FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Shepherd v Watt [2022] FCAFC 78
Appeal from: Watt v Shepherd [2021] FCA 561 File number(s): NSD 530 of 2021 Judgment of: GREENWOOD, BURLEY AND HALLEY JJ Date of judgment: 13 May 2022 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal and appeal from orders made dismissing an application for leave to file an amended cross-claim and to extend the time to file evidence – whether sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration of the discretion to make the orders – whether primary judge’s exercise of his discretion fell within the scope of House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 – whether the primary judge failed to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, being the timely, efficient and cost-effective resolution of proceedings and potential prejudice to the parties – whether the exercise of discretion was unreasonable or plainly unjust – whether the primary judge erred in his application of r 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) in the absence of any application by the respondents – whether procedural fairness was afforded to the applicants – leave to appeal granted – appeal allowed Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2, Australian Consumer Law ss 18, 21, 22
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180, 181, 183
Federal Court Act of Australia 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 37M, 37N, 37P
Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes – Franchising) Regulation 2014 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.40, 5.23
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 58
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27
Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137; [1987] FCA 504
Australian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation and Another v The Commonwealth and Others (1953) 94 CLR 621; [1953] HCA 25
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd (ACN 003 274 655) (2016) 340 ALR 25; [2016] FCAFC 181
Bomanite Pty Limited v Slatex Corp Aust Pty Limited (1991) 32 FCR 379; [1991] FCA 536
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; [1996] HCA 25
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd and Another v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397; [1991] FCA 84
Ex parte Bucknell (1936) 56 CLR 221; [1936] HCA 67
Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd and Others v Armstrong Strategic Managementand Marketing Pty Limited and Others (2013) 250 CLR 303; [2013] HCA 46
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
James v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2022] FCAFC 18
Lenijamar Pty Ltd and Others v AGC (Advances) Limited (1990) 27 FCR 388; [1990] FCA 745
Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar (2008) 237 CLR 66; [2008] HCA 4
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- AGLC
- Shepherd v Watt [2022] FCAFC 78
- Case
- [2022] FCAFC 78
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge's decision was influenced by an error of law and failed to consider relevant factors in the exercise of discretion. The court emphasised the principle from House v The King that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from, and that it should be affirmed unless it is clearly wrong. The court found that the primary judge's decision did not take into account relevant considerations such as the timely, efficient, and cost-effective resolution of proceedings and potential prejudice to the parties. Additionally, the court found that the primary judge erred in his application of rule 5.23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) in the absence of any application by the respondents. The court also found that procedural fairness was not afforded to the applicants.
Accordingly, the court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal. The orders and declarations made by the primary judge on 20 May 2021, 23 July 2021, and 13 December 2021 were set aside. The matter was referred to the National Operations Registrar for reallocation to a judge in the Commercial and Corporations National Practice Area. The respondents were ordered to pay the applicants' costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicants have leave to appeal from the judgment given on 20 May 2021 and the orders 1 to 4 made by his Honour on 20 May 2021.
2. The draft notice of appeal (other than grounds 2, 3, 5 and 6) filed on 7 June 2021 stand as the appellants’ notice of appeal.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. The following orders and declarations made by the primary judge be set aside:
(a) orders 1 to 4 made on 20 May 2021;
(b) the declarations and orders made on 23 July 2021; and
(c) the declaration and orders made on 13 December 2021.
5. The matter be referred to the National Operations Registrar for reallocation to a judge in the Commercial and Corporations National Practice Area.
6. The respondents pay the appellants’ costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The following statement by Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shale at 627 was described in Mallet at 634 by Wilson J as a succinct statement of the principle in House v The King:… the true principle limiting the manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised in respect of decisions involving discretionary judgment is that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is satisfied that it is clearly wrong. A degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the strength of the presumption may exist where there has been an error which consists in acting upon a wrong principle, or giving weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, or making a mistake as to the facts. Again, the nature of the error may not be discoverable, but even so it is sufficient that the result is so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer that there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance: House v The King. [Footnote omitted and emphasis added.] The restatement of the House v The King principle by Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shade expands the scope of the principle in that it uses the phrase “failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations”, rather than the language employed by the plurality in House v The King of “he does not take into account some material consideration”. In Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608; [1964] HCA 25, McTiernan, Taylor and Owen JJ described the restatement of the House v The King principle by Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shale as a “convenient summary” of the principles applicable in appeals from orders involving discretionary judgments, and quoted the passage in full (at 619). The restatement by Kitto J was also quoted in full and applied in Risk v Northern Territory (2007) 240 ALR 75; [2007] FCAFC 46 at [113] (French J, as his Honour then was, Finn and Sundberg JJ), Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137; [1987] FCA 504 at 147 (Davies, Lockhart and Neaves JJ), and Bomanite Pty Limited v Slatex Corp Aust Pty Limited (1991) 32 FCR 379; [1991] FCA 536 at 387 (Gummow J). In Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; [1996] HCA 25, McHugh J found (at 556) that the primary judge in that matter “did not fail to consider or fail to give sufficient weight to any matter he was required to consider” and that “his conclusion was not so ‘unreasonable or plainly unjust’” that an appellate court could infer that the primary judge had failed to properly exercise the discretion, citing Australian Coal and Shale at 627. In Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar (2008) 237 CLR 66; [2008] HCA 4, Gummow ACJ, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ said in response to the question of whether the primary judge had conducted the correct “balancing exercise” in the exercise of the Court’s discretion:137“Balancing exercise”? The orthodox approach to appellate intervention in relation to discretionary decisions requires the expression “balancing exercise” to be employed only with care.138The question is what the particular statute or rule of law conferring the discretion contemplates as relevant or irrelevant factors. If it mandates that particular weight be given to one factor, that mandate must be obeyed. But, in the absence of any such mandate, the question of what weight the relevant factors should be given or what balance should be struck among them is for the person on whom the discretion is conferred, provided no error of law is made, no error of fact is made, all material considerations are taken into account and no irrelevant considerations are taken into account, subject to the possibility of appellate intervention if there is a plain injustice suggesting the existence of one of the four errors just described even though its nature may not be discoverable, or if there is present what has come to be known as “Wednesbury unreasonableness”. [Footnotes omitted.]