Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Applications Under Various Acts or Rules: Civil)

RUSSELL v POLITES INVESTMENTS PTY LTD

[2015] SASC 181

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Peek

12 November 2015

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EXTENSION OF TIME FOR APPEAL

On 12 August 2015 the applicant filed an interlocutory application seeking permission that an appeal (Supreme Court Action 1293 of 2010) be listed for hearing before the Full Court, which he said had not been done due to his bankruptcy between 20 December 2010 and 13 July 2015.

There appear to be two notices of appeal in this matter. The first, filed on 21 September 2010, is against the judgment of Judge Millsteed (District Court Action 925 of 2003), dismissing the plaintiff’s case against each defendant and ordering costs. The second, filed on 5 April 2011, is against the judgment of Judge Herriman (District Court Action 256 of 2007) refusing long extensions of time within which to appeal from the orders of two District Court Masters. Judge Herriman had found that the proposed appeals were frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court. No appeal to the Supreme Court was set down for hearing within the 6 months prescribed by the Rules.

On 28 August 2015 this present application came before Stanley J who ordered that the applicant file and serve a supporting affidavit by close of business 25 September 2015. On 8 October 2015 the applicant filed an affidavit of 43 pages with no reference to an explanation for the delay or the topic of bankruptcy, together with two bound books of documents, including what purported to be an affidavit annexing 12 pages of largely incomprehensible complaints about the trial before Judge Millsteed. On 26 October 2015, the applicant filed a booklet of 29 pages entitled “Appeal Book Submission.” On 30 October 2015 the application was heard by Peek J. His Honour reserved judgment.

Held (dismissing the application):

1.       Any appeal instituted by Supreme Court Action 1293 of 2010 is to be taken to have been discontinued and has lapsed pursuant to Rule 296(2).

2.       There is an unacceptable failure to explain the delay in the prosecution of the appeal against the orders of Judge Millsteed.

3.       There is an unacceptable failure to explain the delay in the prosecution of the proposed appeals against the orders of the two District Court Masters. The judgment of Judge Herriman refusing an extension of time within which these proposed appeals could be lodged was undoubtedly correct.

4.       The prospects of success on any appeal from the judgment of Judge Herriman would be virtually nil.

5.       The prospects of success on any appeal from the judgment of Judge Millsteed would be extremely low.

6.       The orders sought are not necessary for the proper conduct of the proceeding nor are otherwise in the interests of justice.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 60, 60(2), 60(4); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 Rule 117(1), 117(2),…

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Details
Case
[2015] SASC 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd was an appeal brought by Mr Douglas Russell against decisions made in previous proceedings. The case involved a dispute between Mr Russell and Polites Investments Pty Ltd (PIPL) regarding a lease agreement and alleged personal injuries sustained by Mr Russell. The dispute was initially heard in the District Court before being escalated to the Supreme Court. The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the appeal process, specifically whether the appeal should proceed given the appellant's bankruptcy and whether the appeal should be dismissed due to the appellant's inability to comply with a security for costs order.

The court considered the procedural history of the case, which included multiple District Court actions and a Supreme Court action. The court noted the appellant's numerous attempts to pursue claims against the respondents, which were consistently dismissed due to procedural deficiencies and failure to comply with court orders. The appellant's claims were often characterized by poorly drafted pleadings and irrelevant evidence. Despite the appellant's unrepresented status, the court emphasized the necessity for clear and comprehensible pleadings to avoid abuse of process.

In its reasoning, the court highlighted the importance of adhering to procedural requirements and the necessity for litigants to comply with court orders, including security for costs orders. The court found that the appellant had not sought an extension of time to comply with the security order and had acknowledged his inability to do so. The court concluded that the appeal should not proceed due to the appellant's bankruptcy and his failure to comply with the security for costs order, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

