McClure v City of Stirling (No 3)

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   McCLURE -v- THE MAYOR AND COUNCILLORS OF THE CITY OF STIRLING [No 3] [2009] WASC 247

CORAM:   BEECH J

HEARD:   ON THE PAPERS

DELIVERED          :   7 SEPTEMBER 2009

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1644 of 2007

BETWEEN:   MALCOLM McCLURE

First Plaintiff

DANIEL BODKIN
Second Plaintiff

DIBA DURMANICH
Third Plaintiff

KIRSTY MacDONALD-ORCHARD
Fourth Plaintiff

JANET PEARCE
Fifth Plaintiff

LASANTA TILK
Sixth Plaintiff

AMY-ROSE GOODEY
Seventh Plaintiff

SHANTI BEZARD
Eighth Plaintiff

MARILYN STEVENS
Ninth Plaintiff

LENNARD BEROS
Tenth Plaintiff

RACHEL BESSEN
Eleventh Plaintiff

STANLEY BESSEN
Twelfth Plaintiff

ANTHONINA BUTLER
Thirteenth Plaintiff

FRANCIS BUTLER
Fourteenth Plaintiff

ALAN COX
Fifteenth Plaintiff

JULIE CHAPLIN
Sixteenth Plaintiff

PETER CHAPLIN
Seventeenth Plaintiff

SUSAN CHILDS
Eighteenth Plaintiff

GWENDOLINE DARCH
Nineteenth Plaintiff

CECIL DARCH
Twentieth Plaintiff

BRUCE EDMISTONE
Twenty-first Plaintiff

MAXINE GILMOUR
Twenty-second Plaintiff

ALAN PEARCE
Twenty-third Plaintiff

BETTY PEARCE
Twenty-fourth Plaintiff

CONSTANCE PICKERING
Twenty-fifth Plaintiff

BERYL TURNER
Twenty-sixth Plaintiff

ESMA WELLS
Twenty-seventh Plaintiff

LAWRENCE WELLS
Twenty-eighth Plaintiff

JOHN BESSELL-BROWN
Twenty-ninth Plaintiff

LINDA GENNOE
Thirtieth Plaintiff

WENDY COLGROVE
Thirty-first Plaintiff

PETER METROPOLIS
Thirty-second Plaintiff

BRIAN BENTLEY
Thirty-third Plaintiff

SUZANNE BESSELL-BROWN
Thirty-fourth Plaintiff

JILLIAN ILOTT
Thirty-fifth Plaintiff

KERRY BLY
Thirty-sixth Plaintiff

MARGARET HATZISTAVRIDI
Thirty-seventh Plaintiff

JUDITH JONES
Thirty-eighth Plaintiff

ELAINE McNEILL
Thirty-ninth Plaintiff

ROBERT PEIRCE
Fortieth Plaintiff

ROSE-MARIE PEIRCE
Forty-first Plaintiff

MICHELLE RAMSDEN
Forty-second Plaintiff

KED BEZARD
Forty-third Plaintiff

KEVIN DAWES
Forty-fourth Plaintiff

HENDRIK BROUWER
Forty-fifth Plaintiff

GINO CUOMO
Forty-sixth Plaintiff

MALCOLM DUUS
Forty-seventh Plaintiff

BRONWYN HANCOCK
Forty-eighth Plaintiff

MARIA JENKINS
Forty-ninth Plaintiff

PAOLO JUST
Fiftieth Plaintiff

ALAN LAURIE
Fifty-first Plaintiff

SUE SISOVIC
Fifty-second Plaintiff

IGOR SPAJIC
Fifty-third Plaintiff

MARTIN WALKER
Fifty-fourth Plaintiff

ZENNAAN HARKNESS
Fifty-fifth Plaintiff

ANDREW DONNELLY
Fifty-sixth Plaintiff

AND

THE MAYOR AND COUNCILLORS OF THE CITY OF STIRLING
First Defendants

CITY OF STIRLING
Second Defendant

RANGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE CITY OF STIRLING
Third Defendants

GRAHAM MARRIOTT
Fourth Defendant

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Fifth Defendant

MINISTER FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Sixth Defendant

DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE (ABN 61 313 082 730)
Seventh Defendant

Catchwords:

Costs - Plaintiffs seek leave to discontinue - Appropriate terms as to costs - Whether 'public interest' nature of litigation justifies departure from usual approach - Whether supervening event rendered litigation futile - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Plaintiffs granted leave to discontinue on terms that they pay the first to fourth defendants'  costs

