Stone v Guli; Stone v Smith; Stone v Mount Isa Mines Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Stone v Guli; Stone v Smith; Stone v Mount Isa Mines Limited & Anor [2020] QCA 288

PARTIES:

In Appeal No 6621 of 2020:

MARK DOUGLAS STONE
(appellant)
v
NATHAN LEIGH GULI
(respondent)

In Appeal No 6622 of 2020:

MARK DOUGLAS STONE
(appellant)
v
ASHLEY ROBIN SMITH
(respondent)

In Appeal No 6623 of 2020:

MARK DOUGLAS STONE
(appellant)
v
MOUNT ISA MINES LIMITED
ACN 009 661 447
(first respondent)
MICHAEL WESTERMAN

(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 6621 of 2020
Appeal No 6622 of 2020
Appeal No 6623 of 2020
ICQ No C/2019/19
ICQ No C/2019/20
ICQ No C/2019/21

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeals

ORIGINATING COURT:


Industrial Court at Brisbane – [2020] ICQ 6 (Martin J)

DELIVERED ON:

15 December 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 November 2020

JUDGES:

McMurdo and Mullins JJA and Davis J

ORDER:

Appeals dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – QUEENSLAND – OFFENCES – OTHER PARTICULAR CASES – where the appellant, who was the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources and Mines, swore complaints against each of the respondents alleging breaches of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) (MQSHA) – where the complaints were purportedly made pursuant to a delegation to the appellant from the Director General (the chief executive) of the department – where each of the respondents filed an application in the Industrial Magistrates Court and subsequently the Industrial Court seeking an order that the complaints be struck out for want of jurisdiction – whether the appellant had power to take proceedings against the respondents – whether the specific power of authorisation in the MQSHA impliedly limited the power of delegation so the power in the chief executive could not be delegated – whether the power of the chief executive is a power capable of delegation

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 4, s 27A, s 42
Coal Mining Safety and Health Act
1999 (Qld), s 73C
Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), s 554, s 556, s 569
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 42, s 53
Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act
1999 (Qld), s 234, s 257

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41, cited
Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia (1932) 47 CLR 1; [1932] HCA 9, considered
Attorney General (NSW) v Built NSW Pty Ltd (2013) 239 IR 102; [2013] NSWCCA 299, cited
Cross Country Realty Pty Ltd v Peebles [2007] 2 Qd R 254; [2006] QCA 501, considered
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503; [2012] HCA 55, cited
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99; [2005] HCA 7, considered
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534; [1990] HCA 59, considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1998) 84 FCR 400; [1998] FCA 831

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Details
Case
[2020] QCA 288
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Stone v Guli; Stone v Smith; Stone v Mount Isa Mines Limited, the appellant, Mr Stone, who was the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources and Mines, had sworn complaints against the respondents alleging breaches of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld). The respondents, Mount Isa Mines Limited, Nathan Leigh Guli, and Ashley Robin Smith, filed an application in the Industrial Court seeking an order that the complaints be struck out for want of jurisdiction. The central issue was whether Mr Stone had the authority to take proceedings against the respondents. This hinged on whether the power of delegation in the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act implicitly limited the chief executive's power such that it could not be delegated, and whether the power of the chief executive was inherently delegable.

The Industrial Court found that the power to take proceedings was not a power conferred by the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act but rather by the common law and/or by section 42 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. The court held that section 257 of the Act, which identifies the powers that could be delegated by the minister or chief executive as “powers under [the Act]”, did not encompass the power to prosecute. Furthermore, the court determined that the specific power of authorisation in section 234 of the Act, which prescribed the mode and conditions for taking criminal proceedings, impliedly limited the power of delegation in section 257. This reasoning was consistent with the principles articulated in Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia, where it was held that when the legislature explicitly provides a power, it excludes the operation of general expressions that might otherwise be relied upon.

In light of these findings, the Industrial Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision to strike out the complaints for want of jurisdiction. The court concluded that Mr Stone did not have the authority to take the proceedings against the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeals dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