This application purports to be an interlocutory application brought by Mr Douglas Russell (Mr Russell) in Supreme Court Action 1293 of 2010. In effect, he applies for an order that “the appeal of 1293 of 2010 which has been unheard due to bankruptcy … now be listed for hearing in the Full Supreme Court”. The background facts For the purposes of this application it is necessary to consider in some detail two District Court actions as well as Supreme Court Action 1293 of 2010. District Court Action 925 of 2003: Russell v Polites Princes Group of Companies & Ors On 23 June 2003 Mr Russell instituted District Court Action 925 of 2003 against the first defendant, the Polites Princes Group of Companies (“the Polites Group”), the second defendant, Polites Investment Pty Ltd (“PIPL”) and the third defendant, George C Polites (“Mr Polites”). The plaintiff sought damages for personal injury that he claims to have suffered as a result of falling down stairs in premises he leased from PIPL. District Court Action 925 of 2003 came on for trial before Judge Millsteed on 13 September 2006. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the defendants submitted that there was no case to answer. The Judge heard full submissions from both sides and reserved judgment. On 8 July 2009 his Honour delivered his ruling that there was no case to answer and published very detailed reasons for that ruling. During the course of the ruling Judge Millsteed made the following observations:[1][3] PIPL owned a double storey building situated at 254 Hindley Street, Adelaide, all, or part, of which was leased to the plaintiff. The plaintiff contends that the lease extended to the whole of the building, while the defendants assert that it was confined to the ground floor. It is the plaintiff’s case that on three occasions in October 1999, January 2000 and August 2000 he slipped while descending the stairs and, on each occasion, injured his back. The first two falls are not actionable by virtue of s 36 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 having occurred more than three years before the plaintiff commenced this action on 23 June 2003.[2] His claim is therefore limited to the third fall. [4] The plaintiff is an unrepresented litigant. His pleadings were poorly drafted and a good deal of the evidence and arguments he presented at trial were irrelevant. However, reduced to the essentials the plaintiff’s case is that each defendant is liable in negligence for failing to provide safe stairs for his use as a tenant. The plaintiff’s final Amended Statement of Claim[3] asserts that the stairs were dangerous because they lacked handrails, were “too steep”, and had steps which were “too narrow”. Furthermore, the stairs did not meet “council and Australian building standards”. …[8] Before I turn to the evidence it is appropriate to make some observations about the manner in which the plaintiff presented his case. In addition to giving evidence in support of his claim the plaintiff called several witnesses only three of whom I need mention for the purposes of this ruling, namely, Jonathon Crouch (whose lease of the premises was assigned to the plaintiff), Mr Polites (the third defendant) and Mr Peter Murphy (an employee of the Polites Group responsible for leasing rental properties). [9] The last two mentioned witnesses were called by the plaintiff though he was aware they were adverse to his case and despite having been warned by a Master, upon a pre-trial application, of the risks associated with calling those witnesses and the limitations of examination-in-chief.[4] Despite this warning and by reason of the plaintiff being unrepresented, I took a liberal approach at trial and, at times, allowed him to cross-examine Mr Polites and Mr Murphy. (Emphasis added)[1] Russell v Polites Princes Group of Companies & Ors [2009] SADC 73.[2] No application has been made, pursuant to s 48 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936, for an extension of time within which to institute an action in respect of the first two falls.[3] Final Amended Statement of Claim dated 28 March 2006 (FDN 23).[4] see ex tempore orders of Master Rice of 8 September 2006 (Judgment No 111 of 2006).

