SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
SANDS v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2015] SASCFC 36
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Blue, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Nicholson)
31 March 2015
DEFAMATION - STATEMENTS AMOUNTING TO DEFAMATION - PARTICULAR STATEMENTS - IMPUTATION - CRIMINAL
DEFAMATION - STATEMENTS AMOUNTING TO DEFAMATION - REFERENCE TO PLAINTIFF - INNUENDO
DEFAMATION - ACTIONS FOR DEFAMATION - PLEADING
DEFAMATION - JUSTIFICATION - GENERALLY - WHETHER PLEA ESTABLISHED
DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE - OTHER CASES
DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE - STATEMENTS MADE IN RESPECT OF A DUTY OR INTEREST - PARTICULAR STATEMENTS - PUBLICATION FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE - REBUTTAL OF PRIVILEGE BY MALICE - GENERALLY
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES - BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY - GENERALLY
Appeal against dismissal by a Judge of the Supreme Court of an action for defamation and breach of statutory duty.
On 4 July 1997, South Australian Police commenced an investigation into the murder on that afternoon of Corinna Marr at her Collinswood unit. The plaintiff, Mr Sands, who was then employed as a photographer by Messenger Press, was a friend of Ms Marr. Mr Sands provided a statement to SA Police on 30 August 1997 and was formally interviewed by police on 8 October 2002.
On 2 March 2004, an application by SA Police for an order under the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act 1998 (SA) to compel Mr Sands to supply his fingerprints was heard and determined by a Magistrate. The order was made by the Magistrate and Mr Sands complied. The hearing was attended by representatives of the media and was widely reported in South Australia that evening and the following day.
On 3 March 2004, Detective Superintendent Symons conducted a press conference. Before its commencement, he handed to the media representatives a media release, which was also published on the SA Police website.
In September 2005, Mr Sands instituted the action against the State of South Australia for, inter alia, defamation and breach of statutory duty arising from the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act 1998 (SA).
At trial, it was not disputed by the State that imputations were conveyed by the media release and at the press conference that there were reasonable grounds to suspect Mr Sands of having murdered Corinna Marr and that he had so conducted himself as to warrant that suspicion. The State denied that three further pleaded imputations were conveyed, namely that there were strong grounds to suspect that Mr Sands had murdered Corinna Marr; that as there were such strong grounds, he was the prime suspect setting him apart from any other suspect; and that the police had information placing him at the scene of the murder which he knew about and refused to challenge.
Before trial, Mr Sands filed an interlocutory application seeking to strike out the State’s pleas of justification and qualified privilege on the…
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- Case
- [2015] SASCFC 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Full Court included whether certain pleaded imputations were conveyed by a media release and press conference, whether those imputations were defamatory, and whether the defence of justification was established. The court was also required to consider whether the State was precluded from relying on the defences of justification or qualified privilege due to its claim for public interest immunity, and whether the trial judge erred in rejecting the defences of qualified and statutory privilege.
The Full Court found that the trial judge had correctly determined that imputations (a), (d), and (e) were not conveyed by the media release and press conference. It also upheld the trial judge's finding that imputations (b) and (c) were justified, meaning the statements, while defamatory, were true. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the State was precluded from relying on the defences of justification or qualified privilege, finding no error in the trial judge's rejection of these defences. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
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