Robertson v Knott Investments Pty Ltd (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Robertson v Knott Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 1074

Citation: Robertson v Knott Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) [2010] FCA 1074
Appeal from: Robertson v Knott Investments Pty Ltd [2010] FMCA 142
Parties: KARL VERNON ROBERTSON v KNOTT INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
File number: NSD 321 of 2010
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 1 October 2010
Catchwords:

TRADE PRACTICES – representations as to length of employment – no reliance – reasonable grounds for representations made – onus of proof

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – nature of appeal – re-hearing – need for appellable error – review of factual findings made – no appellable error

Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 24(1)(d), 27
Trade Practices Act1974 (Cth), ss 51A, 53B, 82
Cases cited: Ackers v Austcorp International Ltd [2009] FCA 432, cited
Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833, 117 FCR 424, cited
Butcher v Lachlan Elder Realty Pty Limited [2004] HCA 60, 218 CLR 592, considered
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47, 203 CLR 194, cited
CSR Ltd v Della Maddalena [2006] HCA 1, 224 ALR 1, cited
Cummings v Lewis (1993) 41 FCR 559, considered
Dawson v Australian Consolidated Reserves Pty Ltd (1983) ATPR 40-374, cited
Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins [2000] FCA 1902, 105 FCR 476, followed
Farrington v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2002] FCA 1013, 50 ATR 429, followed
Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22, 214 CLR 118, considered
Henville v Walker [2001] HCA 52, 206 CLR 459, cited
I & L Securities Pty Limited v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 41, 210 CLR 109, cited
King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [2001] FCA 308, 184 ALR 98, cited
Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 170, 242 ALR 586, cited
McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 2, 165 FCR 230, applied
O’Neill v Medical Benefits Fund [2001] FMCA 61, cited
Readymix Holdings International Pte Ltd v Wieland Process Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 1480, cited
Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 131, 220 ALR 211, cited
Robertson v Knott Investments Pty Ltd [2010] FMCA 142, affirmed
Robertson v Knott Investments Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 619, cited
Robertson v Knott Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 796, cited
Sterndale v Laurie [2010] WASCA 79, cited
Tasmanian Sandstone Quarries Pty Ltd v Legalcom Pty Ltd [2010] SASCFC 6, cited
Ting v Blanche (1993) 118 ALR 543, followed
Tran v Commonwealth [2010] FCAFC 80, 116 ALD 29, cited
Wade v Australian Railway Historical Society [2000] SASC 233, 77 SASR 221, considered
Walker v Salomon Smith Barney Securities Pty Ltd [2003] FCA…
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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 1074
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Robertson v Knott Investments Pty Ltd (No 3), the appellant, Mr Robertson, sought to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The primary dispute centred on the interpretation of an employment contract and the reliance on specific representations made during the negotiation process. The Federal Circuit Court had found that Mr Robertson had not relied on the representations in question, leading to his unsuccessful claim for damages. The appeal was brought before the Full Court of the Federal Court, which was tasked with determining whether the findings of the Federal Circuit Court were correct and whether any error had been made.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of the employment contract, the nature and effect of the representations made by the respondent, and whether the Federal Circuit Court had correctly assessed the reliance placed by Mr Robertson on those representations. The appellant argued that the Federal Circuit Court had erred in its assessment of the evidence and in its conclusions regarding the absence of reliance on the representations.

The court examined the evidence presented at the trial and considered whether the conclusions reached by the Federal Circuit Court were correct. It noted that the Federal Circuit Court had found the evidence credible and had determined that Mr Robertson had not relied on the representations to his detriment. The Full Court found that the conclusions of the Federal Circuit Court were not "glaringly improbable" or "contrary to compelling inferences" and that no appellable error was discernible. The court held that the appellant had to demonstrate error for the appeal to succeed, which he had not done.

