Channel Nine SA Pty Ltd v Police (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Civil)

CHANNEL NINE SA PTY LTD & ANOR v POLICE & ANOR (NO 2)

[2014] SASCFC 119

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Parker)

30 October 2014

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - COSTS

PROCEDURE - COSTS - DEPARTING FROM THE GENERAL RULE - NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS - PUBLIC DUTY INVOLVED

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF COURTS AND JUDGES - SUPPRESSION ORDERS

Channel Nine SA and Advertiser Newspapers successfully appealed to a single Judge against a refusal by a Magistrate to revoke or vary a suppression order under section 69A of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). The Judge set aside the order suppressing publication of the defendant’s and victim’s identities and varied the order suppressing publication of particular evidence the subject of criminal proceedings.

The appellants sought an order that the Police and intervener, V, pay their costs of appeal.  The Judge referred the application for costs to be determined by the Full Court.

Held by the Court (Kourakis CJ, Blue and Parker JJ):

1.      The rationale for the general rule that the starting point in civil proceedings is that costs follow the event does not apply to an application for a suppression order because the determination of an application for a suppression order cannot be regarded as an adversarial contest in the sense of ordinary civil proceedings (at [47]).

2. Section 69B(3) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) confers power to make an order for costs on appeal from a suppression order decision without importing that costs should normally follow the event (at [56]).

3.      In the present case, the role of the parties was to assist the Court in determining where the public interest lay (at [63]-[64]).

4.      It cannot be said that the appeal was resisted unreasonably by the respondents (at [65]).

5.      There should be no order as to costs of the appeal including the costs of the application for costs (at [69]).

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) – s 352 ; District Court Act 1991 (SA) – s 43; Evidence Act 1929 ss 68, 69, 69A, 69B, 69AB, 69AC, 71; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) – ss 37(1), 40, 42; Statute 23 Henry VIII  UK; Statute 3 Henry VII  UK; Statute 4 James I UK; Statute 8 Elizabeth  UK; Statute of Glouchester 1275 UK; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) – s 189B; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) – s 40, 50; Supreme Court Civil Rules (SA) - r 280, 288; Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (SA); Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875 (SA); Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1890  (SA), referred to.
Australian Crime Commission v NTD8 (No 2) [2009] FCAFC 143; Clarke & Chapman v Hart (1858) 6 HLC 633; 10 ER 1443; Director of Family Services v Campione & Anor (1998) 83 FCR 63; Oshlack v Richmond River…

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Details
Case
[2014] SASCFC 119
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before the Supreme Court of South Australia, constituted by Kourakis CJ, Blue and Parker JJ, on appeal from a decision concerning a suppression order. The appellants were members of the news media who sought to appeal a magistrate's decision regarding a suppression order. The core dispute revolved around the costs of this appeal, specifically whether the general rule that costs follow the event should apply.

The legal issues before the Court were twofold: first, the proper construction of section 69B(3)(c) of the Evidence Act concerning the power of an appellate court to make costs orders on appeals against suppression orders; and second, whether the news media, as appellants, should be entitled to costs on appeal, departing from the general rule. The Court was required to consider the nature of proceedings involving suppression orders, the public interest considerations at play, and the specific rights of media organisations to appeal such decisions.

The Court reasoned that while section 69B(3)(c) of the Evidence Act confers a power to make costs orders, it does not mandate that costs must follow the event, unlike provisions in other appellate jurisdictions. The Court distinguished the appellate jurisdiction concerning suppression orders from general civil and criminal appeals, noting that appeals under Part 8, Division 2 of the Evidence Act are as of right and are open to parties and any person with a proper interest, including media representatives. The Court found that the appellants' contention that a favourable costs order is necessary to encourage media appeals in the public interest carried limited weight, as Parliament did not necessarily expect media entities to appeal solely on the basis of favourable cost outcomes. The Court also noted that the Police and the individual whose identity was subject to the suppression order were acting in the public interest or assisting the Court, rather than pursuing private interests, and had not acted unreasonably in making submissions.

The Court ultimately held that the general rule that costs follow the event should not be applied to appeals concerning suppression orders. While acknowledging the power to make costs orders, the Court determined that the specific nature of these appeals, involving public interest considerations and broader rights of participation for media, warranted a departure from the standard approach. The decision implies that costs in such appeals are discretionary and not automatically awarded to the successful party.

Background

Background to the litigation

Channel Nine SA Pty Ltd v Police (No 2) concerns an appeal against a suppression order made by the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The Police had applied for a suppression order to prevent the publication of certain details about an ongoing criminal investigation. This application was successful and a suppression order was made. Channel Nine SA Pty Ltd, a media company, appealed this suppression order to the Supreme Court of South Australia, arguing that the order should not have been made as it would infringe on the public's right to know.

At first instance, the Police had applied for a suppression order in the public interest, with no private interest at stake. The Magistrate was required to consider the public interest in making the suppression order, which was unopposed at this stage. When the case was reviewed by the Magistrate, the Police continued to act in the public interest, with no private interest. A person named V also had an interest in the suppression of certain details, but his private interest was deemed irrelevant to the public interest considerations. The media applicants for review, including Channel Nine, had a role to assist the Court in determining where the public interest lay.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the role of the Police, V, and the media applicants remained the same: to assist the Court. The Police and V made submissions in support of the suppression order, and the media applicants argued that details of the identities of certain individuals should be communicated to the public. The Supreme Court considered the submissions from all parties and concluded that a suppression order of some sort was appropriate, but the nature and terms of the order required further consideration. The Police and V did not act unreasonably in making their submissions, and the appeal was not considered to be manifestly unmeritorious or meritorious.

