Sanrus Pty Ltd v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors [2019] QCA 160

PARTIES:

SANRUS PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE QC TRUST
ACN 097 049 315
(first appellant)
EDGE DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE KOWHAI TRUST
ABN 26 010 309 529
(second appellant)
H & J ENTERPRISES (QLD) PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE H & J TRUST
ACN 077 333 736
(third appellant)
v
MONTO COAL 2 PTY LTD
ACN 098 919 414
(first respondent)
MONTO COAL PTY LTD
ACN 098 393 072
(second respondent)
MACARTHUR COAL LIMITED
ACN 096 001 955
(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 6710 of 2019
SC No 8609 of 2007

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2019] QSC 162 (Bond J)

DELIVERED ON:

20 August 2019

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

5 August 2019

JUDGES:

McMurdo JA and Applegarth and Bradley JJ

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Set aside the orders in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the orders made on 18 June 2019.

3.   The appellants be permitted to adduce expert evidence in the form of the report of Mr Chris Hartley filed 10 June 2019, save for paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 and 4.

4.   The respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the application in the trial division.

5.   The respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – PARTICULAR CASES – CONTROL OVER PROCEEDINGS – ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE – where the appeal concerns a decision made during the course of a long, complex and ongoing trial – where the appellants as plaintiffs sought, but failed to obtain, leave from the trial judge to adduce new expert evidence – where the trial concerns complaints made by a junior joint venture partner about the conduct of a senior joint venture partner in relation to decisions made in the course of performing a joint venture for the exploitation of a coal deposit – where a pre-trial case management regime imposed deadlines on the parties for filing and serving expert reports, and on experts from each side to attend joint conclaves – where that regime did not provide the appellants a right to submit expert evidence in reply but did provide them an opportunity to contest the respondents’ expert evidence through the provision of joint reports resulting from joint conclaves of experts – where the evidence sought to be adduced rebuts evidence from two of the respondents’ experts and does not reveal any new case – where the appellants’ prosecution of the case has warranted strong criticism – whether the trial judge’s assessment of the relevant likely prejudice to the respondents was incorrect in principle – whether the trial judge erred by not granting leave to rely on additional expert evidence at trial – whether the Court of Appeal should re-exercise the discretion by…

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Details
Case
[2019] QCA 160
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sanrus Pty Ltd appealed against a decision of the trial judge who refused leave for Sanrus to adduce additional expert evidence at trial. Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd opposed the appeal. The dispute arose out of a joint venture between the parties to exploit a coal deposit. Sanrus, the appellant, sought to adduce additional expert evidence in the form of a report by Mr Chris Hartley, a mining engineer. Monto Coal, the respondent, opposed this application on the basis that it would cause unfair prejudice to them. The appeal was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland, Court of Appeal.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the trial judge erred in his assessment of the prejudice to the respondents if the appellant were permitted to adduce additional expert evidence and whether the Court of Appeal should re-exercise the discretion by allowing the appellants to tender the additional expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge’s evaluation of prejudice should be accorded appropriate deference, given his familiarity with the issues and the evidence. The court found that the trial judge’s findings as to the aspects of prejudice were findings which were open to him on the evidence. The court did not agree that the trial judge accorded the prejudice claimed by the respondents more weight than it deserved. The court concluded that the appellants had not demonstrated that the trial judge’s exercise of a discretionary judgment on a matter of practice and procedure was vitiated by an error of the kind described in House v The King. The court found that the appeal did not disclose any appealable error and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The court ordered that the appeal be allowed, the orders in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the orders made on 18 June 2019 be set aside, the appellants be permitted to adduce expert evidence in the form of the report of Mr Chris Hartley filed 10 June 2019, save for paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 and 4, and the respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the application in the trial division and their costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the orders in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the orders made on 18 June 2019.

3. The appellants be permitted to adduce expert evidence in the form of the report of Mr Chris Hartley filed 10 June 2019, save for paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 and 4.

