Sands v State of South Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 81 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

SANDS v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2013] SASC 44

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kelly

5 April 2013

DEFAMATION - PUBLICATION

DEFAMATION - STATEMENTS AMOUNTING TO DEFAMATION - REFERENCE TO PLAINTIFF - IDENTIFICATION

DEFAMATION - STATEMENTS AMOUNTING TO DEFAMATION - PARTICULAR STATEMENTS - IMPUTATION - CRIMINAL

DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE

DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE

DEFAMATION - JUSTIFICATION

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES - BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY

Action for defamation against the defendant - plaintiff alleges that a person within South Australia Police (SAPOL) published copies of an application naming the plaintiff for an order under the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act 1998 (SA) (“Forensic Procedures Act”) and supporting affidavit to the The Advertiser - in the alternative, plaintiff alleges that a person within SAPOL published the existence of those Court documents to The Advertiser - plaintiff alleges that, as a result of that initial publication, The Advertiser published stories on 28 February 2004 and 3 March 2004 - plaintiff further alleges that, following the hearing of the application under the Forensic Procedures Act, SAPOL made defamatory statements in a media release and in the course of a press conference - plaintiff alleges that those publications led to the publication of an article by The Advertiser on 4 March 2004 and to broadcasts and newspaper articles on and after 14 May 2004.

Whether plaintiff has proved that a person within SAPOL leaked the application under the Forensic Procedures Act and supporting affidavit or, alternatively, the existence of those Court documents, to The Advertiser - whether the plaintiff was identified in the media release and press conference publications - whether the media release and statements at the press conference convey the pleaded imputations - whether defendant can rely on defence of absolute privilege as it exists under common law and section 7 of the Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) in respect of the media release and press conference - whether the defendant can rely on the defence of qualified privilege in respect of the media release and the press conference - whether in publishing the statements in the media release and the press conference the police were actuated by malice - whether imputations, if they were conveyed, were justified.

Whether SAPOL owed a statutory duty to the plaintiff by reason of sections 47 and 48 of the Forensic Procedures Act to protect the anonymity of persons the subject of the such applications whether the Forensic Procedures Act gives rise to a duty of care, which was owed to the plaintiff personally - whether the defendant breached that duty, with the effect that he suffered loss - whether the defendant was under a duty to protect his privacy or anonymity as a person subject to an application under the Forensic Procedures Act - whether SAPOL and Crown lawyers breached provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (“TIA Act”).

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Sands v State of South Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] SASC 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Sands v State of South Australia is a defamation case brought against the State of South Australia by the plaintiff, who claims that certain publications by the South Australia Police (SAPOL) and The Advertiser led to defamatory imputations being made against him. The plaintiff argues that SAPOL leaked documents related to an application under the Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act 1998 (SA) to The Advertiser, which then published articles based on these leaks. The plaintiff further contends that SAPOL made defamatory statements during a media release and press conference. The legal issues in this case included whether SAPOL leaked the documents, whether the plaintiff was identified in the media release and press conference, and if the imputations were conveyed. Additionally, the court had to decide whether SAPOL could rely on the defence of absolute or qualified privilege, if the police acted with malice, and if the imputations were justified.

The court held that the plaintiff did not prove that SAPOL leaked the documents to The Advertiser. However, the plaintiff was identified in the media release and press conference by virtue of extrinsic facts, as the hearing of the application under the Forensic Procedures Act made it known to the plaintiff's family, friends, and work colleagues that he was a suspect. The court found that the words of the media release and press conference conveyed some of the pleaded imputations but not others. The court rejected the defence of absolute privilege, as the publications were not made in the execution of duties following an implied request by the media. The defence of qualified privilege was also rejected, as the statements in the media release and press conference were not required to be made at the time they were and exceeded what was reasonably necessary to discharge the duty. The court found that the defence of justification was made out, as the victim's husband and others were investigated and discounted after proper investigation.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claim in breach of statutory duty, stating that the Forensic Procedures Act does not give rise to a civil cause of action. The court further held that even if the defendant breached the confidentiality provisions of the Act, the plaintiff did not suffer loss. Additionally, the court found that no duty of care can be imposed on the police that would lead to conflicting duties and incoherence with the law of defamation. The tort of privacy is not recognised in Australian law, and the information published by the police was not in the nature of material that could be expected to be kept confidential. Lastly, the court held that the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) does not give rise to a civil cause of action, as communication of lawfully intercepted information in the context of the application under the Forensic Procedures Act was authorised by the TIA Act.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims in defamation, breach of statutory duty, and breach of privacy, finding that the defence of justification was made out and that the plaintiff had lied in relation to central and peripheral issues.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held: Plaintiff has not proved the initial publication - plaintiff was identified in the media release and statements at the press conference by reason of extrinsic facts, namely the hearing of the application under the Forensic Procedures Act - publication was limited to members of the police and media, and to the plaintiff’s family, friends and work colleagues, all of whom already knew that the plaintiff was a suspect - the words of the media release and press conference bear some of the pleaded imputations but not others - no reason of public policy to extend defence of absolute privilege to publications made by police in the execution of their duties - media release and press conference were not published following an implied request by members of the media - defence of absolute privilege not made out - statements in the media release and press conference were not required to be made at the time that they were and exceeded what was reasonably necessary to discharge the duty - defence of qualified privilege not made out - malice not proved - plaintiff has lied in relation to central and peripheral issues - victim’s husband and others were investigated and discounted after proper investigation - defence of justification made out - the Forensic Procedures Act does not give rise to a civil cause of action - even if the defendant breached the confidentiality provisions of the Act, the plaintiff did not suffer loss - plaintiff’s claim in breach of statutory duty dismissed - no duty of care can be imposed where it would lead to conflicting duties upon police and incoherence with the law of defamation - tort of privacy not recognised in Australian law - information published by police was not in the nature of material that could be expected to be kept confidential - the TIA Act does not give rise to a civil cause of action - communication of lawfully intercepted information in the context of the application under the Forensic Procedures Act was authorised by the TIA Act - plaintiff’s claim in breach of statutory duty dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

