SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors [2019] QCA 160
PARTIES:
SANRUS PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE QC TRUST
ACN 097 049 315
(first appellant)
EDGE DEVELOPMENTS PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE KOWHAI TRUST
ABN 26 010 309 529
(second appellant)
H & J ENTERPRISES (QLD) PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE H & J TRUST
ACN 077 333 736
(third appellant)
v
MONTO COAL 2 PTY LTD
ACN 098 919 414
(first respondent)
MONTO COAL PTY LTD
ACN 098 393 072
(second respondent)
MACARTHUR COAL LIMITED
ACN 096 001 955
(third respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6710 of 2019
SC No 8609 of 2007DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2019] QSC 162 (Bond J)
DELIVERED ON:
20 August 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
5 August 2019
JUDGES:
McMurdo JA and Applegarth and Bradley JJ
ORDERS:
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the orders in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the orders made on 18 June 2019.
3. The appellants be permitted to adduce expert evidence in the form of the report of Mr Chris Hartley filed 10 June 2019, save for paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 and 4.
4. The respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the application in the trial division.
5. The respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – PARTICULAR CASES – CONTROL OVER PROCEEDINGS – ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE – where the appeal concerns a decision made during the course of a long, complex and ongoing trial – where the appellants as plaintiffs sought, but failed to obtain, leave from the trial judge to adduce new expert evidence – where the trial concerns complaints made by a junior joint venture partner about the conduct of a senior joint venture partner in relation to decisions made in the course of performing a joint venture for the exploitation of a coal deposit – where a pre-trial case management regime imposed deadlines on the parties for filing and serving expert reports, and on experts from each side to attend joint conclaves – where that regime did not provide the appellants a right to submit expert evidence in reply but did provide them an opportunity to contest the respondents’ expert evidence through the provision of joint reports resulting from joint conclaves of experts – where the evidence sought to be adduced rebuts evidence from two of the respondents’ experts and does not reveal any new case – where the appellants’ prosecution of the case has warranted strong criticism – whether the trial judge’s assessment of the relevant likely prejudice to the respondents was incorrect in principle – whether the trial judge erred by not granting leave to rely on additional expert evidence at trial – whether the Court of Appeal should re-exercise the discretion by…
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- Case
- [2019] QCA 160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court was required to decide were whether the trial judge erred in his assessment of the prejudice to the respondents if the appellant were permitted to adduce additional expert evidence and whether the Court of Appeal should re-exercise the discretion by allowing the appellants to tender the additional expert evidence.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge’s evaluation of prejudice should be accorded appropriate deference, given his familiarity with the issues and the evidence. The court found that the trial judge’s findings as to the aspects of prejudice were findings which were open to him on the evidence. The court did not agree that the trial judge accorded the prejudice claimed by the respondents more weight than it deserved. The court concluded that the appellants had not demonstrated that the trial judge’s exercise of a discretionary judgment on a matter of practice and procedure was vitiated by an error of the kind described in House v The King. The court found that the appeal did not disclose any appealable error and dismissed the appeal with costs.
The court ordered that the appeal be allowed, the orders in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the orders made on 18 June 2019 be set aside, the appellants be permitted to adduce expert evidence in the form of the report of Mr Chris Hartley filed 10 June 2019, save for paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 and 4, and the respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the application in the trial division and their costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the orders in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the orders made on 18 June 2019.
3. The appellants be permitted to adduce expert evidence in the form of the report of Mr Chris Hartley filed 10 June 2019, save for paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 and 4.
4. The respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the application in the trial division.
5. The respondents pay to the appellants their costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The respondents’ argument seeks to support in all respects the trial judge’s reasoning. It is submitted that the burdens upon the respondents from the December orders were so onerous that the judge was right to conclude that the respondents should not be further burdened by this evidence, especially at this stage of the trial and so close to the conclaves of experts. The judge was well placed to assess where the interests of justice lay, and made no error in the exercise of his discretion to refuse the application. It is submitted that his Honour explicitly rejected an approach of punishing the appellants for their past defaults and that his Honour’s reference to that history was necessary for an understanding of the burden which was already upon the respondents from an interlocutory regime which was put in place to enable the appellants, close to the trial, to advance an amended case.Consideration The trial judge was correct to observe that the disallowance of Mr Hartley’s evidence would not mean that the appellants would be without evidence which, if accepted, would prove their case. But clearly the apprehension on the appellants’ side was that their case needed to be strengthened by the evidence of Mr Hartley. Clearly also, that apprehension had come from the reports of Mr Conroy and Mr Crump. The evident concern was that, if what was said by those two witnesses could not be specifically answered, their evidence could be critical in precluding the proof of the appellants’ case. Whether Mr Hartley’s evidence would be critical to the outcome could not be decided, one way or the other, at that time. But there was a real prospect, rather than a theoretical or far-fetched one, that his evidence would be critical. It fairly appears that it is a concern about the impact of Mr Hartley’s evidence on the final outcome which explains the respondents’ strenuous opposition to this application. His Honour had to assess the relevant prejudice to the respondents by allowing the evidence of Mr Hartley to be given. Of course, that was not the prejudice which they might suffer by the Hartley evidence being persuasive and important for the outcome of the litigation. It was the prejudice which would be caused to the respondents, by the imposition of a burden in the conduct of their case, beyond any burden which they had to bear by the case progressing according to the December orders. To assess that prejudice, it is necessary to say more about the effect of the December orders. According to the reasons which his Honour gave in December 2018, and which he confirmed in the subject judgment, the intended effect of those orders was to prevent another round of expert evidence being provided by the appellants within the three or four months prior to the commencement of the trial, when the respondents would be preparing their evidence, including expert evidence¸ to meet a substantially amended case. Nevertheless, the December orders did not deprive the appellants of the right to contest the expert evidence for the respondents, not only by cross-examination, but also by expert evidence which was responsive to the evidence of the experts retained by the respondents. Under the December orders, that opportunity was given to the appellants through the provision of joint reports of experts. As I have set out, the orders specifically permitted, indeed required, the experts to not only identify the differences between them, but to provide reasons for those differences.[35][35]Paragraph 18(b)(iii) of the December orders.