4. The respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the application in the trial division.

5. The respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Moreover, the appellants still have not shown that appellate intervention is required to avoid a substantial injustice. They have not shown that Mr Browne’s supposed inability to deal with some undefined parts of the evidence of Mr Conroy and Mr Crump caused some actual prejudice to the fair conduct of the expert conclave or a shortcoming in the joint report produced at it. Mr Browne claimed experience in the relevant field and he had the benefit of Mr Hartley’s report to inform and bolster his response to Mr Conroy and Mr Crump.Factual background I have had the great advantage of reading the reasons of McMurdo JA, and gratefully adopt his Honour’s summary of the facts giving rise to this appeal. In the interests of expedition, I will not refer to many of the matters which are contained in those reasons or attempt to detail the facts which appear in the substantial judgment under appeal. The essential facts may be summarised as follows. The appellants always had the burden of proving that:(a)the Monto coal, with its characteristics (including in particular its relatively low HGI), would have obtained “market acceptance” by about May 2005; and(b)the quantum of coal likely to be produced during Stage 1 and Stage 2 could be successfully marketed and sold at relevant times.[45][45]Reasons at [56]-[58]. To prove its case in that regard the appellants proposed to rely on the Hill 2014 and Hill 2017 reports and the report of Mr Browne dated 7 November 2018, for which the appellants obtained leave to rely upon at trial on 21 December 2018.[46][46]Reasons at [59]. The appellants decided not to rely upon Mr Stainlay as an expert witness. They did not file an expert report by him consisting of those parts of the Hill 2014 and Hill 2017 reports that Mr Stainlay wrote or, indeed, any expert report by Mr Stainlay. In December 2018, over opposition, the appellants obtained leave to plead and present a new case based on expert reports which were not truly “in reply”. They did so on the basis that to be able to go to trial in early 2019 on that new case, the appellants’ expert evidence was taken to be closed (subject to what might emerge from the conclaves).[47] In other words, no provision for any plaintiffs’ expert report in yet further “reply” was made. The orders put an end to the delivery of further expert reports by the appellants and it was unknown how many reports would be contained within the contemplated further round of defendants’ expert reports. However, “it was obvious that it would be extensive”.[48] There was no limitation (subject to relevance) on the matters which could be dealt with by the respondents’ further reports.[49][47]Reasons at [50]-[51].[48]Reasons at [51].[49]Reasons at [50]. In summary, orders made as a result of the appellants’ application to present a new case at trial but still retain trial dates in the first half of 2019 created a framework for the fair and proper conduct of the trial. These included the respondents being able to rely upon expert reports which were yet to be filed, including, as might be expected, experts in coal marketing to respond to Mr Browne’s report and otherwise highlight weaknesses in the appellants’ case about market acceptance of the Monto coal and likely sales of it in the quantum contended for by the appellants. The orders have been helpfully set out in the reasons of McMurdo JA at [12]. Most importantly, they provided that, except with leave of the Court, no party would be permitted to adduce any expert evidence other than in the form of a report which had been filed at the date the orders were made or filed in accordance with them (Order 19(b)). They also provided that, except with leave, opinion evidence would not be received at trial from an expert unless the expert had participated in the directed joint expert conference process and in the subsequent joint expert report (Order 20). The retained experts were required to attend joint conferences for the purpose of preparing joint reports (Order 9), and where matters were not agreed between experts the joint report was to contain “short reasons why agreement has not been reached” (Order 18(b)(ii)).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The trial judge’s evaluation of prejudice should be accorded appropriate deference, given his familiarity with the issues and the evidence and his ability to assess the extent to which the Hartley report constituted a substantial variation to the appellants’ existing case, which had previously been based on the Hill 2014 and Hill 2017 reports and parts of the Browne Report in relation to low HGI coal. If, despite this, the trial judge accorded the prejudice claimed by the respondents more weight than it deserved, this does not mean that his discretion miscarried. In my view, the judge’s findings as to the aspects of prejudice were findings which were open to him on the evidence. I do not agree that they were not supported by the evidence and I do not agree with the conclusion of McMurdo JA that the trial judge’s assessment of the likely prejudice to the respondents involved an error of principle.Conclusion on the issue of appealable error I conclude that the appellants have not demonstrated that the trial judge’s exercise of a discretionary judgment on a matter of practice and procedure was vitiated by an error of the kind described in House v The King.Would