SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)
CHANNEL NINE SA PTY LTD & ANOR v POLICE & ANOR
[2014] SASC 69
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Blue
30 May 2014
EVIDENCE - PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE - IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS
EVIDENCE - PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE - POWER OF COURT
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF COURTS AND JUDGES - SUPPRESSION ORDERS
Appeal against a suppression order by a Magistrate.
On an assault charge, a Magistrate suppressed publication of the identity of the defendant and the alleged victim as well as any declaration that might be obtained from the victim and served on the defendant in future. On an application by the media for review, the Magistrate effectively affirmed the suppression order. The order was made on the ground that publication of the suppressed identities and of any declaration by the victim would cause undue hardship to the victim within the meaning of section 69A of the Evidence Act 1935 (SA).
Held by Blue J (allowing the appeal):
1. It was appropriate for the Magistrate to suppress publication of evidence in relation to the defendant’s remarks, but the Magistrate erred in suppressing publication of any future declaration which might be made by the victim [46]-[47]).
2. The Magistrate failed to identify the hardship which would or might be caused to the victim by publication of the identity of the victim or the defendant. The Magistrate failed to separate consideration of suppressing publication of evidence as opposed to suppressing publication of the identities of the victim and the defendant. These failure lead to consequential failures in addressing whether any hardship to V was undue and, if so, addressing the balance between undue hardship and the public interest in open justice (at [49]-[56]).
3. The errors and failures by the Magistrate vitiated the exercise of the Magistrate’s discretion (at [57]-[59]).
4. It is doubtful whether the hardship to the victim identified by the respondents on appeal amounts to undue hardship within the meaning of section 69A. However, it is unnecessary to decide that question (at [68]).
5. The Magistrate’s discretion to make a suppression order was only enlivened if the Magistrate was satisfied that special circumstances existed giving rise to undue hardship so as to justify the making of the order in the particular case, weighing such hardship against the public interest in open justice. On the materials before the Magistrate, this test was incapable of being satisfied in respect of the identities of the victim and the defendant (at [71]-[72]).
6. No order suppressing publication of the identities of V or D should have been made given the order made by the Magistrate suppressing publication of evidence (at [77]-[78]).
7. Appeal allowed. Order 1 suppressing publication of the identities of the victim and defendant revoked. Parties to be heard on a suitable order to suppress publication of evidence (at [79]).
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20(3); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 68, s 69A,…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Channel Nine SA Pty Ltd v Police and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] SASC 69
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court varied the suppression order to delete any reference to V2 and ordered that evidence relating to the gratuitous remarks should be suppressed from publication.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In any event, it cannot be said that special circumstances exist giving rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice to justify the making of the order in the particular case.Weighing hardship against public interest considerations The second pre-requisite is that special circumstances exist giving rise to undue hardship which justify a suppression order taking into account the countervailing public interest in open justice. In Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Draper,[32] Gray J (Nyland J agreeing) said:There is a public interest in the maintaining of public confidence in the administration of justice. This public interest is maintained by the administration of justice in open court and the publication of what occurs to the community. In this way the public is aware of the process by which and the manner in which the courts administer justice. Open courts allow public scrutiny. It is this public scrutiny which guards against arbitrary, idiosyncratic or unjust conduct on the part of courts.However it has been recognised both at common law and by statute that there are circumstances where it is appropriate for proceedings to be heard in private and for there to be a suppression of information from the public. These circumstances arise when publicity would cause a possible injustice and hence bring the administration of justice into disrepute. However, the ordinary rule is that proceedings should be heard in public unless to do so would prejudice or put at risk justice in the particular case.The general common law principles have been recognised in the provisions of sections 68, 69A and 70 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). Section 69A of the Evidence Act provides for exceptions to be made to the position that the business of a court should be conducted in the public domain. A purpose of the section is to protect the integrity of the administration of justice and to protect those persons in the court who may be vulnerable or who are exposed to hardship.[33][32] (2004) 90 SASR 160.[33] Ibid at [47]-[49]. In Packer v Police,[34] Doyle CJ said:I am not persuaded, on the facts of this case, that the undue hardship should be accorded greater weight than the public interest in the publication of information related to court proceedings. That public interest has been declared by Parliament to be a matter of substantial weight. It is not enough for me to be persuaded that undue hardship will occur if a suppression order is not made. I must further be satisfied that the undue hardship is entitled to greater weight than the public interest. That implies that there will be degrees and kinds of undue hardship and that this must be taken into account when deciding whether the undue hardship is to be given greater weight than the public interest. If this were not so there would have been no point in Parliament imposing that additional barrier to the making of a suppression order.This consideration of the public interest involves qualitative and quantitative considerations. They are very much a matter of impression.[35][34] [2007] SASC 98.[35] Ibid at [29]-[30].