In light of the findings, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent, including reserved costs. The court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was sound, and there was no basis to overturn it. The Full Court's decision reaffirmed the importance of demonstrating error in appellate proceedings and underscored the principle that an appellate court should not substitute its own view for that of the primary decision-maker.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The jurisdiction nevertheless remains an appellate jurisdiction which is to be exercised for the correction of error: Dovuro Pty Ltd v Wilkins [2000] FCA 1902 at [38], 105 FCR 476 at 487 per Branson J. An appellable error must be made out: Knight v Beyond Properties Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 170 at [20], 242 ALR 586 at 591. As to the distinction between an appeal by way of re-hearing and an appeal by way of a hearing de novo, French CJ, Tamberlin and Rares JJ there cited the following observations of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ in Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47, 203 CLR 194:[12] It is common and often convenient to describe an appeal to a court or tribunal whose function is simply to determine whether the decision in question was right or wrong on the evidence and the law as it stood when that decision was given as an appeal in the strict sense. An appeal to this Court under s 73 of the Constitution is an appeal of that kind. In the case of an appeal in the strict sense, an appellate court or tribunal cannot receive further evidence and its powers are limited to setting aside the decision under appeal and, if it be appropriate, to substituting the decision that should have been made at first instance. [13] If an appellate tribunal can receive further evidence and its powers are not restricted to making the decision that should have been made at first instance, the appeal is usually and conveniently described as an appeal by way of rehearing. Although further evidence may be admitted on an appeal of that kind, the appeal is usually conducted by reference to the evidence given at first instance and is to be contrasted with an appeal by way of hearing de novo. In the case of a hearing de novo, the matter is heard afresh and a decision is given on the evidence presented at that hearing. [14] Ordinarily, if there has been no further evidence admitted and if there has been no relevant change in the law, a court or tribunal entertaining an appeal by way of rehearing can exercise its appellate powers only if satisfied that there was error on the part of the primary decision-maker. That is because statutory provisions conferring appellate powers, even in the case of an appeal by way of rehearing, are construed on the basis that, unless there is something to indicate otherwise, the power is to be exercised for the correction of error. However, the conferral of a right of appeal by way of a hearing de novo is construed as a proceeding in which the appellate body is required to exercise its powers whether or not there was error at first instance. [footnotes omitted]When conducting an appeal by way of re-hearing, it is thus the task of the Court to determine whether the findings made are correct; but it is not the function of the appellate court “merely to substitute its own view, as if it were again performing the function of the trial judge”: Wade v Australian Railway Historical Society [2000] SASC 233 at [38], 77 SASR 221 at 227 per Doyle CJ. Nor is it appropriate to invite an appellate court “simply to revisit the relevant evidence … and then contend that the court should reach a different conclusion… [E]rror must be demonstrated for the appellate court to be entitled to disturb the decision of the primary decision-maker… Furthermore, the manner in which the case is conducted by the parties on appeal ought not depart from the manner in which the case was conducted at trial, and generally, the appeal arena is not the appropriate forum to raise new arguments”: Tasmanian Sandstone Quarries Pty Ltd v Legalcom Pty Ltd [2010] SASCFC 6 at [34] per Gray J (Nyland and Kourakis JJ agreeing). THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL – AN INVITATION TO REVISIT THE FACTS

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is, however, unnecessary to resolve Ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal since reliance on the representations was not made out. CONCLUSIONS It is considered that Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of the Notice of Appeal have not been made out. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to resolve Ground 5. To employ the language repeated by Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ in Fox v Percy, supra, the conclusions of the Federal Magistrate are not “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences”. Having again considered the evidence, the conclusions of the Federal Magistrate as to the absence of reliance placed by Mr Robertson upon the representations is correct. Certainly no appellable error is discernible in reaching that conclusion. In order to succeed on the appeal, it was correctly accepted on behalf of Mr Robertson that he had to win on these Grounds, together with Ground 5, if the appeal was to be allowed. The appeal is to be dismissed. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. The Appellant should therefore pay the costs of the Respondent. ORDERS The Orders of the Court are:1.The appeal is dismissed.2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the Respondent, including reserved costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 26 October 2007 a Letter of Offer was forwarded to Mr Robertson by Ms Binns, albeit over the name of Mr Binns. The letter contained a reference to a “probation period” and to the rights of “termination” by both the Respondent and the “employee”. Thereafter, on 30 October 2007 Mr Higgins sent an e-mail to Mr Binns including the following statement:Duration of EmploymentKarl is not comfortable with a probation period. Karl perceives a probation period as the need for him to demonstrate his abilities in doing what he says he can do. He believes at this stage in his career he does not need to ‘prove’ himself. He tells me he is prepared to ‘pack up’ his life and move to Penrith and is seeking a minimum 3 year contract. He has no problem in this contract being terminated due to a serious breach such as a sexual harassment or something else as serious of this nature.There was also annexed to that e-mail a draft letter accepted as having been drafted by Mr Robertson. That letter contained the following proposed term of the contract under discussion:Duration of contract:The contract will be valid for a minimum period of three (3) years from date of commencement. It could be extended thereafter by mutual consentThe letter also included 11 matters proposed to be included in any contract under the heading of “Scope of Contract and Reporting relationship”. Amendments were made and a revised Letter of Offer of Employment was sent to Mr Robertson on 5 November 2007. That letter contained no provision as to the “duration of the contract” but included the following provision as to termination:TerminationIn the event of serious misconduct or persistent breach of the employee obligations under this contract, or wilful neglect, this contract may be terminated without notice. The Employee may terminate this agreement by giving notice in writing, please refer to attached AWA for further information.This was the same term as previously included in the earlier 26 October 2007 letter. The November letter also included a provision as to a “probation period” of six months, also in the same terms as that previously sent. This letter was thus in much the same terms as the earlier letter forwarded on 26 October 2007 – apart from the inclusion in the November letter of the 11 matters which Mr Robertson wanted included. This letter thus incorporated part of what was being sought by Mr Robertson but not the proposed clause as to the duration of the contract. The form of the employment contract remained the same. Intervening between the draft letter sent on 30 October 2007 and the subsequent letter on 5 November 2007 was a conversation between Mr Higgins and Mr Robertson “[i]n or about the first few days of November 2007”. Mr Higgins in his affidavit set forth the text of this conversation as follows:KR:They have a six month probationary period. If I sign a contract does that mean that I come all the way to Australia and they can get rid of me in six months?MH:No, that is not their intention. That is just common practice in all contracts for employment we have here in Australia. Even I have that in my contract with SouthTech. And Karl, that can give you the opportunity to renegotiate your salary package in six months.KR:I don’t know if I can start on 3 December as I have to give Ashok Leyland some notice.MH: I will have to talk to Ben about that.