Supreme Court of South Australia
(Full Court)
RUSSELL v POLITES INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
[2020] SASCFC 11
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Justice Nicholson, The Honourable Justice Parker and The Honourable Auxiliary Justice David)
26 February 2020
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT - INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
Applications for permission to appeal relating to two separate actions.
The appellant appeals against orders made by Peek J on 12 November 2015, Stanley J on 17 August 2016 and Doyle J on 25 August 2017, in Supreme Court Actions 1293 of 2010 and 934 of 2015, respectively.
The orders made by Peek, Stanley and Doyle JJ concern the appellant’s appeals against the dismissal of his claim for personal injury by Judge Millsteed in District Court Action 925 of 2003 and dismissal of his claim for a breach of lease by Judge Herriman in District Court Action 256 of 2007. The orders, inter alia, refused an extension of time under r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) to set down the appeals for hearing and also dismissed the appeals under r 294(1)(h) on the basis that they had no prospect of success. Those decisions were interlocutory and permission to appeal is required.
Held, per Parker J (Nicholson J and David AJ agreeing), refusing permission to appeal in both actions:
1. The appellant cannot rely upon the statutory stay under s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to justify his failure to lodge the appeals, or to set the appeals down for hearing within the required time limits. The effect of s 60(4) is that the appellant was entitled to continue the personal injury claim after his bankruptcy without any requirement for his trustee to make an election. Thus, his bankruptcy cannot explain the delay.
2. The appellant’s complaints that two witnesses had lied to explain their unavailability on the first day of trial of the personal injury claim and a third witness was unavailable throughout the trial are completely devoid of merit.
3. The appellant’s complaint that a booklet containing copies of medical evidence was mislaid for a period prior to trial in the personal injury claim had absolutely no bearing on the outcome of the proceedings. There is no merit in that contention.
4. The appellant’s contention that the certificate of title and street number for the premises that he had leased on Hindley Street was incorrectly recorded on his lease is without merit. Neither the certificate of title nor the street number was relevant to the personal injury claim. Even if the complaints by the appellant are correct, that could have no possible bearing on the correctness of the decision made by Judge Millsteed.
5. The appellant’s complaint that Master Blumberg did not have jurisdiction to review the decisions made by Master Bampton in the tenancy claim is incorrect. The Master had jurisdiction to consider whether subsisting interlocutory orders…
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- Case
- [2020] SASCFC 11
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Full Court included whether permission to appeal should be granted against the interlocutory orders made by various judges and Masters, and the merits of Mr Russell's appeals against the dismissal of his personal injury claim and adverse findings in the tenancy dispute. The Court was required to consider whether Mr Russell's appeals had been validly instituted and prosecuted, particularly in light of his bankruptcy and the rules governing the discontinuance of appeals.
The Court reasoned that the orders made by the Masters and Judge Herriman were interlocutory, thus requiring permission to appeal. It noted that Mr Russell's attempts to re-litigate matters already judicially determined against him were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, echoing the findings of previous judges. The Court found that Mr Russell's appeals had been deemed discontinued and lapsed under the Supreme Court Civil Rules due to failure to set them down for hearing within the prescribed time. Furthermore, the Court found that Mr Russell's bankruptcy did not excuse the extensive delay in prosecuting his appeals, and that his prospects of success were extremely low, bordering on nil.
Consequently, the Full Court considered the applications for permission to appeal on the papers and dismissed them. The Court affirmed that Mr Russell's appeals had lapsed and that his conduct amounted to an abuse of process, with a warning that further such conduct could lead to him being declared a vexatious litigant.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Because I had strong reservations about the capacity of Mr Russell to deal effectively with the preparation of the casebook, and so as to facilitate the hearing of the appeal, I had arranged for my associate to prepare the casebook. The content of the casebook was ultimately agreed by the parties. Nevertheless, immediately prior to the hearing, Mr Russell filed a further four volumes of submissions and documents. At the commencement of the hearing he also handed up copies of correspondence sent to him by the Adelaide City Council. I will refer to the content of that correspondence later. Mr Russell also handed up another book of documents described as submissions.[18] While the Court has perused the latter material, it largely comprises further repetitive submissions or contains additional copies of documents previously received or produced by this Court and the District Court. That is also the case with a further two volumes of documents lodged by Mr Russell with the Court several weeks after the hearing in the Full Court. [18] The last page in that document is numbered 311. However, the numbering is not sequential, i.e. there is something less than 311 pages.Consideration I have carefully read and considered the three Supreme Court judgments delivered by Peek, Stanley and Doyle JJ and also the reasons published in the District Court by Judges Millsteed, Herriman and Stretton. Certain of the observations made by Judge Herriman in 2011 remain apposite, those being:[19] [19] Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd [2011] SADC 30 at [22], [35], [36] (Judge Herriman). [22] Further, having regard to the appellant’s continued failure to articulate a maintainable cause of action, his refusal to accept the binding effect of Judge Millsteed’s findings, whether in the hearings before the learned Masters or before me, and the scandalous accusations he makes in his affidavit of 8 December 2010 (FDN 35) of bias and corruption, I find myself satisfied that his pursuit of this appeal is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of court process.…[35]This long and sorry saga can be thus summarised:(1) In the personal injury claim the appellant specifically raised issues touching upon the conduct of the parties in and about the assignment of the subject lease and as to its true meaning. Evidence was called on those issues and His Honour Judge Millsteed specifically found against the appellant’s contentions.(2) Those matters having been litigated and judicially determined, it is not open to the appellant to seek to re-litigate them, even if the form of relief sought by him differs from that sought in the personal injury claim, yet he has sought to do so, both in these proceedings and in the 2010 Magistrates Court action.He must understand that he is not at liberty to do that. He has been told as much several times before but seems unprepared to accept it.(3) He was unable to articulate or plead any other maintainable cause against the respondent in these proceedings and this led to the making of security and stay orders.(4) Those orders remained in place for several months without any appeal having been lodged nor security provided, nor indeed any attempt by the appellant to seek to extend the time for compliance with the security order. (5) Ultimately, when the respondent’s application for dismissal of the proceedings came on for hearing, the appellant still had not sought to plead a maintainable cause nor had he taken any steps with respect to the security order.In consequence, Master Blumberg dismissed the appellant’s claim. Although not strictly called upon to deal with the merit issues decided upon by Master Bampton, he also considered and noted that he agreed with her findings. With all due respect to both learned Masters, I must say that I do, too. (6) I have refused the appellant’s application for extension of time on each appeal.(7) The appellant advanced no new material or any argument satisfying me that either Master acted on a wrong principle, made incorrect factual findings, had regard to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failed to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant matters.There was no other reason advanced for departing from the decision of either Master and, indeed, all that was effectively put to the court on the hearing of each appeal was a submission that the appellant was impecunious and otherwise repetition of his contentions as to the terms of the lease assignment.(8) On the merits generally, it appears to me that the appellant has been afforded every opportunity to properly plead a cause in this matter and he has failed to do so.(9) I have found the appellant’s pursuit of both appeals to be frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of court process and, indeed, his repeated attempts at re-litigating a matter already judicially determined against him, put him at risk of being declared a vexatious litigant.[36]Ultimately, there is a serious and practical need for finality in litigation and in respect of the matters which here excite the appellant, that point has been reached and he must accept that.