Sands v State of South Australia

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

SANDS v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2011] SASC 146

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek

16 September 2011

DEFAMATION - ACTIONS FOR DEFAMATION - PLEADING - SOUTH AUSTRALIA

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - AMENDMENT

DEFAMATION - JUSTIFICATION - GENERALLY - WHETHER PLEA ESTABLISHED

PROCEDURE - DISCOVERY AND INTERROGATORIES - DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS - PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION - GROUNDS FOR RESISTING PRODUCTION - PUBLIC INTEREST IMMUNITY - GENERALLY

DEFAMATION - PRIVILEGE - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE - STATEMENTS MADE IN RESPECT OF A DUTY OR INTEREST - PARTICULAR STATEMENTS - ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST - WHAT CONSTITUTES PRIVILEGED OCCASION, COMMUNICATION OR CONDUCT

Defamation - four separate interlocutory applications - first application by the defendant to file an amended defence - whether it was reasonably arguable that the amended particulars supported a plea of justification.

Held: application allowed - reasonably arguable that supported a plea of justification.

Second application to strike out the plea of justification - whether the plea of justification was capable of being established - whether public interest immunity prevented complete disclosure being made such as to result in an unfair trial.

Held: application refused - application premature and appropriate that trial Judge consider it.

Third application to strike out particulars of the plaintiff’s amended reply.

Held: application refused - not established that amended reply should be struck out prior to trial - appropriate matter for trial Judge to consider.

The fourth application was an application to strike out the defence of qualified privilege - reciprocal duties - whether public interest immunity unfairly prevents complete discovery being made by the defendant - whether the particular publications are not sufficiently connected with the asserted privileged occasion.

Held: application refused - not established that defendant's position is unarguable - appropriate matter for the trial Judge to consider.

Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 7, referred to.
S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 108, applied.
Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450, distinguished.
Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2009) 104 SASR 452; AON v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; S, DJ v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 229; Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450; Sands v South Australia (No 2) [2010] SADC 340; Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1; Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 366; Sands v South Australia [2010] SASC 340; Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135; Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309; Cush v Dillon (2011) 85 ALJR 865, discussed.
Gatley, Gatley on Libel and Slander (Sweet & Maxwell, 11 ed, 2008); Sands v South Australia (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Judge Withers, 19 March 2009); Bellino v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1996) 185; Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation (2010) 241 CLR 79, considered.

SANDS v STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2011]…

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Details
Case
[2011] SASC 146
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Sands v State of South Australia involves a defamation claim brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, the State of South Australia. The dispute arose from statements made by the defendant suggesting that the plaintiff was the prime suspect in a murder investigation. The plaintiff sought to amend his statement of claim to include additional imputations, leading to a series of interlocutory applications. One such application by the defendant sought to strike out parts of the plaintiff’s amended reply, arguing that it was not reasonably arguable that the amended particulars supported a plea of justification.

The primary legal issues before the court included whether the defendant’s application to amend its defence was reasonably arguable, particularly in light of the plaintiff’s insistence on pursuing the cause of action of misfeasance in public office. Another significant issue was whether the defendant could rely on public interest immunity to resist the production of documents relevant to the amended imputations. Additionally, the court had to determine whether certain statements made by the defendant constituted a privileged occasion under the law of defamation.

The court's reasoning focused on whether the defendant’s application to amend its defence was reasonably arguable and whether the plaintiff's insistence on pursuing the cause of action of misfeasance in public office would compel a stay of the action. Anderson J concluded that the plaintiff's whole action might be stayed if the plaintiff continued to pursue the misfeasance claim, leading the plaintiff to discontinue that particular cause of action. The court found that the defendant’s application to strike out parts of the plaintiff’s amended reply was not reasonably arguable, as the plaintiff had not pleaded malice in relation to any aspect of the case. The court also considered the implications of public interest immunity and the nature of privileged occasions in defamation law, ultimately ruling in favour of the plaintiff on these points.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The defendant’s application to strike out parts of the plaintiff’s amended reply flows from the decision and reasons of Anderson J in Sands v South Australia (No 2)[18] (hereafter referred to as “the decision of Anderson J”). During the course of that application, his Honour intimated that the plaintiff’s whole action might be stayed if he insisted on proceeding with the cause of action of misfeasance in a public office and the plaintiff thereupon discontinued that particular cause of action. In short, the defendant argued that the necessary effect of Anderson J’s decision was that the plaintiff was not permitted to rely on malice in relation to any aspect of the case and that the present consequence must be that the various parts of the reply purporting to plead malice or aspects thereof should be struck out.[18] [2010] SASC 340.The background to the application before Anderson J It is necessary briefly to consider the circumstances surrounding the decision of Anderson J. As his Honour there explained, the plaintiff in his original statement of claim had originally pleaded the imputation that there were grounds to strongly suspect that he had murdered Ms Marr. The plaintiff was subsequently granted permission to amend his statement of claim by a Master of the Court on 17 February 2010. At [7] of his reasons, Anderson J summarised the four substantive amendments thus:(i)As to the natural and ordinary meaning of the press statements and/or the media release, the master allowed two further subparagraphs to be added as follows:…(d) As there were strong grounds to suspect that the plaintiff had murdered Corinna Marr he is the prime suspect, setting him apart from any other suspect; and(e) The police had information placing the plaintiff at the scene of the murder which the plaintiff knew about and refused to challenge.(ii) A claim of misfeasance in public office.(iii) Breaches of statutory duty.(iv) Breaches of duty of care, duty of confidence and duty of privacy. The defendant then sought a stay of the action, claiming that it could not fully plead its defence of justification to the new imputations alleged by the plaintiff in the paragraphs (i)(d) and (e) reproduced above because it would be required to plead facts and material subject to a claim of public interest immunity that had been recently made. Senior counsel for the plaintiff made lengthy written and oral submissions before Anderson J which, in effect, suggested that the defendant was being disingenuous here. Counsel relied on, inter alia, the following matters. First, there was a delay of almost four years from the defendant filing its defence in July 2006 to pursuing its application for a stay. Second, the defendant had been able to give discovery by filing its list of documents 16 July 2009 in relation to the original imputation of “strong suspicion” without recourse to a claim for public interest immunity, let alone an application for a stay of proceedings. Third, the relatively minor changes in the pleaded imputations could not logically account for the different stance now being taken by the defendant because a proper discharge of the obligations of discovery on the filing of the list of documents 16 July 2009 in relation to an imputation of strong suspicion required exactly the same documents to be discovered as if the imputation had then been in the now amended form. These submissions do appear to have some weight.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J