Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors [2022] QCA 238

PARTIES:

In Appeal No 6166 of 2022:

SHARON KELSEY
(appellant)
v
LOGAN CITY COUNCIL
(first respondent)
CHERIE MARIE DALLEY
(second respondent)
RUSSELL BRUCE LUTTON
(third respondent)
STEPHEN FREDERICK SWENSON
(fourth respondent)
LAURENCE WILLIAM SMITH
(fifth respondent)
PHILIP WAYNE PIDGEON
(sixth respondent)
TREVINA DALE SCHWARZ
(seventh respondent)
JENNIFER RACHEL JULIE BREENE
(eighth respondent)

In Appeal No 9189 of 2022:

SHARON KELSEY
(appellant)
v
LOGAN CITY COUNCIL
(first respondent)
CHERIE MARIE DALLEY
(second respondent)
RUSSELL BRUCE LUTTON
(third respondent)
STEPHEN FREDERICK SWENSON
(fourth respondent)
LAURENCE WILLIAM SMITH
(fifth respondent)
PHILIP WAYNE PIDGEON
(sixth respondent)
TREVINA DALE SCHWARZ
(seventh respondent)
JENNIFER RACHEL JULIE BREENE
(eighth respondent)

FILE NOS:

Appeal No 6166 of 2022
Appeal No 9189 of 2022
ICQ No C/2021/8

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Industrial Court of Queensland – [2022] ICQ 13 (Davis J)

DELIVERED ON:

25 November 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

5 October 2022

JUDGES:

McMurdo and Flanagan JJA and Freeburn J

ORDERS:

In Appeal No 6166 of 2022:

1.       The appeal is allowed.

2.       The order made by the primary judge on 6 May 2022 dismissing the application filed 18 June 2021 is set aside.

3.       The application filed 18 June 2021 be remitted to the Industrial Court of Queensland to be considered by Deputy President Merrell.

4.       The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

In Appeal No 9189 of 2022:

1.       The order for costs made by the primary judge on 14 July 2022 is set aside.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SETTING ASIDE – where the primary judge dismissed an application to amend an application to appeal – where the application to appeal did not state any grounds of appeal – where the appellant applied to amend the grounds of appeal – where the appellant’s application to amend the appeal was dismissed – where the application to appeal was effectively dismissed – whether the primary judge, in refusing the application to amend, erred in failing to adequately consider the whole of the evidence in assessing whether there were no reasonable prospects of success on the appeal

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SETTING ASIDE – relevant factors to prospects of success of an appeal – where the primary judge had regard to the appellant’s skills and experience as relevant to the appellant’s prospects of success in the appeal as a self-represented litigant – where the primary judge considered whether the appellant could receive legal advice as relevant to the prospects of success of the appeal – where the primary judge concluded that the appellant had not committed to the appeal – where the dismissal of the application to amend the appeal effectively dismissed the appeal – principles to dismiss an application to appeal – principles to amend an application…

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Details
Case
[2022] QCA 238
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the Court involved an appeal by Ms Kelsey against a decision of the Vice President of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. Ms Kelsey alleged that her employment as Chief Executive Officer of the Logan City Council was terminated for reasons amounting to a contravention of s 285 of the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Qld) and s 40 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld). The respondents to the appeal were the Council and several Councillors. The central issue in this case was whether the primary judge correctly exercised his discretion when he dismissed an application to amend an appeal, effectively dismissing the appeal itself. The appellant argued that the primary judge erred in failing to adequately consider all the evidence when assessing whether there were no reasonable prospects of success on the appeal.

The legal issues before the Court included whether the primary judge had correctly considered all relevant factors in determining the prospects of success of the appeal. The Court considered the appellant’s skills and experience as relevant to her prospects of success as a self-represented litigant and whether the appellant could receive legal advice. The Court also examined whether the primary judge had taken into account extraneous or irrelevant considerations in determining the prospects of success of the appeal. Furthermore, the Court assessed whether the primary judge had erred in dismissing the application to amend the appeal, which effectively dismissed the appeal, without properly considering the application in light of the Industrial Relations (Tribunals) Rules 2011 (Qld).

