SZEWL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 38 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZEWL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

[2009] FCA 209

MIGRATION –– protection visa –– procedural fairness –– jurisdictional error –– tribunal powers –– inquisitorial nature of tribunal –– s 424A “information” –– witnesses in tribunals –– when applicant for review requests tribunal under s 426(2) to obtain oral evidence from a witness –– whether information of witnesses in support of applicant’s claim is the applicant’s information for s 424A(3)(b) –– when the tribunal obtains that evidence, the evidence is “information” and is not information given by the applicant for the purpose of the application for review in under s 424A(3)(b) –– held, appeal allowed

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 91R, 424A, 424AA, 425, 426

Applicant M164/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 16 considered
Applicant NAAF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1 cited
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1 followed
Minister for Immigration of Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 followed
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 discussed
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 applied
SZAYW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 230 CLR 486 applied
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 followed
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 discussed
SZECG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 733 approved
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214 cited
SZEWLv Minister for Immigration and anor [2008] FMCA 1495 reversed
SZIAT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 766 not followed
SZICU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 100 ALD 1 followed
VBAM of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCA 504 not followed

SZEWL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

NSD 1805 of 2008

RARES J
9 MARCH 2009
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1805 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZEWL
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MARCH 2009

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed with costs.

2.The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 3 November 2008 be set aside, and, in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:

(1)an order in nature of an order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent, signed on 5 May 2008, to affirm the decision of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa;

(2)an order in the nature of a…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZEWL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] FCA 209
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Szewl v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the court considered an appeal against the decisions of the tribunal and the Federal Magistrates Court concerning the applicant's application for a protection visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the tribunal had erred in its assessment of the genuineness of the applicant's relationship with Ms L, and whether the tribunal had failed to properly invite the applicant to provide evidence and arguments regarding specific issues.

The court analysed the submissions made by the appellant, who argued that the tribunal had not given him a fair opportunity to present evidence and arguments about his relationship with Ms L. The appellant claimed that Ms L had not informed him of her attempts to seek residence in Australia, and he was thus denied a chance to address this matter. However, the court found that the tribunal had clearly identified the issue of the genuineness of the relationship and had questioned the appellant extensively on this point. The tribunal's comments indicated that it was concerned about the future of the relationship, despite accepting some aspects of the appellant's claims.

The reasoning of the court was grounded in the evidence presented during the tribunal's hearing and the statutory provisions governing the tribunal's duties. The tribunal had accepted that there was some form of relationship evidenced by continuous contact and financial support but was unconvinced that the relationship was a spousal or de facto one due to the lack of commitment shown by the parties. The tribunal concluded that the appellant had not taken reasonable steps to reunite with Ms L and their child, which cast doubt on his commitment to the relationship.

The court ultimately allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court and directing the tribunal to hear and determine the application for review according to law. The court also ordered that the Minister pay the applicant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed with costs.

2. The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 3 November 2008 be set aside, and, in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:

(1) an order in nature of an order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent, signed on 5 May 2008, to affirm the decision of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa;

(2) an order in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to hear and determine the application for review according to law; and

(3) the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant argued, with some force, that there was an unfairness in asking an applicant for a protection visa why he or she has not followed to a third country the persons they claimed to love. However, s 36(2) of the Act does not preclude the tribunal from investigating this question for the purpose of satisfying itself as to whether Australia owes an applicant for review protection obligations. I reject this ground.GROUND 2: FAILURE TO INVITE THE APPELLANT TO GIVE EVIDENCE AND PRESENT ARGUMENTS RELATING TO TWO ISSUES ARISING IN RELATION TO THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW The appellant accepted that the real issue which the tribunal was investigating was the genuineness of his claimed relationship. But, he contended that the tribunal had to inform him of the two aspects complained of: namely the tribunal’s use of his lack of familiarity of the steps taken by Ms L to seek residence in Australia and its conclusion that his desire to remain here was stronger than his desire to live with Ms L and their daughter. Ms L had told the tribunal that she had not informed the appellant about the steps she had taken to seek residence because she believed he might get too excited about it and then get depressed if she failed. Thus, it was common ground that Ms L had not discussed with the appellant any attempt by her to return to Australia with a visa. The appellant argued that the tribunal denied him an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments in relation to this issue in accordance with s 425 of the Act. He noted that the tribunal had informed him at the end of the hearing that it did not need to hear oral evidence from the uncle, because it accepted everything in his statutory declaration. Subsequently, he noted that the tribunal wrote a letter to him under s 424A of the Act asking him to comment on country information in DFAT Report 803. It had received that report on 8 April 2008. The report related to persons who no longer practised their religion and were known to be in a de facto relationship in Bangladesh. The appellant argued that because of the tribunal’s comments on the uncle’s evidence and because it had referred to persons who were known to be in a de facto relationship, he was entitled to assume that there was no issue before the tribunal as to the genuineness and nature of his account of his relationship. I reject that submission. The transcript of the hearing before the fourth tribunal shows that it was obvious that there was an issue about the nature of his relationship with Ms L. The two sentences I have emphasised in the tribunal’s final remarks at the end of the hearing (see [13] above) highlighted a problem that had been apparent earlier in the tribunal’s questioning of the appellant. And, after it referred to accepting whatever was in the uncle’s declaration, the tribunal identified its concern as to what would happen in the future in terms of the appellant’s and Ms L’s relationship. Earlier, just before Ms L gave evidence, the tribunal had almost finished its questioning of the appellant, it said that it did not think there was anything more to ask him. The tribunal member said that she would speak to Ms L in a moment and then give the appellant an opportunity to say anything else. The member said that she did not know if she really needed to speak to his other witnesses. She stated that she accepted that he contacted Ms L and sent money to her, and continued.“As I said before, I need to determine whether that is sufficient for me to find that your partner will go with you to Bangladesh if you have to return to Bangladesh and that is probably something the witnesses cannot help me with” (emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

