Sanrus Pty Ltd v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 65 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2)
[2019] QSC 162
PARTIES: 

First Plaintiffs: 

SANRUS PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE QC TRUST ACN 097 049 315

AND

Second Plaintiffs:  EDGE DEVELOPMENTS
PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF
THE KOWHAI TRUST ABN
26 010 309 529

AND

Third Plaintiffs: 

H&J ENTERPRISES (QLD) PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF THE H&J TRUST ACN 077 333 736

AND

First Defendants:  MONTO COAL 2 PTY LTD
ACN 098 919 414

AND

Second Defendants:  MONTO COAL PTY LTD
ACN 098 393 072

AND

Third Defendants:  MACARTHUR COAL
LIMITED ACN 096 001 955
FILE NO/S:  SC No BS8609/07
DIVISION:  Trial Division
PROCEEDING:  Application
DELIVERED ON:  Date of Orders: 18 June 2019
Date of Publication of Reasons: 26 June 2019
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
HEARING DATE:  17 June 2019
JUDGE:  Bond J
ORDER:  Date of Orders: 18 June 2019
The orders of the Court are that:
1.  The plaintiffs’ application for:

(a)

an order permitting the plaintiffs to adduce expert evidence in the form of the report of Mr Chris Hartley filed 10 June 2019; and

(b)

an order varying the table in Schedule A to the order of 3 June 2019 so as to admit the participation of Mr Hartley in the joint expert conclaves,

is refused.

2.           The parties are directed to inform the facilitator of the terms of this order as soon as is practicable.

3.           The plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs of the application incurred after 13 June 2019, to be assessed on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS: 

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF EVIDENCE – EXPERT REPORTS AND EXPERT EVIDENCE – OTHER MATTERS – where the proceeding concerns complaints made by a junior joint venture partner about the conduct of a senior joint venture partner in relation to decisions made in the course of performing a joint venture for exploitation of a coal deposit – where a pre-trial case management regime imposed on the parties deadlines for filing and serving expert reports – where the plaintiffs sought leave to adduce new expert evidence on day 31 of a long and factually complex trial and shortly before the expert conclaves and joint expert reports process was due to commence – where the plaintiffs had enjoyed a significant indulgence in being permitted to amend their case based on new expert evidence shortly before the trial was due to commence which imposed a considerable burden on the defendants – where the plaintiffs must be taken as having made a forensic decision in finalising the case they would take to trial at the time the amendment was permitted – where the defendants would suffer prejudice if the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend – whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to rely on additional expert evidence at trial

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), Ch 11 Pt 5

(2009) 239 CLR 175, considered
Birla Mt Gordon Pty Ltd…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Sanrus Pty Ltd v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] QSC 162
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Sanrus Pty Ltd v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd (No 2), the case before the court involved complaints from a junior joint venture partner, Sanrus, regarding the conduct of the senior joint venture partner, Monto Coal 2, in decisions made during the joint venture for coal deposit exploitation. The primary issue was whether the plaintiffs, Sanrus, should be granted leave to rely on additional expert evidence at trial. This request came on day 31 of a protracted and complex trial, just before the expert conclaves and joint expert reports process was to commence. The plaintiffs had previously been granted significant leeway in amending their case based on new expert evidence shortly before the trial began, which had placed a considerable burden on the defendants.

The court had to decide whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to adduce new expert evidence, considering the substantial indulgence they had previously enjoyed in amending their case. The court held that the plaintiffs must be taken as having made a forensic decision regarding the case they would take to trial at the time the amendment was permitted. Allowing the plaintiffs to introduce new expert evidence would prejudice the defendants, who had already been burdened by the earlier amendment. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that warranted further indulgence.

In conclusion, the court found that the plaintiffs should not be granted leave to rely on additional expert evidence at trial. The decision was based on the significant indulgence already granted to the plaintiffs and the prejudice it would cause to the defendants. The court ordered that the plaintiffs were not permitted to rely on the new expert evidence at trial.

Orders

Orders of the court

Date of Orders: 18 June 2019

The orders of the Court are that:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The statement recorded that (emphasis added): To assist me in forming my opinions I have engaged the assistance of various subject specialist experts as identified in items a) to c) below. I have managed this work in a manner to ensure I understand what those experts have done and that I agree with the assumptions, methodology, conclusions and opinions reached for the work performed. The experts from whom I have obtained assistance are: As had the equivalent statement in his previous report, the statement went on to deal with the usual matters required of expert reports by Chapter 11 Part 5 of the UCPR, including that Mr Hill genuinely held the opinions stated in the report and that the report represented his true and complete professional opinion; and he knew that his paramount duty was to assist the Court on matters relevant to his area of expertise. Appendices B and C to Mr Hill’s report contained expert statements made by Irfan Visca and Steve Laracy. There was no similar expert statement of Mr Stainlay. In the executive summary in the body of the report, Mr Hill relevantly wrote (emphasis added): l have prepared this Expert Report by undertaking work myself, supervising Xenith employees and overseeing the contributions of various experts in their particular fields. I have engaged various experts in each particular field to undertake defined components of the work and author the various chapters of this report. The opinions and analyses of these experts cover each of the following disciplines and are found in the following sections of this report: Coal product quality and HGI discount was dealt with in paragraph 3.3.13 at pages 35 – 38 of the Hill 2017 report. The report expressed a revised assessment of the calorific value of Monto coal and explained why that opinion was expressed. It then expressed a revised “Indicative Monto Product Coal Specification”. Finally the report expressed these propositions: One of the expert reports filed by the defendants was the expert report of Mr John Barkas dated 31 May 2018. Mr Barkas is the Managing Director of Metalytics, a specialist consultancy that provides high-level independent advisory services and applied microeconomic analysis on commodity market economics and project evaluation in the mining and metals industries. Mr Barkas’ report relevantly addressed coal pricing, including by addressing the Hill 2014 and Hill 2017 reports. Amongst other things, Mr Barkas expressed the following opinions: On 30 July 2018, the plaintiffs were ordered to file and serve their expert reports in reply on or before 2 November 2018. This is the second deadline which must be regarded as having applied to expert opinion addressing the subject matters dealt with in Mr Hartley’s report. The following expert reports were delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendants prior to 16 November 2018 and on the dates set out below: On 16 November 2018 I ordered that: 3 By 4 pm on 30 November 2018 the plaintiffs must: The following further expert reports were delivered by the plaintiffs pursuant to the orders made 16 November 2018:

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.