The matter before the Court is an appeal against a decision made by a Magistrate in the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The original application for a suppression order was brought by the Police, acting solely in the public interest. The Police were not opposed at first instance and the Magistrate proceeded to make the suppression order. The appellants, members of the media, subsequently appealed against the terms of the suppression order. The Supreme Court of South Australia heard the appeal and considered the proper construction of section 69B(3)(c) of the Evidence Act, which confers a power on the appellate court to make orders for costs. The Court considered the nature of the appeal, the role of the parties involved, and whether the general rule that costs follow the event should apply in this context. The Court ultimately determined that the general rule should not apply to costs on appeal against a suppression order decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On the assumption that courts have power to make a costs order on a suppression order application at first instance in civil or summary criminal proceedings, it might be appropriate to make a costs order against a person who applies for a suppression order on manifestly untenable grounds. It might be appropriate to make a costs order against a person making submissions in opposition to a suppression order on manifestly untenable grounds in respect of the additional costs caused by those submissions. However, there is no reason to adopt as a starting point the principle applied in private civil actions that costs follow the event.Costs on appeal against a suppression order decision Turning to the issue raised on the present application by the appellants for costs of the appeal, the starting point is the proper construction of section 69B(3)(c) of the Evidence Act. Regard is to be had to its wording, structure, context and evident purpose.[77][77] Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381 [69] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. Section 69B(3)(c) of the Evidence Act relevantly provides that “the appellate court…may make orders for costs...”. It is expressed in terms conferring a power. In contrast to section 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act and its equivalents, it does not provide that costs are in the discretion of the Court. In the absence of an express power to make an order for costs in Part 8, Division 2 of the Evidence Act, it would have been arguable that section 69B is a comprehensive code covering the field of the powers of an appellate court and an appellate court has no power to award costs on an appeal against a suppression decision. There is a marked difference between the general appellate jurisdiction of this Court in civil and criminal matters on the one hand and this Court’s special appellate jurisdiction in relation to suppression orders under the Evidence Act on the other hand. For example, appeals in civil proceedings under section 50 of the Supreme Court Act against an interlocutory order of a single Judge to the Full Court[78] and in criminal proceedings under section 352(1)(b)(ii) and (c) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act effectively against an interlocutory order of a single Judge to the Full Court[79] are generally subject to permission and no appeal lies against a judgment of a Magistrate in a preliminary examination.[80] By contrast, appeals under Division 2 of Part 8 of the Evidence Act are as of right.[81] This reflects the paramountcy accorded by Parliament to decisions on suppression orders being made in the public interest at the highest appellate level. In civil and criminal proceedings, the right of appeal is generally only given to the parties to the proceedings and strangers do not generally have a right to appeal or appear. By contrast, in appeals under Part 8, Division 2 of the Evidence Act, any person with a proper interest in whether the suppression order should be made, including a representative of a newspaper or radio television station, has a right to appeal or appear. [78] See Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) rule 288(1)(a)(i). Permission is also required for an appeal from an order on appeal of a single Judge against an interlocutory order of a District Court Judge or a Magistrate: see rule 288(1)(a)(ii).[79] Permission is required for an appeal against an interlocutory order of a District Court Judge under the same section. Permission is also required for an appeal against an interlocutory order of a Magistrate: see Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 42(1a).[80] Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 42(1).[81] Assuming that the appellant appeared before the primary court or is an applicant, party or media representative: see Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions & Anor [2002] SASC 422 at [8]-[9] per Doyle CJ, Lander and Bleby JJ.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants contend that, if costs of appeals do not generally follow the event, the news media are less likely to exercise their right of appeal and this may be detrimental to the principle of open justice recognised by Part 8, Division 2 of the Evidence Act. Insofar as that contention is put as a factor influencing the construction of section 69B(3), it is of limited weight. The appellants accept that in general terms the media referred to by Parliament in Part 8, Division 2 are commercial entities. The commercial news media have an obvious commercial interest in publishing details of court proceedings. There is no reason to attribute to Parliament an expectation that the media would not exercise their right of appeal unless they had an expectation that they would receive a favourable costs order against a respondent if successful on appeal. This matter is incapable of outweighing the considerations addressed above supporting a construction of section 69B(3) that Parliament did not intend that the general rule should be that costs follow the event on appeal. Consideration of the present application At first instance, the Police applied for a suppression order. The Police were acting solely in the public interest and had no private interest in so doing. The Magistrate was required to consider whether to make an order notwithstanding that there was no opposition to the making of the order at first instance. In a real and substantive sense, the role of the Police was to assist the Court. On the review before the Magistrate, the interest of the Police remained the same: they continued to act in the public interest with no private interest. While V had an interest in details of the proceedings not being published, his private interest was irrelevant and the only purpose of the Magistrate hearing submissions from him was for the assistance of the Court in determining where the public interest lay. In a real and substantive sense, the role of the Police, V and the media applicants for review, was to assist the Court. On appeal, the role of the persons appearing before the Court did not change. The appellants themselves are not parties to the underlying proceedings. They are members of the media and their appeal was brought on the ground that it was in the public interest that details of the identities of V and D be communicated to the public. The Court was assisted by submissions made by the Police and by V in response to the appellants’ submissions. If the Police and V had taken no part in the appeal, it would have been desirable for the Court to appoint a person or body as amicus curiae to identify and articulate an opposing viewpoint to that put by the appellants. In some cases, it can be said that an unmeritorious appeal is prosecuted unreasonably by an appellant or that a manifestly meritorious appeal is resisted unreasonably by a respondent. That is not this case. It was apparent that a suppression order of some sort should be made and the real issue was as to its nature and terms. The Police and V did not act unreasonably in making submissions on the appeal, nor in supporting the Magistrate’s conclusion.