JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: RODGERS -v- DE MOL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD [No 2] [2016] WASC 151
CORAM: KENNETH MARTIN J
HEARD: 23 MARCH 2016
DELIVERED : 23 MARCH 2016
PUBLISHED : 17 MAY 2016
FILE NO/S: CIV 2192 of 2010
BETWEEN: LYNDON DOUGLAS RODGERS
ROBERTA WINIFRED RODGERS
First PlaintiffsGILROG PTY LTD
Second PlaintiffAND
DE MOL INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
First DefendantJAMAC CONSTRUCTION GROUP PTY LTD
Second DefendantAON RISK SERVICES LTD
Fourth Third Party
Catchwords:
Costs - Proposed discontinuance of third party proceedings - All other aspects of complex multi-party litigation resolved - Defendant seeks leave to discontinue on basis of no orders as to costs - Supervening events in trial - No criticism of defendant in bringing third party proceedings - High level view of proceedings - No capitulation
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Foreshadowed grant of leave to discontinue with no order as to costs
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
First Plaintiffs : No appearance
Second Plaintiff : No appearance
First Defendant : Mr P Mendelow
Second Defendant : No appearance
Fourth Third Party : Mr G Hancy
Solicitors:
First Plaintiffs : No appearance
Second Plaintiff : No appearance
First Defendant : WHL Legal Pty Ltd
Second Defendant : No appearance
Fourth Third Party : HBA Legal
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Ann Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd v KPMG [2011] FCA 453
Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 162
Clark v ING Life Ltd [2007] FCA 1960
Marsh v Baxter [2014] WASC 187; (2014) 46 WAR 377
McClure v The Mayor and Councillors of the City of Stirling (No 3) [2009] WASC 247
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622
Re Western Australian Planning Commission; Ex parte Solomon [2010] WASCA 236 (S)
Rigging West Pty Ltd v Stanick Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 185
Rodgers v De Mol Investments Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 284
KENNETH MARTIN J:
(These reasons were delivered extemporaneously on 23 March 2016 and have been edited from the transcript.)
Background
The purpose of the hearing today is to hear an application by the first defendant to this action, De Mol Investments Pty Ltd (De Mol) for leave to discontinue its action against the fourth third party, Aon Risk Services Ltd (Aon), on terms that there be no order as to costs. That application is supported by its written submissions of 10 March 2015 and its reply submissions of 21 March 2016, and the affidavits of its solicitor, Ms Nicole Levy, filed on 11 and 18 March 2016.
De Mol's application is opposed by Aon, which has filed its written submissions of 16 March 2016, as well as an affidavit of its solicitor, Mr Mark Birbeck, filed 16 March 2016. Aon has also indicated, today, that it might want to put further relevant material (as to costs issues) before the court as it says, at par 5 of its written submissions, 'after…
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- Case
- [2016] WASC 151
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the relevant legal principles, drawing on several authorities. The central issue was whether De Mol's proposed discontinuance amounted to a surrender or if there had been a significant supervening event that altered the landscape of the dispute. The court referred to the well-known decision in Lai Qin, where McHugh J outlined the approach to determining whether a party should bear costs when discontinuing proceedings. Additionally, the Full Federal Court's decision in Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd provided further guidance on the principles to be considered. The court also considered local decisions such as McClure v The Mayor and Councillors of the City of Stirling (No 3) and Rigging West Pty Ltd v Stanick Pty Ltd, which provided context on the exercise of judicial discretion in such matters. Ultimately, the court concluded that De Mol's decision to discontinue was reasonable given the circumstances, and no costs were ordered against De Mol.
In summary, the court found that De Mol's proposal to discontinue the third-party proceedings without bearing costs was reasonable. The court's decision was based on a thorough analysis of the relevant legal principles and the specific circumstances of the case. The court considered the supervening events and the broader context of the litigation, ultimately concluding that no costs should be ordered against De Mol for discontinuing the proceedings. This decision underscores the importance of evaluating each case on its own merits when determining costs in situations involving the discontinuance of litigation.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as a request from De Mol Investments to discontinue third party proceedings without bearing costs. The request was made on the basis that all other aspects of the complex multi-party litigation had been resolved, and no criticism was made of De Mol Investments for bringing the third party proceedings. The court had to consider the defendant's application in light of the supervening events during the trial and determine if the defendant was effectively 'giving up' or 'surrendering' the litigation or if the change in the landscape of the dispute justified discontinuance without costs. The court examined relevant case law and principles to make its decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Has the party (De Mol) that wants to discontinue on the basis of not bearing costs acted reasonably?
