SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
RETURN TO WORK CORPORATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA v MITCHELL
[2019] SASCFC 34
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Stanley and The Honourable Justice Hinton)
11 April 2019
WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION - EMPLOYMENT RELATED INJURY, DISABILITY OR DISEASE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION - ASSESSMENT AND AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION
Appeal from a decision of the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal (SAET).
The worker suffered a compensable lower back injury in the course of employment. He successfully claimed lump sum compensation for non-economic loss pursuant to s 43 of the repealed Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (the repealed Act).
The worker underwent a lumbar spinal fusion surgery. He made a claim for lump sum compensation pursuant to s 43 for several subsequent impairments caused by his ingestion of one or more medications prescribed to him for pain control following the surgery. The Judge accepted the worker’s claim, holding that for the purpose of determining the level of Whole Person Impairment (WPI), the WPI assessments for these impairments were all to be combined as well as combining them with the WPI assessment previously made in respect of the worker’s back injury and scarring. That was because each of the impairments and the lower back injury itself were all “compensable injuries arising from the same trauma” within the meaning of s 43(6) of the repealed Act.
On appeal, the Full Bench of the SAET upheld the Judge’s decision.
On appeal to this Court, at issue is whether the respondent suffered a single compensable injury or two or more compensable injuries within the meaning of s 43(6). If the answer is the former, then s 43(6) does not apply. If the answer is the latter, there is the further question of whether the respondent’s compensable injuries arose from the same trauma.
Held per Stanley J (Kourakis CJ and Hinton J agreeing), allowing the appeal:
1. The impairments to the respondent’s upper and lower digestive systems, his urinary and reproductive system and mastication and deglutition are separate physiological changes from the impairment of his lumbar spine, constituting a distinct, subsequent compensable injury.
2. The impairments that arose as a complication of the respondent’s ingestion of opioid medication to relieve the symptoms of his lumbar spine following surgery arose not from the injury to his lumbar spine, but from his ingestion of opioid medication. As that event occurred subsequent to the events which resulted in the injury to his lumbar spine, it was not the case that those injuries arose from the same trauma as the lumbar spine injury. Accordingly, the condition for combination prescribed by s 43(6) is not made out.
3. Appeal allowed, the order awarding compensation to the respondent pursuant to s 43 of the repealed Act in the sum of $359,190 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the SAET for appropriate factual findings to be made and for an assessment of…
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- Case
- [2019] SASCFC 34
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Court was whether the worker's subsequent impairments, resulting from prescribed medication, constituted separate compensable injuries or were to be treated as part of the original lower back injury for the purposes of calculating permanent impairment under the repealed Workers' Compensation Act 1971 (SA). Specifically, the court had to determine if these impairments arose from the "same trauma" as the initial back injury, as contemplated by section 43(6) of the repealed Act, which would allow for the combination of various percentage whole person impairment (WPI) assessments.
The Full Court reasoned that adverse consequences of medical treatment necessitated by an original compensable injury should be regarded as part of that original injury, provided there is no gross negligence breaking the chain of causation. Relying on established authorities such as *Lindeman*, *Mahony*, and the dissenting judgment in *Migge*, the court held that surgery and medical treatment, and their complications, are not to be treated as separate traumas. Therefore, the impairments suffered by the worker due to the prescribed medications were considered to have arisen from the same trauma as his initial lower back injury. This approach distinguished the present case from situations where a new and independent trauma causes a subsequent injury, as seen in *Marrone*.
The Full Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Employment Tribunal that the worker's various impairments were to be combined with his initial back injury assessment for the purpose of calculating his total WPI. This meant that the worker's total WPI was assessed at 70 per cent, entitling him to lump sum compensation based on this combined assessment.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Full Bench considered the judge’s conclusion to be incorrect. The Full Bench found that the judge’s conclusion proceeded from the premise that the original injury and the consequences of treatment are to be treated as separate compensable injuries. The Full Bench rejected that premise. It did so in reliance upon the same line of authority relied upon by the Full Bench in this case, namely, Lindeman, Mahony and Migge. The Full Bench concluded:[21]In our view, relevant authorities and common sense lead to the conclusion that provided the medical treatment is made necessary because of the original injury, short of gross negligence that might break the chain of causation, any adverse consequences of that treatment should be regarded as forming part of the original compensable injury.It follows that the so called Marrone principles do not apply to this issue and the learned Deputy President’s ruling in respect of it must be set aside.[22][Footnotes omitted.][21] [2016] SAET 95 at [66]-[67].[22] Although it is not necessary to decide for the purposes of this appeal, the correctness of the qualification said to be established in Mahony that negligent medical treatment might break the causal chain in relation to the compensability of the consequences of surgical or medical treatment of the work injury must be doubted, particularly in light of the different statutory context under the repealed Act, especially s 30(3)(e). Consideration At issue is whether the respondent suffered a single compensable injury or two or more compensable injuries within the meaning of s 43(6). If the answer is the former, then s 43(6) does not apply. If the answer is the latter, there is the further question of whether the respondent’s compensable injuries arose from the same trauma. It is convenient first to address the question of whether the respondent suffered a single compensable injury or two or more compensable injuries within the meaning of s 43(6). The starting point is the concept of “injury”. In Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May,[23] Gageler J considered the ordinary sense in which the term “injury” is used in the context of workers compensation legislation. He said:[24]An injury, it has long been repeatedly explained, is some definite or distinct “physiological change” or “physiological disturbance” for the worse which, if not “sudden” is at least “identifiable”. The universality of that explanation has been questioned, and the comment has fairly been made that “a distinct physiological change is not itself an expression of clear and definite meaning”. The expression has nevertheless been shown by repeated usage to have utility as an exposition of the particular sense in which injury has been used, and continues to be used, in the particular legislative context.[Citations omitted.][23] [2016] HCA 19, (2016) 257 CLR 468.[24] [2016] HCA 19 at [75], (2016) 257 CLR 468 at 486. An injury was compensable under the repealed Act pursuant to s 30, if it arose from employment. I have set out the terms of that provision earlier in these reasons.