appellate intervention be required in any case to avoid a substantial injustice? If I had agreed that the trial judge’s assessment of the respondents’ prejudice was vitiated by the errors found by McMurdo JA, then I would not have concluded that those errors created a substantial injustice which required this Court’s intervention and an order that the appellants be permitted to rely on the Hartley report. For the reasons which I have given, particularly in the section headed “The exercise of a discretion concerned with fairness”,[76] even if little weight was given to the three aspects of practical prejudice discussed by the trial judge,[77] the appellants would not have discharged the onus of proving that the interests of justice favoured granting their application. They would not have established that the interests of justice warranted disturbing a framework for the reception of expert evidence which was ordered in the interests of justice, particularly in circumstances in which the prejudice to them was ill-defined and their explanations for bringing the expert report into play were judged to be inadequate. Such an order was not necessary to ensure a fair trial.[76][148]-[155] above.[77]Reasons at [87]-[89]. For those reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.Additional considerations Certain considerations, which arise from High Court authority, warrant mention at this point. They are concerned with the interests of justice in a broader sense than the interest of the respondents in not being unfairly disadvantaged by the late introduction of a new report by a new expert when the ground rules for the trial did not envisage that course (absent a good reason to do so). In my respectful opinion, to allow the appeal and order the Hartley report be adduced into evidence on the basis of what I would regard as a different view to that of the trial judge in assessing prejudice to the respondents would carry certain unintended risks.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The respondents’ argument seeks to support in all respects the trial judge’s reasoning. It is submitted that the burdens upon the respondents from the December orders were so onerous that the judge was right to conclude that the respondents should not be further burdened by this evidence, especially at this stage of the trial and so close to the conclaves of experts. The judge was well placed to assess where the interests of justice lay, and made no error in the exercise of his discretion to refuse the application. It is submitted that his Honour explicitly rejected an approach of punishing the appellants for their past defaults and that his Honour’s reference to that history was necessary for an understanding of the burden which was already upon the respondents from an interlocutory regime which was put in place to enable the appellants, close to the trial, to advance an amended case.Consideration The trial judge was correct to observe that the disallowance of Mr Hartley’s evidence would not mean that the appellants would be without evidence which, if accepted, would prove their case. But clearly the apprehension on the appellants’ side was that their case needed to be strengthened by the evidence of Mr Hartley. Clearly also, that apprehension had come from the reports of Mr Conroy and Mr Crump. The evident concern was that, if what was said by those two witnesses could not be specifically answered, their evidence could be critical in precluding the proof of the appellants’ case. Whether Mr Hartley’s evidence would be critical to the outcome could not be decided, one way or the other, at that time. But there was a real prospect, rather than a theoretical or far-fetched one, that his evidence would be critical. It fairly appears that it is a concern about the impact of Mr Hartley’s evidence on the final outcome which explains the respondents’ strenuous opposition to this application. His Honour had to assess the relevant prejudice to the respondents by allowing the evidence of Mr Hartley to be given. Of course, that was not the prejudice which they might suffer by the Hartley evidence being persuasive and important for the outcome of the litigation. It was the prejudice which would be caused to the respondents, by the imposition of a burden in the conduct of their case, beyond any burden which they had to bear by the case progressing according to the December orders. To assess that prejudice, it is necessary to say more about the effect of the December orders. According to the reasons which his Honour gave in December 2018, and which he confirmed in the subject judgment, the intended effect of those orders was to prevent another round of expert evidence being provided by the appellants within the three or four months prior to the commencement of the trial, when the respondents would be preparing their evidence, including expert evidence¸ to meet a substantially amended case. Nevertheless, the December orders did not deprive the appellants of the right to contest the expert evidence for the respondents, not only by cross-examination, but also by expert evidence which was responsive to the evidence of the experts retained by the respondents. Under the December orders, that opportunity was given to the appellants through the provision of joint reports of experts. As I have set out, the orders specifically permitted, indeed required, the experts to not only identify the differences between them, but to provide reasons for those differences.[35][35]Paragraph 18(b)(iii) of the December orders.