Sands v State of South Australia

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

SANDS v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2013] SASC 105

Judgment of The Honourable Justice White

2 July 2013

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - SECURITY FOR COSTS

PROCEDURE - COSTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - POVERTY - BANKRUPTCY

PROCEDURE - COSTS - SECURITY FOR COSTS - OTHER REASONS FOR SECURITY

The appellant appeals against the dismissal of his defamation action. The State has applied for an order that the appellant give security for its costs in the appeal and that the appeal be stayed until he does so. The State submitted that special circumstances arose from the appellant's impecuniosity; the substantial nature of the appeal; the failure of the appellant's lengthy, related action against Channel 7 and the ABC; and the limited prospects of success of the appeal. The appellant submitted that the Court's decision should be deferred until after the hearing of its application for a search order under r 148 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006.

Held:

1. The appellant's impecuniosity, the substantial nature of the appeal and the related, substantial action in which the appellant failed and did not meet the costs of those defendants constitute special circumstances.

2. There is no absolute prohibition on an award of security against an individual appellant resident in the jurisdiction.

3. Defamation appeals are not a special category of cases in which courts should be reluctant to order security.

4. The submission that the appellant's impecuniosity was caused by the State is contrary to an express finding of the Court below and is therefore not open on this application.

5. The appellant's contingency fee arrangement means that the appellant has not established that an award of security will stultify the appeal.

6. There is no basis on which to defer determination of the security application until after the search order application is determined.

7. The further prosecution of the appeal is stayed until the appellant has paid into Court the sum of $60,000 to secure the State's costs of the appeal.

Crown Proceedings Act 1992 (SA) s 5; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 r 148, r 194 and r 295, referred to.
McVicar v S & J White Pty Ltd [2006] SASC 233; (2006) 245 LSJS 177; Dagenham Nominees Pty Ltd v Shanks [2011] SASC 163; (2011) 110 SASR 577; Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 215; (2009) 104 SASR 452; Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd [2010] SASC 202; (2010) 270 LSJS 340; Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178; Min Kyu Kim v Byung Sun (Eric) Song [2012] NSWSC 103; Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34; Citicorp Australia Ltd v Cirillo [2003] SASC 204; (2003) 228 LSJS 132; Foxgold Pty Ltd v Paterson [2005] SASC 376; Kennedy v McGuchan (1978) 1 NSWLR 314; Lall v 53-55 Hall St (1978) 1 NSWLR 310

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Details
Case
[2013] SASC 105
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sands v State of South Australia involved the appellant, Sands, appealing against the refusal of an application for leave to appeal and an order for security for costs. The dispute centered around whether the appellant's financial situation, combined with other factors, constituted 'special circumstances' warranting an award of security for costs. The case was heard in the South Australian Supreme Court.

The primary legal issues addressed by the court included whether the appellant's financial difficulties, the substantial nature of the appeal, and his failure in a related action constituted special circumstances that would justify an order for security for costs. Another significant issue was whether there was an absolute prohibition on ordering security for costs against an individual resident within the jurisdiction, as argued by the appellant.

The court concluded that the appellant's financial situation, the substantial nature of the appeal, and his failure in a related action indeed constituted special circumstances. It rejected the appellant's argument that there was an absolute prohibition on ordering security against an individual resident in the jurisdiction, noting that such a statement was merely dicta and not a binding principle. The court also dismissed the notion that defamation appeals were a special category of cases where security should not be ordered. Consequently, the court found that the appellant's impecuniosity did not stem from the actions of the State, and that the appellant's contingency fee arrangement did not prove that an award of security would stultify the appeal. The court determined that the further prosecution of the appeal should be stayed until the appellant paid $60,000 into court to secure the State's costs of the appeal.

In summary, the court found in favor of the State, ordering the appellant to pay $60,000 as security for costs before proceeding with the appeal. The court's decision hinged on the existence of special circumstances and the discretionary nature of the power to award security for costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held:

1. The appellant's impecuniosity, the substantial nature of the appeal and the related, substantial action in which the appellant failed and did not meet the costs of those defendants constitute special circumstances.

2. There is no absolute prohibition on an award of security against an individual appellant resident in the jurisdiction.

3. Defamation appeals are not a special category of cases in which courts should be reluctant to order security.

4. The submission that the appellant's impecuniosity was caused by the State is contrary to an express finding of the Court below and is therefore not open on this application.

5. The appellant's contingency fee arrangement means that the appellant has not established that an award of security will stultify the appeal.

6. There is no basis on which to defer determination of the security application until after the search order application is determined.

