SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Stone v Guli; Stone v Smith; Stone v Mount Isa Mines Limited & Anor [2020] QCA 288
PARTIES:
In Appeal No 6621 of 2020:
MARK DOUGLAS STONE
(appellant)
v
NATHAN LEIGH GULI
(respondent)In Appeal No 6622 of 2020:
MARK DOUGLAS STONE
(appellant)
v
ASHLEY ROBIN SMITH
(respondent)In Appeal No 6623 of 2020:
MARK DOUGLAS STONE
(appellant)
v
MOUNT ISA MINES LIMITED
ACN 009 661 447
(first respondent)
MICHAEL WESTERMAN
(second respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6621 of 2020
Appeal No 6622 of 2020
Appeal No 6623 of 2020
ICQ No C/2019/19
ICQ No C/2019/20
ICQ No C/2019/21DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeals
ORIGINATING COURT:
Industrial Court at Brisbane – [2020] ICQ 6 (Martin J)DELIVERED ON:
15 December 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
11 November 2020
JUDGES:
McMurdo and Mullins JJA and Davis J
ORDER:
Appeals dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – OFFENCES – OTHER PARTICULAR CASES – where the appellant, who was the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources and Mines, swore complaints against each of the respondents alleging breaches of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) (MQSHA) – where the complaints were purportedly made pursuant to a delegation to the appellant from the Director General (the chief executive) of the department – where each of the respondents filed an application in the Industrial Magistrates Court and subsequently the Industrial Court seeking an order that the complaints be struck out for want of jurisdiction – whether the appellant had power to take proceedings against the respondents – whether the specific power of authorisation in the MQSHA impliedly limited the power of delegation so the power in the chief executive could not be delegated – whether the power of the chief executive is a power capable of delegation
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 4, s 27A, s 42
Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld), s 73C
Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 554, s 556, s 569
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 42, s 53
Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld), s 234, s 257Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41, cited
Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1; [1932] HCA 9, considered
Attorney General (NSW) v Built NSW Pty Ltd (2013) 239 IR 102; [2013] NSWCCA 299, cited
Cross Country Realty Pty Ltd v Peebles [2007] 2 Qd R 254; [2006] QCA 501, considered
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503; [2012] HCA 55, cited
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99; [2005] HCA 7, considered
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; [1990] HCA 59, considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1998) 84 FCR 400; [1998] FCA 831
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- Case
- [2020] QCA 288
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Industrial Court found that the power to take proceedings was not a power conferred by the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act but rather by the common law and/or by section 42 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. The court held that section 257 of the Act, which identifies the powers that could be delegated by the minister or chief executive as “powers under [the Act]”, did not encompass the power to prosecute. Furthermore, the court determined that the specific power of authorisation in section 234 of the Act, which prescribed the mode and conditions for taking criminal proceedings, impliedly limited the power of delegation in section 257. This reasoning was consistent with the principles articulated in Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia, where it was held that when the legislature explicitly provides a power, it excludes the operation of general expressions that might otherwise be relied upon.
In light of these findings, the Industrial Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision to strike out the complaints for want of jurisdiction. The court concluded that Mr Stone did not have the authority to take the proceedings against the respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeals dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Industrial Court considered two key arguments from the respondents, both of which were accepted. Firstly, the court held that the power to take proceedings was not a power "under" the MQSHA, meaning it was not conferred by the MQSHA but by the common law or s 42 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. The court interpreted "under" to mean "conferred by" and found that s 234 of the MQSHA did not confer any power but restricted the class of persons who could exercise the common law power. Therefore, the power to prosecute was not a power "under" the MQSHA.
Secondly, the Industrial Court applied the principles from Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia, holding that when the legislature explicitly gives a power by a particular provision, it excludes the operation of general expressions in the same instrument. The court found that s 234's specific power of authorisation for taking criminal proceedings impliedly limited the general power of delegation in s 257. Thus, the power in the chief executive could not be delegated for taking criminal proceedings.
The court further reasoned that the power of the chief executive to take criminal proceedings was not a power capable of delegation, aligning with the findings that the power was not conferred by the MQSHA and was specifically restricted by s 234. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that specific statutory provisions can limit the extent of delegation of powers, particularly when those provisions explicitly outline the conditions and restrictions for exercising such powers.