The Court found that the primary judge had failed to adequately consider the whole of the evidence when assessing whether there were no reasonable prospects of success on the appeal. The Court held that the primary judge should have taken into account all relevant factors and evidence before concluding that the appeal had no reasonable prospects of success. The Court also found that the primary judge had considered extraneous or irrelevant considerations in determining the prospects of success of the appeal. Consequently, the Court set aside the primary judge’s order dismissing the application to amend the appeal and remitted the application to the Industrial Court of Queensland for reconsideration. The Court further ordered that the respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

In summary, the Court held that the primary judge had not adequately considered all the evidence and had taken into account extraneous or irrelevant considerations in dismissing the application to amend the appeal. The Court set aside the primary judge’s order and remitted the application to the Industrial Court of Queensland for reconsideration, ordering the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

In Appeal No 6166 of 2022:

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The order made by the primary judge on 6 May 2022 dismissing the application filed 18 June 2021 is set aside.

3. The application filed 18 June 2021 be remitted to the Industrial Court of Queensland to be considered by Deputy President Merrell.

4. The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

In Appeal No 9189 of 2022:

1. The order for costs made by the primary judge on 14 July 2022 is set aside.

Background

Background to the litigation

This Court will only interfere with such an exercise of discretion in the limited circumstances stated by McMurdo JA in Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors [2019] QCA 160 at [2] (Bradley J agreeing):“The appellants have the formidable task of persuading this Court to reverse a discretionary judgment, and on a matter of practice and procedure. Nevertheless, each case must be considered in the light of its own particular circumstances, and, if there is a demonstrated basis, according to House v The King, for interfering with the decision, this Court should do what is necessary to avoid a substantial injustice.” (citations omitted).Background On 1 April 2021, the Vice President of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (“Commission”), following a 23 day hearing, delivered a 155 page judgment[2] which dismissed an application by Ms Kelsey. The application alleged that Ms Kelsey’s employment as Chief Executive Officer of the Logan City Council (“Council”) was terminated for reasons that amounted to a contravention of s 285 of the IR Act and also a contravention of s 40 of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) (“the PID Act”). The named first respondent was the Council. The second respondent was Mayor Smith with seven Councillors named as the other respondents.[2]Kelsey v Logan City Council & Ors (No. 8) [2021] QIRC 114. Ms Kelsey’s contract of employment contained a six month probation period during which her employment could be ended on two weeks’ notice. On 10 October 2017, two Councillors and Mayor Smith conducted a performance review meeting with Ms Kelsey. During this meeting the Councillors present told Ms Kelsey there were concerns with her performance. On 12 October 2017, Ms Kelsey made a Public Interest Disclosure (the PID) to the Council, Minister for Local Government and the Crime and Corruption Commission alleging possible misconduct on the part of Mayor Smith. On 7 February 2018 at a meeting of the Council, comprised of twelve Councillors, a vote was conducted on whether Ms Kelsey’s employment should continue. By a vote of seven to five, her employment was terminated. The named respondent Councillors were the seven Councillors who had voted in favour of terminating Ms Kelsey’s employment. Before the Commission, Ms Kelsey alleged that her termination was procured by Mayor Smith and carried into effect by the seven Councillors as an act of reprisal against her by reason of the complaints and the PID she had made about Mayor Smith. Before the Commission, it was contended for Ms Kelsey that the termination of her employment was for a prohibited reason, namely a “reprisal” under the PID Act or “adverse action” under the IR Act. Section 306 of the IR Act applies a reverse onus of proof which required the Council to satisfy the Commission that the reason for the action taken against Ms Kelsey was not the reason alleged by her and which was prohibited by the IR Act.[3][3]Amended outline of argument for the first respondent, paragraphs 5 – 9.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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