Re Grimsley v Telstra Corporation Ltd

Case [2010] AATA 106


Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2010] AATA 106

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)          No 2009/4999

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re JUDITH GRIMSLEY

Applicant

And

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Deputy President P E Hack SC

Date12 February 2010  

PlaceBrisbane

Decision The application is dismissed.

.............Signed.................

Deputy President

CATCHWORDS

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – entitlement to compensation – causal relation between injury and incapacity or death – application concerning causation constitutes mere relitigation of consent decision – consent decision to affirm was correct decision – application dismissed

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – estoppel – former adjudication of matters of record – effect of an earlier consent decision

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 33

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 14

Morales v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 82 FCR 374

Re Quinn and Australian Postal Corporation (1992) 15 AAR 519

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87; (2006) 151 FCR 253

REASONS FOR DECISION

12 February 2010   Deputy President P E Hack SC    
  1. Ms Judith Grimsley was employed by Telstra. In February 2004 she injured her right knee during the course of her employment. She made a claim for compensation. On 25 March 2004, Telstra (by its insurers) accepted liability pursuant to s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the SRC Act) for a “right knee injury” but also determined that Telstra ceased to be liable to pay compensation on and from that date on the basis that no further treatment was required and that Ms Grimsley had made a good recovery from the injury.

  2. That decision was the subject of an application to the Tribunal[1]. On 21 November 2005 the Tribunal made a decision, by consent, by which Telstra was liable to pay compensation under ss 16 and 19 of the SRC Act for the condition “right knee injury and an aggravation of left knee injury” sustained on 13 February 2004.

    [1]    Q2004/727.

  3. Next, on 8 June 2006, on the basis of medical evidence then available to it, Telstra determined that Ms Grimsley had “ceased to suffer from the effects of the

    compensable injury” and that there was no liability to pay compensation for medical treatment or incapacity for work under ss 16 or 19 of the SRC Act. That decision was affirmed on reconsideration on 24 August 2006. Ms Grimsley sought a review of the decision in the Tribunal in proceedings Q2006/685. On 21 July 2009, in the course of a hearing of a great number of applications concerning various ailments and injuries, all proceedings between Ms Grimsley and Telstra were settled on terms reduced to writing and signed by, or on behalf of, the parties. On that day I made a decision pursuant to s 42C(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) affirming the decision under review in application Q2006/685.

  4. On 30 August 2009 Ms Grimsley wrote to Telstra’s insurer making what was treated by the insurer as…

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AGLC
Re Grimsley v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] AATA 106
Case
[2010] AATA 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Re Grimsley v Telstra Corporation Ltd involved a dispute concerning the entitlement of a worker, Grimsley, to workers' compensation from Telstra Corporation Ltd. Grimsley sought to challenge a previous decision regarding the causation of his injury and the subsequent entitlement to compensation. The matter was heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which had to determine whether the application for review constituted a mere relitigation of a prior consent decision.

The legal issues before the tribunal were whether the application for review was an attempt to re-litigate a decision that had already been agreed upon by the parties, and if so, whether such an application was permissible. The AAT had to consider the principles of estoppel and the effect of a prior consent decision on the current application. The tribunal also needed to assess whether the application raised new matters or simply sought to challenge the correctness of the prior consent decision.

The AAT found that the application was essentially an attempt to re-litigate the issue of causation, which had already been agreed upon in a prior consent decision. The tribunal held that such an application amounted to a mere relitigation of the earlier decision and was not permissible. The AAT referred to precedents such as Morales v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford, which underscored that a consent decision affirmed by the tribunal was binding and could not be challenged in a subsequent application. The tribunal concluded that the application did not raise new matters or evidence but merely sought to challenge the correctness of the prior decision, which was not allowed under the relevant legislative provisions.

The tribunal dismissed the application, affirming that the consent decision to affirm the causation of Grimsley's injury and his entitlement to compensation was the correct decision. The tribunal further held that allowing the application would amount to re-litigating a matter that had already been conclusively determined, which was not within the scope of permissible review. Therefore, the application was dismissed, and the earlier consent decision stood affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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