Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1270

Appeal from: Sun v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2952
File number: QUD 922 of 2016
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 27 October 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations – whether Tribunal erred in failing to identify “all of the circumstances” of appellant’s relationship under reg 1.15A(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – consideration of Tribunal’s obligations under s 368 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether an inference can be drawn that the Tribunal did not have regard to certain matters

Held:  appeal allowed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Cameron v Board of Trustees of the State Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (2003) 130 FCR 122; [2003] FCAFC 214

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389; [2003] HCA 26

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136; [2001] FCA 1802

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291

Klychev v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1356

Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1; [2009] FCAFC 140

Li v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 102 ALD 354; [2008] FCA 902

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431; [2013] FCAFC 114

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi (2010) 190 FCR 248; [2010] FCAFC 145

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164; [2010] HCA 48

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 1; [2014] FCAFC 38

Pokharel v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 34

Reece v Webber (2011) 192 FCR 254; [2011] FCAFC 33

Sun v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2952

SZDXZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 109

Undershaft No 1 v The Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 175 FCR 150; [2009] FCA 41

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593; [2003] FCAFC 184

Zhang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 30

Date of hearing: 10 and 11 May 2017
Date of last submissions: 21 July 2017
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1270
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court is an appeal brought by Ms Sun against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which itself was reviewing a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). Ms Sun, a Chinese citizen, sought to appeal the Tribunal's decision to dismiss her review of a decision of the Minister's delegate to refuse her application for a Partner (Temporary) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court was required to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in finding that the Tribunal had properly conducted its review of the delegate’s decision and whether the Tribunal had failed to take into account relevant considerations under reg 1.15A(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). This involved considering the Tribunal’s obligations under s 368 of the Act and whether it was permissible to draw an inference that the Tribunal did not have regard to certain matters.

The court held that the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in finding that the Tribunal properly conducted its review of the delegate’s decision. The court found that the Tribunal did not consider all of the relevant matters that it was bound to consider when reviewing the delegate's decision. Specifically, the Tribunal failed to take into account the social aspects of Ms Sun's relationship with her husband, which included the opinion of friends and acquaintances about the nature of their relationship. The court emphasised that the Tribunal was required to give "proper, genuine and realistic" consideration to all relevant matters, and that each case must be evaluated according to its own particular circumstances. The court also noted that the importance of a particular matter will affect the nature and extent of the consideration it attracts, and that a matter of fundamental importance will require closer consideration.

The court further found that the Tribunal’s failure to consider all relevant matters constituted a jurisdictional error, and thus the Tribunal's decision should be quashed. The court set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court and issued a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision. It also issued a writ of mandamus directing the Tribunal to rehear and determine Ms Sun's application for review according to law. The court also ordered the Minister to pay Ms Sun's costs of the application and the appeal.

In summary, the court found that the Tribunal did not properly consider all relevant matters in reviewing the delegate's decision, leading to a jurisdictional error. The court quashed the Tribunal's decision, directed the Tribunal to rehear Ms Sun's application, and ordered the Minister to pay costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 17 November 2016 be set aside and substituted with orders that:

(a) a writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 21 April 2016 (case no 1411375);

(b) a writ of mandamus issue directing the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to rehear and determine the applicant’s application for review according to law; and

(c) the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia: [2016] FCCA 2952 (Sun). The central question it raises is whether the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in determining that the Migration Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), properly conducted its review of a decision of the delegate of the Minister to refuse to grant a partner visa to Ms Sun, the appellant.THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND Ms Sun is a citizen of China. She was born in 1954 and came to Australia in 2013 “to spend time with her daughter and grandchild”. Her first husband had died 10 years earlier and, by that time, all of her children were adults. She first met her present husband in Australia in late November 2013. He is an Australian citizen. By January 2014, they claimed to have formed a “committed relationship”. They married on 12 March 2014. On 26 March 2014, Ms Sun applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.THE RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS At the time Ms Sun made her application, Class UK contained only one subclass: Subclass 820 (Partner (Temporary)). The criteria for the grant of that class of visa were set out in Part 820 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). Clause 820.211(2)(a) of the Regulations relevantly required that, at the time the visa application was made and at the time of the delegate’s decision with respect to it, Ms Sun had to be the “spouse” of her sponsor/husband and he had to be an Australian citizen. I interpose that, at the hearing of Ms Sun’s appeal, it was common ground that these criteria had to be met as at the time of the Tribunal’s decision. The expression “spouse” is defined in s 5F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) as follows:(1)For the purposes of this Act, a person is the spouse of another person if, under subsection (2), the 2 persons are in a married relationship.(2)For the purposes of subsection (1), persons are in a married relationship if:(a)they are married to each other under a marriage that is valid for the purposes of this Act; and(b)they have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others; and(c)the relationship between them is genuine and continuing; and(d)they:(i)live together; or(ii)do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.(3)The regulations may make provision in relation to the determination of whether one or more of the conditions in paragraphs (2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) exist. The regulations may make different provision in relation to the determination for different purposes whether one or more of those conditions exist. As provided for by s 5F(3) above, certain provisions of the Regulations affected Ms Sun’s application. Relevantly, they were reg 1.15A(2) and (3) as follows:(2)If the Minister is considering an application for:…(d) a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa;the Minister must consider all of the circumstances of the relationship, including the matters set out in subregulation (3).(3) The matters for subregulation (2) are:(a)the financial aspects of the relationship, including:(i)any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets; and(ii)any joint liabilities; and(iii)the extent of any pooling of financial resources, especially in relation to major financial commitments; and(iv)whether one person in the relationship owes any legal obligation in respect of the other; and(v)the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses; and(b) the nature of the household, including:(i)any joint responsibility for the care and support of children; and(ii)the living arrangements of the persons; and(iii)any sharing of the responsibility for housework; and(c)the social aspects of the relationship, including:(i)whether the persons represent themselves to other people as being married to each other; and(ii)the opinion of the persons’ friends and acquaintances about the nature of the relationship; and(iii)any basis on which the persons plan and undertake joint social activities; and(d) the nature of the persons’ commitment to each other, including:(i)the duration of the relationship; and(ii)the length of time during which the persons have lived together; and(iii)the degree of companionship and emotional support that the persons draw from each other; and(iv)whether the persons see the relationship as a long-term one.THE PROCEDURAL HISTORYThe delegate’s decision

