SZEHN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZEHN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1389


MIGRATION – protection visa – appeal from Federal Magistrates Court of Australia which dismissed appellant’s application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether Tribunal failed to have regard to a relevant consideration – Tribunal had invited appellant to comment on certain matters pursuant to s 424A of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – letter conveyed member’s concern as to whether the appellant, a Bangladeshi Muslim, had married a Hindu woman as he claimed, and whether mixed marriages in Bangladesh led to persecution as he claimed – appellant responded by supplying, relevantly, five letters, three from university academics, one from general secretary of a Bangladeshi association in Australia, and one from the editor of a Bengali newspaper in Australia – whether Tribunal had failed to have regard to the letters – failure to mention them or their contents specifically.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from Federal Magistrates Court of Australia which dismissed appellant’s application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – application for leave to raise new ground of appeal not reflected in grounds on which application had been made to Federal Magistrates Court for review of Tribunal decision – principles governing application for leave to raise new ground of appeal, where no associated application for leave to lead further evidence on the appeal.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 424A

H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 43 cited
VAAC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 168 cited
Gomez v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 190 ALR 543 cited
Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788 cited
Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 192 ALR 71 cited
VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 cited

Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 applied
Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 62 FCR 402 followed
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 followed

Paul v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 followed
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 followed
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 followed
Steed v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 37 ALR 620 cited
Karras v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 56 ALD 167 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 cited
MZWBW v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 94 cited
Thirukkumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 268 cited

SZEHN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL
& INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS & ANOR

NSD 557 OF 2005

LINDGREN J
28 SEPTEMBER 2005

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 1389
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Szehn v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, sought to appeal against a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, which had dismissed his application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The appellant's application for review was based on the contention that the Tribunal had failed to consider certain documents, referred to as "references," which he had submitted in support of his claim. The appellant further argued that the Tribunal denied him procedural fairness in relation to the references and that the Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction in making its decision on his claims.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had failed to consider relevant material and, if so, whether this constituted a denial of procedural fairness or a failure to exercise jurisdiction. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's failure to consider the "references" was a fundamental error that warranted the appeal being allowed. The court also had to consider whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and whether it was open to the Tribunal to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the appellant had not provided adequate submissions to support his grounds of appeal.

The court found that the appellant's primary ground of appeal, that the Tribunal failed to consider the "references," was not well founded. The court noted that while the Tribunal did not specifically refer to the "references," it had considered the broader issues they sought to address, such as the recognition of interfaith marriages in Bangladesh. The court also noted that the appellant had not provided any submissions to support his grounds of appeal, and that the Minister had provided submissions addressing the issues. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and that there was no error that warranted the appeal being allowed. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs.

In summary, the court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its consideration of the appellant's claims and that the appeal was without merit. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to file amended notice of appeal.

2. The appeal be dismissed

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant appeals from a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (‘FMCA’) given on 22 March 2005. The FMCA dismissed an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) made on 14 July 2004 and handed down on 4 August 2004, by which the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister (respectively, ‘the Delegate’ and ‘the Minister’) not to grant a protection visa to the appellant.BACKGROUND FACTS The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He arrived in Australia on 9 March 1996. On 1 April 1996 he applied for a Protection Visa (866). On 13 May 1997 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant him the visa. The appellant applied for relief by way of constitutional writs to the High Court of Australia, and on 3 May 2001, that Court made orders remitting the matter to the Delegate for a decision to be made in accordance with law. On 1 October 2002 the Delegate refused to grant the visa to the appellant, and on 14 October 2002 the appellant lodged an application for review of the Delegate’s decision by the Tribunal. The Tribunal conducted a hearing on 28 January 2004. On 18 March 2004, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant inviting him to comment on certain matters. On 16 June 2004, the appellant, through his immigration consultants, replied at length and forwarded with his reply certain documents. The Tribunal’s letter and the appellant’s reply have assumed importance in the present appeal. The appellant complains that the Tribunal failed to have regard to five ‘references’ which were enclosed with his reply.LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL The appellant filed his notice of appeal on 11 April 2005 setting out four grounds of appeal. The hearing of the appeal was fixed for Friday 8 July 2005. The appellant did not comply with a direction to file and serve written submissions five days prior to that date. The Minister filed and served written submissions on 6 July 2005. In the absence of written submissions from the appellant, the Minister’s submissions could address only the grounds stated in the notice of appeal. However, the appellant came to be represented on the hearing before me by counsel who prepared an amended notice of appeal and submissions in support. I wish to express my appreciation of Ms Avenell’s assistance to the Court in both her written and oral submissions. Counsel for the Minister opposed the filing of the amended notice of appeal. Against the possibility that leave to file it should be granted, counsel for the Minister prepared supplementary written submissions in support of a refusal of leave to file the amended notice of appeal and addressing the grounds of appeal advanced in it. Those proposed grounds were as follows:‘Ground 1:The Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”) failed to have regard to relevant material, being references supporting the appellant’s claim to have married a Hindu woman and as to the consequences of such a marriage in Bangladesh (“the references”).Ground 2:The Tribunal denied the appellant procedural fairness in relation to the references.Ground 3:The Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction in making its decision on the appellant’s claims.’Ground 2 was not pressed. Ground 3 depends on Ground 1. Accordingly, in substance Ground 1 is the only ground of appeal. Ground 1 is narrower than the grounds which had been set out in the original notice of appeal. Counsel for the appellant did not make any submissions in support of those grounds.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN J
One further matter should be mentioned. The third letter, that of Dr Das, states: ‘The legal status of a marriage between a Muslim and a Hindu is void under the Muslim law currently in operation in Bangladesh ...’. Notwithstanding the words, ‘currently in operation in Bangladesh’, this statement appears to refer to religious, not secular law, and to say no more than DFAT had said: ‘... unless the non-Muslim converts to Islam, the marriage will not be recognised under Shariah law’. The Tribunal’s letter of 18 March 2004 was inviting comments on, relevantly, the proposition that marriages between people from different religions are specifically recognised under the Special Marriage Act, are celebrated by a marriage registrar or a magistrate without hesitation, and are registered locally. Dr Das’s letter did not address these matters.CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN J

