RZMW v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

RZMW v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1761

Review from: RZMW and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 4620
File number: WAD 15 of 2019
Judge: JACKSON J
Date of judgment: 31 October 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION - application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal - revocation of Class XB Subclass 200 Refugee visa on character grounds - Ministerial Direction 65 - jurisdictional error by Tribunal in failing to take into account best interests of applicant's minor stepchild and minor sister who reside in Australia - jurisdictional error by Tribunal in failing to take into account applicant's mental health when considering impediments applicant may face if removed from Australia - materiality - whether errors can be aggregated for purposes of determining materiality - application allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A, 499, 500, 501, 501CA
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89

Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 359 ALR 1

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; (2001) 233 FCR 136

Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 140; (2009) 112 ALD 1

Minister for Home Affairs v Ogawa [2019] FCAFC 98; (2019) 369 ALR 553

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 [2019] FCAFC 40; (2019) 163 ALD 469

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 363 ALR 599

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134; (2005) 147 FCR 51

PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1540

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451

Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 15; (2015) 256 CLR 203

WZAQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 327; (2013) 233 FCR 534

Date of hearing: 19 July 2019
Date of last submissions: 28 July 2019 (applicant)
2 August 2019 (respondent)
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 78
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr HW Glenister
Solicitor for the Applicant: Cathal Smith Legal Pty Ltd
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms SJ Oliver
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 15 of 2019
BETWEEN:

RZMW

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1761
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of RZMW v Minister for Home Affairs involved the applicant, a citizen of Liberia, seeking judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to revoke his Class XB Subclass 200 Refugee visa on character grounds. The primary legal issues were whether the AAT made a jurisdictional error by failing to take into account the best interests of the applicant's minor stepchild and minor sister residing in Australia, and whether the AAT erred by not considering the applicant's mental health when assessing the impediments he might face if removed from Australia. Additionally, the court had to determine whether these errors could be aggregated for the purpose of assessing their materiality.

The court found that the AAT did indeed commit jurisdictional errors by neglecting to consider the best interests of the minor children and the applicant's mental health. The court held that these omissions were significant because they pertained to critical aspects of the applicant's ties to Australia and the potential impediments he might face if deported. The court further concluded that these errors, when considered together, were material enough to affect the outcome of the decision. Consequently, the court allowed the application for judicial review, set aside the AAT's decision, and remitted the matter back to the AAT for reconsideration in accordance with the law.

In its final orders, the court granted the application for judicial review, quashed the AAT's decision made on 11 December 2018, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring a differently constituted Tribunal to determine the applicant's application for review according to law. The applicant was also given liberty to apply in relation to costs within 14 days of the date of these orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is allowed.

2. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent, quashing its decision made on 11 December 2018.

3. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, requiring a Tribunal constituted differently to the Tribunal that made the decision of 11 December 2018 to determine the applicant's application for review according to law.

