Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Full Court)

RUSSELL v POLITES INVESTMENTS PTY LTD

[2020] SASCFC 11

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Nicholson, The Honourable Justice Parker and The Honourable Auxiliary Justice David)

26 February 2020

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT - INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS

Applications for permission to appeal relating to two separate actions.

The appellant appeals against orders made by Peek J on 12 November 2015, Stanley J on 17 August 2016 and Doyle J on 25 August 2017, in Supreme Court Actions 1293 of 2010 and 934 of 2015, respectively.

The orders made by Peek, Stanley and Doyle JJ concern the appellant’s appeals against the dismissal of his claim for personal injury by Judge Millsteed in District Court Action 925 of 2003 and dismissal of his claim for a breach of lease by Judge Herriman in District Court Action 256 of 2007. The orders, inter alia, refused an extension of time under r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) to set down the appeals for hearing and also dismissed the appeals under r 294(1)(h) on the basis that they had no prospect of success. Those decisions were interlocutory and permission to appeal is required.

Held, per Parker J (Nicholson J and David AJ agreeing), refusing permission to appeal in both actions:

1. The appellant cannot rely upon the statutory stay under s 60 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to justify his failure to lodge the appeals, or to set the appeals down for hearing within the required time limits. The effect of s 60(4) is that the appellant was entitled to continue the personal injury claim after his bankruptcy without any requirement for his trustee to make an election. Thus, his bankruptcy cannot explain the delay.

2.  The appellant’s complaints that two witnesses had lied to explain their unavailability on the first day of trial of the personal injury claim and a third witness was unavailable throughout the trial are completely devoid of merit. 

3.  The appellant’s complaint that a booklet containing copies of medical evidence was mislaid for a period prior to trial in the personal injury claim had absolutely no bearing on the outcome of the proceedings. There is no merit in that contention.

4.  The appellant’s contention that the certificate of title and street number for the premises that he had leased on Hindley Street was incorrectly recorded on his lease is without merit. Neither the certificate of title nor the street number was relevant to the personal injury claim. Even if the complaints by the appellant are correct, that could have no possible bearing on the correctness of the decision made by Judge Millsteed.

5.  The appellant’s complaint that Master Blumberg did not have jurisdiction to review the decisions made by Master Bampton in the tenancy claim is incorrect.  The Master had jurisdiction to consider whether subsisting interlocutory orders…

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Details
Case
[2020] SASCFC 11
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia by Mr Russell against interlocutory orders made in District Court proceedings. The primary dispute arose from a personal injury claim brought by Mr Russell against his former landlord, Polites Investments Pty Ltd, alleging injury from a fall down stairs. At the conclusion of Mr Russell's case, the District Court found no case to answer. Mr Russell also pursued a separate tenancy dispute.

The legal issues before the Full Court included whether permission to appeal should be granted against the interlocutory orders made by various judges and Masters, and the merits of Mr Russell's appeals against the dismissal of his personal injury claim and adverse findings in the tenancy dispute. The Court was required to consider whether Mr Russell's appeals had been validly instituted and prosecuted, particularly in light of his bankruptcy and the rules governing the discontinuance of appeals.

The Court reasoned that the orders made by the Masters and Judge Herriman were interlocutory, thus requiring permission to appeal. It noted that Mr Russell's attempts to re-litigate matters already judicially determined against him were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, echoing the findings of previous judges. The Court found that Mr Russell's appeals had been deemed discontinued and lapsed under the Supreme Court Civil Rules due to failure to set them down for hearing within the prescribed time. Furthermore, the Court found that Mr Russell's bankruptcy did not excuse the extensive delay in prosecuting his appeals, and that his prospects of success were extremely low, bordering on nil.

