Channel Nine SA Pty Ltd v Police

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

CHANNEL NINE SA PTY LTD & ANOR v POLICE & ANOR

[2014] SASC 69

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Blue

30 May 2014

EVIDENCE - PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE - IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS

EVIDENCE - PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION OF EVIDENCE - POWER OF COURT

CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS POWERS OF COURTS AND JUDGES - SUPPRESSION ORDERS

Appeal against a suppression order by a Magistrate.

On an assault charge, a Magistrate suppressed publication of the identity of the defendant and the alleged victim as well as any declaration that might be obtained from the victim and served on the defendant in future. On an application by the media for review, the Magistrate effectively affirmed the suppression order. The order was made on the ground that publication of the suppressed identities and of any declaration by the victim would cause undue hardship to the victim within the meaning of section 69A of the Evidence Act 1935 (SA).

Held by Blue J (allowing the appeal):

1.      It was appropriate for the Magistrate to suppress publication of evidence in relation to the defendant’s remarks, but the Magistrate erred in suppressing publication of any future declaration which might be made by the victim [46]-[47]).

2.      The Magistrate failed to identify the hardship which would or might be caused to the victim by publication of the identity of the victim or the defendant.  The Magistrate failed to separate consideration of suppressing publication of evidence as opposed to suppressing publication of the identities of the victim and the defendant.  These failure lead to consequential failures in addressing whether any hardship to V was undue and, if so, addressing the balance between undue hardship and the public interest in open justice (at [49]-[56]). 

3.      The errors and failures by the Magistrate vitiated the exercise of the Magistrate’s discretion (at [57]-[59]).

4. It is doubtful whether the hardship to the victim identified by the respondents on appeal amounts to undue hardship within the meaning of section 69A. However, it is unnecessary to decide that question (at [68]).

5.      The Magistrate’s discretion to make a suppression order was only enlivened if the Magistrate was satisfied that special circumstances existed giving rise to undue hardship so as to justify the making of the order in the particular case, weighing such hardship against the public interest in open justice.  On the materials before the Magistrate, this test was incapable of being satisfied in respect of the identities of the victim and the defendant (at [71]-[72]).

6.      No order suppressing publication of the identities of V or D should have been made given the order made by the Magistrate suppressing publication of evidence (at [77]-[78]).

7.      Appeal allowed.  Order 1 suppressing publication of the identities of the victim and defendant revoked.  Parties to be heard on a suitable order to suppress publication of evidence (at [79]).

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20(3); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 68, s 69A,…

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Details
Case
[2014] SASC 69
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Channel Nine SA Pty Ltd v Police was an appeal against the decision of a Magistrate not to revoke or otherwise vary a suppression order. The suppression order suppressed any information that might disclose the identity of the defendant, D, or of the victim, V, or of V2. The appellants sought to revoke or vary the suppression order, but the Magistrate declined to do so. The primary legal issues were whether the Magistrate erred in failing to identify the hardship which would be caused to V by publication of the names of V and D, and whether the Magistrate failed to distinguish between the suppression of publication of evidence and the suppression of publication of identity. The Court held that the Magistrate did not articulate and answer the questions which arose and needed to be answered before a suppression order could be made. The exercise of the discretion was vitiated by the matters identified above. Even if the judgments were regarded as one of law and fact and error was required to be determined in accordance with Fox v Percy, the failure to give reasons identifying the hardship, why publication of identity as opposed to evidence should be suppressed, why the hardship was undue, or why it was not outweighed by the public interest amounted to an error of law. The Court concluded that it was appropriate that an order be made forbidding publication of evidence relating to the gratuitous remarks. The terms of Order 2 made by the Magistrate should be varied in any event. The Court turned to the substantive question whether the names of V and D and any material tending to identify them ought also to be suppressed from publication. The Court concluded that undue hardship involves something more than "ordinary" hardship, and it could not be said that special circumstances existed giving rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice to justify the making of the order in the particular case. The Court weighed the hardship against public interest considerations and concluded that it was not enough to be persuaded that undue hardship would occur if a suppression order was not made. The Court must further be satisfied that the undue hardship was entitled to greater weight than the public interest. The Court concluded that the undue hardship was not entitled to greater weight than the public interest.

