Marrone v Employers Mutual Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court: Case Stated)

MARRONE v EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIMITED AS AN AGENT FOR WORKCOVER CORPORATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

[2013] SASCFC 67

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Sulan and The Honourable Justice White)

2 July 2013

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION - DETERMINATION OF CLAIMS - APPEALS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND STATED CASES - QUESTION OF LAW

Question of law referred by the Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal - whether, in the determination of a worker's entitlement to lump sum compensation for non-economic loss under s 43 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), two or more disabilities having more than one cause are to be treated as arising from the same trauma only when it is the same event, or series of events, which causes both disabilities, or whether it is sufficient that at least one of the separate causes of these disabilities is common to both.

Held: Section 43(6) applies when one and the same trauma causes two or more disabilities.

Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) s 3, s 43, s 43A, s 46, s 54, s 86A, s 113 and Schedule 3; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation (Employer Payments) Amendment Act 2011 (SA) s 4 and Schedule 1; Workers Compensation Act 1971 (SA) s 69; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation (Scheme Review) Amendment Act 2008 (SA) s 24; Workmen's Compensation Act 1932 (SA) s 26; Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Regulations 2010 (SA) Reg 39 and Schedule 4; Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) s 44 and s 69, referred to.
Marrone v WorkCover Corporation [2011] SAWCT 8; Wardleworth v Green (1996) 66 SASR 421; NRMA Insurance Ltd v Motor Accidents Authority of NSW [2004] NSWSC 567; (2004) 61 NSWLR 264; Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Crazzi [2006] NSWSC 1090; (2006) 68 NSWLR 266; Spry v Manser (1993) 60 SASR 586; Manser v Spry (1994) 181 CLR 428; Australian Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Federation Insurance Ltd (1976) 15 SASR 282; WorkCover Corporation v Beckwith (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Full Court, Doyle CJ, Bollen and Nyland JJ, 1 August 1996, Judgment No S5794); Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation v Hillier & Van Wyk (1997) 193 LSJS 57, considered.

MARRONE v EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIMITED AS AN AGENT FOR WORKCOVER CORPORATION OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2013] SASCFC 67

Full Court:   Kourakis CJ, Sulan and White JJ

  1. KOURAKIS CJ:   This case stated raises as a question of law the proper construction of the term “arising from the same trauma” in s 43(6) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (“the Act”). “Trauma” is defined by s 3(1) of the Act to mean an event, or series of events, out of which a compensable disability arises. The question is whether two discrete compensable injuries arise out of the same series of events, within the meaning of that statutory term, if one or more events in…

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Details
Case
[2013] SASCFC 67
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Supreme Court of South Australia considered a question of law referred by the Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal concerning the interpretation of section 43(6) of the *Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986* (SA). The dispute arose from Mr Marrone's claim for lump sum compensation for non-economic loss, where he suffered disabilities to his right elbow, forearm, and shoulder due to repetitive lifting, and subsequently developed a left shoulder disability due to compensatory overuse and aggravation of a pre-existing condition. The compensating authority, Employers Mutual Ltd, accepted that the left shoulder disability occurred due to the compensatory overuse following the right-sided injuries.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether, for the purposes of section 43(6), two or more disabilities with multiple causes are to be treated as arising from the same trauma only if the same event or series of events causes both disabilities, or if it is sufficient that at least one of the separate causes of these disabilities is common to both. This question arose from the Tribunal's finding that Mr Marrone's left shoulder disability, while developing gradually and having multiple contributing factors, was causally linked to the initial trauma of 8 June 2006, which caused his right-sided injuries.

The Court reasoned that section 43(6) applies when one and the same trauma causes two or more compensable disabilities. It held that the phrase "same trauma" in section 43(6) requires that all events in a series must have operated as a cause of both impairments. The Court distinguished this provision from section 54(7)(b) of the Act, noting that section 43(6) focuses on the physical occurrence of the trauma causing the disabilities, rather than the legal rights arising from it. The Court concluded that the text and context of section 43(6), supported by High Court authority in *Manser v Spry*, indicate that a comprehensive series of events must have caused both disabilities for them to be treated as arising from the same trauma.

The Court answered the question posed by the Tribunal in the affirmative, indicating that the disabilities must arise from the same trauma in the sense that the same event or series of events causes both.

