ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Workers' Compensation-" Injury arising out of and in the course of the employment"
-Second injury sustained by worker while convalescing in hospital from effects of original injury-Original and second injuries-Causal connectionWorkers' Compensation Act 1926-1942 (N.S.W.) (No. 15 of 1926-No. 13 of 1942), 88. 6 (1), 7, 9, 37 (4).
A worker sustained a head injury which arose out of and in the course of MELBOURNE, his employment and resulted in total incapacity for work for a period. Before that period ended, but while he was convalescent in hospital, he, his medical attendant having said that he could walk in the grounds, if the weather was fine and warm and that he should move about, proceeded to walk in the hospital grounds and whilst walking down a flight of steps his left leg broke. The fractured leg caused an additional period of some months of total incapacity for work. The worker suffered from a pathological condition of the bones which rendered his leg liable to spontaneous fracture in the ordinary course of walking. The Commission found as a fact that walking down the steps was an integral part of the treatment prescribed for his head injury and that the chain of causation between the head injury and the total incapacity for the further period was unbroken and awarded the worker compensation as for total incapacity for work during the whole of the extended period.
Held, by Latham C.J., Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ. (McTiernan J. dissent- ing), that there was no evidence of a sufficient causal connection between the original head injury and the subsequent fracture of the worker's leg; accord- ingly in making such award the Commission had erred in law.
Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court), by majority,
An application under the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1942 (N.S.W.) was made on 7th August 1945 to the Workers' Compensation Commission by Hugh Colvin for compensation claimed to be payable by Lindeman Ltd. for alleged total incapacity for work as from 28th March 1944 to 18th September 1944, both dates inclusive, arising from a head injury sustained by Colvin on 28th March 1944 whilst employed as a vineyard worker by the company at its vine- yard at Corowa, New South Wales, and from a broken leg sustained by him while convalescing at the Corowa District Hospital from the effects of the head injury.
It was admitted that payments at the rate of £4 per week as from 28th March 1944 to 26th May 1944 had been made by the company to Colvin.
The company denied, inter alia, its liability to pay compensation in respect of the incapacity sustained by Colvin as a result of breaking his leg whilst in hospital, and at the hearing relied on the ground that Colvin did not thereby receive personal injury arising out of and in the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Lindeman Ltd v Colvin [1946] HCA 35
Case
[1946] HCA 35
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Lindeman Ltd appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appeal concerned a claim for workers' compensation by Hugh Colvin against his employer, Lindeman Ltd. Colvin had sustained a head injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, which resulted in total incapacity. While convalescing in hospital and following medical advice to walk in the hospital grounds, Colvin fractured his leg. The employer disputed liability for the incapacity arising from the broken leg, arguing it was not an injury arising out of or in the course of employment.
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the Workers' Compensation Commission and the Supreme Court had erred in law by finding a sufficient causal connection between the original head injury and the subsequent leg fracture, and consequently, whether the award of compensation for total incapacity during the period of the leg injury was justified. Specifically, the court had to determine if the act of walking, which led to the fracture, could be considered an integral part of the treatment for the head injury, thereby maintaining the chain of causation from the initial employment-related injury.
A majority of the High Court, comprising Latham C.J., Starke, Dixon, and Williams JJ., held that the Commission had erred in law. Their reasoning was that while the leg fracture occurred during a period of convalescence and was associated with an activity recommended for treatment, there was no sufficient causal connection between the original head injury and the fracture itself. The fracture was attributed to a pre-existing pathological condition of the worker's bones, rendering them liable to break during ordinary walking, and the act of walking was considered a normal activity of life rather than a direct consequence or medical treatment necessitated by the head injury. McTiernan J. dissented, finding that the walking was an integral part of the prescribed treatment for the head injury and that a causal connection was established.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Supreme Court. The three questions posed in the case stated were answered in the affirmative, indicating that the Commission had erred in law. The matter was remitted to the Commission.