4. The applicant has liberty to apply in relation to costs within 14 days of the date of these orders.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Paragraph 14 set out a number of 'other considerations' which must be taken into account where relevant. They included the '[s]trength, nature and duration of ties' (paragraph 14.2) and the 'extent of impediments if removed' (paragraph 14.5).Background to this application The applicant is a citizen of Liberia. He experienced what the Tribunal described as a 'difficult upbringing' in that country. This was something of an understatement, as the applicant witnessed the murder of his father when he was 5 years old, and had other highly traumatic experiences. The applicant arrived in Australia in 2004 on the refugee visa when he was 17. Between November 2005 and March 2018 he was convicted of a large number of offences, of escalating seriousness. They include public nuisance, unlawful possession of suspected stolen property, wilful damage of property, serious assault, breach of a domestic violence order, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, possession of a knife in a public place, and common assault and assault occasioning bodily harm, both of which were domestic violence offences. The victim of the domestic violence was the applicant's partner, whom I will call A. The applicant assaulted her on one occasion when she was pregnant with his child. There was in addition to this a history of traffic offences which the Tribunal described as 'equally appalling'. The applicant blamed his criminal behaviour on alcohol, but the Tribunal found that there was little or no evidence that he had engaged in any rehabilitation programs that might support a decision that he can safely be released back into the community with a visa. The Tribunal found that since July 2013, in particular, the applicant's offending 'took a serious and violent turn'. He had continued to behave violently while in immigration detention. The Tribunal found that his history of offending was very serious. The Tribunal found that the applicant would pose a very significant risk to the general public, his 'domestic spouse' or a law enforcement officer if he were to be released. The potential harm included financial loss, serious physical or psychological injury, or conceivably death. The Tribunal also found there was a high likelihood of the applicant reoffending in a very serious way. Therefore the first primary consideration weighed heavily in favour of the visa being cancelled. So did the third primary consideration, the expectations of the Australian community. In relation to the second primary consideration, the best interests of minor children in Australia, the Tribunal concluded that they did not weigh in favour of revoking the decision to cancel the applicant's visa; at best that consideration had neutral weight. I will address specific aspects of the Tribunal's reasoning in relation to that primary consideration when I deal with the grounds of review. I will also address the Tribunal's reasoning in relation to certain of the other considerations that are the subject of the grounds, namely the 'strength, nature and duration of ties' and the 'extent of impediments if removed'.Grounds 1 and 1A - strength, nature and duration of ties

