Schmidt v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   SCHMIDT -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2013] WASCA 201

CORAM:   MARTIN CJ

BUSS JA
MAZZA JA

HEARD:   14 JUNE 2013

DELIVERED          :   30 AUGUST 2013

FILE NO/S:   CACR 211 of 2012

CACR 212 of 2012

BETWEEN:   STEFAN PAHIA SCHMIDT

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :SIMMONDS J

File No  :INS 208 of 2011

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Section 279(1)(b) murder - The subjective and objective components of s 279 (1)(b) - Trial judge erred in directions to jury - Whether jury verdict unreasonable or cannot be supported - Whether trial judge failed adequately to canvass the defence case in his summing up

Criminal law - Conviction for murder quashed on appeal - Acquittal or new trial - Whether it would be unjust to order a new trial of the appellant for murder - Whether a judgment of conviction for manslaughter should be entered

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30(3)(a), s 30(5)
Criminal Code (WA), s 10A, s 10B, s 10C, s 23B, s 279, s 280, s 281
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 85, s 112, s 131, sch 1 div 2
Juries Act 1957 (WA), s 51

Result:

Appeal against conviction allowed
Appellant's conviction for murder set aside
Retrial ordered
Appeal against sentence dismissed

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr D Grace QC & Mr S B Watters

Respondent:     Mr J McGrath SC

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Malcolm J Ayoub

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Alford v Magee (1952) 85 CLR 437

Anderson v The Queen (1991) 53 A Crim R 421

Carroll v The State of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 254

Charlie v The Queen [1999] HCA 23; (1999) 199 CLR 387

Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) v Fowler [1984] HCA 48; (1984) 154 CLR 627

Domican v The Queen [1992] HCA 13; (1992) 173 CLR 555

Jiminez v The Queen [1992] HCA 14; (1992) 173 CLR 572

Jones v The Queen [1997] HCA 56; (1997) 191 CLR 439

JRNT v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 183

Kaporonovski v The Queen [1973] HCA 35; (1973) 133 CLR 209

King v The Queen [1986] HCA 59; (1986) 161 CLR 423

Krakouer v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 81; (2006) 161 A Crim R 347

Libke v The Queen [2007] HCA 30; (2007) 230 CLR 559

M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487

Parker v The Queen [1997] HCA 15; (1997) 186 CLR 494

Pollock v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 133

R v Nguyen [2010] HCA 38; (2010) 242 CLR 491

R v Taiters; ex parte Attorney‑General [1996] QCA 232; [1997] 1 Qd R 333

R v Taufahema [2007] HCA 11;

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Details
Case
[2013] WASCA 201
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Schmidt v The State of Western Australia, the appellant, Schmidt, appealed against his conviction for murder, arguing that the trial judge had erred in his directions to the jury regarding the subjective and objective components of s 279(1)(b) of the criminal code. The court was required to decide whether the jury verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported given the trial judge's directions, and whether the trial judge had failed adequately to canvas the defence case in his summing up.

The court held that the trial judge's directions to the jury were flawed, leading to an error in the jury's verdict. However, the court also found that the error was not so substantial that it would be unjust to order a new trial. Instead, the court considered whether it would be appropriate to substitute a conviction for manslaughter or assault occasioning death. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter, and that it would not be unjust to order a new trial for murder. Therefore, the court set aside the conviction for murder and entered a judgment of conviction for manslaughter.

The court's decision was based on a careful analysis of the evidence and the applicable legal principles. The court found that the trial judge's directions to the jury were flawed, but that the error was not so substantial as to render the verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter, and that it would not be unjust to order a new trial for murder. The court therefore set aside the conviction for murder and entered a judgment of conviction for manslaughter. This decision highlights the importance of proper jury directions in criminal trials, and the need for careful consideration of the evidence and applicable legal principles when determining whether to order a new trial or substitute a conviction for a lesser offence.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 30(5) of the Criminal Appeals Act relevantly provides:30. Appeal against conviction, decision on…(5)If the Court of Appeal allows the appeal, it must set aside the conviction of the offence (offence A) and must -(a)order a trial or a new trial; or(b)enter a judgment of acquittal of offence A; or(c)if -(i)the offender could have been found guilty of some other offence (offence B) instead of offence A; and(ii)the court is satisfied that the jury must have been satisfied or, in a trial by a judge alone, that the judge must have been satisfied of facts that prove the offender was guilty of offence B,enter a judgment of conviction for offence B and impose a sentence for offence B that is no more severe than the sentence that was imposed for offence A; or… This court, upon allowing the appeal against conviction, must set aside the conviction and may:(a)order a new trial on the offence of murder or enter a judgment of acquittal of that offence ; or (b)order a new trial for manslaughter or assault occasioning death; or(c)if the appellant could have been found guilty of some other offence instead of murder and the court is satisfied that the jury must have been satisfied of the facts that prove that the offender was guilty of another offence, enter a judgment of conviction for that other offence. In this case, the offences for which the appellant may have been convicted other than murder were manslaughter (s 280 of the Code) or assault occasioning death (s 281 of the Code). The appellant's written submissions state that if the appeal is allowed on ground 2, the conviction should be set aside and a retrial ordered on a count of murder. At the conclusion of oral submissions, counsel for the appellant submitted, contrary to the written case, that this court could substitute a verdict of manslaughter (appeal ts 50). Whether this court orders a new trial or makes some other order pursuant to s 30(5) of the Criminal Appeals Act is discretionary. This is not a case where the appeal has succeeded on a ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify a conviction. If that were the case, it would be against principle to order a new trial: R v Taufahema [2007] HCA 11; (2007) 228 CLR 232 [63] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon & Crennan JJ). It must be accepted that the power to order a new trial should not be exercised in such a way as to give the prosecution an opportunity to make a new case which was not made at the first trial: R v Wilkes [1948] HCA 22; (1948) 77 CLR 511, 518 (Dixon J). In Taufahema, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ discussed what is meant by a 'new case which was not made at the first trial' [64]. Their Honours, having analysed R v Wilkes, King v The Queen [1986] HCA 59; (1986) 161 CLR 423, Jiminez v The Queen [1992] HCA 14; (1992) 173 CLR 572 and Parker v The Queen [1997] HCA 15; (1997) 186 CLR 494, said:These authorities suggest that the difference between the case relied on in a first trial and the case to be relied on in a second trial must be substantial if the difference is to stand as a bar to an order for a second trial [67].Gleeson CJ and Callinan J, in the same case, said:What, in the context, is meant by 'a new case'? Plainly, it does not mean a different charge. Subject to certain rules of preclusion, or to considerations of oppression, if the prosecuting authorities fail to establish that an accused person committed one offence they may later charge him or her with another offence. In such circumstances, there is no new trial in other than a colloquial sense. There is a further and different trial. In the context of a new trial for the same offence, the reference to a 'new case' must be to the particulars of the charge, and to the nature of the evidence that will be adduced in support of it, not to the elements of the offence [36].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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