NEW SOUTH WALES. Workers' Compensation-Injury-Disease-Contracted by gradual process-Whether
brought about or contributed to by employment during twelve months preceding disablement--Necessity of proof-Disease incidental to employment in question- SYDNEY,
Cause-Condition of worker-Certificate of Medical BoardConclusiveness- April 6, 7:
Case stated to Supreme Court subsequent to award-Appeal therefrom to High Aug. 4.
contributed to by the employment of the employer or employers during the twelve months preceding his disablement it is enough if the disease is inci- dental to that class of employment SO that it can be attributed to service
Harmey v. Board of Fire Commissioners of New South Wales, (1927) 1 W.C.R. (N.S.W.) 247, disapproved.
The Workers' Compensation Commission, under sec. 51 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (N.S.W.), referred to a medical board questions as to the condition of an applicant, and his fitness for employment. The Board, in its certificate, answered the questions and also expressed its opinion as to the cause of the applicant's condition. The Supreme Court held that the cause of the condition did not come within the scope of the questions referred to the Board and, therefore, the Commission was not bound by that part of the certificate. On appeal to the High Court,
Held, by Rich, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ. (Gavan Duffy C.J. dissenting), that the Board's certificate, stating the condition and the cause of that condition, was a certificate as to the condition of the applicant within the meaning of sec. 51 of the Act, and bound the Commission.
Upon a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal to the High Court, on the ground that the decision of the Supreme Court upon a case stated by the Workers' Compensation Commission under sec. 37 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (N.S.W.) was merely an advisory or consultative opinion, and was not a "judgment, decree, order or sentence" within the meaning of sec. 73 of the Constitution from which an appeal would lie:
Held, by Rich, Starke, Dixon and McTiernan JJ., that a decision of the Supreme Court, given after the making of an award by the Commission, was not an advisory or consultative opinion but was a final determination of the rights of the parties in the matter in which it was given, and an appeal would
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): Smith V. Mann, (1931) 48 N.S.W.W.N. 171, reversed.
APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
In proceedings before the Workers' Compensation Commission of New South Wales, the applicant, Joseph Smith. claimed compensa- tion in respect of disablement from a disease, that is, lead-poisoning, arising, as he alleged, out of and in the course of his employment as employment, whether at or away from
whose employment the worker is or his place of employment
who last employed the worker. Any receive compensation from…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Smith v Mann [1932] HCA 30
Case
[1932] HCA 30
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The applicant, Joseph Smith, sought workers' compensation for lead poisoning, alleging it arose out of and in the course of his employment as a painter. The respondents included his last employer and several previous employers from the twelve months preceding his disablement.
The central legal issues before the High Court were twofold. Firstly, whether a decision of the Supreme Court on a case stated by the Workers' Compensation Commission was a "judgment, decree, order or sentence" capable of being appealed to the High Court under section 73 of the Constitution. Secondly, the High Court was required to determine the conclusiveness of a Medical Board's certificate under section 51 of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (NSW), specifically whether the Commission was bound by the Board's opinion on the cause of the applicant's condition, even if that opinion extended beyond the precise questions referred.
A majority of the High Court (Rich, Starke, Dixon, and McTiernan JJ.) held that a decision of the Supreme Court on a case stated after an award had been made by the Commission was a final determination of the parties' rights and therefore an appealable judgment. They also found that the Medical Board's certificate, which stated both the condition of the worker and the cause of that condition, was a certificate as to the condition of the applicant within the meaning of section 51 of the Act, and thus binding on the Commission. Gavan Duffy C.J. dissented on the appealability issue.
The High Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Supreme Court had held that the Commission was not bound by the Medical Board's opinion on the cause of the applicant's condition, as it fell outside the scope of the questions referred. The High Court's determination meant that the Medical Board's certificate was conclusive regarding the cause of the applicant's condition, and the Commission was bound by it.