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In June 2014, a delegate of the Minister examined the evidence Ms Sun had provided with respect to the matters set out above and decided: “As you do not meet the definition of spouse under section 5F of the Migration Act I am therefore not satisfied that you meet subclause 820.211(2)(a) of the Migration Regulations. I therefore refuse your application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.”The Tribunal’s decision Soon after the delegate’s decision, Ms Sun applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. On 14 April 2016, she appeared before the Tribunal and gave evidence and her representative made submissions on her behalf. By that time, Ms Sun had separated from her husband/sponsor and had obtained a protection order against him. This obviously affected Ms Sun’s capacity to comply with the requirement that their relationship was “continuing” (see s 5F(2)(c) at [4] above). However, she was able to rely upon reg 820.221 and, in particular, reg 820.221(1). It provided that:In the case of an applicant referred to in subclause 820.211(2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) or (9), the applicant either:(a) continues to meet the requirements of the applicable subclause; or(b) meets the requirements of subclause (2) or (3). Because Ms Sun’s application fell within the terms of subclause 820.211(2), she was able to rely upon reg 820.221(1)(b) above and, in turn, reg 820.221(3). In particular, she sought to rely upon reg 820.221(3)(b)(i)(A), which was in the following form:An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a)the applicant would continue to meet the requirements of subclause 820.211(2), (5) or (6) except that the relationship between the applicant and the sponsoring partner has ceased; and(b) either or both of the following circumstances applies:(i) either or both of the following:(A) the applicant;…has suffered family violence committed by the sponsoring partner; The circumstances in which an applicant “has suffered family violence” was dealt with in Division 1.5 (regs 1.21 to 1.30, inclusive) of the Regulations. Of particular relevance to Ms Sun’s application were subregs 1.23(4) and (5) as follows:(4)The alleged victim is taken to have suffered family violence, and the alleged perpetrator is taken to have committed family violence, if:(a)a court has made an order under a law of a State or Territory against the alleged perpetrator for the protection of the alleged victim from violence; and(b)the order was made after the court had given the alleged perpetrator an opportunity to be heard, or otherwise to make submissions to the court, in relation to the matter.(5)For subregulation (4), the violence, or part of the violence, that led to the granting of the order must have occurred while the married relationship or de facto relationship existed between the alleged perpetrator and the spouse or de facto partner of the alleged perpetrator. Against this background, the Tribunal began its reasons for decision by describing the nature of Ms Sun’s application (at [1]–[3]) and then identifying the relevant law (at [4]–[8]). In the course of the latter, the Tribunal specifically referred to s 5F of the Act and the matters set out in subsections (2)(a) to (2)(d) (see at [4] above). It then stated (at [6]):In forming an opinion as to these matters, regard must be had to all of the circumstances of the relationship. This includes evidence of the financial and social aspects and the nature of the parties’ household and their commitment to each other as set out in r.1.15A(3).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

There was no dispute in this appeal that the non-exhaustive list of matters that are set out in the provisions I have referred to above are relevant considerations in the sense that they were matters that the Tribunal was bound to consider when it was reviewing the delegate’s decision.The principles on a decision-maker’s obligations with respect to relevant considerations There is also general agreement, although with different emphasis, about the following principles relating to a decision-maker’s obligations with respect to relevant considerations and any review that is conducted to ascertain whether a decision-maker has complied with those obligations. As illuminated by Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39, the necessity to consider, or have regard to, such considerations requires a decision-maker to give “proper, genuine and realistic” consideration to them (see Khan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1987) 14 ALD 291 at 29 per Gummow J; Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1; [2009] FCAFC 140 at [47]–[54] per Lindgren, Rares and Foster JJ and Reece v Webber (2011) 192 FCR 254; [2011] FCAFC 33 (Reece) at [68] per Jacobson, Flick and Reeves JJ). However, when a court is reviewing a decision to ascertain whether the decision-maker has complied with this obligation, it is necessary to ensure that impermissible merits review does not ensue (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164; [2010] HCA 48 at [30]–[36] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ and Reece at [69]). Furthermore, the importance of a particular matter will affect the nature and extent of the consideration which it attracts. Thus, a matter of fundamental importance to the decision-making process will require closer consideration than one of lesser importance (see Khadgi at [60]–[62] and Reece at [70]). In Khadgi, the Full Court said, with respect to a list of 10 criteria that the Minister was required to have regard to under s 109 of the Act in that matter , that (at [62]):… It is hard to see why a decision-maker should be required to treat each and every one of them as fundamental for the purposes of s 109. Although the Minister must have regard to each and every one of the prescribed circumstances, not all of them will be central or fundamental to every case in which the Minister is called upon to make a decision under s 109(1) of the Act. Additionally, when a court is conducting such a review, it is important to bear in mind that the question whether the decision-maker has complied with his or her obligation in this regard is a question of “fact” and “degree” (see Khadgi at [71] and Reece at [67] respectively) and each case must be “evaluated according to its own particular circumstances” (see Khadgi at [70]). Finally, it is well-established that any review of a decision-maker’s reasons for a decision should not to be undertaken “with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error” (see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). The obligations under s 368 and the inferences that may be drawn