SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Cross Country Realty P/L & Ors v Peebles [2006] QCA 501
PARTIES:
CROSS COUNTRY REALTY PTY LTD
ACN 086 154 949
CROSS, Kellie Lee-Ann
CROSS, Ronald Malcolm
(applicants)
v
PEEBLES, David Lindsay
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 240 of 2006
CA No 241 of 2006
CA No 242 of 2006
DC No 329 of 2005
DC No 328 of 2005
DC No 330 of 2005DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Southport
DELIVERED ON:
1 December 2006
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
17 November 2006
JUDGES:
McMurdo P, Keane JA and Chesterman J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made
ORDER:
Application for leave to appeal refused with costs to be assessed
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - QUEENSLAND - TIME FOR APPEAL - EXTENSION OF TIME - WHEN REFUSED - where respondent public officer brought complaints against each of the three applicants under the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) - where the complaints were dismissed in the Magistrates Court as having been brought outside time constraints imposed by the above Act - where District Court judge ruled to the contrary - where applicants contend that the judge misinterpreted the relevant provision and now apply for leave to appeal - whether the judge did so misinterpret the provision - whether the proceeding was brought within time
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118(3)
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld), s 132(2), s 138(1)(c), s 550, s 581(2), s 589, s 591(2)
Smith v Baldwin; ex parte Smith [1979] Qd R 380, considered
Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300, applied
COUNSEL:
M J Byrne QC for the applicants
A J Rafter SC for the respondent
SOLICITORS:
Ryan & Bosscher for the applicants
Crown Law for the respondent
McMURDO P: This is an application for leave to appeal under s 118(3) District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) from a District Court judge's order on an appeal under s 222 Justices Act 1886 (Qld) setting aside an order of the Magistrates Court at Southport and remitting the matters to the Magistrates Court to be tried according to law.
The respondent, David Lindsay Peebles, an officer employed by the Office of Fair Trading ("OFT"), brought 39 complaints against each of the three applicants under the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) ("the Act"). The corporate applicant was charged with 38 offences under s 138(1)(c) of the Act in that being a residential property agent for the sale of residential property it failed to disclose to a prospective buyer the amount of any benefit any person expected to receive in connection with the sale of the property. It was also charged under s 132(2) of the Act with failing to ensure that the individual in charge of business at its…
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- Case
- [2006] QCA 501
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory provisions in question, specifically sections 132(2), 138(1)(c), 550, 581(2), 589, and 591(2) of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld). It also considered the case of Smith v Baldwin; ex parte Smith [1979] Qd R 380 for context and the principles articulated in Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300 regarding the interpretation of time constraints in statutory provisions. The court concluded that the District Court judge had correctly interpreted the statutory time limits, and that the complaints were indeed brought outside the permissible timeframe. The applicants' argument that the District Court judge had misinterpreted the relevant provision was not substantiated.
Accordingly, the court refused the application for leave to appeal, holding that the District Court's interpretation of the statutory time constraints was correct and that the complaints were untimely. The applicants were ordered to pay costs to be assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application for leave to appeal refused with costs to be assessed
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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