RARES J
The uncle said that he had returned to the Philippines to visit Ms L five times since she left Australia and had taken gifts from the appellant to Ms L and their daughter. The uncle deposed that he had had many conversations with Ms L to the effect that she wanted to join the appellant as soon as possible and for them and their daughter to live together as a family. He said that the appellant called him “uncle” and they had a very close relationship. The uncle said that they met regularly, usually every weekend and spoke also regularly on the telephone. The uncle deposed to a candid discussion with the appellant shortly after the daughter was born concerning his and Ms L’s religious differences and asking how the relationship would work. He said that the appellant told him that he had been born a Muslim but did not believe in Islam and did not follow it in any way. The uncle said that he knew the appellant and Ms L very well and that he knew the appellant loved Ms L and was fully committed to living a life together with her and their daughter. He also said that Ms L loved the appellant and wanted to join him as soon as she could. He noted that the daughter called the appellant “Papa”. A similar statutory declaration was made by the aunt.THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL The tribunal reasoned that the fact that the appellant had not been familiar with steps undertaken by Ms L to seek residence in Australia after her return to the Philippines indicated a lack of communication between him and her. The tribunal concluded that this fact suggested that the appellant’s desire to remain in Australia was stronger than his desire to live with Ms L and their child and brought into question his commitment to a familial or de facto relationship. The tribunal also observed that the appellant had not made enquiries about the requirements for Ms L and their child to obtain residence in Bangladesh. He had explained to the tribunal that they would be harmed if they went there and that she did not want to live in Bangladesh. However, the tribunal said that the appellant’s evidence and the parties’ past conduct in being separated for a significant time with little, if any effort to be reunited, suggested to it that the appellant and Ms L did not have a strong commitment to live together and that their separation since 2000 was not caused solely by immigration or visa limitations. The tribunal concluded that if the appellant were really in the relationship he claimed, he could reasonably have taken more steps to be reunited with Ms L and their child by travelling to the Philippines, making enquiries about that travel or taking steps for her and the child to travel to Australia. The tribunal found that the appellant had not appeared to have undertaken any of those steps and that while it accepted that there was “some form of relationship” between him, Ms L and the child “… as is evidenced by their continuous contact, financial support and opinions of third parties, the tribunal does not accept that the [appellant] and [Ms L] are in a spousal or de facto relationship or that they are in a familial relationship of a kind in which the parties are committed to living together as a family”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RARES J

After hearing evidence from the appellant and Ms L the tribunal asked the appellant whether there was anything else he wanted to say about any of the matters it had asked him about or anything else that he had not been asked about, to which he responded that he had nothing else to say. The appellant’s advisor, who was also counsel appearing for him before me, raised a point not presently relevant and then enquired whether the tribunal wanted to see the other witness who was waiting, namely Ms L’s uncle. Just before the conclusion of the hearing the tribunal member said:“I have his declaration and I do accept that there is communication with your partner. I do accept that you sent her money. I accept all that. As I said, that is probably the reason I don’t need to speak to him. I accept whatever is in the declaration. My concern really is what will happen in the future in terms of your relationship other than what has happened in terms of your contact with her. So I accept that. I will probably accept his evidence, so I don’t think I need to speak to him.” (emphasis added) The uncle said that he had returned to the Philippines to visit Ms L five times since she left Australia and had taken gifts from the appellant to Ms L and their daughter. The uncle deposed that he had had many conversations with Ms L to the effect that she wanted to join the appellant as soon as possible and for them and their daughter to live together as a family. He said that the appellant called him “uncle” and they had a very close relationship. The uncle said that they met regularly, usually every weekend and spoke also regularly on the telephone. The uncle deposed to a candid discussion with the appellant shortly after the daughter was born concerning his and Ms L’s religious differences and asking how the relationship would work. He said that the appellant told him that he had been born a Muslim but did not believe in Islam and did not follow it in any way. The uncle said that he knew the appellant and Ms L very well and that he knew the appellant loved Ms L and was fully committed to living a life together with her and their daughter. He also said that Ms L loved the appellant and wanted to join him as soon as she could. He noted that the daughter called the appellant “Papa”. A similar statutory declaration was made by the aunt.THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL The tribunal reasoned that the fact that the appellant had not been familiar with steps undertaken by Ms L to seek residence in Australia after her return to the Philippines indicated a lack of communication between him and her. The tribunal concluded that this fact suggested that the appellant’s desire to remain in Australia was stronger than his desire to live with Ms L and their child and brought into question his commitment to a familial or de facto relationship. The tribunal also observed that the appellant had not made enquiries about the requirements for Ms L and their child to obtain residence in Bangladesh. He had explained to the tribunal that they would be harmed if they went there and that she did not want to live in Bangladesh. However, the tribunal said that the appellant’s evidence and the parties’ past conduct in being separated for a significant time with little, if any effort to be reunited, suggested to it that the appellant and Ms L did not have a strong commitment to live together and that their separation since 2000 was not caused solely by immigration or visa limitations.