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First to

Fifty-Sixth Plaintiffs       :     No appearance

First Defendants            :     No appearance

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Third Defendants           :     No appearance

Fourth Defendant           :     No appearance

Fifth Defendant              :     No appearance

Sixth Defendant             :     No appearance

Seventh Defendant         :     No appearance

Solicitors:

First to

Fifty-Sixth Plaintiffs       :     In person

First Defendants            :     McLeods

Second Defendant         :     McLeods

Third Defendants           :     McLeods

Fourth Defendant           :     McLeods

Fifth Defendant              :     No appearance

Sixth Defendant             :     No appearance

Seventh Defendant         :     No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Conservation Foundation v Forestry Commission (1988) 81 ALR 166

Australian Securities Commission v Aust‑Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194

Buddhist Society of Western Australia Inc v…

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Details
Case
[2009] WASC 247
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

McClure and others sought leave to discontinue their proceedings against the City of Stirling and others. The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit Court, with the court being asked to determine the appropriate terms for costs, given the discontinuance. The primary legal issue was whether the public interest nature of the litigation warranted a departure from the usual approach to costs, and if the supervening events had rendered the litigation futile. The court considered whether the plaintiffs had acted unreasonably in pursuing the litigation and whether the defendants had acted reasonably in defending it, up until the point where the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not acted unreasonably in discontinuing the proceedings and that the defendants had acted reasonably in defending them. The court also found that the supervening events had rendered the litigation futile. The court considered the principles set out in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin, which held that the power to order costs is a discretionary power, exercised after a hearing on the merits, and that the successful party is prima facie entitled to a costs order. However, the court held that in the present case, the usual approach to costs could be departed from due to the public interest nature of the litigation. The court also considered the observations made by Burchett J in ONE.TEL Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, which held that the determining factor in many cases would be the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties.

The court held that the plaintiffs were granted leave to discontinue the proceedings on terms that they pay the first to fourth defendants' costs. The court held that the plaintiffs had acted reasonably in discontinuing the proceedings and that the defendants had acted reasonably in defending them. The court also held that the supervening events had rendered the litigation futile, and that there was no clear reason why one party, rather than the other, should bear the costs. The court held that it was appropriate to make an order for costs in this case, given the public interest nature of the litigation and the fact that both parties had acted reasonably up until the point where the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile.

Orders

Orders of the court

Plaintiffs granted leave to discontinue on terms that they pay the first to fourth defendants' costs

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622, McHugh J dealt with a question of costs in the context of a discontinuance in materially different circumstances. He set out principles 'which govern an application for costs when a party elects not to pursue an action because he or she has achieved the relief sought in the action either by settlement or by extra‑curial means' (624). That is not the category in which the present case falls. Nonetheless, some of his Honour's observations may assist by analogy. McHugh J said as follows:In most jurisdictions today, the power to order costs is a discretionary power. Ordinarily, the power is exercised after a hearing on the merits and as a general rule the successful party is entitled to his or her costs: Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534. Success in the action or on particular issues is the fact that usually controls the exercise of the discretion. A successful party is prima facie entitled to a costs order: Latoudis v Casey (543, 566 ‑ 568). When there has been no hearing on the merits, however, a court is necessarily deprived of the factor that usually determines whether or how it will make a costs order.In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between parties: Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194, 201. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. In some cases, however, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties has acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the action: Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments (201). …Moreover, in some cases a judge may feel confident that, although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried. … But such cases are likely to be rare.If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings (624 – 625). In ONE.TEL Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270; (2000) 101 FCR 548, Burchett J said as follows:It is accepted that, in a case which terminates before there has been a hearing, the Court should not resolve the issue of costs by engaging in something in the nature of a hypothetical trial … But this does not mean that the Court can never make an order for costs. Often, it will be unable to do so; but in other cases an examination of the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties, respectively, may provide the basis of an order … …… What is well established is that frequently the determining factor will be the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties … …In my opinion, it is important to draw a distinction between cases in which one party, after litigating for some time, effectively surrenders to the other, and cases where some supervening event or settlement so removes or modifies the subject of the dispute that, although it could not be said that one side has simply won, no issue remains between the parties except that of costs. In the former type of case, there will commonly be lacking any basis for an exercise of the Court's discretion otherwise than by an award of costs to the successful party. It is the latter type of case which more often creates problems, since there may be difficulty in discerning a clear reason why one party, rather than the other, should bear the costs [5] ‑ [6].