JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: McCLURE -v- THE MAYOR AND COUNCILLORS OF THE CITY OF STIRLING [No 3] [2009] WASC 247
CORAM: BEECH J
HEARD: ON THE PAPERS
DELIVERED : 7 SEPTEMBER 2009
FILE NO/S: CIV 1644 of 2007
BETWEEN: MALCOLM McCLURE
First Plaintiff
DANIEL BODKIN
Second PlaintiffDIBA DURMANICH
Third PlaintiffKIRSTY MacDONALD-ORCHARD
Fourth PlaintiffJANET PEARCE
Fifth PlaintiffLASANTA TILK
Sixth PlaintiffAMY-ROSE GOODEY
Seventh PlaintiffSHANTI BEZARD
Eighth PlaintiffMARILYN STEVENS
Ninth PlaintiffLENNARD BEROS
Tenth PlaintiffRACHEL BESSEN
Eleventh PlaintiffSTANLEY BESSEN
Twelfth PlaintiffANTHONINA BUTLER
Thirteenth PlaintiffFRANCIS BUTLER
Fourteenth PlaintiffALAN COX
Fifteenth PlaintiffJULIE CHAPLIN
Sixteenth PlaintiffPETER CHAPLIN
Seventeenth PlaintiffSUSAN CHILDS
Eighteenth PlaintiffGWENDOLINE DARCH
Nineteenth PlaintiffCECIL DARCH
Twentieth PlaintiffBRUCE EDMISTONE
Twenty-first PlaintiffMAXINE GILMOUR
Twenty-second PlaintiffALAN PEARCE
Twenty-third PlaintiffBETTY PEARCE
Twenty-fourth PlaintiffCONSTANCE PICKERING
Twenty-fifth PlaintiffBERYL TURNER
Twenty-sixth PlaintiffESMA WELLS
Twenty-seventh PlaintiffLAWRENCE WELLS
Twenty-eighth PlaintiffJOHN BESSELL-BROWN
Twenty-ninth PlaintiffLINDA GENNOE
Thirtieth PlaintiffWENDY COLGROVE
Thirty-first PlaintiffPETER METROPOLIS
Thirty-second PlaintiffBRIAN BENTLEY
Thirty-third PlaintiffSUZANNE BESSELL-BROWN
Thirty-fourth PlaintiffJILLIAN ILOTT
Thirty-fifth PlaintiffKERRY BLY
Thirty-sixth PlaintiffMARGARET HATZISTAVRIDI
Thirty-seventh PlaintiffJUDITH JONES
Thirty-eighth PlaintiffELAINE McNEILL
Thirty-ninth PlaintiffROBERT PEIRCE
Fortieth PlaintiffROSE-MARIE PEIRCE
Forty-first PlaintiffMICHELLE RAMSDEN
Forty-second PlaintiffKED BEZARD
Forty-third PlaintiffKEVIN DAWES
Forty-fourth PlaintiffHENDRIK BROUWER
Forty-fifth PlaintiffGINO CUOMO
Forty-sixth PlaintiffMALCOLM DUUS
Forty-seventh PlaintiffBRONWYN HANCOCK
Forty-eighth PlaintiffMARIA JENKINS
Forty-ninth PlaintiffPAOLO JUST
Fiftieth PlaintiffALAN LAURIE
Fifty-first PlaintiffSUE SISOVIC
Fifty-second PlaintiffIGOR SPAJIC
Fifty-third PlaintiffMARTIN WALKER
Fifty-fourth PlaintiffZENNAAN HARKNESS
Fifty-fifth PlaintiffANDREW DONNELLY
Fifty-sixth PlaintiffAND
THE MAYOR AND COUNCILLORS OF THE CITY OF STIRLING
First DefendantsCITY OF STIRLING
Second DefendantRANGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE CITY OF STIRLING
Third DefendantsGRAHAM MARRIOTT
Fourth DefendantWESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING COMMISSION
Fifth DefendantMINISTER FOR PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Sixth Defendant
DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE (ABN 61 313 082 730)
Seventh Defendant
Catchwords:
Costs - Plaintiffs seek leave to discontinue - Appropriate terms as to costs - Whether 'public interest' nature of litigation justifies departure from usual approach - Whether supervening event rendered litigation futile - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Plaintiffs granted leave to discontinue on terms that they pay the first to fourth defendants' costs
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
First to
Fifty-Sixth Plaintiffs : No appearance
First Defendants : No appearance
Second Defendant : No appearance
Third Defendants : No appearance
Fourth Defendant : No appearance
Fifth Defendant : No appearance
Sixth Defendant : No appearance
Seventh Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
First to
Fifty-Sixth Plaintiffs : In person
First Defendants : McLeods
Second Defendant : McLeods
Third Defendants : McLeods
Fourth Defendant : McLeods
Fifth Defendant : No appearance
Sixth Defendant : No appearance
Seventh Defendant : No appearance
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Australian Conservation Foundation v Forestry Commission (1988) 81 ALR 166
Australian Securities Commission v Aust‑Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194
Buddhist Society of Western Australia Inc v…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read McClure v City of Stirling (No 3) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2009] WASC 247
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the plaintiffs had not acted unreasonably in discontinuing the proceedings and that the defendants had acted reasonably in defending them. The court also found that the supervening events had rendered the litigation futile. The court considered the principles set out in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin, which held that the power to order costs is a discretionary power, exercised after a hearing on the merits, and that the successful party is prima facie entitled to a costs order. However, the court held that in the present case, the usual approach to costs could be departed from due to the public interest nature of the litigation. The court also considered the observations made by Burchett J in ONE.TEL Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, which held that the determining factor in many cases would be the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties.
