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543 at 549-552 per von Doussa, Moore and Sackville JJ. In this case, the circumstances do not support varying the orders.