2. Should the court exercise its judicial discretion in a manner that promotes settlement and mitigates against unnecessary litigation?
3. What are the relevant principles and case authorities that the court should consider in making its decision?
Held
1. The court concluded that De Mol had acted reasonably in seeking to discontinue on the basis of not bearing costs. The court found that no supervening event had significantly altered the landscape of the litigation, and thus De Mol's decision to discontinue was not akin to surrendering or walking away from the litigation.
2. The court exercised its judicial discretion to promote settlement and mitigate against unnecessary litigation. It found that the costs of the litigation should not be borne by the party seeking to discontinue, as there had not been a capitulation or surrender of the litigation.
3. The court considered several principles and case authorities in making its decision, including the Lai Qin test articulated by McHugh J and the Full Federal Court decision in Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd. It also referred to the decision of Beech J in McClure v The Mayor and Councillors of the City of Stirling (No 3) and the observations of Pullin and Newnes JJA in Re Western Australian Planning Commission; Ex parte Solomon. The court also considered its own decision in Rigging West Pty Ltd v Stanick Pty Ltd.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Her Honour refers to the well-known authorities, and particularly to the reasons of McHugh J in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622, 624, which are invariably referred to in these situations. Another significant decision that her Honour discusses at [28] is by the Full Federal Court, Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 162, particularly at [7], where a number of principles are set out. In blunt terms, the required analysis distils down to a question of whether or not I can detect in the putative discontinuing party that it is, in effect, 'giving up', 'surrendering' or walking away from the litigation, after having started off the fight in the first place. Or is the situation different? Is it more of a genre of case described in the case authorities as to there arising in the litigation (as it has progressed) some supervening event of significance which has changed the landscape - or to use the words of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Chapman:… where some supervening event or settlement so removes or modifies the subject of the dispute that, although it could not be said that one side has simply won, no issue remains between the parties except that of costs [7]. In the former class of case, that is, the surrender looking scenario by the former aggressor, there must usually follow an award of costs against it, favouring the party who is the beneficiary of the surrender. But in the latter genre of case, that is, where there emerges a supervening event in the litigation or some real modification of the case, then costs are normally not ordered against the discontinuing or terminating party. In that latter context, there are important policy considerations which mitigate towards promoting a settlement and correlatively against a court, in effect, countenancing the waste with what has become unnecessary litigation. So the first issue here is - in this situation, has the party (De Mol) that wants to discontinue on the basis of not bearing costs acted reasonably? A judicial discretion is exercised when the court is embarked upon that exercise. To the basket of case authorities that counsel have mentioned I add two more local decisions. First, I note the decision of Beech J in McClure v The Mayor and Councillors of the City of Stirling (No 3) [2009] WASC 247. In particular, I respectfully adopt his Honour's comprehensive analysis of the applicable principles. I note the general principles his Honour discusses at [26] - [29] and, in particular, by reference to the Lai Qin test as articulated by McHugh J. I would also add the observations of the Court of Appeal, Pullin and Newnes JJA, in Re Western Australian Planning Commission; Ex parte Solomon [2010] WASCA 236 (S). I would also add my decision in Rigging West Pty Ltd v Stanick Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 185. That was not a case of mooted discontinuance. Rather, it was one of dismissal, in circumstances where the proceedings had, effectively, fallen away in terms of underlying subject matter. But the approach is broadly analogous. I discussed underlying principles, at [65], by reference to the Lai Qin decision. I evaluated different considerations there, at [67], in particular at subparagraphs (e), (f) and (k). I found that that plaintiff would need to bear some of the costs of the dismissal effected in that case.