[2014] AATA 21
Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION File Number(s)
2013/3374
Re
Virginia Austin
APPLICANT
And
Commonwealth Bank of Australia
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Senior Member J Toohey
Date 20 January 2014 Place Sydney (i)The application for an order under s 42B is refused.
(ii)The matter is to be listed for a directions hearing at the earliest time suitable to the parties.
.......................................................................
Senior Member J Toohey
CATCHWORDS – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COMPENSATION – whether application for compensation valid – whether application for review frivolous or vexatious – whether discontinued application should be reinstated – application to dismiss as vexatious or frivolous refused
Legislation
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1999 ss 5A, 54 (2)(b), 54(5), 65(4)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 2A, 25, 29(7), 33(1)(a), 42(1B), 42A(10), 42B(1)(a), 42C,
Cases
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Minister of Home Affairs and Environment [1984] FCA 176
Rana and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2008] AATA 558
Re Asset Risk Management Ltd (1995) 59 FCR 254; 130 ALR 605 at 607
Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 173
Grimsley and Telstra Corporation [2010] AATA 106
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125Re Coa and Australian Postal Corporation [1999] AATA 995
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member J Toohey
Background
In January 2009 and August 2009, the applicant lodged claims under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1999 (the SRC Act) for physical and psychological injuries.
The respondent accepted liability under s 14 of the SRC Act for the applicant’s physical injury. In October 2009, the respondent denied liability for the psychological injury. It seems accepted that the applicant suffers a psychological condition to which her employment contributed, but the respondent says it did not contribute to a significant degree and, in any event, relying on s 5A(1), that it was not an injury within the meaning of the Act.
On 6 November 2009, the respondent wrote to the applicant advising that available evidence indicated it had no present liability to compensate her for incapacity and medical treatment in relation to her physical injury beyond 7 November 2009. The respondent advised that it proposed to make a formal decision regarding liability after 14 days, and invited the applicant to submit any relevant information before then.
The applicant asked for additional time in which to submit material concerning the claim for physical injury, and an extension of time to respond to the denial of liability for the psychological injury.
Over the course of the following months, the applicant sought, and was granted, further extensions of time to respond until, on 7 May 2010, the respondent declined a further extension of time to obtain medical material in relation to the physical injury. The respondent’s letter purported to be a reviewable decision and the applicant regarded it as such.
It appears, from an email from the respondent to the applicant on 4 August 2010, that on or around that date, the applicant…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Austin and Commonwealth Bank of Australia and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] AATA 21
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain Ms Austin's application for review. A secondary issue was whether the application was frivolous or vexatious, which the respondent argued on the basis that Ms Austin had not provided further material to support her claims. The court also needed to determine whether the application should be allowed to proceed, and if so, how quickly it should be heard.
In addressing these issues, the court found that the Tribunal did indeed have jurisdiction to hear the application for review. The court was not persuaded that the application was frivolous or vexatious, rejecting the respondent's contention on this point. The court considered it preferable to allow the review to proceed promptly, despite the respondent's assertion that it needed time to have Ms Austin examined by its doctors. The court scheduled a directions hearing to facilitate the expeditious progression of the case.
The final orders made by the court were that the respondent's application for an order under section 42B was refused, and that a directions hearing would be convened to allow the parties to program the review process as quickly as possible. The court emphasized that the matter should proceed with due haste, subject only to the reasonable time needed for the respondent to arrange medical examinations.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It appears, from an email from the respondent to the applicant on 4 August 2010, that on or around that date, the applicant inquired about the progress of reconsideration of her psychological claim. It is not clear what gave her to understand that reconsideration was on foot. In reply, the respondent advised that it was not required to make a formal reconsideration as she had not submitted further material in the extended time granted to her, and the rejection of her claim was maintained. The applicant treated this as a failure to complete the reconsideration and so a reviewable decision.Application for review of determination to refuse an extension of time in which to seek reconsideration On 22 October 2010, the applicant lodged with the Tribunal applications for an extension of time in which to seek review of the decisions on 7 May 2010 and 4 August 2010. In effect, she sought an extension of time in which to seek review of a decision refusing an extension of time in which to seek reconsideration of the original determinations. The respondent opposed the extensions. On 28 January 2011, the applications for extensions of time came before Senior Member Britton. After argument about whether extensions should be granted, the applicant discontinued her applications and the Tribunal dismissed them accordingly under s 42(1B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act). How that came about is discussed below. Nothing further happened until 22 August 2012, when the applicant’s solicitors wrote to the respondent enclosing a claim form for injuries described as “muscoluligamentous strain to the cervical spine; aggravation of pre-existing degenerative cervical spondylosis; rotator cuff strain to the right shoulder; subsequent development of adhesive capsulitis to the right shoulder; chronic depression and anxiety resulting from a major depressive disorder”. The descriptions of the applicant’s injuries were broadly similar, although different in detail, to those in her original claims. The letter accompanying the claim form made no reference to the earlier claims or applications. On 6 September 2012, the respondent wrote to the applicant’s solicitors to say it was confused by the claim which appeared to be for the same injuries as claimed in the 2009, determinations in respect of which had previously been made. The respondent suggested the more appropriate way to proceed, if the applicant wished to pursue her claim, was to seek an extension of time from the Tribunal in which to file an application for review of the reviewable decisions already made. The respondent asked how the injuries presently claimed were different from those in the prior claims and why they required separate s 14 determination. The respondent also cited numerous unanswered questions on the claim form and said that, in the event that separate determinations were needed, a properly completed claim was required. By letter dated 15 November 2012, the applicant’s solicitors advised “The injuries pleaded are different, so is the time period during which it is alleged that the injuries occurred.” It is not clear what this statement meant except that the period referred to in the later claim extended some months after the earlier claim. The applicant’s solicitors further stated that she was not stopped from further action and they regarded the respondent’s letter of 6 September 2012 as being a determination of which it sought reconsideration. They provided some further particulars of the claim.