7. The further prosecution of the appeal is stayed until the appellant has paid into Court the sum of $60,000 to secure the State's costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WHITE J
The State also submitted that success by the appellant on the appeal would be tantamount to an overturning of findings adverse to the appellant in the previous proceedings against Channel 7 and the ABC. Again, I consider it undesirable on an application of the present kind for the Court to attempt an assessment of the merit of that submission. It too would require the Court to engage in a detailed comparison of the pleadings and findings in the Channel 7/ABC action and the pleadings and findings in the present action.Conclusion on Special Circumstances I consider that the matters identified above do amount to special circumstances. As I have said, the appellant’s impecuniosity by itself is a significant matter. The fact that the appellant has failed in a related, substantial action and has not met the costs of the defendants to that action is also a material consideration. The substantial nature of the appeal is another matter, bearing in mind that the appellant has already had access to the courts in an endeavour to vindicate his position in two substantial trials. I conclude that the discretion to award security has been enlivened.Discretionary Considerations As previously indicated, the matters bearing on the existence of special circumstances are also relevant to the exercise of the discretion. In addition to those matters, a number of other considerations are pertinent.An Individual Resident in South Australia The appellant’s submissions emphasised the traditional reluctance of courts to order natural persons to provide security. He submitted that this Court should give effect to the statement of Mason CJ and Deane J (with whom Gaudron J agreed) in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd that:Security cannot be ordered against a defendant or a plaintiff who is an individual and who resides in the jurisdiction.[7]The appellant’s submissions tended to regard this statement as containing an absolute prohibition on an award of security in his circumstances given that he is an individual residing in South Australia. I decline to act on that submission. [7] (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 190. The issue in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd was the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Queensland to make an award of costs against a non‑party following a first instance hearing. The statement of Mason CJ and Deane J on which the appellant relied was in the nature of dicta, made in the context of their rejection of a submission that the availability of an order for security for costs was a reason for denying the existence of jurisdiction to order costs against a non‑party. The statement of Mason CJ and Deane J was, seemingly, a reference to the practice of the common law courts and the courts of equity. It is not readily to be supposed that Mason CJ and Deane J were intending to enunciate a principle of universal application when the power to award security is derived from statute or from a rule of court. In those cases the nature, scope and extent of such a power and any limitations on its exercise, are, of course, to be derived principally from the terms of the statute or rule of court in question.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WHITE J

I conclude that the discretion to award security has been enlivened.Discretionary Considerations As previously indicated, the matters bearing on the existence of special circumstances are also relevant to the exercise of the discretion. In addition to those matters, a number of other considerations are pertinent.An Individual Resident in South Australia The appellant’s submissions emphasised the traditional reluctance of courts to order natural persons to provide security. He submitted that this Court should give effect to the statement of Mason CJ and Deane J (with whom Gaudron J agreed) in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd that:Security cannot be ordered against a defendant or a plaintiff who is an individual and who resides in the jurisdiction.[7]The appellant’s submissions tended to regard this statement as containing an absolute prohibition on an award of security in his circumstances given that he is an individual residing in South Australia. I decline to act on that submission. [7] (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 190. The issue in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd was the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Queensland to make an award of costs against a non‑party following a first instance hearing. The statement of Mason CJ and Deane J on which the appellant relied was in the nature of dicta, made in the context of their rejection of a submission that the availability of an order for security for costs was a reason for denying the existence of jurisdiction to order costs against a non‑party. The statement of Mason CJ and Deane J was, seemingly, a reference to the practice of the common law courts and the courts of equity. It is not readily to be supposed that Mason CJ and Deane J were intending to enunciate a principle of universal application when the power to award security is derived from statute or from a rule of court. In those cases the nature, scope and extent of such a power and any limitations on its exercise, are, of course, to be derived principally from the terms of the statute or rule of court in question. In construing a statute or rule context will be important. That is so in the case of the 2006 Rules. The power of this Court to award security on appeal under r 295(1)(g) contrasts with the power under r 194 to award security in first instance proceedings.[8] Save for the requirement of special circumstances, the power under r 295(1)(g) is unfettered. There is no basis upon which one can read into r 295(1)(g) a limitation on the exercise of that power which is not contemplated by the rule itself.[8] Rule 194(1) provides:The Court may order a plaintiff to provide security for costs if—(a) the action is brought in a representative capacity and the plaintiff is insolvent or would have insufficient resources to meet an order for costs if the action were to prove to be unsuccessful; or(b) the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside Australia; or(c) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the action may have been brought for an ulterior purpose; or(d) the order is authorised by statute; or(e) the order is necessary in the interests of justice.Note—If a defendant makes a counterclaim, the defendant is the plaintiff in the cross action—see definition of plaintiff.