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J
I adopt the following chronological summary of events relating to District Court Action 256 of 2007 compiled by Judge Herriman (as from February 2007):[5][5] Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd [2011] SADC 30.7.3.2An Amended Statement of Claim was filed in October 2007 (FDN 3). In that document the appellant asserted: 32. The plaintiff wishes to pursue the claims that the landlord/occupier did wrongfully knowingly evict the plaintiff to conceal the defendants who knowingly had wrongfully leased the said property to not relinquish the landlord’s/occupiers title and furthermore the plaintiff states the said breach of contract to be illegal to point of a conspiracy to wrongfully charge rent to the disadvantaged plaintiff with complete and total disregards to the state statures [Fair Tradings Act 1987] and [Consolidated Act]] [Retail and Commercial Leases Act] [Development Act] [Real Estate Trading Act] and [the laws of State] [the law of negligence] [company law] [criminal law] [local government] and [contract and property law] [sic]He then sought repayment of rents paid to the landlord, the sum of $700,000 by way of ‘loss of profit’, renovation costs and ‘unspecified other costs’.7.3.3On 25 February 2008 the defendants applied to have that Amended Statement of Claim struck out on the grounds that it did not comply with the Rules, that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action, that it purported to raise matters which had been judicially determined by His Honour Judge Millsteed, that it was vexatious and embarrassing and that it constituted an abuse of process.The defendants also sought an order that the appellant provide security for their costs of and incidental to the action.7.3.4On 24 October 2008 Master Bampton ordered that the Amended Statement of Claim be struck out. In her reasons, the learned Master noted that there was no pleading supporting the introduction of parties other than the second defendant in the action (being the respondent herein) and she accordingly dismissed the claims against the first and third defendants. She observed: I am also of the view the pleading against the second defendant is in many instances irrelevant and incomprehensible … I am conscious that the plaintiff does not have the benefit of legal assistance. Making allowance for this, the claim put forward by the plaintiff is difficult to distil and comprehend. The amended statement of claim does not comply with the Rules as to pleading and is an abuse of process of the court. This is a clear and obvious case where the court should exercise its discretion and strike out the amended statement of claim pursuant to 6R 104.The plaintiff must set out his pleading in clear, comprehensible language so that the defendant and the court can understand what he says establishes his cause of action and why he says he is entitled to the relief he seeks …I strike out the amended statement of claim and give the plaintiff a final opportunity to replead his claim against the second defendant only. The plaintiff must not replead the matters pertaining to the claim for damages for personal injury that is the subject of the proceedings before Judge Millsteed. The plaintiff must take heed of my comments regarding the deficiencies in the amended statement of claim I have struck out.The plaintiff must also seek an extension of time …Otherwise, the learned Master adjourned the respondent’s application for security for costs.7.3.5On 20 November 2008 the appellant filed a Further Amended Statement of Claim (FDN 11) alleging that the respondent had caused him loss and damage by providing him with an incorrect disclosure statement and fraudulently concealing from him the correct Certificate of Title reference and fraudulently increasing his rent, these being matters which had only come to his attention during the trial in Action 925 of 2003.The document went on:The PLAINTIFF does claim the following which the Defendants cannot denyBreach of LeaseFraud and Fraudulent ConcealmentBreach of the Trade practices ActBreach of the Real Estate and Property ActBreach of the Retail and Commercial leases ActBreach of ContractBreach of the Development ActWrongful Eviction and other WrongsWhich did resulted in the Plaintiff Loss and Damages from the Property leased by the Defendants wrongly contravening Statutes, Laws, Rules, and Regulations of Commonwealth and State and Council[sic]That document appeared to seek damages of the kind identified in his previous Statement of Claim.7.3.6Subsequently, on 8 July 2009, His Honour Judge Millsteed delivered his decision in Action No. 925 of 2003.7.3.7On 9 July 2009 Master Bampton heard further argument upon the respondent’s application for security for costs. In the course of doing so she addressed the adequacy of the appellant’s Further Amended Statement of Claim in this action (FDN 11). She observed:6. Pursuant to my orders 24/10/08, the plaintiff filed and served a further amended statement of claim on 28/11/08. I am concerned that this amended pleading still suffers from the deficiencies I identified in paragraphs 17 of my Reasons for Decision dated 24/10/08. It also appears from the amended pleading the plaintiff still seeks to agitate his eviction from the premises in August 2000 and matters that were the subject of proceedings before Judge Millsteed.7. Allowing for the fact that the plaintiff does not have legal assistance, I am not satisfied he has pleaded an arguable case against the second defendant in the further amended statement of claim.8. Accordingly, having regard to the matters set out above I am satisfied it is necessary in the interests of justice to order the plaintiff to provide security for costs pursuant to 6R 194(1)(e).The learned Master thereupon ordered that the appellant provide the sum of $15,000 by way of security by 14 August 2009 and that in default of such payment the action be stayed.Those orders are now the subject of Appeal 1.7.3.8The appellant did not pay into court any sum by way of security and on 21 January 2010 the respondent applied to have the appellant’s action dismissed for want of prosecution. In response, the appellant filed an application seeking leave to pursue his claim without having to comply with the security order. He advanced no new basis for that application, which effectively sought a review of Master Bampton’s order.7.3.9Both applications came on for hearing before Master Blumberg on 31 May 2010. He refused to vary Master Bampton’s order and otherwise ordered that the appellant’s claim against the respondent be dismissed for want of prosecution. He also awarded the respondent costs on those applications. An allocatur with respect to those costs was subsequently lodged. In reasons delivered on 31 May (FDN 25), Master Blumberg commented:· that the appellant had not sought an extension of time in order to comply with the security order and, accordingly, he lifted the stay of proceedings; · that he agreed with Master Bampton’s observations with respect to the inadequacy of the Further Amended Statement of Claim (FDN 11);· that irrespective of any merit, the action ought to be dismissed because the appellant had not, would not and could not provide security and he had freely acknowledged that.Those orders are now the subject of Appeal 2.7.4The 2010 Magistrates Court ActionOn 15 June 2010 the appellant instituted further proceedings against the respondent in the Adelaide Magistrates Court which prima facie sought to re-agitate the relief sought in this action.On 10 August 2010 that claim was dismissed on the footing that it amounted to an abuse of process.The judgment of Judge Herriman in District Court Action 256 of 2007