The court held that the plaintiffs were granted leave to discontinue the proceedings on terms that they pay the first to fourth defendants' costs. The court held that the plaintiffs had acted reasonably in discontinuing the proceedings and that the defendants had acted reasonably in defending them. The court also held that the supervening events had rendered the litigation futile, and that there was no clear reason why one party, rather than the other, should bear the costs. The court held that it was appropriate to make an order for costs in this case, given the public interest nature of the litigation and the fact that both parties had acted reasonably up until the point where the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile.
Orders
Orders of the court
Plaintiffs granted leave to discontinue on terms that they pay the first to fourth defendants' costs
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622, McHugh J dealt with a question of costs in the context of a discontinuance in materially different circumstances. He set out principles 'which govern an application for costs when a party elects not to pursue an action because he or she has achieved the relief sought in the action either by settlement or by extra‑curial means' (624). That is not the category in which the present case falls. Nonetheless, some of his Honour's observations may assist by analogy. McHugh J said as follows:In most jurisdictions today, the power to order costs is a discretionary power. Ordinarily, the power is exercised after a hearing on the merits and as a general rule the successful party is entitled to his or her costs: Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534. Success in the action or on particular issues is the fact that usually controls the exercise of the discretion. A successful party is prima facie entitled to a costs order: Latoudis v Casey (543, 566 ‑ 568). When there has been no hearing on the merits, however, a court is necessarily deprived of the factor that usually determines whether or how it will make a costs order.In an appropriate case, a court will make an order for costs even when there has been no hearing on the merits and the moving party no longer wishes to proceed with the action. The court cannot try a hypothetical action between parties: Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194, 201. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigated action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. In some cases, however, the court may be able to conclude that one of the parties has acted so unreasonably that the other party should obtain the costs of the action: Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments (201). …Moreover, in some cases a judge may feel confident that, although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried. … But such cases are likely to be rare.If it appears that both parties have acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings (624 – 625). In ONE.TEL Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270; (2000) 101 FCR 548, Burchett J said as follows:It is accepted that, in a case which terminates before there has been a hearing, the Court should not resolve the issue of costs by engaging in something in the nature of a hypothetical trial … But this does not mean that the Court can never make an order for costs. Often, it will be unable to do so; but in other cases an examination of the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties, respectively, may provide the basis of an order … …… What is well established is that frequently the determining factor will be the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties … …In my opinion, it is important to draw a distinction between cases in which one party, after litigating for some time, effectively surrenders to the other, and cases where some supervening event or settlement so removes or modifies the subject of the dispute that, although it could not be said that one side has simply won, no issue remains between the parties except that of costs. In the former type of case, there will commonly be lacking any basis for an exercise of the Court's discretion otherwise than by an award of costs to the successful party. It is the latter type of case which more often creates problems, since there may be difficulty in discerning a clear reason why one party, rather than the other, should bear the costs [5] ‑ [6].