Consequently, the Full Court considered the applications for permission to appeal on the papers and dismissed them. The Court affirmed that Mr Russell's appeals had lapsed and that his conduct amounted to an abuse of process, with a warning that further such conduct could lead to him being declared a vexatious litigant.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The orders made by Masters Bampton and Blumberg and by Judge Herriman were clearly interlocutory. Thus, the decisions made in relation to appeals from those orders in Action 934 of 2015 by Peek, Stanley and Doyle JJ were also interlocutory and permission to appeal is required. In accordance with r 290, whether permission to appeal should be granted has been considered on the papers.BackgroundThe personal injury claim The first of the District Court proceedings was Action 925 of 2003. Mr Russell sought damages for personal injury based upon a claim in negligence against Polites Investments Pty Ltd, his former landlord of retail premises in Hindley Street. I will refer to that action as the personal injury claim. The basis for the claim was that Mr Russell had allegedly suffered injury caused by falling down the stairs. At the conclusion of Mr Russell’s case, Judge Millsteed ruled on 8 July 2009 that there was no case to answer. His Honour published detailed reasons for his decision comprising 28 pages.[4] [4] Russell v Polites Princes Group of Companies [2009] SADC 73. Judge Millsteed found that there was no basis upon which the first defendant, the Polites Group, or the third defendant, Mr George Polites, a director of Polites Investments and the Chief Executive of the Polites Group, could be legally liable for any injury suffered by Mr Russell. It had not been established that the Polites Group was a body corporate capable of being sued. It had also not been established that Mr Polites[5] was personally liable for tortious conduct by Polites Investments. Judge Millsteed reached the latter conclusion after applying the three recognised tests for determining whether a director was liable for the tortious acts of a company. Judge Millsteed found that it could not be said that Mr Polites had a case to answer under any of those three tests. There was simply no evidence upon which liability could be established.[5] My references to “Mr Polites” refer to Mr George Polites. His father, Mr Con Polites, who had passed away some years before the trial, was mentioned in evidence. Judge Millsteed also found, notwithstanding the subjective belief of Mr Russell and also the belief of a former tenant whose rights under the lease had been assigned to Mr Russell, that the lease only permitted Mr Russell to occupy the ground floor of the premises. Judge Millsteed rejected the contention by Mr Russell that the defendant had deliberately deceived him into thinking that the lease extended to the upper floor. His Honour expressly stated that he had reached that conclusion after carefully watching the witnesses and closely examining their evidence. While a plan attached to the memorandum of lease and a plan attached to the deed of assignment conveyed contradictory information as to whether the lease extended to the upper floor, Judge Millsteed found that Mr Russell had been expressly informed by an employee of the defendant that the lease was confined to the ground floor.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Judge Stretton made an interim order staying the enforcement of the costs order made by Judge Herriman in the tenancy matter pending the hearing of Mr Russell’s appeal to the Supreme Court. His Honour set aside the District Court costs allocatur of $13,898.71 and also reserved his decision as to the costs of that appeal. The Court has been informed that the orders made by Judge Stretton remain in operation. The decision of Peek J in Action 1293 of 2010 delivered on 12 November 2015 On 21 September 2010, Mr Russell lodged an appeal against the orders of Judge Millsteed dismissing the personal injury claim. On 5 April 2011, he lodged an appeal against the orders made by Judge Herriman in the tenancy dispute. Both appeals were filed in Supreme Court Action 1293 of 2010, being the file relating to the personal injury claim. As neither the appeal lodged on 21 September 2010 nor that lodged on 5 April 2011 was set down for hearing within six months, r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) operated to deem both appeals to have been discontinued and lapsed. On 12 August 2015 Mr Russell lodged an interlocutory application seeking permission for both appeals to be listed before the Full Court. Stanley J made procedural orders and the application was then heard before Peek J on 30 October 2015. On 12 November 2015, Peek J dismissed the application by Mr Russell that the two appeals filed in Action 1293 of 2010 be listed for hearing in the Full Court. Peek J rejected the contention by Mr Russell that s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) had operated to impose a stay that prevented him from prosecuting his appeals to the Full Court during the period when he was bankrupt. Peek J accepted that Mr Russell was bankrupt from 20 December 2010 until 13 July 2015. However, s 60(4) of the Bankruptcy Act permitted the continuation of a personal injury claim by a bankrupt. The delay was otherwise unexplained. Peek J indicated that, in his opinion, the prospects of success on any appeal from the judgment of Judge Millsteed were extremely low. His Honour also indicated that the prospects of success on any appeal from the judgment of Judge Herriman were virtually nil. Peek J also adopted with approval what he described as the “wise words” of Judge Herriman that:[15] I have found the appellant’s pursuit of both appeals to be frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of court process and, indeed, his repeated attempts at re-litigating a matter already judicially determined against him, put him at risk of being declared a vexatious litigant. [15] Ibid at [39] (Peek J). Peek J noted that the risk that Mr Russell might be declared a vexatious litigant had been accentuated by his conduct since Judge Herriman’s judgment. Peek J declared that any appeal that had been instituted in Action 1293 of 2010 was taken to have been discontinued and lapsed pursuant to r 296(2). I consider that this order applied to Mr Russell’s appeals to the Full Court in relation to the personal injury claim and also the tenancy claim.