Orders

Orders of the court

Held: Section 43(6) applies when one and the same trauma causes two or more disabilities.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Full Bench of the Workers Compensation Tribunal has referred for the opinion of this Court[10] a question concerning the proper construction and application of s 43(6). In substance the issue is whether multiple disabilities having more than one cause will arise from the same trauma in the manner contemplated by the opening line of the subsection if at least one of the causes is common to both. Before identifying the question more closely, it is appropriate to outline the circumstances giving rise to it.[10] See Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA), s 86A(1).Background Circumstances Mr Marrone suffered compensable disabilities to his right elbow, right forearm and right shoulder as a result of repetitive lifting activities. These disabilities were treated as having been suffered on 8 June 2006.[11] The pain and limitations from the right shoulder disability were initially minor but worsened over the ensuing months. As a result, Mr Marrone was given modified duties and eventually underwent surgery before returning again to modified duties.[11] Apparently under s 113(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA). By reason of the disabilities in his right arm and shoulder, Mr Marrone made increased use of his left arm, both in activities of daily living and in the performance of his modified duties. In about early 2007, he developed pain and discomfort in his left shoulder. This pain and discomfort worsened and it was accepted that, for the purposes of the WRC Act, Mr Marrone had suffered a compensable disability to the left shoulder on or around 2 April 2009.[12][12] Under s 113(1) of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA). The compensating authority, Employers Mutual Ltd (EML), accepted in the Tribunal, in proceedings for a judicial determination, that the disability to Mr Marrone’s left shoulder “occurred due to compensatory overuse of the left arm following the disability to the right shoulder and elbow”.[13] Hannon DP did not make a specific finding as to the nature of the left shoulder disability but found that the “factors contributing to the ongoing development of the disability in addition to the continued increased use of the left arm in compensation for the right elbow/shoulder disability included the ongoing and repetitive nature of the work duties done with the left arm, and an aggravation of a pre‑existing degenerative condition of the left shoulder”.[14][13] Marrone v WorkCover Corporation [2011] SAWCT 8 at [34].[14] Ibid at [35]. Hannon DP then considered whether the left shoulder disability could be said, for the purposes of s 43(6) of the WRC Act, to have arisen from the same trauma as did the injuries to the right arm and shoulder. He concluded that it did:[53]The worker’s left shoulder disability developed gradually. He first became partially incapacitated for work by the disability on or about 2 April 2009. Under s 113(1) of the Act, the left shoulder disability is to be deemed to have occurred on 2 April 2009. [54]Notwithstanding this conclusion, the left shoulder disability, as a matter of fact, arose from the same event as the right elbow/shoulder disability, namely the event causing injury to the right elbow/shoulder on 8 June 2006. The causal connection arises from the fact that the right elbow/shoulder disability led to an increased use by the worker of his left arm for activities of daily living and work. This increased use materially contributed to the development of the left shoulder disability. The fact that other events contributed to that disability, and that left shoulder pain was not first experienced by the worker until after 8 June 2006, does not mean that a finding cannot be made on the evidence that the disabilities arose from the same trauma. [55]The worker has established that he suffers from a right elbow/shoulder disability and a left shoulder disability which arose from the same trauma. He is entitled to have those disabilities assessed as one disability under s 43(6) of the Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WHITE J
The construction I would give the term “same trauma” for the purposes of s 43 of the Act is the same as the meaning attributed to that term as it is used in s 53(7) of the Act by this Court and the High Court in Manser v Spry[6]. The cases of Wardleworth v Green[7] (Wardleworth) and Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v Hillier & Van Wyk[8] (Hillier) do not bear on the extension of the definition of “same trauma” to include a series of events. In Wardleworth both the damage for which the third party tortfeasor was liable, and the compensable injury were sustained in the motor vehicle accident. The Full Court held that the circumstance that WorkCover was also liable to pay compensation by reason of a subsequent work related aggravation was of no consequence. Similarly in Hillier both the damage for which the surgeon was liable and the injury which WorkCover was bound to compensate were sustained in the negligently performed operation. Again it was of no consequence that WorkCover was also liable to pay the same compensation by reason of the earlier work injury which had placed the worker on the operating table.[6] Spry v Manser (1993) 60 SASR 586; Manser v Spry (1994) 181 CLR 428, 434.[7] (1996) 66 SASR 421.[8] (1997) 193 LSJS 57.Conclusion For the above reasons both the text and context of the s 43(6) of the Act combine to support the construction proposed by the Compensating Authority. That construction is also consistent with the decisions of this Court and the High Court in Manser v Spry. The series must include all of the events out of which the injury arose; it must be a comprehensive series. Questions may arise as to whether a step in the progression of an impairment is part of the internal physiological pathogenesis of the injury of whether it is caused by an external event, but any two impairments do not arise out of the same series unless all of the events in the series have operated as a cause of both impairments. I would answer the question posed: “Yes”. SULAN J: I would answer the question “Yes”. I agree with the reasons of White J. By s 43 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (the WRC Act), a worker who suffers a compensable disability resulting in a permanent impairment of a defined type is entitled to compensation for non‑economic loss by way of a lump sum. Section 43(6) addresses the circumstance of a worker who suffers two or more compensable disabilities arising from the same trauma:(6) If a worker suffers 2 or more compensable disabilities arising from the same trauma—(a) the disabilities may together be treated as 1 disability to the extent set out in the WorkCover Guidelines (and assessed together using any combination or other principle set out in the WorkCover Guidelines); and(b) the worker is not entitled to receive compensation by way of lump sum under subsection (2) in respect of those disabilities in excess of the prescribed sum.[9][9] By s 4 and Schedule 1 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation (Employer Payments) Amendment Act 2011 (SA), which came into operation on 1 July 2012, all references to “compensable disability” in the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) have been replaced by the term “compensable injury”. That change is of no consequence for present purposes, and I will continue to use the expression “compensable disability”, that being the term in force at times relevant to the referral of the question to this Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WHITE J