It was unsuccessfully contended by the respondents before an Industrial Magistrate that the appellant had no authority to commence the criminal proceedings and so the Industrial Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction to hear the complaints.[2] On appeal to the Industrial Court of Queensland, the respondents’ arguments were accepted and the complaints were struck out for want of jurisdiction.[3] The appellant appeals from that decision and seeks to reinstate the orders of the Industrial Magistrates Court.[2]Stone v Mount Isa Mines Limited, Westerman, Guli and Smith, unreported, Industrial Magistrates Court at Brisbane, 1 July 2019.[3]Smith v Stone; Guli v Stone; Mount Isa Mines Limited v Stone [2020] ICQ 6.Background At the material time, the appellant, Mr Stone, was the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources and Mines (the department) and James Purtill was the Director General which is also the position of chief executive. On 29 August 2017, Mr Purtill delegated powers to the appellant. The delegation was in writing, relevantly as follows:“DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND MINESMining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017MINING AND QUARRYING SAFETY AND HEALTH DELEGATION (NO 1) 2017Power to Delegate1.Under section 257(1) of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act1999 (the Act), the chief executive administering the Act may delegate the chief executive’s powers under the Act to an appropriately qualified public service employee.Powers Delegated2.I delegate the power of the chief executive to appoint an officer or employee of the public service as an inspector or an inspection officer under section 122(1) of the Act to the Chief Inspector of Mines.3.I delegate the powers of the chief executive under the provisions of the Act and Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 (the Regulation) as specified in Column 1 of the Schedule to the holders of the offices specified in Column 3 of the Schedule.4.The description of the power delegated by the chief executive in Column 2 of the Schedule is a summary of the chief executive’s power and is not to be relied upon as a statement of the extent of the power delegated. The officer or holder of office to whom power is delegated must, in each case, refer to the Act or Regulation for the full text of the relevant section of the Act or Regulation.5.This delegation commences on 1 September 2017 or upon execution, whichever is the later.This delegation is made by James Purtill, Director-General, Department of Natural Resources and Mines:Signed:James PurtillDirector-General[4]Department of Natural Resources and MinesDated: [29/8/17]SCHEDULEMining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act1999 (the Act)Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Regulation 2017 (the Regulation)[4]Which is also the position of chief executive. The respondent, Mount Isa Mines Limited (MIM), operates a copper mine (the mine).[6] MIM allegedly employed the respondent, Michael Westerman, as Site Senior Executive[7] for the mine, the respondent, Nathan Leigh Guli, as the Mine Superintendent[8] and the respondent, Ashley Robin Smith, as Electrical Supervisor-Secondary[9] at the mine.[6]Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999: s 21 “Meaning of operator”, s 38 “Obligations of operators”.[7]Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999: s 22 “Meaning of site senior executive”, s 39 “Obligations of site senior executives for mine”.[8]Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999: s 36(1), a superintendent being a “person at [the] mine who may affect safety and health of persons at [the] mine”.[9]Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999: s 36(1), an Electrical Supervisor-Secondary being a “person at [the] mine who may affect safety and health of persons at [the] mine”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The MQSHA grants various powers[23] to and imposes various obligations upon the Commissioner.[23]Sections 61, 63, 119, 122, 126A, 127, 202, 231, 239, 244, 254C, 259 and 230.Decision of the Industrial Court Two separate but related arguments were raised by the present respondents and accepted in the Industrial Court. Firstly, it was observed that s 257 identified the powers which could be delegated by the minister or chief executive as “powers under [the MQSHA]”.[24] The Industrial Court held that the “power” to take proceedings is not a power “under” the MQSHA.[25] The Industrial Court held that “under” was synonymous with “conferred by”[26] and that the power to prosecute was not conferred by the MQSHA.[27] The court held that the power to “take proceedings”[28] was a power conferred by the common law and/or by s 42 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954, not by s 234.[29] Section 42 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 provides:“42 Any person may prosecute etc.Any person may take a proceeding for the imposition or enforcement of a penalty, or the making of a forfeiture order, under an Act.”[24]Smith v Stone; Guli v Stone; Mount Isa Mines Limited v Stone [2020] ICQ 006 at [13].[25]At [40].[26]At [39] and [40].[27]At [40].[28]Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999, s 234(5).[29]At [25], [26] and [40]. The Industrial Court held that s 234 of the MQSHA did not confer any power but restricted the class of persons who could exercise the common law power to those listed in paragraphs 234(5)(a), (b) and (c).[30][30]At [40]. The appellant, both in the Industrial Court and here, submitted that the term “powers under [the MQSHA]” as it appears in s 257 ought not to be read as identifying only powers, the exclusive source of which is the MQSHA. It was submitted that a broader meaning ought to be attributed to the term, namely to identify powers “beneath and covered by” the MQSHA. It was submitted that s 234 removed the right of persons to take proceedings for offences against the MQSHA, and regulated who could take proceedings. It did so by exempting the persons listed in s 234(5) from the prohibition, thus empowering them to take proceedings. In that way, it was submitted, the power to prosecute is a power “under the [MQSHA]”. That submission was rejected by the Industrial Court.[31][31]At [34] and [40]. Secondly, it was submitted by the respondents and accepted by the Industrial Court that the power of delegation conferred by s 257 was of a general nature while the power of authorisation, in s 234 was specific to the taking of criminal proceedings. This, the Industrial Court held,[32] enlivened the principles explained in Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia[33] and the often quoted passage:“When the Legislature explicitly gives a power by a particular provision which prescribes the mode in which it shall be exercised and the conditions and restrictions which must be observed, it excludes the operation of general expressions in the same instrument which might otherwise have been relied upon for the same power.”[34][32]At [58].[33](1932) 47 CLR 1.[34]At 7.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Industrial Court considered two key arguments from the respondents, both of which were accepted. Firstly, the court held that the power to take proceedings was not a power "under" the MQSHA, meaning it was not conferred by the MQSHA but by the common law or s 42 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954. The court interpreted "under" to mean "conferred by" and found that s 234 of the MQSHA did not confer any power but restricted the class of persons who could exercise the common law power. Therefore, the power to prosecute was not a power "under" the MQSHA.

Secondly, the Industrial Court applied the principles from Anthony Hordern & Sons Ltd v Amalgamated Clothing & Allied Trades Union of Australia, holding that when the legislature explicitly gives a power by a particular provision, it excludes the operation of general expressions in the same instrument. The court found that s 234's specific power of authorisation for taking criminal proceedings impliedly limited the general power of delegation in s 257. Thus, the power in the chief executive could not be delegated for taking criminal proceedings.

The court further reasoned that the power of the chief executive to take criminal proceedings was not a power capable of delegation, aligning with the findings that the power was not conferred by the MQSHA and was specifically restricted by s 234. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that specific statutory provisions can limit the extent of delegation of powers, particularly when those provisions explicitly outline the conditions and restrictions for exercising such powers.