Dr Das begins his letter by explaining the context in which he writes it:‘I am giving this legal opinion based on my experiences as an Advocate in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and also as a Lecturer in law in the University of Dhaka and in the University of Chittagong, Bangladesh. My comments about the social stand about [sic – social standing of] a marriage between a Muslim and a Hindu are based on my empirical observation of the society as well as on my works with human rights NGOs.’Dr Das then goes on to state:‘The legal status of a marriage between a Muslim and a Hindu is void under the Muslim law currently in operation in Bangladesh and the children out of such a void marriage are also illegitimate.’ (my emphasis)After comments about the recent political situation in Bangladesh, Dr Das then states:‘In this background of the society, in case of a marriage between a Muslim and a Hindu in Bangladesh, it has become an unavoidable option for the Hindu to convert into Islam, not only to validate the marriage thereby but also to avoid heinous attack by the Islamic fundamentalists in the society. If the spouse of a Muslim is not converted to Islam, that is, they observe their respective religion, the couple is not only ostracized but has to live under constant threat on their lives and property by the Muslim fundamentalists around the society.’ At the foot of his letter, Dr Das includes the following disclaimer:‘Disclaimer: The letter only clarifies the legal status of a marriage between a Muslim and a Hindu in Bangladesh and how the society generally reacts to such a marriage. This letter does not vindicate of corroborate any particular individual’s claim or allegation regarding his/her marriage. Further, this opinion is not given in my official capacity as an associate lecturer in the University of Western Sydney.’ (my emphasis)Letter 4: Mr Pranesh Das, General Secretary of the Bangladesh Puja Association Australia Inc Mr Das gives an account of the recent history of Bangladesh, and in relation to the appellant’s alleged marriage states:‘Quite naturally, [the appellant] was targeted by those evil forces as he holds progressive views, and to make it worse, had married a Hindu woman. According to the fundamentalists, he had committed one of the executable sins. Like hundreds of thousands of other Bangladeshis, he and his wife had no other option but to flee from Bangladesh merely to save their lives.’Later in the letter, Mr Das states:‘Due to his marriage with a Hindu woman and his liberal and progressive views, I have no doubt, [the appellant] will be inevitably risking his life if he goes back to Bangladesh.’Letter 5: Mr P S Chunnu, Editor, The Sonar Bangla Mr Chunnu states:‘I know [the appellant] son of [name omitted] an assassinated freedom fighter and renowned activist of his locality, since 1990. I know that [the appellant] involved with progressive journalism and cultural activities for a considerable period of time. [The appellant] is a citizen of Bangladesh and force to leave his country to save his life. I also know that [the appellant] being a Muslim married to a Hindu girl, who didn’t converted herself to Muslim religion. Marrying a non Muslim is not unusual in Bangladesh but failing to convert the respective spouse to Muslim religion attracts huge criticism and personal risk from various social groups some of them are extremely fanatic and hostile to progressive journalist and cultural activist like [the appellant].’ (my emphasis)CONSIDERATION