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I do accept, however, the Minister's submission that the Tribunal did not fall into error in failing to advert to the hand injury. The psychiatrist's report indicated that he injured his thumb while working in an abattoir in 2009 and received a 'payout' of $125,000. But there was nothing cogent before the Tribunal as to the ongoing effect of that condition in 2018. It was open to the Tribunal to discount it as a significant health concern, and not to mention it. I infer that is what the Tribunal did.Ground 6 - A's evidence The applicant abandoned grounds 4 and 5 of his application, so the only ground remaining to be considered is ground 6. This alleges that certain findings that the evidence of the applicant's partner A was not credible were based on illogical or unreasonable reasoning and a misstatement of her evidence. In the course of considering the nature of harm to individuals or the community should the applicant continue to commit crimes, the Tribunal referred to evidence which A gave on the applicant's behalf. She said she was not concerned that the applicant may commit another act of domestic violence against her. The Tribunal agreed with the Minister that it 'should exercise a degree of caution in receiving her evidence as she has been a victim of the Applicant's domestic violence offending' (paragraph 75). After making that comment the Tribunal went on to explain that it was difficult to believe her evidence, when A had thought that the domestic violence perpetrated on her to date merited reporting to the police and the making of a domestic violence order. She admitted that her relationship with the applicant had been intermittent, and that the applicant had been the subject of a domestic violence order that had effectively prevented him from seeing her between December 2016 and March 2018. The Tribunal found that the relationship was 'strained at its highest'. It found A's evidence to be less than forthright when asked if she and the applicant would continue to be in a relationship if he was released back into the community (paragraph 76). The applicant submitted that the Tribunal did not disclose any logical or probative basis for its finding that A was not credible and said that it is 'perverse to suggest women who have been subject to domestic violence cannot be trusted'. That is an inflammatory and inaccurate characterisation of what the Tribunal found. There was a basis for the Tribunal to approach A's evidence cautiously. That basis, as expressed by the Tribunal, was the tension between her statement that she was not concerned that the applicant would commit another act of violence towards her, and the fact that he had been violent enough in the past to lead her to report him to the police and to obtain a domestic violence order against him. The Tribunal was not expressing any general view that domestic violence victims lack credibility. The applicant also attacked the Tribunal's findings on other bases, which in my view were invitations to impermissible merits review. It was said that there was no evidence that the applicant and A were in a strained relationship, so that finding was not open. But A agreed that their spousal relationship had been on and off and that the applicant had been subject to a domestic violence order. In those circumstances a finding that their relationship was strained was open. It was said that A was never asked whether they would continue to be in a relationship if he was released. But she was asked whether she would let him come and live with her if he was released. They amount to the same thing, and if they do not, that error would be an error of fact finding within jurisdiction. It was said that the Tribunal's treatment of her evidence was unreasonable. But the reasoning of the Tribunal here did not lack justification, transparency and intelligibility, nor did it fall outside the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [105] (Gageler J). The justification for the Tribunal's approach is intelligible, and evident on the face of the reasoning as I have summarised it. Whether the findings it made were correct is not for this court to decide.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For completeness, I will mention two other grounds, in relation to which I have found the Tribunal made no error. They are the alleged misconstruction of paragraph 14.2(1) of Direction 65, about strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia, and the alleged misunderstanding of the applicant's evidence about the paternity of the child M. Even if I am wrong that the Tribunal did not fall into error about those matters, I find that any such errors would not have been material individually and would have made no significant contribution to the question of materiality if considered in the aggregate with other errors. As I have said, the misconstruction of the role of paragraph 14.2(1)(a)(i) did not lead the Tribunal to put less weight on the 'ties to Australia' consideration as a whole than it otherwise would have. And since there was no evidence that the applicant had a relationship with M, considering that child's interests would not have made any difference to the outcome anyway.Conclusion I uphold ground 2 and ground 3, to the extent of finding that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in failing to make a determination about the best interests of S and J and in failing to take the applicant's mental illness into account when considering the extent of any impediments the applicant will face if he is removed to Liberia. The Tribunal's decision will be set aside and the matter will be remitted to the Tribunal to decide according to law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the second primary consideration, the best interests of minor children in Australia, the Tribunal concluded that they did not weigh in favour of revoking the decision to cancel the applicant's visa; at best that consideration had neutral weight. I will address specific aspects of the Tribunal's reasoning in relation to that primary consideration when I deal with the grounds of review. I will also address the Tribunal's reasoning in relation to certain of the other considerations that are the subject of the grounds, namely the 'strength, nature and duration of ties' and the 'extent of impediments if removed'.Grounds 1 and 1A - strength, nature and duration of ties By ground 1 the applicant claims that the Tribunal misconstrued and misapplied paragraph 14.2(1) of Direction 65, or failed to engage in an active intellectual process with the evidence relevant to the consideration contained in paragraph 14.2(1)(b). Paragraph 14.2(1) of Direction 65 was as follows:The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia. Reflecting the principles at 6.3, decision-makers must have regard to:a)How long the non-citizen has resided in Australia, including whether the non‑citizen arrived as a young child, noting that:i.less weight should be given where the non-citizen began offending soon after arriving in Australia; andii.More weight should be given to time the non-citizen has spent contributing positively to the Australian community.b)The strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia, including the effect of non-revocation on the non-citizen's immediate family in Australia (where those family members are Australian citizens, permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely). The Tribunal's reasoning in relation to this consideration was as follows:156.There is a ready (and, in my respectful view, correct) acknowledgement by the Respondent that the Applicant arrived in Australia as a teenager, has resided here for 14 years and, as a consequence, there would be some impact on his family members were he to be returned to Liberia. There was some corroboration from his family members in this regard.157.However, I am of the view that less weight should be given to this Other Consideration (b) because of the operative effect of paragraph 14.2(1)(a) of the Direction. The Applicant commenced offending within one year of arriving in Australia. Paragraph 14.2(1)(a) stipulates that less weight should be given to this factor when a non-citizen begins offending soon after arriving here. Taking into account all of the evidence in and around the Applicant's offending history, I concur with the Respondent's contention that this Other Consideration (b) weighs slightly in favour of the Applicant, but is not out‑weighed by the Primary Considerations weighing against him. The applicant contends that the Tribunal was wrong to construe the paragraph so that the finding reached under paragraph 14.2(1)(a) meant that less weight should be given to the consideration at 14.2(1)(b). Paragraph 14.2(1)(a) is solely concerned with the non‑citizen. Paragraph 14.2(1)(a)(i) provides that less weight should be given to the considerations in 14.2(1)(a). Paragraph 14.2(1)(b) is different, as it is concerned with both the non‑citizen and the effect of non‑revocation of the visa on others. There is no basis to read it as requiring that the non‑citizen's history of offending means that less weight be given to the interests of those other people.