It emerged late in the trial that a witness had secretly recorded a conversation involving Detective Keane and that the plaintiff intended to rely on that conversation to attack Detective Keane’s credibility. The defendant objected on the basis of the Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA). I heard argument as to the admissibility of that recording and ruled that the recording and the transcript were not admissible in the trial. My reasons for that ruling are set out in Appendix 3.The plaintiff’s background The plaintiff was born on 24 August 1969. He has lived in South Australia all his life. Towards the end of his secondary schooling, the plaintiff developed an interest in photography. After matriculation, he commenced a course at TAFE College for a Certificate in Commercial Photography. In 1988, when he was 18, he commenced employment with Messenger Newspapers Pty Ltd (“Messenger”) as a cadet photographer. He was later engaged as a photographer and was employed by Messenger until his employment was terminated on 5 July 2004. Messenger publishes a number of weekly suburban newspapers for distribution in metropolitan Adelaide. The plaintiff was employed principally from the Port Adelaide head office of Messenger but with occasional rotations to the Christies Beach and Salisbury offices. He had the use of a company vehicle and travelled throughout the Adelaide metropolitan and outer metropolitan areas for assignments. Between 1998 and 2000, the plaintiff was employed as a permanent photographer with the Sunday Mail, working one or two shifts per week. He also occasionally undertook photographic assignments for The Advertiser. In his spare time, he undertook private freelance photographic work for private and commercial parties, including local councils. In his work as a photographer, the plaintiff met “thousands” of people in the community. He engaged socially with his colleagues and, from time to time, with the people he photographed. The plaintiff’s usual work pattern was to undertake photographic assignments during the week and to spend Friday afternoons processing the films he had taken that week in order to meet the Monday deadline for publication of the weekly newspapers. In 1991, the plaintiff purchased a property in Valley View. In April the following year, he sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident and returned to live with his mother. The evidence is not entirely clear as to how long he lived with his mother after that accident. The plaintiff said that he continued to live with her for approximately seven years, but also that in 1995 he lived with Judy Southam at Valley View. At the time of Ms Marr’s murder in 1997, he was living with his mother in Kilkenny. In May 1997, he commenced a relationship with Janelle Denley. They did not live with each other, but met during the week and spent most weekends together. That relationship ended in about March or April the following year. In mid-1998 the plaintiff commenced a relationship with Kelly Nelson. By the date of the trial, she had changed her name to Kelly Hody, but for reasons of convenience, she will be referred to throughout these reasons as Ms Nelson. The plaintiff and Ms Nelson did not commence living together until 2003, after the plaintiff purchased a house in Alberton. Their relationship ended in May 2004. The pair continued to live together, although not on an intimate basis, until Ms Nelson moved out 12 months later.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KELLY J
Mr Todd said that he had watched closely the media releases in relation to the murder investigation and believed that they were inaccurate. He formed the view, on the basis of the media releases, that the police were not properly investigating the matter or following up leads which he had provided. For these reasons, he became increasingly frustrated with the investigation. Conclusion I was not impressed with Mr Todd’s explanation for why he recorded the conversation. I formed the view that he was not entirely frank with the court on a number of topics. His explanation for handing over the tape to a colleague of his, who was probably Mr Sheehan, and his attempts to distance himself from the handing over of this material to the plaintiff’s solicitors prior to the commencement of the trial, in particular appeared to me to be quite disingenuous. His answers in cross-examination revealed, perhaps unwittingly, his real motive for taping the conversation and for later handing over the tape to the plaintiff’s advisers. He wanted to expose what he perceived to be a botched police investigation and, as he put it, to uncover the truth about the incompetence, or worse, of Detective Keane. His explanation for why he did not have an independent person present when the police came to visit him on 23 October 2008, notwithstanding his claimed fear about his own safety in the situation, was illogical. His explanations confirmed that his real motive was to covertly record the police as he thought they would be more candid if an independent observer was not present. I do not accept that Mr Todd was wholly truthful in his evidence. I find that the tape recording made by him of the conversation on 23 October 2008 was not made to protect his or anyone else’s lawful interests. Moreover, I find that he was not genuinely in fear of the police. He was disgruntled and unhappy with the efforts of the police and was annoyed that, in circumstances where he believed the police had not followed up other more pertinent leads, he was being asked to provide another statement about the plaintiff’s sexual relationship with Ms Marr. Moreover, the conversation was recorded without the consent of either Detective Keane or his partner Detective Roberts. I conclude, therefore, that the recording was not made for any purpose defined in s 7(1)(b) of the Listening Devices Act. It follows that the recording was not lawful and was in breach of s 4 of the Listening Devices Act. I do not consider that there is any residual discretion to admit the evidence.[92] Even if I am wrong about that, I would decline to exercise that discretion. There was no public interest in admitting the evidence at this trial. It was relevant only to the credit of Detective Keane, and even then could only have marginal relevance to that issue, as it was a conversation which occurred years after the relevant events in 2004. To permit the tender of this evidence would, in my view, be to encourage other disgruntled members of the public to illegally record private conversations with members of the police force which might then later be widely disseminated. That consequence, as Doyle CJ pointed out in Thomas, would undermine the very purpose of the protection in s 4 which lies at the heart of the Listening Devices Act. [92] See Thomas v Nash (2010) 107 SASR 309 at [56] per Doyle CJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KELLY J