Howson v Town of Mosman Park

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   HOWSON -v- TOWN OF MOSMAN PARK [2018] WASC 373

CORAM:   PRITCHARD J

HEARD:   ON THE PAPERS

PUBLISHED           :   3 DECEMBER 2018

FILE NO/S:   GDA 11 of 2017

BETWEEN:   COLLEEN CHRISTINE HOWSON

Appellant

AND

TOWN OF MOSMAN PARK

Respondent


Catchwords:

Costs - Exercise of discretion as to costs where no determination on the merits - Where appeal discontinued - Whether supervening event - Whether prosecution of appeal was unreasonable - Whether capitulation

Legislation:

State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 105(9)
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 37

Result:

No order as to costs

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : No appearance
Respondent : No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant : Hotchkin Hanly
Respondent : McLeods Barristers & Solicitors

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194

Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 162

Commissioner of State Taxation v EDI Rail (Maryborough) Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 17 (S)

Keet v Ward [2011] WASCA 139

Lafferty v Waterton [2016] WASCA 183

Lawrence v Cooperative Bulk Handling Ltd [2017] WASC 24 (S)

McClure v The Mayor and Councillors of the City of Stirling [No 3] [2009] WASC 247

Minniti v Motor Vehicle Industry Board [2011] WASCA 275 (S)

ONETEL Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270; (2000) 101 FCR 548

Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72

Ramont Holdings Pty Ltd v City of Kalgoorlie-Boulder [No 2] [2016] WASC 179

Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622

Re Western Australian Planning Commission; Ex parte Solomon [2010] WASCA 236 (S)

Rogers v De Mol Investments Pty Ltd [No 2] [2016] WASC 151

PRITCHARD J:

  1. In these proceedings, Ms Howson appealed against a decision of the State Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) to dismiss an application for review of a decision of the Town of Mosman Park.  The Town had refused to grant a building application and a building permit to enable Ms Howson to build a house on her property in Mosman Park.  The question of law which was the subject of the appeal concerned the proper construction of provisions of the Town of Mosman Park Town Planning Scheme No. 2, relating to the maximum building height for a single house for the purpose of the Residential Design Codes.

  2. On the day before the listed hearing date for the appeal, the parties filed a minute of consent orders by which Ms Howson was to discontinue the appeal, and for the question of the costs of the appeal to be reserved and determined on the papers.  Each of the parties has filed written submissions and an affidavit in support of the orders that they seek.

  3. The Town seeks an order that Ms Howson pay its costs of the appeal.  Ms Howson contends that there should be no order as to costs.

  4. For the reasons which follow, there will be no order as to…

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Details
Case
[2018] WASC 373
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Howson v Town of Mosman Park was a case in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, where Ms. Howson appealed against the Town of Mosman Park's refusal to grant her a certified building permit for a property she owned. The case was discontinued just before the scheduled hearing date, leading to a consideration of the principles surrounding the exercise of discretion as to costs in cases where no determination on the merits occurs. The central legal issue was whether the discontinuance of the appeal was due to a supervening event, making it unreasonable for Ms. Howson to have prosecuted the appeal, or whether the discontinuance was due to a capitulation by the Town, warranting an order for costs in favour of Ms. Howson.

The Court considered established principles regarding the exercise of the costs discretion in cases not determined on their merits, particularly where there is no hypothetical determination of where the costs may have fallen. The Court noted that if a party acted unreasonably in pursuing the litigation, it might warrant an order for costs. However, generally, if both parties acted reasonably throughout the proceedings until their conclusion, the Court would typically make no order as to costs. The Court also recognised that if an intervening event substantially alters the subject matter of the dispute after litigation has commenced, the party who acted reasonably by initiating the litigation may be allowed to discontinue the proceedings without incurring costs. The Court applied these principles to determine whether the discontinuance was justified and whether it was reasonable for Ms. Howson to have pursued the appeal.

The Court found that Ms. Howson had acted reasonably throughout the proceedings, and the Town had not demonstrated any unreasonable conduct. The discontinuance of the appeal was not due to any supervening event that would have made it unreasonable for Ms. Howson to have pursued the appeal. The Court held that since both parties acted reasonably and the discontinuance did not result from any unreasonable conduct by Ms. Howson, the proper exercise of the costs discretion was to make no order as to costs.

No specific orders as to costs were made by the Court in this instance. The Court's decision underscores the importance of both parties acting reasonably throughout litigation, especially in cases where the matter is not determined on its merits.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Some well-established principles have been developed in relation to when an order for costs may be appropriate, in a case where the matter has not been determined on its merits. Those principles recognise that the Court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties to determine where the costs may have fallen, had there been a hearing on the merits.[9] If one party has acted unreasonably, the Court may conclude that that should sound in an order for costs. In other ‑ probably rare - cases, the Court may feel confident that although both parties have acted reasonably, one party was almost certain to have succeeded if the matter had been fully tried. However, generally speaking, where both parties have acted reasonably in commencing, defending and conducting the proceedings, and their conduct continued to be reasonable until the litigation was brought to an end, the proper exercise of the costs discretion will usually mean that the Court will make no order as to costs.[10] [9] Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622, 624; Australian Securities Commission v Aust-Home Investments Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 194, 201; ONETEL Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270; (2000) 101 FCR 548 [5].[10] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622, 625 (McHugh J); Lafferty v Waterton [2016] WASCA 183 [18] (Newnes, Murphy & Mitchell JJA). It has also been recognised that when some intervening event or unexpected factor has emerged after the litigation has been commenced, so as to substantively remove or heavily qualify the underlying subject matter of the dispute, then in such circumstances a party who has acted reasonably in commencing the litigation may be permitted to bring it to an end without being exposed to the costs of the other litigating parties.[11] [11] Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 162 [7]; ONE.TEL Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 270; (2000) 101 FCR 548 [6] (Burchett J); McClure v The Mayor and Councillors of the City of Stirling [No 3] [2009] WASC 247; Re Western Australian Planning Commission; Ex parte Solomon [2010] WASCA 236 (S); Ramont Holdings Pty Ltd v City of Kalgoorlie-Boulder [No 2] [2016] WASC 179 [9]; Rogers v De Mol Investments Pty Ltd [No 2] [2016] WASC 151 [17]. The appeal was listed for hearing on 14 February 2018. It was discontinued on 13 February 2018. The events leading up to that discontinuance were as follows. Ms Howson first sought, and was refused, approval for a development application to build a house on her Mosman Park property in February 2016. She initially sought a review by the Tribunal of the Town's refusal of her development application, but withdrew that application.[12] In February and April 2017 respectively, the Town refused Ms Howson's application for a certified building permit, and for a slightly modified certified building permit. Ms Howson then sought a review of the latter decision by the Tribunal. In August 2017, the Tribunal dismissed that application for review. The present appeal was then filed.[12] Affidavit of Gabriela Renate Poezyn sworn 28 February 2018 [3].