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Because I had strong reservations about the capacity of Mr Russell to deal effectively with the preparation of the casebook, and so as to facilitate the hearing of the appeal, I had arranged for my associate to prepare the casebook. The content of the casebook was ultimately agreed by the parties. Nevertheless, immediately prior to the hearing, Mr Russell filed a further four volumes of submissions and documents. At the commencement of the hearing he also handed up copies of correspondence sent to him by the Adelaide City Council. I will refer to the content of that correspondence later. Mr Russell also handed up another book of documents described as submissions.[18] While the Court has perused the latter material, it largely comprises further repetitive submissions or contains additional copies of documents previously received or produced by this Court and the District Court. That is also the case with a further two volumes of documents lodged by Mr Russell with the Court several weeks after the hearing in the Full Court. [18] The last page in that document is numbered 311. However, the numbering is not sequential, i.e. there is something less than 311 pages.Consideration I have carefully read and considered the three Supreme Court judgments delivered by Peek, Stanley and Doyle JJ and also the reasons published in the District Court by Judges Millsteed, Herriman and Stretton. Certain of the observations made by Judge Herriman in 2011 remain apposite, those being:[19] [19] Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd [2011] SADC 30 at [22], [35], [36] (Judge Herriman). [22] Further, having regard to the appellant’s continued failure to articulate a maintainable cause of action, his refusal to accept the binding effect of Judge Millsteed’s findings, whether in the hearings before the learned Masters or before me, and the scandalous accusations he makes in his affidavit of 8 December 2010 (FDN 35) of bias and corruption, I find myself satisfied that his pursuit of this appeal is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of court process.…[35]This long and sorry saga can be thus summarised:(1) In the personal injury claim the appellant specifically raised issues touching upon the conduct of the parties in and about the assignment of the subject lease and as to its true meaning. Evidence was called on those issues and His Honour Judge Millsteed specifically found against the appellant’s contentions.(2) Those matters having been litigated and judicially determined, it is not open to the appellant to seek to re-litigate them, even if the form of relief sought by him differs from that sought in the personal injury claim, yet he has sought to do so, both in these proceedings and in the 2010 Magistrates Court action.He must understand that he is not at liberty to do that. He has been told as much several times before but seems unprepared to accept it.(3) He was unable to articulate or plead any other maintainable cause against the respondent in these proceedings and this led to the making of security and stay orders.(4) Those orders remained in place for several months without any appeal having been lodged nor security provided, nor indeed any attempt by the appellant to seek to extend the time for compliance with the security order. (5) Ultimately, when the respondent’s application for dismissal of the proceedings came on for hearing, the appellant still had not sought to plead a maintainable cause nor had he taken any steps with respect to the security order.In consequence, Master Blumberg dismissed the appellant’s claim. Although not strictly called upon to deal with the merit issues decided upon by Master Bampton, he also considered and noted that he agreed with her findings. With all due respect to both learned Masters, I must say that I do, too. (6) I have refused the appellant’s application for extension of time on each appeal.(7) The appellant advanced no new material or any argument satisfying me that either Master acted on a wrong principle, made incorrect factual findings, had regard to extraneous or irrelevant matters, or failed to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant matters.There was no other reason advanced for departing from the decision of either Master and, indeed, all that was effectively put to the court on the hearing of each appeal was a submission that the appellant was impecunious and otherwise repetition of his contentions as to the terms of the lease assignment.(8) On the merits generally, it appears to me that the appellant has been afforded every opportunity to properly plead a cause in this matter and he has failed to do so.(9) I have found the appellant’s pursuit of both appeals to be frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of court process and, indeed, his repeated attempts at re-litigating a matter already judicially determined against him, put him at risk of being declared a vexatious litigant.[36]Ultimately, there is a serious and practical need for finality in litigation and in respect of the matters which here excite the appellant, that point has been reached and he must accept that.