FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZEWL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2009] FCA 209
MIGRATION –– protection visa –– procedural fairness –– jurisdictional error –– tribunal powers –– inquisitorial nature of tribunal –– s 424A “information” –– witnesses in tribunals –– when applicant for review requests tribunal under s 426(2) to obtain oral evidence from a witness –– whether information of witnesses in support of applicant’s claim is the applicant’s information for s 424A(3)(b) –– when the tribunal obtains that evidence, the evidence is “information” and is not information given by the applicant for the purpose of the application for review in under s 424A(3)(b) –– held, appeal allowed
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 91R, 424A, 424AA, 425, 426
Applicant M164/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 16 considered
Applicant NAAF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1 cited
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1 followed
Minister for Immigration of Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 followed
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 discussed
Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141 applied
SZAYW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 230 CLR 486 applied
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 followed
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 discussed
SZECG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 733 approved
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214 cited
SZEWLv Minister for Immigration and anor [2008] FMCA 1495 reversed
SZIAT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 766 not followed
SZICU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 100 ALD 1 followed
VBAM of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCA 504 not followedSZEWL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
NSD 1805 of 2008
RARES J
9 MARCH 2009
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 1805 of 2008
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZEWL
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MARCH 2009
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed with costs.
2.The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 3 November 2008 be set aside, and, in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:
(1)an order in nature of an order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent, signed on 5 May 2008, to affirm the decision of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa;
(2)an order in the nature of a…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 209
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court analysed the submissions made by the appellant, who argued that the tribunal had not given him a fair opportunity to present evidence and arguments about his relationship with Ms L. The appellant claimed that Ms L had not informed him of her attempts to seek residence in Australia, and he was thus denied a chance to address this matter. However, the court found that the tribunal had clearly identified the issue of the genuineness of the relationship and had questioned the appellant extensively on this point. The tribunal's comments indicated that it was concerned about the future of the relationship, despite accepting some aspects of the appellant's claims.
The reasoning of the court was grounded in the evidence presented during the tribunal's hearing and the statutory provisions governing the tribunal's duties. The tribunal had accepted that there was some form of relationship evidenced by continuous contact and financial support but was unconvinced that the relationship was a spousal or de facto one due to the lack of commitment shown by the parties. The tribunal concluded that the appellant had not taken reasonable steps to reunite with Ms L and their child, which cast doubt on his commitment to the relationship.
The court ultimately allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court and directing the tribunal to hear and determine the application for review according to law. The court also ordered that the Minister pay the applicant's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed with costs.
2. The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 3 November 2008 be set aside, and, in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:
(1) an order in nature of an order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent, signed on 5 May 2008, to affirm the decision of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa;
(2) an order in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to hear and determine the application for review according to law; and
(3) the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: RARES J
After hearing evidence from the appellant and Ms L the tribunal asked the appellant whether there was anything else he wanted to say about any of the matters it had asked him about or anything else that he had not been asked about, to which he responded that he had nothing else to say. The appellant’s advisor, who was also counsel appearing for him before me, raised a point not presently relevant and then enquired whether the tribunal wanted to see the other witness who was waiting, namely Ms L’s uncle. Just before the conclusion of the hearing the tribunal member said:“I have his declaration and I do accept that there is communication with your partner. I do accept that you sent her money. I accept all that. As I said, that is probably the reason I don’t need to speak to him. I accept whatever is in the declaration. My concern really is what will happen in the future in terms of your relationship other than what has happened in terms of your contact with her. So I accept that. I will probably accept his evidence, so I don’t think I need to speak to him.” (emphasis added) The uncle said that he had returned to the Philippines to visit Ms L five times since she left Australia and had taken gifts from the appellant to Ms L and their daughter. The uncle deposed that he had had many conversations with Ms L to the effect that she wanted to join the appellant as soon as possible and for them and their daughter to live together as a family. He said that the appellant called him “uncle” and they had a very close relationship. The uncle said that they met regularly, usually every weekend and spoke also regularly on the telephone. The uncle deposed to a candid discussion with the appellant shortly after the daughter was born concerning his and Ms L’s religious differences and asking how the relationship would work. He said that the appellant told him that he had been born a Muslim but did not believe in Islam and did not follow it in any way. The uncle said that he knew the appellant and Ms L very well and that he knew the appellant loved Ms L and was fully committed to living a life together with her and their daughter. He also said that Ms L loved the appellant and wanted to join him as soon as she could. He noted that the daughter called the appellant “Papa”. A similar statutory declaration was made by the aunt.THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL The tribunal reasoned that the fact that the appellant had not been familiar with steps undertaken by Ms L to seek residence in Australia after her return to the Philippines indicated a lack of communication between him and her. The tribunal concluded that this fact suggested that the appellant’s desire to remain in Australia was stronger than his desire to live with Ms L and their child and brought into question his commitment to a familial or de facto relationship. The tribunal also observed that the appellant had not made enquiries about the requirements for Ms L and their child to obtain residence in Bangladesh. He had explained to the tribunal that they would be harmed if they went there and that she did not want to live in Bangladesh. However, the tribunal said that the appellant’s evidence and the parties’ past conduct in being separated for a significant time with little, if any effort to be reunited, suggested to it that the appellant and Ms L did not have a strong commitment to live together and that their separation since 2000 was not caused solely by immigration or visa limitations.