The Court varied the suppression order to delete any reference to V2 and ordered that evidence relating to the gratuitous remarks should be suppressed from publication.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants appeal against the decision of the Magistrate not to revoke or otherwise vary the suppression order.Background On 26 March 2014, D was arrested and charged with assaulting V on that day. V gave a statement to a police officer on the same day, which was drawn in the form of an affidavit and sworn by V on 27 March 2014.[1] When D was arrested, he was also arrested for an unrelated offence against an unrelated victim (“V2”).[1] The police prosecutor in the Magistrates Court referred to D's affidavit as a declaration. On 22 April 2014, the Police filed a complaint in the Magistrates Court alleging that D assaulted V on 26 March 2014.[2][2] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20(3). On 23 April 2014, the complaint came on for mention. It was adjourned to a subsequent date for a pre-trial conference. The police prosecutor applied for a suppression order under section 69A of the Act in relation to the identities of the parties and the allegations in the matter. D made no substantive submissions on the application for a suppression order. The Magistrate made a suppression order in the following terms:1.suppressing any information that might disclose the identity of the defendant [D] or of the victim, [V] or of [V2].2.in particular the publication of any statement or declaration that might be obtained from [V] or [V2] that is disclosed to [D] by SAPOL in the course of its compliance with the requirements of the Magistrate Court Rules.3.exempt from the order any communication or disclosure made by [D] to a legal practitioner … or … for the purpose of securing financial support to assist in the engagement of a legal practitioner.[3][3] Order 3 was ex abundant cautela because a suppression order under sections 68 and 69A only applies to publication to the public and not to private communications. No point was taken in relation to this and Order 3 can be ignored for the purposes of the appeal. On 30 April 2014, the appellants applied to the Magistrate to revoke, or alternatively vary, the suppression order.[4] It was common ground at the hearing that the suppression order should be varied to delete any reference to V2. Otherwise, the application was opposed by the Police and by V (“the respondents”). D did not appear on that occasion.[4] Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 69A(6) and (7). The Magistrate varied the order by removing the references in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order to V2, but declined to revoke or otherwise vary the suppression order.The material before the Magistrate and on appeal On appeal, an affidavit by the police prosecutor filed in this Court deposing to what occurred at the hearings before the Magistrate on 23 and 30 April 2014 was tendered and received without opposition. An affidavit by V filed in this Court deposing to the events on 26 March 2014 and to verbal exchanges with D on two prior occasions was tendered and received without opposition. The only material before me as to what occurred at the hearing before the Magistrate on 23 April 2014 is the affidavit of the police prosecutor and what may be inferred from the Magistrate’s ex tempore reasons given on the revocation/variation application on 30 April 2014. Based on that material, the police prosecutor made the following submissions to the Magistrate in support of the application.1.The prosecutor informed the Magistrate that V’s declaration stated that, when V was assaulted by D, D also made gratuitous negative remarks (“the gratuitous remarks”).[5]2.The prosecutor alleged that D had a history of making the same gratuitous remarks and told the Magistrate that details had been provided by V to the police in his declaration.3.The prosecutor alleged that D had a history of drug abuse and mental health issues.4.The prosecutor alleged that the police had been told by D that he intended to use the open court forum to voice the same gratuitous remarks.5.The prosecutor submitted that a suppression order should be ordered to uphold public confidence in the Court system and process by preventing D using the Court to make further gratuitous remarks.6.The prosecutor submitted that a suppression order should be granted to prevent unnecessary hardship to V because any gratuitous remarks made by D would have a negative impact upon V.[5] I infer this from the Magistrate’s reasons, although it is not stated explicitly in the prosecutor’s affidavit.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

If the Magistrate had identified the hardship in the manner now articulated by the respondents on appeal, it may be expected that he would have proceeded to consider the likelihood and extent of any dissemination of the gratuitous remarks by the persons who heard them on the prior occasions and proceed to consider whether the hardship amounted to undue hardship within the meaning of section 69A. It may also be expected that he would have proceeded to weigh that hardship against the public interest. In the circumstances, it was essential for the Magistrate to identify the hardship which the Magistrate was satisfied would be caused to V by publication of the name of V and/or D.Suppression of publication of identity or evidence The appellants make an allied contention that the Magistrate did not separate consideration of the question whether there should be a suppression of publication of evidence under the first limb of the definition of suppression order in section 68 from the question whether there should be a suppression of publication of the identity of V or D under the second limb. In Channel Seven Pty Ltd and Ors v An Accused and Anor,[21] Bleby J addressed the need to distinguish between these two different types of order. A suppression order had been made under the second limb of the definition forbidding publication of the name of the accused and any matter tending to identify him. Bleby J held that the proper order would have been to forbid publication of the evidence under the first limb rather than identity under the second limb. While the case involved prejudice to the proper administration of justice rather than undue hardship, the observations by Bleby J concerning suppression of publication of evidence compared to suppression of publication of identity are apposite. Bleby J said:The definition contains two distinct parts. Paragraph (a) relates to the publication of specified evidence. “Evidence” is also defined in s 68 as meaning “any statement made before a court whether or not the statement constitutes evidence for the purposes of the proceedings before the court”. It would include the submissions of counsel as well as the statement of a witness. Paragraph (b) of the definition relates to the publication of the name or identity of any person mentioned in the paragraph. The definition therefore provides substantial scope for crafting selective orders designed to suppress from publication only so much as is necessary in the identified special circumstances as would otherwise give rise to the sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.…I am satisfied that in this case special circumstances exist giving rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice to justify the making of a suppression order … However, in my view, the judge failed to give proper effect to the mandate of s 69A(2) that a suppression order should be moulded in such a way as to minimise the threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice while still giving effect to the principles of open justice which s 69A demands.The suppression order under consideration relates to the suppression from publication of evidence or the identity of a party in proceedings conducted in the Magistrates Court. …[T]he evil of the likely media coverage is not the fact that a person holding public office has been committed for trial on certain offences.The suppression order to be made must be sufficient to prevent an unfair trial by suppressing, but only to the extent necessary, publication of certain aspects of the proceedings in the Magistrates Court.I consider that too little attention was given by the Judge to the provisions of para (a) of the definition of “suppression order” in s 68 of the Evidence Act and to the comprehensive definition of “evidence” imported into that paragraph of the definition. What was required was an order that does not link the factual allegations being made with the name of the accused.[22][21] [2008] SASC 246; (2008) 103 SASR 459.[22] Ibid at [39] and [48]-[52].

