FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1270
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1270
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in finding that the Tribunal properly conducted its review of the delegate’s decision. The court found that the Tribunal did not consider all of the relevant matters that it was bound to consider when reviewing the delegate's decision. Specifically, the Tribunal failed to take into account the social aspects of Ms Sun's relationship with her husband, which included the opinion of friends and acquaintances about the nature of their relationship. The court emphasised that the Tribunal was required to give "proper, genuine and realistic" consideration to all relevant matters, and that each case must be evaluated according to its own particular circumstances. The court also noted that the importance of a particular matter will affect the nature and extent of the consideration it attracts, and that a matter of fundamental importance will require closer consideration.
The court further found that the Tribunal’s failure to consider all relevant matters constituted a jurisdictional error, and thus the Tribunal's decision should be quashed. The court set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court and issued a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision. It also issued a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to rehear and determine Ms Sun's application for review according to law. The court also ordered the Minister to pay Ms Sun's costs of the application and the appeal.
In summary, the court found that the Tribunal did not properly consider all relevant matters in reviewing the delegate's decision, leading to a jurisdictional error. The court quashed the Tribunal's decision, directed the Tribunal to rehear Ms Sun's application, and ordered the Minister to pay costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 17 November 2016 be set aside and substituted with orders that:
(a) a writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 21 April 2016 (case no 1411375);
(b) a writ of mandamus issue directing the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to rehear and determine the applicant’s application for review according to law; and
(c) the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There was no dispute in this appeal that the non-exhaustive list of matters that are set out in the provisions I have referred to above are relevant considerations in the sense that they were matters that the Tribunal was bound to consider when it was reviewing the delegate’s decision.The principles on a decision-maker’s obligations with respect to relevant considerations There is also general agreement, although with different emphasis, about the following principles relating to a decision-maker’s obligations with respect to relevant considerations and any review that is conducted to ascertain whether a decision-maker has complied with those obligations. As illuminated by Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39, the necessity to consider, or have regard to, such considerations requires a decision-maker to give “proper, genuine and realistic” consideration to them (see Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291 at 29 per Gummow J; Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1; [2009] FCAFC 140 at [47]–[54] per Lindgren, Rares and Foster JJ and Reece v Webber (2011) 192 FCR 254; [2011] FCAFC 33 (Reece) at [68] per Jacobson, Flick and Reeves JJ). However, when a court is reviewing a decision to ascertain whether the decision-maker has complied with this obligation, it is necessary to ensure that impermissible merits review does not ensue (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164; [2010] HCA 48 at [30]–[36] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ and Reece at [69]). Furthermore, the importance of a particular matter will affect the nature and extent of the consideration which it attracts. Thus, a matter of fundamental importance to the decision-making process will require closer consideration than one of lesser importance (see Khadgi at [60]–[62] and Reece at [70]). In Khadgi, the Full Court said, with respect to a list of 10 criteria that the Minister was required to have regard to under s 109 of the Act in that matter , that (at [62]):… It is hard to see why a decision-maker should be required to treat each and every one of them as fundamental for the purposes of s 109. Although the Minister must have regard to each and every one of the prescribed circumstances, not all of them will be central or fundamental to every case in which the Minister is called upon to make a decision under s 109(1) of the Act. Additionally, when a court is conducting such a review, it is important to bear in mind that the question whether the decision-maker has complied with his or her obligation in this regard is a question of “fact” and “degree” (see Khadgi at [71] and Reece at [67] respectively) and each case must be “evaluated according to its own particular circumstances” (see Khadgi at [70]). Finally, it is well-established that any review of a decision-maker’s reasons for a decision should not to be undertaken “with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error” (see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). The obligations under s 368 and the inferences that may be drawn