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J

In the case of Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd, the Full Supreme Court addressed several significant procedural issues, focusing on whether the appellant, Mr Douglas Russell, should be granted an extension of time to lodge his appeal and whether various orders made by lower courts should be quashed. The court also considered whether Mr Russell should be granted leave to pursue his claim without complying with a security order and whether his amended pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

Firstly, regarding the extension of time for Mr Russell to lodge his appeal, the court examined the appellant's circumstances, including his lack of legal representation and the complexity of the case. The Full Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulties faced by Mr Russell, who was an unrepresented litigant with poorly drafted pleadings. However, the court held that despite these challenges, the appellant had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances that warranted an extension of time. The court reasoned that while Mr Russell's situation was sympathetic, it did not provide a sufficient basis for granting an extension beyond the statutory time limit for lodging the appeal. Consequently, the court declined to grant an extension of time for the appellant to lodge his appeal.

Secondly, the court assessed whether the orders made by the Magistrates Court dismissing Mr Russell's claim for abuse of process should be quashed. The Magistrates Court had dismissed the claim on the basis that it amounted to an abuse of process. The Full Supreme Court reviewed the Magistrates Court's decision and considered whether the dismissal was justified. The court found that the Magistrates Court's decision was appropriate, given that Mr Russell's claim sought to re-agitate relief already considered in prior proceedings. The Full Supreme Court upheld the Magistrates Court's order, confirming that the dismissal for abuse of process was correctly made.

Thirdly, the court turned to whether the orders made by Master Bampton requiring Mr Russell to provide security for costs should be quashed. Master Bampton had ordered that Mr Russell provide security for costs due to the inadequacy of his Further Amended Statement of Claim. The Full Supreme Court examined the reasoning behind Master Bampton's order and found it to be sound. The court concluded that the Master had correctly identified deficiencies in Mr Russell's pleadings and had reasonably ordered security for costs to protect the respondent from potential costs incurred due to the appellant's failure to comply with court orders. Thus, the Full Supreme Court upheld Master Bampton's order.

Fourthly, the court addressed whether the orders made by Master Blumberg dismissing Mr Russell's claim for want of prosecution and awarding costs should be quashed. Master Blumberg had dismissed the claim for want of prosecution because Mr Russell had not complied with the security order and had acknowledged his inability to do so. The Full Supreme Court found that Master Blumberg's decision was justified, as Mr Russell had not sought an extension of time to comply with the security order and had freely acknowledged his inability to provide the required security. The court also noted that Master Blumberg had appropriately considered the inadequacy of Mr Russell's Further Amended Statement of Claim. Consequently, the Full Supreme Court upheld Master Blumberg's orders.

Fifthly, the court examined whether Mr Russell should be granted leave to pursue his claim without having to comply with the security order. Mr Russell sought leave to proceed without providing security for costs, essentially asking for a review of Master Bampton's order. The Full Supreme Court found that Mr Russell had not provided a new basis for his application and that the security order was correctly made. The court held that Mr Russell was not entitled to leave to pursue his claim without complying with the security order, as his arguments did not present a compelling case for departure from the lower court's decision.

Lastly, the court considered whether Mr Russell's Amended Statement of Claim and Further Amended Statement of Claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action. The Full Supreme Court reviewed the pleadings and found them to be inadequate. The court held that neither statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action due to their lack of clarity and relevance, as well as their failure to comply with court rules. The Full Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts were correct in their assessment of the pleadings.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Full Supreme Court will not grant an extension of time for lodging an appeal unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. It will uphold orders made by lower courts in the absence of a compelling reason to do otherwise, including orders dismissing claims for abuse of process, requiring security for costs, and dismissing claims for want of prosecution. Additionally, the court will not grant leave to proceed without complying with a security order if the applicant has not provided a new basis for their application. Finally, the court will find that pleadings are inadequate if they are unclear, irrelevant, or do not comply with court rules.