Decision

Reasons for decision

These contentions might have less weight if the Magistrate had identified the hardship which he was satisfied would be suffered by V if a suppression order were not made and had considered separately whether evidence or identity or both should be suppressed. However, the Magistrate’s failure to address those matters necessarily has a consequential effect on these downstream issues.Conclusion on error The Magistrate did not articulate and answer the questions which arose and needed to be answered before a suppression order could be made. On the basis that the judgments the Magistrate was called upon to make are discretionary, the exercise of the discretion was vitiated by the matters identified above. Even if the judgments were regarded as one of law and fact and error was required to be determined in accordance with Fox v Percy,[23] the failure to give reasons identifying the hardship, why publication of identity as opposed to evidence should be suppressed, why the hardship was undue or why it was not outweighed by the public interest amounted to an error of law. [23] [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118. Given my conclusion, I am called upon to determine afresh whether a suppression order should be made and in what terms. Suppression order and terms It is common ground that it is appropriate that an order be made forbidding publication of evidence relating to the gratuitous remarks. The concession by the appellants is rightly made. It is clear that reference to the gratuitous remarks (if the names of V and D are published) would cause undue hardship to V outweighing the public interest in open justice. However, the terms of Order 2 made by the Magistrate should be varied in any event and I will hear the parties concerning the form of the varied order. I turn to the substantive question whether the names of V and D and any material tending to identify them ought also to be suppressed from publication. Undue hardship The first pre-requisite is that an order suppressing publication of the names and identities should be made to prevent undue hardship to V as an alleged victim of crime or a potential witness in criminal proceedings. The appellants accept that publication of the names of V and D might give rise to a risk that persons who heard D make the gratuitous remarks on the two prior occasions might pass that on to others and that this is capable of being characterised as “hardship” within the meaning of section 69A. However, the appellants contend that it is incapable of being characterised as “undue” hardship. Undue hardship involves something more than “ordinary” hardship. In G v The Queen,[24] King CJ (Walters and Mohr JJ agreeing) said:The use of the adjective “undue” to qualify “hardship” in the section, indicates that something more than that ordinary degree of hardship is required. I do not think that the mere fact that a person who is well known in the community, or follows a particular calling, and is therefore likely to attract greater publicity than another, can be sufficient.[25][24] (1984) 35 SASR 349. [25] Ibid at 352.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In any event, it cannot be said that special circumstances exist giving rise to a sufficiently serious threat of prejudice to the proper administration of justice to justify the making of the order in the particular case.Weighing hardship against public interest considerations The second pre-requisite is that special circumstances exist giving rise to undue hardship which justify a suppression order taking into account the countervailing public interest in open justice. In Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd v Draper,[32] Gray J (Nyland J agreeing) said:There is a public interest in the maintaining of public confidence in the administration of justice. This public interest is maintained by the administration of justice in open court and the publication of what occurs to the community. In this way the public is aware of the process by which and the manner in which the courts administer justice. Open courts allow public scrutiny. It is this public scrutiny which guards against arbitrary, idiosyncratic or unjust conduct on the part of courts.However it has been recognised both at common law and by statute that there are circumstances where it is appropriate for proceedings to be heard in private and for there to be a suppression of information from the public. These circumstances arise when publicity would cause a possible injustice and hence bring the administration of justice into disrepute. However, the ordinary rule is that proceedings should be heard in public unless to do so would prejudice or put at risk justice in the particular case.The general common law principles have been recognised in the provisions of sections 68, 69A and 70 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). Section 69A of the Evidence Act provides for exceptions to be made to the position that the business of a court should be conducted in the public domain. A purpose of the section is to protect the integrity of the administration of justice and to protect those persons in the court who may be vulnerable or who are exposed to hardship.[33][32] (2004) 90 SASR 160.[33] Ibid at [47]-[49]. In Packer v Police,[34] Doyle CJ said:I am not persuaded, on the facts of this case, that the undue hardship should be accorded greater weight than the public interest in the publication of information related to court proceedings. That public interest has been declared by Parliament to be a matter of substantial weight. It is not enough for me to be persuaded that undue hardship will occur if a suppression order is not made. I must further be satisfied that the undue hardship is entitled to greater weight than the public interest. That implies that there will be degrees and kinds of undue hardship and that this must be taken into account when deciding whether the undue hardship is to be given greater weight than the public interest. If this were not so there would have been no point in Parliament imposing that additional barrier to the making of a suppression order.This consideration of the public interest involves qualitative and quantitative considerations. They are very much a matter of impression.[35][34] [2007] SASC 98.[35] Ibid at [29]-[30].