Counsel for Mr Marrone submitted that this passage too was consistent with a view of s 43(6) encompassing disabilities having multiple causes provided that at least one of the causes was common to both. Consideration For the reasons given earlier, I consider that the legislative context and history of s 43(6) indicate strongly that it is confined to the circumstance in which one and the same event, or series of events, causes multiple compensable disabilities. With the exception of disabilities arising from a series of events, it has no application to traumas suffered successively. The construction of the expression “rights arising from the same trauma” by the High Court in Manser v Spry supports this understanding of s 43(6). However, Manser v Spry concerned the construction and application of s 54(7)(b) in factual circumstances different from the present. The application of the reasoning of Manser v Spry by this Court in Wardleworth v Green, Beckwith and, to a lesser extent, Hillier, in relation to s 54(5) and s 54(7)(b), suggests that “rights” will arise from the same trauma if a disability in respect of which damages are paid, and in respect of which compensation could have been paid, had a common cause, even though other causes were disparate events. That supports the construction for which Mr Marrone contended. In my opinion, the reasoning in Wardleworth, Beckwith and Hillier is not decisive of the proper construction of s 43(6). Section 54(7)(b) refers to “rights” arising from the same trauma as gave rise to the “rights” to compensation, whereas s 43(6) refers to “compensable disabilities” arising from the same trauma. The emphasis in the former is on the legal entitlement and the bundle of circumstances giving rise to it, whereas in the latter it is on a physical occurrence. There is a close relationship between the two because it could be said that the existence of the right is dependent on the happening of the occurrence. However, the difference in wording reflects the different subject matter of the two provisions and perhaps a difference in emphasis. It also appears that the expression “compensable disabilities” may not be used in s 43(6) with exactly the same meaning as in s 54(5), to which s 54(7) gives effect. Section 54(5) uses the term “disability” in the sense of “injury”. The subject matter of s 43, on the other hand, is permanent impairments resulting from compensable disabilities (see subss (1)-(4) and (10)). It is the impairments, and not the disabilities causing them, for which the lump sum compensation is payable. In this context, s 43(6) seems to use the expression “compensable disabilities” in reference to the resulting impairments or at least to both the disabilities and the impairments, rather than to the disabilities which cause those impairments. It is true that s 43(1) distinguishes the compensable disability, on the one hand, and the resulting impairment, on the other, but the distinction does not seem to be maintained in subs (6). The disabilities to which it refers seem to be injuries in the sense of impairments. The same was true of the counterpart provision in the 1971 Act as s 69 of that Act used the word “injury” to describe the impairments in the table for which compensation was payable. The reference in s 43(9)(a) to the prescribed sum to be applied with respect to a particular “disability” seems to be a similar usage of the term “disability”.