SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court: Case Stated)
MARRONE v EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIMITED AS AN AGENT FOR WORKCOVER CORPORATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2013] SASCFC 67
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice White)
2 July 2013
WORKERS' COMPENSATION - PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION - DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS - APPEALS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STATED CASES - QUESTION OF LAW
Question of law referred by the Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal - whether, in the determination of a worker's entitlement to lump sum compensation for non-economic loss under s 43 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), two or more disabilities having more than one cause are to be treated as arising from the same trauma only when it is the same event, or series of events, which causes both disabilities, or whether it is sufficient that at least one of the separate causes of these disabilities is common to both.
Held: Section 43(6) applies when one and the same trauma causes two or more disabilities.
Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 3, s 43, s 43A, s 46, s 54, s 86A, s 113 and Schedule 3; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation (Employer Payments) Amendment Act 2011 (SA) s 4 and Schedule 1; Workers Compensation Act 1971 (SA) s 69; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation (Scheme Review) Amendment Act 2008 (SA) s 24; Workmen's Compensation Act 1932 (SA) s 26; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Regulations 2010 (SA) Reg 39 and Schedule 4; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) s 44 and s 69, referred to.
Marrone v WorkCover Corporation [2011] SAWCT 8; Wardleworth v Green (1996) 66 SASR 421; NRMA Insurance Ltd v Motor Accidents Authority of NSW [2004] NSWSC 567; (2004) 61 NSWLR 264; Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Crazzi [2006] NSWSC 1090; (2006) 68 NSWLR 266; Spry v Manser (1993) 60 SASR 586; Manser v Spry (1994) 181 CLR 428; Australian Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Federation Insurance Ltd (1976) 15 SASR 282; WorkCover Corporation v Beckwith (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Full Court, Doyle CJ, Bollen and Nyland JJ, 1 August 1996, Judgment No S5794); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation v Hillier & Van Wyk (1997) 193 LSJS 57, considered.
MARRONE v EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIMITED AS AN AGENT FOR WORKCOVER CORPORATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2013] SASCFC 67Full Court: Kourakis CJ, Sulan and White JJ
KOURAKIS CJ: This case stated raises as a question of law the proper construction of the term “arising from the same trauma” in s 43(6) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (“the Act”). “Trauma” is defined by s 3(1) of the Act to mean an event, or series of events, out of which a compensable disability arises. The question is whether two discrete compensable injuries arise out of the same series of events, within the meaning of that statutory term, if one or more events in…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Marrone v Employers Mutual Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] SASCFC 67
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether, for the purposes of section 43(6), two or more disabilities with multiple causes are to be treated as arising from the same trauma only if the same event or series of events causes both disabilities, or if it is sufficient that at least one of the separate causes of these disabilities is common to both. This question arose from the Tribunal's finding that Mr Marrone's left shoulder disability, while developing gradually and having multiple contributing factors, was causally linked to the initial trauma of 8 June 2006, which caused his right-sided injuries.
The Court reasoned that section 43(6) applies when one and the same trauma causes two or more compensable disabilities. It held that the phrase "same trauma" in section 43(6) requires that all events in a series must have operated as a cause of both impairments. The Court distinguished this provision from section 54(7)(b) of the Act, noting that section 43(6) focuses on the physical occurrence of the trauma causing the disabilities, rather than the legal rights arising from it. The Court concluded that the text and context of section 43(6), supported by High Court authority in *Manser v Spry*, indicate that a comprehensive series of events must have caused both disabilities for them to be treated as arising from the same trauma.
The Court answered the question posed by the Tribunal in the affirmative, indicating that the disabilities must arise from the same trauma in the sense that the same event or series of events causes both.
Orders
Orders of the court
Held: Section 43(6) applies when one and the same trauma causes two or more disabilities.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: WHITE J
Counsel for Mr Marrone submitted that this passage too was consistent with a view of s 43(6) encompassing disabilities having multiple causes provided that at least one of the causes was common to both. Consideration For the reasons given earlier, I consider that the legislative context and history of s 43(6) indicate strongly that it is confined to the circumstance in which one and the same event, or series of events, causes multiple compensable disabilities. With the exception of disabilities arising from a series of events, it has no application to traumas suffered successively. The construction of the expression “rights arising from the same trauma” by the High Court in Manser v Spry supports this understanding of s 43(6). However, Manser v Spry concerned the construction and application of s 54(7)(b) in factual circumstances different from the present. The application of the reasoning of Manser v Spry by this Court in Wardleworth v Green, Beckwith and, to a lesser extent, Hillier, in relation to s 54(5) and s 54(7)(b), suggests that “rights” will arise from the same trauma if a disability in respect of which damages are paid, and in respect of which compensation could have been paid, had a common cause, even though other causes were disparate events. That supports the construction for which Mr Marrone contended. In my opinion, the reasoning in Wardleworth, Beckwith and Hillier is not decisive of the proper construction of s 43(6). Section 54(7)(b) refers to “rights” arising from the same trauma as gave rise to the “rights” to compensation, whereas s 43(6) refers to “compensable disabilities” arising from the same trauma. The emphasis in the former is on the legal entitlement and the bundle of circumstances giving rise to it, whereas in the latter it is on a physical occurrence. There is a close relationship between the two because it could be said that the existence of the right is dependent on the happening of the occurrence. However, the difference in wording reflects the different subject matter of the two provisions and perhaps a difference in emphasis. It also appears that the expression “compensable disabilities” may not be used in s 43(6) with exactly the same meaning as in s 54(5), to which s 54(7) gives effect. Section 54(5) uses the term “disability” in the sense of “injury”. The subject matter of s 43, on the other hand, is permanent impairments resulting from compensable disabilities (see subss (1)-(4) and (10)). It is the impairments, and not the disabilities causing them, for which the lump sum compensation is payable. In this context, s 43(6) seems to use the expression “compensable disabilities” in reference to the resulting impairments or at least to both the disabilities and the impairments, rather than to the disabilities which cause those impairments. It is true that s 43(1) distinguishes the compensable disability, on the one hand, and the resulting impairment, on the other, but the distinction does not seem to be maintained in subs (6). The disabilities to which it refers seem to be injuries in the sense of impairments. The same was true of the counterpart provision in the 1971 Act as s 69 of that Act used the word “injury” to describe the impairments in the table for which compensation was payable. The reference in s 43(9)(a) to the prescribed sum to be applied with respect to a particular “disability” seems to be a similar usage of the term “disability”.